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This study is the child of a gestation period that stretches back into
the late 1980s, when I encountered the bizarre phenomenon of Nazi
euthanasia for the first time as an exchange student at Göttingen
University. Ernst Klee’s Euthanasie im NS-Staat was my guide through
the apocalyptic landscape of Nazi violence against the mentally handi-
capped. After a five-year career as an attorney, I returned to this
grim subject out of a conviction of its importance for all of us today,
dedicating my doctoral studies to its representation in postwar trials.
Many people have been involved in one way or another with the
project, both within the United States and abroad. I would like to
thank my wife, Patty, for her support throughout the research and
writing of this study. She provided not only encouragement and as-
tute readings of the manuscript, but bore up under periods of separa-
tion that lasted for several months as I conducted research in foreign
archives. Thanks go also to my mother, Elizabeth Bryant, who pro-
vided invaluable childcare for our infant son, Reed, that enabled me
to finish the manuscript.
A special debt of gratitude is owed to my adviser, Dr. Alan
Beyerchen, for his thoughtful comments on my chapters, as well as
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 But I’ll tell you here . . . it is the nature of villainy to absent
itself, even as it stands before you. You reach for it and close
on nothing. You smash your hand on the mirror. Who is this
looking back at you? Perhaps you’re aware by now of the
elusiveness of my villains. This is a story of invisible men, dead
men or men indeterminately alive . . . of men hidden, barri-
caded, in their own created realm. . . . You have not seen
them, except in the shadows, or heard them speak, except in
the voices of others. . . . They’ve been hiding in my language
. . . powerful, absent men.




We can only speculate about the thoughts that raced through the
head of Dr. Alfred Leu in December 1953 as he awaited the verdict
of the Cologne state court (Landgericht) presiding over his criminal
case. Leu was charged with the murders of hundreds of adults and
seventy children in 1941 during his tenure as a physician at the
Sachsenberg mental hospital near Schwerin, Germany. The state’s
evidence against Leu was impressively incriminating. Numerous eye-
witnesses had stepped forward to attest to their observation of mur-
ders committed in Leu’s wards through lethal injections of veronal
and luminal. Others testified about Leu’s admission during the war
that he was a confirmed advocate of euthananizing the mentally ill.
His connections with the Berlin office entrusted with the mass kill-
ing of handicapped patients were well documented.
Whatever anxiety Leu experienced as the court prepared to an-
nounce its verdict could only have been accentuated by the recent
history of West German prosecution of physicians for their partici-
pation in killing the mentally ill. Leu was assuredly aware of the
1946 case of Dr. Hilde Wernicke, convicted of murder by the Berlin
state court for her role in passing on the names of selected patients
LAW AND POWER
INTRODUCTION
I N T R O D U C T I O N2
to her nurses for extermination. Wernicke was executed for her crimes. Other
euthanasia personnel in the late 1940s were, like Wernicke, convicted of mur-
der and sentenced to death or lifelong prison terms. To make matters worse for
Leu’s equanimity, these earlier physicians were convicted even though they
had not directly administered the coup de grace to their patients. By contrast,
Leu had not only transmitted patient lists to his nurses for killing but had
himself personally participated in the murders. Although the Constitution of
the Federal Republic of Germany had abolished capital punishment in 1949,
Leu faced the possibility of life in prison if convicted.
Leu’s fears proved to be unfounded. The Cologne state court acquitted Leu
of all charges on the ground that he had participated in the destruction of
patients only to oppose it from within. His choice to follow his conscience
rather than the law of homicide justified his actions, even if it did involve him
in killing handicapped children who, in the court’s words, were “completely
below the zero line.” With this legal benediction, Dr. Alfred Leu, the proven
killer of patients at the Sachsenberg mental hospital, left the Cologne court-
house a free man.
How did German courts travel the light-year from convicting euthanasia
doctors of murder to not only acquitting them, but celebrating their conscien-
tious devotion to the healing craft? How can we account for so prodigious a
change in judicial interpretations of murderous violence against the mentally
handicapped during the war? Were West German courts merely applying the
law in a neutral manner to the facts before them, or were they bending the law
and finessing evidence in order to achieve a result that served an agenda rather
than the ideals of substantive justice? To what degree were the extralegal forces
that may have conditioned the outcomes of German euthanasia trials also at
work in the U.S. prosecutions of euthanasia criminality? What kinds of gen-
eral conclusions may be drawn from a comparative juxtaposition of the two
groups of national trials immediately after the war? These important questions
are the focus of this study.
The central argument is that, despite the sincere desires of many policy-
makers, jurists, and politicians to punish the crimes of euthanasia criminality,
the matrix of power relationships in the immediate postwar era played havoc
with the prosecution of euthanasia killers. For both Americans and West Ger-
mans,* concerns about preserving or recuperating sovereign power consistently
bedeviled the neutral quest for justice. On the U.S. side, the tendency to view
Nazi euthanasia (and genocide more generally) as the excrescence of Germany’s
* Although the Federal Republic of Germany was not formally established until
1949, I will refer throughout this book to that portion of the country under U.S.,
British, and French occupation prior to 1949 as “West Germany.”
I N T R O D U C T I O N 3
war of aggression, a view originating in U.S. insistence that to prosecute crimes
unrelated to waging aggressive war might detract from U.S. sovereignty, skewed
the Americans’ construction of euthanasia as early as 1945. Preoccupation
with its own sovereignty inclined the United States to relate all forms of
National Socialist criminality—including euthanasia—to Hitler’s grand plan
to subjugate the peoples of Europe. In the process, individual degrees of par-
ticipation in the destruction of the mentally ill were dissolved in an overarching
conspiracy that equated the smallest participant with the greatest on a theory
of joint and several criminal liability. The effect was not only to obscure the
origins of Nazi euthanasia by over-identifying it with military conquest but, in
some cases, to invert the usual presumption of innocence in U.S. criminal
trials.
The West Germans, too, were concerned with national power in the im-
mediate postwar years. For them, however, the issue was not to preserve sover-
eign power, but to regain it after the unconditional surrender to the Allies in
1945 and the military occupation of their country. Growing disenchantment
with denazification, a restive impatience with continued prosecution of ac-
cused war criminals, and mounting demands for a general amnesty for the
perpetrators of Nazi crimes and for their reintegration into German society
sapped the will of the West Germans to prosecute and punish euthanasia per-
sonnel. Particularly in the late 1940s, these extralegal forces increasingly af-
fected the kind and quality of justice dispensed in West German euthanasia
trials. The effect, as in the case of the Americans, was to reverse conventional
burden of proof standards: where German criminal procedure tended to pre-
sume guilt with formal indictment, German courts in the waning years of the
1940s assumed the innocence of euthanasia defendants, despite voluminous
evidence against them. The impact on the progress and outcome of euthanasia
trials of this drive to preserve or recover sovereign power is the focus of this
study.

The word euthanasia, the Greek roots of which translate as “good death,” may
be interpreted on at least two separate levels. On the first, euthanasia is the
election by morally autonomous beings to end their lives in the face of excru-
ciatingly painful and terminal illness. Recent manifestations of euthanasia in
Western culture, such as the controversial practices of Dr. Jack Kevorkian and
the adoption of a voluntary euthanasia law in the Netherlands, belong to this
first level. Because deference to the choice of the individual underlies it, eu-
thanasia of the first level may be called the “libertarian” theory of euthanasia.
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On the second level, euthanasia emerges as a means to eliminate “useless” or
“valueless” life from society for racial, economic, or aesthetic motives. Because
its animating force is the alleged welfare of the collective over and above that
of the individual, we may call this second level “eugenic” euthanasia.
Eugenic euthanasia is the extreme possibility of the pseudoscience of eu-
genics, an international sociopolitical movement between the late nineteenth
century and 1945. Coined by its founder, Francis Galton, the term eugenics
derives from the Greek, meaning “well born.” In both theory and practice
eugenics movements can be diverse, but they have in common the aim to
improve the genetic timbre of the individual members of a social order through
government intervention. The hardnosed variant of eugenics tended to op-
pose the role of environment in heredity, stressing instead the brute facticity
of genetic fitness. Accordingly, it was pessimistic about improving human po-
tential through social means, and thus tended to be politically conservative.
The hardnosed eugenic approach favored a “negative” eugenics that sought to
prevent genetic inferiors from reproducing by forbidding them to marry, im-
posing birth control on them, sterilizing them, or, in the most extreme case,
killing them. In Great Britain and the United States, eugenics initiatives
never went beyond sterilization. The eugenicists of the Third Reich, however,
ran the gamut from forced sterilization to the centrally planned destruction of
human beings branded as worthless by the Nazi regime.
Clearly, accomplices were needed at all levels of the German mental health-
care system to bring the killing program to fruition. The plan to eliminate
human beings considered strange and disturbing beckoned to one of the most
nazified professions in Germany—German medicine. As compared with other
professional groups, doctors were overrepresented in the Nazi Party: in 1933,
33 percent of German doctors were party members, constituting just under 25
percent of Nazi academic professionals, or one-fifteenth of the social elite
within the Nazi Party. By 1937 (a year when the membership rolls of the Nazi
Party were open to all Germans over the age of seventeen), almost 44 percent
were party members, or one-third of Nazi academic professionals and one-
tenth of the Nazi social elite. These figures far exceed statistics from other
German professions: neither lawyers nor teachers with party membership ever
rose above 25 percent, and other civil servants lagged considerably behind
doctors. Significant percentages of physicians also belonged to the ideological
bastions of Nazism, the SA (26 percent between 1935–1945) and the SS (9
percent between 1933–1939, and possibly more from 1939–1945). Again, we
can better appreciate these figures when compared with other professions, such
as teachers (among whom only 0.4 percent were SS members). As Canadian
historian Michael Kater points out, 1.3 percent of all SS men were doctors by
1937—a figure indicating that physicians were overrepresented in the SS by a
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factor of seven relative to their percentage within the population. Kater fur-
ther notes that only lawyers, with a ratio of twenty-five to one, were more
overrepresented in the SS than doctors.1
Of the 90,000 doctors practicing in Germany during the era of the Third
Reich, how many were involved in the crimes of the Nazi regime? In a lecture
delivered at the Fifty-first German Doctors’ Day in 1948, Fred Mielke, at the time
a German medical student, estimated that between 300 and 400 doctors were
implicated in Nazi criminality. Alexander Mitscherlich, Mielke’s co-author in
one of the first studies of medical crimes under Hitler,2 subsequently revised
this estimate, stating that Mielke’s figure represented only the direct perpetra-
tors who committed crimes with their own hands. Standing behind these doctors
was an elaborate bureaucratic structure that had facilitated their wrongdoing.
When we consider the vast program of institutionalized destruction, ranging from
euthanasia killing facilities, transit centers, federal and local health ministries,
research institutions, and the concentration/death camp system, Mitscherlich’s
more capacious approach seems closer to the mark.3
After the war, the Allies were faced with the task of sorting out personal
responsibility for Nazi crimes and prosecuting the offenders in formal proceed-
ings. In addition to the International Military Tribunal (IMT) conducted by
the Big Four (the United States, Great Britain, France, and the USSR) and
trials held by military commissions and military government courts, numerous
national trials prosecuted Germans involved in Nazi criminality, including
euthanasia killings. In twelve separate trials between 1946–1949, U.S. au-
thorities indicted and tried 184 representatives of Nazi organizations deemed
criminal by the IMT. Of these, 142 were convicted; sentences varied from
eighteen months to death. Among the most important of the U.S. trials was
the Medical Case held in Nuremberg between October 1946 and August 1947.
It involved twenty-three defendants (primarily physicians) charged with hei-
nous concentration camp experiments on human subjects and the mass killing
of mental patients pursuant to the government’s euthanasia program. Only
four of the twenty-three defendants were charged with euthanasia killings:
Karl Brandt, Viktor Brack, Waldemar Hoven, and Kurt Blome. All save Blome
were convicted and executed.
As the IMT and national trials were moving forward, the Germans pros-
ecuted their own Nazi criminals. The lion’s share of investigations and trials of
Nazi crimes took place in the five-year period following the end of the war. By
late 1950 West German courts had convicted 5,228 Nazi defendants (roughly
81 percent of Nazi crimes successfully prosecuted from 1945–1992). If we ex-
amine the West German trials by category, we find that they embraced six
distinct categories of crime: (1) political denunciations; (2) deportations of Jews
and Gypsies; (3) euthanasia; (4) “last phase” killings; (5) killings of prisoners
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of war, concentration camp prisoners, eastern (European) workers (Ostarbeiter),
and Jews; and (6) a miscellaneous category of homicide. Among these six cat-
egories, euthanasia cases amounted to just under 13 percent of Nazi crimes
tried between 1945–1950 (37 out of 288 cases). Beginning in 1951, the num-
bers of convictions plummeted. In 1950 West German courts convicted 809
Nazi defendants, but that figure fell to 259 in 1951 and a paltry 21 by 1955.4
How can we account for the dramatic decline in Nazi criminal prosecu-
tion? The most immediate (if superficial) explanation for the decline is the
web of legal limitations that inhibited prosecution in the postwar years. First,
the structure of German criminal investigation in the postwar years impeded
efficient location and prosecution of Nazi war criminals. German state pros-
ecutors were required by law to investigate a crime only if it was committed
within their jurisdiction or the perpetrator either resided or was arrested within
it. Because the crimes of the Final Solution had been committed on foreign
soil, they had no geographic link to West German jurisdiction, nor could the
bare possibility that a perpetrator might reside within the prosecutor’s juris-
diction create a prima facie reason for investigation. In theory, a prosecutor
could know of the existence of a mass shooting in the Soviet Union by Ger-
mans, and even the identity of the killers, yet still be legally hamstrung from
setting an inquiry in motion. The absence in Germany of a federal investiga-
tive body like the U.S. FBI contributed to the judiciary’s paralysis.*
Second, the Allied Control Council (the occupational government formed
by the Allies as a successor to the defunct Nazi state) deprived the German
judiciary, at least technically, of jurisdiction over any crimes perpetrated by
Germans on foreign nationals. This ban was rescinded in August 1951, but
until that time it was a stumbling block to efforts by German prosecutors in
the crucial five years after the war to investigate, arrest, and prosecute the
suspected murderers of foreign Jews and others.
* The absence of a federal authority capable of coordinating nationwide investiga-
tions of Nazi war crimes suspects was to a degree alleviated by the establishment in
December 1958 of the Central Office of the State Justice Administrations for the
Clarification of National Socialist Crimes in Ludwigsburg. The office was charged
with investigating Nazi war crimes, collecting records about them, and ascertaining
the whereabouts of suspected perpetrators. Although the office was vested with no
indictment authority, it forwarded its evidence to state prosecutors who could issue
indictments based on the documentation. See Adalbert Rückerl, The Investigation
of Nazi Crimes 1945–1978: A Documentation (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1980),
49; Erwin Schüle, “Die Zentrale der Landesjustizverwaltungen zur Aufklärung
nationalsozialistischer Gewaltverbrechen in Ludwigsburg,” Juristenzeitung, 1962,
241.
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Third, efforts to prosecute Nazi offenders sometimes ran afoul of the stat-
ute of limitations, which barred prosecution of certain offenses after a speci-
fied period of time had elapsed. In May 1950 the first statute of limitations
expired, immunizing from prosecution all offenses of a relatively minor crimi-
nal nature (i.e., crimes punishable with a sentence of up to five years). In
1954 an amnesty law decreed by the Bundestag immunized a second category
of offense—manslaughter punishable with a prison sentence up to three years.
The following year, the statute expired for all crimes subject to a maximum
jail term of ten years. Five years later, offenses punishable with fifteen years or
less (i.e., manslaughter, infliction of grievous bodily harm, deprivation of lib-
erty resulting in death, and robbery) were beyond the reach of the judicial
authorities. Thus, by 1960 only perpetrators of murder were susceptible to
prosecution.5
The structure of West German criminal investigation, restrictions im-
posed by the Allied Control Council on German jurisdiction over Nazi crimes,
and the statute of limitations are systemic factors that obstructed a thorough
judicial accounting of National Socialist crimes by West German courts. They
do not, however, fully explain the plunge in indictments after 1950, nor do
they address the psychological, political, demographic, and cultural forces afoot
in German postwar society that inhibited an open confrontation with Nazi
criminality. Scholars have cited several explanations to account for the re-
fusal, characteristic of broad segments of the population in the immediate
postwar period, to look Germany’s “brown” past fully in the face. First, reports
on the IMT proceedings indiscriminately blended the defendants’ military,
political, and genocidal offenses, thereby effacing the differences between po-
litical or military crimes and the racially inspired crimes of the Third Reich.
The result was to plant the idea in the minds of many Germans that the
regime’s murderous treatment of Jews, Soviet POWs, Gypsies, and the men-
tally ill were the unfortunate but common byproducts of total war. Political or
war crimes were a recognizable species of offense, committed by both the vic-
tors and the vanquished in the heat of battle. On this view, the Nazis’ crimes
were acts carried out in the course of service to the Fatherland; in no sense
could they be identified with the asocial depravity of “real” criminals.6 From
this set of dubious premises, some drew the conclusion that Allied trials of
“war criminals” were little more than Siegerjustiz (victor’s justice), punishing
German defendants for crimes the Allies had also perpetrated.
Furthermore, many Germans regarded the Allied trials as violations of a
traditional cornerstone of German criminal jurisprudence, the Roman law
maxim nullum crimen sine lege (no crime may be charged without a preexisting
law that defines it). Because neither the London Charter (the legal basis of the
IMT) nor Control Council Law #10 (the legal basis for the subsequent trials
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and for German prosecution of Nazi defendants until September 1951) was in
existence prior to 1945, some argued that the categories of offense spelled out
by them were ex post facto laws. (German courts were not persuaded by this
argument; they indicted, tried, and convicted defendants in the postwar years
for infringing the German law of murder or for committing crimes against
humanity in violation of Control Council Law #10—the latter often justified
on natural law grounds.)
No effort to explore the West Germans’ unfavorable attitudes toward Nazi
war crimes trials after 1948 should overlook the perceived failures of the U.S.
denazification program. Germans living in the U.S. zone were obliged in the
immediate postwar years to complete a questionnaire on their prior political
and social engagements. These forms were reviewed by denazification courts,
which classified the subjects of the questionnaires into one of five categories:
exonerated, follower only, lesser offender, offender, and major offender. The
denazification bodies could impose penalties based upon this classification,
ranging from fines to confinement in a labor camp for no more than ten years.
They could also ban an individual from his profession for a period of time.
Mere membership in certain Nazi organizations (like the SS or the SD) cre-
ated a prima facie case against the subject of the questionnaire; once this
affiliation was proven, the burden shifted to the subject to rebut the presump-
tion of guilt.
Aiming to scour German society of the Nazi taint, the U.S. denazification
program achieved notable successes. Sometimes, however, its implementa-
tion was farcical, as major criminals neglected to mention on the forms their
involvement in mass killings in the east, thus escaping with trivial sentences,
while easily documented but minor party memberships occasioned draconian
punishment. The spectacle of mass murderers receiving “detergent certifi-
cates” (Persilscheine), cleansing them of egregious wrongdoing, discredited the
process in the eyes of many. The bad odor surrounding the denazification
proceedings may have clung by association to Allied and German trials of
Nazi defendants, viewed by the public as an extension of denazification under
a different name.7
Deep psychological and cultural forces also contributed to the German
public’s unwillingness to confront Nazi crimes. In their study The Inability to
Mourn,8 psychologists Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich argued that postwar
Germans suffered from an incapacity to “work through” the traumas of the era
of the Third Reich, a process Sigmund Freud had called Trauerarbeit, or “the
work of mourning.” The vast amplitude of National Socialist criminality pre-
cluded the German people from coming to terms with a past that was still
cancerously alive. The alternative—openly confronting the Nazis’ crimes, in
which so many Germans at all levels of society and vocation were implicated—
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risked plunging the German people into a society-wide psychosis that would
have jeopardized all efforts at postwar reconstruction and renewal.
A more recent account by Aleida Assmann likewise traces the failures of
German confrontation with Nazi mass murder in the postwar era to psycho-
cultural factors. Drawing on the anthropological distinction between “shame”
and “guilt” cultures, she contends that Germany immediately after the war,
like militaristic societies in general, was a shame culture that enforced the
conformity of its members by exposing them to “the gaze” of formal and infor-
mal social control. A guilt culture, by contrast, expiated individual guilt through
public confession, acknowledgment of responsibility, and internal conversion.
In such a culture, guilt properly confessed and accepted became a “resource of
individuation” for both the individual perpetrator and for society collectively.
This process obviously includes criminal trials as a means of uncovering of-
fenses, restoring order to the society discomposed by them, and facilitating the
“conversion” of the perpetrator through punishment. Where, however, crimi-
nal guilt was repressed because of the shame evoked by it, particularly in a
culture transitioning from a shame to a guilt paradigm (like postwar Germany),
the willingness to acknowledge past criminality and recognition of the need to
punish it with the devices of the criminal law are blocked. Although Germans
would eventually shrug off their shame culture and confront the crimes of
National Socialism after 1958, its paralyzing effects prior to that time induced
a “massive defense against memory” among the German population. One casu-
alty of this repression was continued judicial engagement with the trials of
Nazi offenders.9
The cumulative effect of these circumstances was to engender strong op-
position to continued prosecution and punishment of Nazi defendants begin-
ning in the late 1940s. Although most Germans supported the trial of the
major war criminals by the IMT in 1946 (insofar as it buttressed the mistaken
but fervid German belief in the “exclusive guilt” [Exklusivschuld] of Hitler and
his top-echelon henchmen for the regime’s crimes), an equal number disap-
proved of the trials of German elites after the IMT had concluded. Fueled by
the movement into western zones of millions of displaced Germans from the
east, political opposition quickly arose against a sustained war crimes trial
program. Obscure far-right parties formed, demanding an end to denazification
and to prosecution of Nazi war crimes defendants. Leaders in both Catholic
and Protestant churches like Bishop Wurm and the director of the chancellery
of the German Protestant Church Hans Asmussen pressed Allied officials to
end war crimes prosecutions. In 1949 a group of German jurists was estab-
lished, composed of among others the foremost defense attorneys from the
Nuremberg trials. Called the Heidelberg Circle, the group set about to achieve
a final liquidation of the war crimes trials by influencing politicians and public
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alike. The ability of these and other critics to mold and channel the negative
attitudes of West Germans toward war crimes trials was considerable: in 1946
70 percent of West German respondents approved of prosecuting the major
war criminals, but by the end of the decade a comparable percentage disap-
proved of continued trials.10
Politicians like Konrad Adenauer were, of course, keenly aware of the
topography of West German sentiment regarding further prosecution. As pre-
vious scholars have convincingly demonstrated, Adenauer pursued a “policy
toward the past” that consisted of amnesty for many Nazi war criminals (the
Christmas amnesty law of 1949 and a second amnesty law passed in 1954),
their reintegration into German society through the Article 131 law (which
required the civil service to allocate a prescribed percentage of jobs for former
members of the Nazi government), and a process of what Norbert Frei has
termed “normative demarcation,” that is, affirming the democratic, pro-Western
character of the Federal Republic by contrasting it with its alleged opposites—
unreconstructed Nazis and Communists. The trifecta of amnesty, reintegra-
tion, and normative demarcation achieved simultaneous goals: it preempted
the appeal of ultra far-right political parties, won adherents to the new Ger-
man state, and placated the Western allies. The victory of Adenauer and the
CDU in the 1953 elections was a sign of popular assent to this policy. Adenauer’s
accomplishments, however, could only be paid for in the coin of forgetting and
repression—an attitude of willed amnesia that retarded the progress of war
crimes trials.11
Adenauer’s “policy toward the past” was thus cunningly designed to serve
both domestic and foreign objectives. At home, it subverted nationalist poli-
ticians, stabilized the fledgling democracy, and won votes for the CDU. Abroad,
it conveyed the image to the United States and its allies of a rehabilitated
Germany, democratic, capitalist, confident, and, most important, securely in
the Western camp. The late 1940s witnessed the rise of the Cold War as Eu-
rope fissioned into two armed camps. As political tensions between the East-
ern bloc and Western allies threatened to turn into a shooting war, the Allies’
need for West Germany as a bulwark against Communism in central Europe
became poignant. A remarkable seachange had occurred in the space of a few
years: the Soviets had displaced the Nazis as the clear and present danger to
Western security interests. Adenauer was acutely aware of Germany’s impor-
tance in the geopolitical chess match between the two superpowers. Only
months after the outbreak of the Korean War—a time when hostility between
east and west was at its peak—Adenauer sought to exploit this opportunity to
recover German sovereignty from the Allies via the quashing of war crimes
trials. He dispatched a memorandum to the Allied High Commission, de-
manding that the occupation statute be revised to enhance German sover-
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eignty. If no revision (read: repeal) was made, he warned ominously that Ger-
mans might be unwilling to “sacrifice” themselves for freedom, and plans for a
European defense community to protect the West from Soviet invasion would
be stillborn. Frank Stern summarizes Adenauer’s strategy and the degree to
which it encapsulated the feelings of West Germans in 1950:
Sovereignty via integration into the West and rearmament, which
included rehabilitation of the Wehrmacht, were essential aspects of the
developing national consciousness and key points of official government
policy. In concrete terms, this ultimately meant negotiations: on canceling
the debt of the German Reich, repealing of the Statute of Occupation and
creation of a European defense community.
In short, the price Adenauer demanded for a German contribution to fighting
the Soviets was recuperated national power achieved, at least in part, by dis-
continuing Nazi war crimes trials.12
A salient component of Adenauer’s policy toward the past was the reinte-
gration of former Nazis into the German civil service, including the judiciary.
As denazification petered out, onetime Nazi judges and prosecutors, many of
whom had served on the infamous “special courts” (Sondergerichte) and “People’s
Court” (Volksgerichtshof), returned to their positions in the German legal sys-
tem during the Adenauer era. In the British zone of occupation, by the late
1940s between 80 and 90 percent of state court judges were former Nazi Party
members. By 1949, 81 percent of all judges and prosecutors in Bavaria had
belonged to the party—a percentage, asserts Nazi war crimes trial expert Willi
Dressen, that corresponds to the proportion of Nazi jurists in the judiciary
prior to 1945.13 For such individuals, Adenauer’s program of amnesty and inte-
gration nourished by an atmosphere of collective forgetting must have been
especially attractive.
The present study limns a portrait of U.S. and West German euthanasia
trials against this background of a society yearning for an end to constant
evocations of Nazi atrocity, particularly as embodied in continued war crimes
trials. Rather than reenact what other scholars have already done,14 in this
book I undertake close readings of transcripts and verdicts generated in the
trials of euthanasia defendants. Accordingly, with the exception of periodic
references to the context of the trials, this study does not focus specifically on
the socioeconomic, political, and cultural forces that shaped the prosecution
of Nazi defendants. Instead, through close textual readings of actual trial tran-
scripts and verdicts, I seek to chart how social, geopolitical, and cultural forces
shaped the actual verdicts of the trials. The focus is on the texts of the trials,
in which are registered the skewing influence of extrajuridical forces in West
Germany in the crucial eight-year period following the war. The extraordinary
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impact of contextual (or non-legal) factors on the trials of the Nazi euthanasia
doctors will emerge as a palimpsest underlying the trial documents. Our ex-
amination of the court records will reveal that the influence of these non-legal
factors was determinative of the verdicts. In locating the judgments squarely
within their historical context, the study suggests that considerations of na-
tional sovereignty were an intrinsic and predestinating force in the postwar
trials of the euthanasia doctors, a force so irresistible and pervasive as to alter
the legal burdens of proof in both the U.S. and German cases.
Of course, tracing decisively the arcs of causality between a force and its
effect (or, in this book, between an alleged bias and a final verdict) is impos-
sible in historical investigation; too many causes interact in shifting permuta-
tions that directly or indirectly impinge on the ultimate result. E. H. Carr’s
hypothetical about the length of Cleopatra’s nose and the founding of the
principate is a facetious but telling illustration of this point.15 To develop a
narrower account of the progress of euthanasia trials after the war, the enor-
mous range of potential causes would have to be ranked lexically: primary
status assigned to some, secondary to others. In the final analysis, any such
ranking of causes as they pertain to Nazi war crimes trials must by necessity be
artificial. Did the structure of German criminal investigative agencies after
the war contribute more to the decline of these trials than the unpopularity of
the denazification program? Did the pain felt by Germans when reflecting on
their collective guilt for the multitudinous criminality of the Nazi government
have greater weight than the active lobbying efforts of far-right nationalist
parties to draw a Schlußstrich to further trials? Did the checkered pasts of West
German judges outweigh Adenauer’s policy toward the past as factors in the
movement toward leniency, acquittal, and amnesty, and were these factors
more important than the geopolitics of the Cold War?
To ascribe priority to any one of these factors over the others would amount
to an arbitrary valuation, because all of them affected the trend toward an
abatement of Nazi war crimes trials, yet to none can be assigned a numerical
value that would justify its super- or subordination to the others. In this re-
spect, a Foucauldian methodology of looking for contingencies rather than
causes in historical change is more appropriate. On this approach, the phe-
nomenon to be explained—the subsidence of euthanasia trials into leniency
and acquittal—was a result of a complex set of interrelated causes. The phe-
nomenon, in other words, was contingent on political, institutional, cultural,
demographic, and international developments in the postwar era. Subtract
any one or more of them—say, the lack of an integrated criminal investigation
system or the outbreak of the Cold War—and the result may have been con-
siderably different. It is hard to imagine, for example, that Alfred Leu would
have been acquitted if the Allies were less intent on establishing West Ger-
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many as a partner in the defense of Western Europe against Soviet attack and
more concerned with punishing former executioners of the Nazi regime at
large in the Federal Republic. Similarly, the existence of a federal criminal
investigation agency might have alerted prosecutors’ offices to the presence
within their jurisdiction of Nazi war criminals, thus facilitating their arrest
and prosecution. The point is that all of these factors played a role in under-
mining the spirit of Nuremberg; in their absence, the outcome may not have
ensued and, if it did, may not have taken the form in which we currently
understand it.
I would suggest that a Foucauldian emphasis on historical contingencies
does not preclude generalizations about causality in history. This study seeks
to knit together into a general concept many diverse causes underlying the
decline of euthanasia prosecution: that is, the desire for national power. With-
out reference to the quest for sovereign power, neither the U.S. conspiracy
approach to Nazi euthanasia nor Adenauer’s quid pro quo of German support
for a European Defense Community in exchange for ending war crimes trials is
explicable. The Americans’ desire for a democratic, armed, and anti-Soviet
Germany opened the door to the German longing for restored sovereignty. If
in fact the eclipse of justice in the cases of Nazi murderers is overdetermined
in this account, that fact proves the complexity and multi-causality of postwar
efforts to prosecute the offenders. A tidier explanation may convey an appear-
ance of greater mastery, but it would do so at the price of imposing an artificial
simplicity on a densely tangled historical situation.16
The first trial group we will analyze relates to the prosecution of euthana-
sia personnel by the United States between 1945 and 1947. The U.S. eutha-
nasia trials are composed of two separate proceedings: the prosecution by military
commission of the medical staff at the Hadamar killing center in Hesse-Nassau
(where both foreign nationals and mentally ill Germans were killed) and the
Medical Case (Case #1) against some of the high-ranking designers and
implementers of the euthanasia program, tried before the U.S. National Mili-
tary Tribunal at Nuremberg. The U.S. euthanasia trials were premised on
violations of international law. In the Hadamar case, the defendants were
charged with violating the Laws of Armed Conflict, a body of customs and
rules set forth in various treaties, international agreements, and decisions of
international and domestic courts and designed to temper the brutality with
which modern war is waged. Offenses proscribed by the Laws of Armed Con-
flict are generally called war crimes. In the 1946 Medical Case, on the other
hand, the four defendants indicted for their roles in the Nazi euthanasia pro-
gram were charged with committing “crimes against humanity,” a species of
offense related to war crimes but conceptually distinct from them. Whereas
war crimes were derived from the treaties, accords, and court opinions that
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made up the Laws of Armed Conflict, crimes against humanity were not de-
fined in an international instrument until the London Charter (August 1945)
that became the basis for the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.
Article 6(c) of the charter defined crimes against humanity for the first time
in international legal history. They consisted of “murder, extermination, en-
slavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts” against a civilian popula-
tion, as well as “political, racial, or religious” persecution “whether or not in
violation of domestic law of the country where perpetrated.” Although the
U.S. prosecution teams at the IMT and the National Military Tribunal (NMT)
often treated war crimes and crimes against humanity synonymously, they
were—and continue to be—separate and distinct crimes under international
law.17
By contrast, the West German euthanasia trials were for the most part
based upon alleged violations of the German law of homicide (sections 211
and 212 of the German Penal Code). Until August 31, 1951, the Germans
could charge euthanasia defendants with committing either a crime against
humanity as defined under the IMT Charter (and incorporated into Control
Council Law #10) or a homicide under their own penal code.* Beginning in
September 1951, Control Council Law #10 became null and void, and Nazi
defendants could only be charged by West German courts with infringing
German law. Until that time German prosecutors sometimes charged defen-
dants with both offenses, but the prevailing practice was to indict them for
violating domestic law. The Germans’ aversion to ex post facto prosecution
may explain their preference for trying their accused under their own laws of
homicide.
The time frame of this study is the critical eight-year period following the
end of the war, when all of the U.S. and most of the German trials were
conducted. Chapter 1 provides the reader with the historical prelude to the
trials. It sketches the history of the idea of “life unworthy of life” with refer-
ence to what we might justly call the crucible of eugenic euthanasia—the
German experience of World War I and the traumas of the early 1920s. In this
chapter I suggest that the fusion of eugenics with racial hygiene in Germany
became a potent cocktail for many Germans in the Weimar years. I recount
* German courts in the west could charge defendants with crimes against humanity
under Control Council Law #10 only in the British and French zones of occupation.
The United States never formally authorized the German courts in its zone to try
cases under the auspices of Law #10. See Brief an die Herren Dienstvorstände der
Gerichte und Staatsanwaltschaften betr. Strafverfahren nach Kontrollratgesetz Nr.
10, Bad. Ministerium der Justiz, 6 December 1951, Staatsarchiv Freiburg, Bestand F
178/1, Nr. 1112.
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how voices advocating negative eugenic solutions to the problem of “worth-
less” life, relegated to the fringe in the prewar years, had moved to the center
by the 1930s. Further, Chapter 1 explores the evolution of euthanasia killing
from 1933 to 1941 as a prelude to the expanded killing projects of the Third
Reich by late 1941 and early 1942. Finally, the chapter takes up the question
of the “radicalization” of Nazi mass killing as it spread from the disabled to
Soviet POWs, the European Jews, and other groups in the summer and fall of
1941.
The remaining chapters excavate from the U.S. and West German trial
records interpretations of the motives behind the mass killing of the disabled.
Chapter 2 shows that U.S. prosecutors and judges regarded euthanasia as an
auxiliary to the Nazis’ efforts to wage aggressive war against their European
neighbors. The U.S. conspiracy theory was driven by a predisposition to inter-
pret Nazi crimes in terms of the regime’s ambitions to conquer by military
force the peoples of Europe. Without this link to the conduct of the war, U.S.
policymakers feared the euthanasia program would be deemed a domestic pro-
gram. In their eyes, interfering in the purely domestic policies of a sovereign
state might set a dangerous precedent in international law. Consistent with
their war-connected theory of euthanasia, U.S. authorities portrayed the kill-
ing of the mentally ill as a war measure to strengthen the German army by
enriching it with booty (chiefly medical supplies and hospital space) plundered
from “useless eaters.” Because all the euthanasia defendants belonged to the
same “conspiracy” to attack other European countries, it mattered little how
large or small a function they discharged; they were equally liable for all acts
carried out on behalf of the conspiracy.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 contrast the U.S. approach with that of the Ger-
mans, who generally depicted their defendants as accomplices (Gehilfe) rather
than perpetrators (Täter), a distinction that in German law hinges upon the
degree of a defendant’s self-interest in the crime. Portraying Nazi physicians,
nurses, and health service bureaucrats as accomplices driven less by ideology
than characterological shortcomings, German courts virtually assured lenient
treatment of their defendants. The trend toward leniency and acquittal began
in the late 1940s and grew in intensity as political and psychological factors
(the Cold War, the mounting resentment by the German population of trials
viewed as Victor’s Justice, and other extralegal factors) increasingly affected
the adjudication process.
A subsidiary but intriguing theme is taken up in Chapter 3: U.S. and
West German conceptions of their jurisdiction over these crimes. The U.S.
authorities premised their jurisdiction over euthanasia defendants on the tra-
ditional laws of armed conflict, including the Geneva and Hague conventions.
Because Nazi euthanasia, on the U.S. view, was designed to promote the German
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war effort, it was legally and conceptually related to war crimes codified in
international documents. By asserting a nexus between war crimes and crimes
against humanity (as the euthanasia crimes were charged), the Americans could
argue they were not meddling in the Nazis’ internal state affairs but prosecut-
ing matters recognized as breaches of international law by the world commu-
nity. For U.S. authorities, concerns about ex post facto prosecution were less
significant than upholding the principle of sovereignty, under which no coun-
try was permitted to intervene in the domestic affairs of another state.
The Germans, by contrast, were deeply concerned about the ex post facto
question, not least because the ban on retroactive prosecution was fundamen-
tal to the continental legal tradition. They faced a vexing dilemma: how could
they hold defendants accountable for crimes that were not regarded as illegal
at the time they were committed? In both U.S. and West German trial records,
the issue is repeatedly raised of the defendants’ awareness of illegality at the
time they participated in euthanasia crimes. The U.S. authorities were gener-
ally unfazed by this issue, inferring from their defendants’ purposive conduct
on behalf of the euthanasia program the requisite intent to commit the of-
fense. The Germans initially countered the problem of lack of consciousness
of illegality with resort to natural law: all sane human beings were able to
perceive the injustice of a course of action in the light of the “law of nature.”
By the early 1950s, however, natural law as a liability-producing device was on
the wane as courts began to express doubts about their defendants’ awareness
of wrongdoing.
Now that I have acquainted the reader with my argument and method, I
would like to say what this book is not about. It is not a polemic against human
rights trials nor a critique of those who advocate an enlarged international
jurisdiction over notorious war criminals. Despite the case presented here that
considerations of national power often beset the process of adjudication, it is
my firm belief that the effort to hold international criminals liable for their
atrocious assaults on humanity should and must be pursued. If the present
study proves anything of value to the war crimes question in contemporary
debate, it is that the wisest course yet devised for dealing with war criminals is
the International Criminal Court (ICC), created by the Rome Statute in 1998.
Arguably, a permanent body representing a broad cross section of the world’s
nations will be less susceptible to forces of politics, power, and international
contingency that have plagued ad hoc tribunals since 1945. Insofar as we as-
pire to do justice at the international level, the ICC is our best hope. This
book is merely a caveat for the champions of prosecuting war crimes offenders;
like the retainer who whispered in the ear of the Roman conqueror that all
glory is fleeting, it reminds us that all human justice is limited. The striving is
still worth the endeavor.
I N T R O D U C T I O N 17
LAW VS. HISTORY
It might be objected that the purpose of a criminal trial is not to present a
historically truthful account of the episode at its center; hence, it is pointless
to find fault with the historical inaccuracies and distortions of a criminal pro-
ceeding like the U.S. Doctors’ Trial. Whatever the merits of this criticism as it
pertains to conventional criminal trials, it fails to understand one of the pri-
mary motives behind the Nuremberg proceedings: to preserve the history of
Nazi criminality for the education of future generations. In his Report to the
President of June 6, 1945, Robert Jackson affirmed that the “groundwork” of
the Allied case against the major war criminals had to be
factually authentic and constitute a well-documented history of what we
are convinced was a grand, concerted pattern to incite and commit the
barbarities which have shocked the world. . . . Unless we write the record
of this movement with clarity and precision, we cannot blame the future if
in days of peace it finds incredible the accusatory generalities uttered
during the war. We must establish incredible events by credible evidence.18
The Nuremberg trials, including the subsequent proceedings, were different
from conventional criminal trials: in the minds of leading policymakers like
Jackson, they were to serve an educative purpose for future generations by
memorializing a history that might in palmier days seem beyond belief. Jack-
son and his colleagues were not oblivious to the historical significance of their
work; on the contrary, in Jackson’s own words, their aim was to use the trials
as a stylus to write a “factually authentic . . . well-documented history” for the
benefit of posterity.
Given the extraordinary nature of Nazi criminality, and in view of the trial
planners’ own conception of their purpose in holding the trials, it is hardly amiss
to hold the U.S. judiciary’s conception of Nazi crimes up to critical scrutiny.
Much of the analysis in Chapter 2 will subject U.S. constructions of Nazi eutha-
nasia to historical cross-examination—particularly the overarching theory that
euthanasia was driven by the voracious resource demands of aggressive warfare.
A NOTE ON SOURCES
Like all works of history, this one employs primary and secondary sources to
document the judicial encounter with Nazi euthanasia killing. These include
the German court opinions collected in the 34-volume series, Justiz und NS-
Verbrechen (The Judiciary and Nazi Crimes).19 For the U.S. trials I have relied on
trial transcripts, exhibits, and interrogation protocols located in the World
War Two Records Division at the National Archives in College Park, Mary-
land. I have also drawn on essays about the euthanasia cases, German law, and
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related judicial themes written by German jurists in the immediate postwar
period, published in diverse German legal periodicals.20 Some of the primary
source documents cited in this study are taken from two compendia, Ernst
Klee’s Dokumente zur “Euthanasie” and Michael Marrus’s The Nuremberg War
Crimes Trial, 1945–46.21 Finally, my study makes liberal use of secondary sources
by European and U.S. scholars. The reader will note my debt to Henry Fried-
lander and Ernst Klee in Chapter 1.22 The structure of Chapters 3–5 on the
German euthanasia trials was influenced to a considerable degree by Dick de
Mildt’s pioneering study on postwar Nazi trials by West German courts.23
The time period that brackets this study is roughly 1945–1953. (Reference
is made to some euthanasia trials after 1953, but only to illuminate issues
raised during the eight-year period after the war.) My reasons for focusing on
this period are twofold. First, it was a formative time in the crystallization of
West German judicial attitudes toward euthanasia criminality. Many of the
primary legal theories and historical perceptions of Nazi euthanasia coalesced
during this period. Second, a narrower focus enabled more sustained analysis
of the leading cases in the euthanasia trials. A third reason could also be cited:
the post-1953 cases did not affect my conclusions about the German euthana-
sia trials in the immediate postwar period. On these grounds, I felt justified in
restricting my study to its current time frame.
One further point should be made concerning trial records. The reader
will note that the U.S. proceedings are recorded in verbatim transcripts, a
format unknown in German trials (although used in pre-trial interrogations of
the accused). U.S. law does not require a detailed written verdict by the court
“of first instance” (i.e., the court that first hears the case), in part because a
verbatim transcript of the proceedings exists, and in part because the role of
the judge in a criminal case is restricted to that of umpire because it is the jury
that typically determines guilt or innocence. Appeals of guilty verdicts are
reviewed by a court of appeals with reference to this trial transcript. German
trials, by contrast, are dominated by the persons of the judges and lay assessors
(Schwurgericht) working in tandem. Verbatim transcripts and jurors are alien to
German criminal proceedings. Chiefly as a result of the judge’s enhanced role
as both investigator and trier of fact, a detailed written justification of the
verdict by the court is required, setting forth the background of the case,
findings of fact, applicable law, viability of defenses, verdict, factors in extenu-
ation or aggravation, and sentence.24 Although the verdict of the U.S. tribu-
nal in the Doctors’ Case contains some explanatory material, it is remarkably
brief in comparison with the German decisions. Thus my discussion of the
U.S. Medical Case in Chapter 2 is based on the transcript of the proceeding
(nearly 11,000 pages), while my treatment of the German euthanasia trials in
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 relate to the courts’ sometimes elaborate written opinions.
In this chapter we examine at some length the Nazis’ murderous
assault on the mentally handicapped. Because the postwar prosecu-
tions of euthanasia defendants heavily depend on the factual con-
text of that assault, a clear understanding of the trials requires some
familiarity with the history of the euthanasia program. The German
government’s war on the disabled progressed from discriminatory
legislation requiring involuntary sterilization of “worthless” people
to their planned destruction as the war began. In this chapter I
analyze the organizational structure of the killing process, inasmuch
as the bureaucratic configuration of the euthanasia program largely
shaped how Nazi mass murder developed between 1939 and 1945.
After examining the roots of Nazi euthanasia in the interwar
period, I focus on “phase one” of the euthanasia program, in which
“incurable” patients were gassed in one of six killing facilities. Phase
one ended in August 1941 on Hitler’s orders, apparently as a result
of growing popular protest against the euthanasia program. The al-
leged stop, however, did not terminate the killing program. A sec-
ond phase of the euthanasia program promptly ensued, characterized
by “wild euthanasia”—the centrally planned but locally administered
Russians consider feebleminded people holy. Despite that, kill-
ing necessary.
—EXTRACT FROM THE DIARY OF
GENERAL FRANZ HALDER, 26 SEPTEMBER 19411
Let the lamp affix its beam. The only emperor is the emperor of
ice-cream.
—WALLACE STEVENS, “THE EMPEROR OF ICE-CREAM” (1923)
If you’ve got criminal tendencies . . . one of the places to make
your mark is law enforcement.
—DON DELILLO, LIBRA
THE EMPEROR OF ICE-CREAM
NATIONALIST SOCIALIST EUTHANASIA, 1933–1945
Chapter 1
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killing of patients by means of fatal overdoses of narcotics. The second part of
the chapter recounts this development in the history of Nazi euthanasia, as
well as its connections with the “Final Solution,” the Nazis’ scheme to make
occupied Europe Judenfrei (free of Jews) through the physical obliteration of
European Jewry.
By fall 1941, what had begun as a program to eliminate “incurable” mental
patients had ballooned into an official policy of state-sponsored murder. The
targeted groups included Soviet POWs, “asocials,” the Sinti and Roma, and
European Jews. Without refined destruction techniques and killers trained in
the euthanasia program, the attack on these other groups, when it came, would
have been substantially different, or perhaps would not have occurred. The
euthanasia program furnished an already murderous government with the skills,
personnel, and materiel for expanded genocide. Equally important, the eutha-
nasia program gave the Nazis a precedent for solving problems through mass
killing. Beginning in late 1941, the “questions” that confronted the Third
Reich—such as the “Gypsy question,” the “Eastern Worker question,” and the
“Jewish question”—were answered through mass murder. The regime’s experi-
ences with euthanasia would make the unthinkable thinkable.
WORLD WAR I, THE WEIMAR YEARS, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE MENTALLY ILL
Scholars of Nazi criminality identify World War I as a major turning point in
the history of the National Socialist assault on “unworthy life.”2 Before 1919,
proposals to use state power to eliminate “undesirables” from a society perceived
to be in the throes of degeneration were on the fringes of public discourse. The
radicalizing effects of World War I, however, pushed these dissident voices
from the fringe toward the center. From 1919 until Hitler came to power in
1933, increasing numbers of Germans—doctors, psychiatrists, health officials,
politicians, policymakers, and university professors—were won over to the
cause of violent solutions to the mental illness problem.
The privations of the German population during World War I (1914–1919)
cast a long and fateful shadow over German attitudes toward the mentally ill
in the interwar period. Without question, the Great War was a demographic
disaster not just for the mentally ill in German institutions—who between
1914 and 1918 suffered a mortality rate of 30 percent because of neglect, hun-
ger, and disease—but for all of Germany, which suffered a loss of 1.9 million
men with another 3.6 million wounded or captured. The British blockade led
to severe food shortages that brought the populace to—and beyond—the brink
of starvation by 1918. Both soldiers and civilians became embittered, and the
source of their anger was food: the rank and file within the navy and army
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resented a system of rationing that gave larger portions to officers, while Ger-
man mothers lashed out at authorities for failing to provide adequate nourish-
ment for their children.3
By 1920, the effects of military defeat, political upheaval, mass death, and
famine had altered the moral landscape within German medicine. The new
decade was ripe for ideas that openly called for the physical sacrifice of the men-
tally ill for the health of German society. In 1920, as Germany reeled from the
double humiliation of military defeat and what was perceived as a Carthaginian
peace treaty, a pamphlet entitled The Permission to Destroy Life Unworthy of Life
was published. An eminent retired jurist from the University of Leipzig, Karl
Binding (1841–1920), and a professor of psychiatry at the University of Freiburg,
Alfred Hoche (1856–1944), were the co-authors of the tract. It was divided
into two sections, one written by Binding, the other by Hoche. Binding started
his section with a defense of the individual’s right over his or her body—an
overarching right that entailed the right to suicide. Although he conceded
society’s interest in preserving valuable members, the right of a terminally ill
patient experiencing intense pain to have a physician end his or her life by
artificial means overrode the social interest. Binding referred to this act of
voluntary euthanasia as an “act of healing.” Although he emphasized that
euthanasia in such a case had to be consensual, the principle of autonomy was
at war with his conception of “valueless” life. He asked: “Is there human life
which has so far forfeited the character of something entitled to enjoy the
protection of the law that its prolongation represents a perpetual loss of value,
both for its bearer and for society as a whole?” The question was of course
rhetorical. By posing it, he had segued from an issue involving a competent
terminally ill patient in excruciating pain to the question of whether society
may destroy individuals whose lives have no value, either for themselves or for
society.4
Binding identified three groups who qualified for his proposed euthanasia
measures: (1) terminally ill patients (including the mortally wounded) who
expressed their wish for a premature death; (2) “incurable idiots,” no matter
whether their idiocy was congenital or acquired; and (3) people who had suf-
fered grievous physical war injuries that rendered them unconscious but who
would desire a foreshortening of their lives if they were able to express their
wishes. These three groups represented a class of individuals Binding called
lebensunwertes Leben (“life unworthy of life”), an ambiguous phrase that cov-
ered persons whose lives had been made unbearable because of physical pain
and persons whom society regarded as so defective by virtue of their mental
impairment that their lives had no value.5
Unlike terminally ill patients, who under Binding and Hoche’s proposals
could freely choose euthanasia to end prolonged suffering, the state could destroy
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A fateful document in the historical prologue to the Nazis’ extermination of the mentally ill
was a pamphlet authored by Karl Binding and Alfred Hoche, The Permission to Destroy
Life Unworthy of Life, published in 1920. An apologia for the planned, systematic killing
of the mentally disabled, the pamphlet would be widely cited by both the T-4 killers and
postwar German courts responsible for adjudicating their crimes. Courtesy U.S. Holocaust
Memorial Museum Collection
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the “inferiors” even if they would otherwise live without pain for years. Bind-
ing conjured visions of battlefields strewn with the flower of German youth,
contrasting their sacrifice with the pointless maintenance of worthless “idi-
ots”: “If one thinks of a battlefield covered with thousands of dead youth . . . and
contrasts this with our institutions for the feebleminded with their solicitude
for their living patients—then one would be deeply shocked by the glaring dis-
junction between the sacrifice of the most valuable possession of humanity on
one side and on the other the greatest care of beings who are not only worth-
less but even manifest negative value.” Binding goes on to describe the “terri-
bly difficult burden” that the “incurably” feebleminded imposed on both their
families and society. Enormous amounts of money and medical personnel were
lavished on them, while the basic needs of the healthy went unmet. In his
section of the tract, Hoche concurred with Binding’s points. He referred to
the mentally retarded and feebleminded as “ballast” that could be jettisoned to
right the ship of state, and echoed Binding’s economistic argument for killing
them: “It is a distressing idea,” he laments, “that entire generations of nurses
shall vegetate next to such empty human shells, many of whom will live to be
seventy years or even older.” Hoche was untroubled by violations of the Hippo-
cratic Oath, which he dismissed as a superannuated document “of ancient
times.” Instead, he asserted the physician’s duty to promote the interests of
the collective, even at the cost of sacrificing the lives of “idiots.”6
Binding ends his contribution with an outline of procedures to govern the
proposed killing program. The patient, the doctor, or the patient’s relatives
could initiate a request for euthanasia, but only the state could authorize it.
Binding provided for a panel of “experts” consisting of a jurist and two doctors
responsible for evaluating each application. Their decision, Binding stipulated,
had to rest on the most current scientific knowledge, the mode of killing had
to be “absolutely painless,” and the person administering the killing had to be
an expert. Errors would doubtlessly occur, but Binding brushed them aside,
because “humanity loses due to error so many members, that one more or less
really does not make a difference.”7
Binding and Hoche’s work ignited a vigorous debate among lawyers, doc-
tors, and theologians in Weimar Germany. A leading critic of their thesis was
Ewald Meltzer, director of the Katharinenhof psychiatric hospital in Saxony.
Meltzer’s is one of the obscure but extraordinary voices in twentieth-century
European history. His scalding retort to the euthanasia school suggests that
proto-Nazi ideas of biological inferiority and mass murder were not entrenched
in Germany prior to 1933. He presciently warned in 1925 of the slippery slope
down which euthanasia could take Germany, and with comparable foresight
pointed out that to assign such power over life and death to the state would
invest it with tyrannical control over its citizens. Further, he asserted, the
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mentally handicapped slated for killing under the Binding/Hoche proposal
had in fact retained human personalities and were capable of enjoying their
lives.8
Troubled by the controversy over Binding and Hoche’s pamphlet, Meltzer
conducted a survey in 1920 to explore parental attitudes toward the euthana-
sia of their incurable mentally ill children. The central question of the survey
read: “Would you agree to the painless curtailment of the life of your child if
experts had established that it was suffering from incurable idiocy?”9 Meltzer
was astonished when, of the 162 parents who responded, 119 (73 percent)
answered in the affirmative. These parents sought relief from the burden of a
severely handicapped child, but they wished to be disburdened without their
knowledge. Some even desired that the physicians “deceive” them by identify-
ing false causes of death. Postwar doctors facing prosecution for their involve-
ment in the National Socialist euthanasia program would later invoke the
Meltzer survey to justify the cloak of secrecy and deceit thrown around the
killing program.
Parental support for destroying “unworthy” life to the contrary, the Ger-
man medical profession opposed it during the Weimar Republic. A change in
attitudes toward the mentally ill, however, gradually crept over the German
medical community in the 1920s. Perhaps the most momentous contribution
to this change was a shift of the doctor’s duty from the individual patient to
the “body of the people.” Late nineteenth-century eugenics had always subor-
dinated the individual to the wellbeing of the collective, conceived as state,
society, nation, or in Germany as das Volk. The prewar German eugenics move-
ment, unlike its decentralized counterparts in the United States and Great
Britain, was concentrated in a single group, the German Society for Race
Hygiene. The society shared with U.S. and British eugenicists a belief in con-
genital “superiority” and “inferiority,” setting for itself the aim of preserving
Germany’s “genetic heritage” from biological degeneracy. Prior to World War
I, German eugenicists had de-emphasized the negative implications of their
beliefs (i.e., sterilization of the unfit), realizing that little support existed for it
in the population, and focused instead on promoting the nation’s health by
raising the birthrate of “superior” individuals. The privations of Germany’s
military collapse, however, radicalized German eugenics. Among physicians,
the locus of care shifted from the individual to the community. Because Ger-
man eugenicists tended to be physicians and academic psychiatrists working in
state hospitals and university clinics, this meant that caregivers directly re-
sponsible for the mentally handicapped were abandoning the Hippocratic ethic
of devotion to their patients’ wellbeing. As early as 1915 Alfred Hoche, re-
flecting an attitude that would win increasing support in the 1920s and 1930s,
proclaimed the end of individualism and the beginning of a new order in
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which the nation emerged as an organism with rights ascendant to those of
the individual.10
The Germans did not have a monopoly on eugenic ideas of social im-
provement. The founders of eugenic thought—Thomas Huxley, Francis Galton,
Herbert Spencer, and Karl Pearson—were British. Influenced by their thought,
U.S. eugenicists like Charles Davenport and H. H. Goddard embraced a he-
reditarian view of social characteristics, constructing hierarchies that ranked
individuals, groups, races, and nations in terms of their biological value. Yet,
despite the presence of eugenic policy and practice in other Western countries,
only in Germany did state-organized mass killing of the mentally handicapped
come into being. As mentioned previously, one of the primary reasons for
Germany’s singularity was the brutalizing effects of World War I, which wrought
a change in the German medical profession’s attitude toward “life unworthy of
life,” causing ever larger numbers of doctors, psychiatrists, and health officials
to embrace radical approaches to treating the mentally ill. Organic views of
society as a biological organism in need of medical care gradually supplanted
the Hippocratic devotion of the doctor to the individual patient. A tendency
to problematize the care and treatment of “worthless life” manifested itself; in
addressing this “problem,” mainstream voices in the German medical and pub-
lic health fields increasingly called for violent “solutions” by the state in the
form of forced sterilization or outright killing of patients. A position advo-
cated only by fringe elements prior to the war had become a part of main-
stream public policy discourse by the 1920s.
THE NAZIS IN POWER: STERILIZATION AND
THE BEGINNING OF “EUTHANASIA,” 1933–1939
The most obvious and important reason why Germany became the cradle of
medical mass murder is politics. A political party sympathetic to the most
radical views of German eugenicists, the National Socialist German Workers
Party (NSDAP), came to power in January 1933. The rise of the Nazis was at
once the victory of the most radical far-right political movement in Germany
and the defeat of those moderates who in earlier decades had consistently
opposed eugenic and racial-hygienic proposals. By the time Hitler came to
power, these voices of criticism had been silenced, effectively relegated to the
fringe.
Although numerous German political parties endorsed, in varying degree,
the idea of eugenic sterilization, none was as fervent in its support as the Nazi
Party. In 1931 Hitler identified sterilization as “the most humane act for man-
kind,” urging his listeners to overcome their misplaced pity and misgivings
about it. His call for a sweeping program to sterilize a substantial number of
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the German population received plaudits from eugenicists like Fritz Lenz and
Ernst Rüdin, who lauded Hitler for being the only politician to introduce “the
importance of eugenics . . . to all intelligent Germans.”11 Prior to 1933, how-
ever, involuntary eugenic sterilization was an act of criminal assault under
German law. With political power came the opportunity and means to change
the status quo. Hitler published a sterilization law on July 26, 1933, that would
become effective on January 1, 1934. It was modeled on an earlier Prussian
proposal from 1932, with the critical difference that the Nazi variant did not
require the consent of the affected individual. The law made it legally permis-
sible to sterilize any person suffering from the following illnesses: “(1) con-
genital feeblemindedness; (2) schizophrenia; (3) manic-depressive psychosis;
(4) hereditary epilepsy; (5) Huntington’s chorea; (6) hereditary blindness; (7)
hereditary deafness; (8) severe hereditary physical deformity; or (9) severe al-
coholism on a discretionary basis.” It went on to establish a legal procedure for
sterilization. The mentally handicapped patients themselves, public health
service doctors, and directors of hospitals, nursing homes, and prisons were all
competent to apply for sterilization under the new guidelines. Hereditary health
courts would receive and evaluate all applications. Each court was attached to
a local court of general jurisdiction (Amtsgericht), and consisted of three mem-
bers: an Amtsrichter, or judge; a doctor from the public health service; and a
physician specializing in genetics. A system to handle cases on appeal was built
into the regional appellate courts (Oberlandesgerichte); a similar triad of one
judge and two doctors constituted these courts of appeal, the decisions of which
were final and nonappealable.12
A positive finding by the courts in a given case permitted local health
authorities throughout Germany to sterilize the person, whether or not con-
sent was given. With the passage of the law, nonconsensual sterilization ceased
to be a criminal assault and battery; in fact, now physicians and public health
officials could invoke the police power to enforce compliance. In the years
following the law’s passage, these local and state doctors and administrators
had tens of thousands of German men and women involuntarily sterilized. In
1934 the majority (52.9 percent) were the “feeble-minded,” followed by those
diagnosed with schizophrenia (25.4 percent) and epilepsy (14 percent). The
criteria for a presumptive case of feeblemindedness were lying, argumentative-
ness, laziness, and receptiveness to influence. The overarching issue, however,
was the question of the person’s value to the Volk: if a case could be made for
the person’s social usefulness, sterilization might be stayed; if not, then the
decision was made to proceed.13 The inflationary potential for including ever-
greater numbers of people in this largest of the sterilization categories is clear
and prefigures the expansive direction the euthanasia program would take in
coming years, as it swept up into its net mentally ill children, then mentally ill
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adults, and later Jews, Gypsies, shell-shocked residents of bombed-out cities,
and “asocials.”
The wave of legislation between 1933 and 1936, of which the sterilization
law was a part, identified categories of “unworthy life” that would become the
targets of National Socialist killing policy between 1939 and 1945. The Law
for the Prevention of Offspring with Hereditary Diseases, published in July
1933, was followed by another four months later, the Law Against Dangerous
Habitual Criminals and Regulation of Security and Reform (enacted on No-
vember 11, 1933). Section 42 of this law provided that Asozialen (asocials)
could be detained in mental institutions if they were deemed by the courts to
have committed their crimes in a state of diminished responsibility. It also
permitted authorities to detain recidivists in public workhouses and detoxifi-
cation centers and required castration for sexual offenders. Finally, the law
forbade offenders from working in their professions.14
For both habitual criminals and the mentally ill, the basis of their “worth-
lessness” was considered genetic and unalterable. (In the Commentary to the
sterilization law, the authors declared that “there can be no doubt that the
predisposition for crime is also hereditary.”15) For decades eugenicists and ra-
cial hygienists had associated mental disability with criminal activity. The
Nazis’ detention law made this alleged connection explicit by establishing a
legal basis for imprisoning the “asocials” in mental hospitals. During the war,
as we will see, many of these individuals were caught up in the euthanasia
program or deported to concentration camps for extermination through work.
At his trial in front of the American NMT in 1947, Karl Brandt, Hitler’s
escort physician and later a leading euthanasia operative, testified that some-
time in 1935 Hitler had informed Reich Health Leader Gerhard Wagner of his
intention to implement euthanasia of the mentally disabled once war had
begun. According to Brandt, Hitler believed the opposition to euthanasia from
church circles would be less pronounced during war than in peacetime.16 De-
spite voices demonstrably sympathetic to euthanasia within both the Catholic
and Protestant churches, the National Socialists remained apprehensive in
the late 1930s of ecclesiastical attitudes toward a formal euthanasia program.
Albert Hartl, an ex-priest and from 1935 the Chief of Church Information for
the government’s security service, testified before a German court in 1970 that
Reinhard Heydrich (later head of the Reich Security Main Office, to which
Hitler entrusted execution of the Final Solution) instructed him in 1938 to
report to Viktor Brack of the Führer’s personal chancellery (Kanzlei des Führers,
or KdF). Brack would inform him of a top-secret matter, concerning which he
would receive further orders. When Hartl met with Brack, the latter related
that a considerable number of petitions had arrived at the KdF requesting
that “incurable patients be granted a mercy death.” Brack stated, however,
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that Hitler had expressed reservations about euthanasia because of possible
opposition from the Catholic and Protestant churches. As a trained theolo-
gian, Hartl was in an ideal position to evaluate the attitudes of the churches
toward euthanasia. Accordingly he was commissioned to prepare a report on
the subject.17
Hartl allegedly expressed to Brack his qualms about preparing such a study,
because he did not feel competent to do so. Instead, he contacted moral theo-
logian Dr. Josef Mayer, the author of the 1927 Legal Sterilization of the Mentally
Ill. Mayer had already declared his openness to the possibility of eugenic steril-
ization; for this reason, Hartl believed he would be qualified to address the
question of the Church’s attitude toward it. Hartl met with Mayer in early
1939 and offered him the job of preparing a memorandum on the subject.
Mayer accepted, and six months later Hartl received five copies of the com-
pleted 100-page memorandum. In his judicial testimony, Hartl recalled that
Mayer’s study was “neither 100 percent in favor of nor against euthanasia.”
Mayer’s equivocal conclusion was based on the history of debate about the
destruction of “unworthy life”: because authorities for centuries had marshaled
sound arguments pro and con, euthanasia was a “defensible” act. Copies of
Mayer’s study were forwarded to Viktor Brack in the KdF, who approached
Hitler with Mayer’s findings. In a subsequent meeting, Brack told Hartl that,
in view of Mayer’s opinion that the Church would not strenuously condemn
euthanasia, Hitler had overcome his own reservations about it. The green
light had been given, and the euthanasia program could now begin.18
CHILDREN’S EUTHANASIA, 1938–1941: THE KNAUER CASE AND THE
BEGINNING OF THE CHILDREN’S OPERATION
According to Albert Hartl, the decision to proceed with killing mentally ill
patients was made sometime during summer 1939, probably in July. As early as
1938, however, the Nazi government had participated in the destruction of
mentally handicapped children. In that year, a severely handicapped child from
a family called Knauer was admitted to the Children’s Clinic at Leipzig Uni-
versity. The child’s father requested that the director, Werner Catel, euthanize
the child, an entreaty that Catel declined on legal grounds. The father then
applied directly to Hitler through his private chancellery for permission to kill
the child. Hitler was intrigued by the case and sent his escort physician, Karl
Brandt, to see the child to determine whether he was as severely handicapped
as the family claimed in their petition. Brandt traveled to Leipzig, confirmed
the doctors’ diagnosis, and authorized them to euthanize the child, which was
done shortly thereafter. Hitler authorized Brandt and the chief of the KdF,
Philipp Bouhler, to take the same actions in all future cases of a similar nature.
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The Knauer case inaugurated the “Children’s Operation,” a program designed
to kill mentally and physically handicapped children.19
As Hartl testified in 1970, the Knauer family’s petition for euthanasia was
only one of a multitude of similar requests for a “mercy death” received by the
KdF. This organization, intimately associated with the person of Adolf Hitler,
was destined to play a central role in the mass murder committed by the Nazis
during the war. The KdF was not a state but a party agency, separate from the
Nazi Party Chancellery located in the Munich party headquarters and from
Hitler’s Presidential Chancellery. It was also independent of the Reich Chan-
cellery under Hans Heinrich Lammers. Hitler had established it as the “Chan-
cellery of the Führer of the Nazi Party” in 1934 to handle correspondence from
party members specifically addressed to him. The aim was to create the impres-
sion of Hitler’s accessibility to the rank and file. Although much of the corre-
spondence that flowed into the chancellery’s offices was trivial, the volume
grew to 250,000 letters by the late 1930s. The request of the Knauer parents
that a mercy death be administered to their child was just a molecule in the
ocean of correspondence that flooded into the chancellery in 1938.20
Adolf Hitler shaking hands with Philipp Bouhler, chief of the Führer’s private chancellery, on
October 1, 1938, one year before Hitler authorized him and Karl Brandt to implement the
destruction of the mentally ill. Courtesy Bundesarchiv Koblenz
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Hitler could have entrusted the children’s euthanasia program to other
offices within the Reich government or the party, such as the Reich Ministry
of the Interior (within the Reich Chancellery), the Party Chancellery, or the
SS. That he chose to give the commission to his own personal chancellery
requires some explanation. Two factors may account for this election. First,
the role of the KdF within the National Socialist system of government virtu-
ally guaranteed its participation in euthanasia when Hitler had finally resolved
to implement it. In 1938 Hitler’s chancellery consisted of five offices. Of the
five, Main Office II, which typically handled “matters affecting the state and
party,” was responsible for dealing with applications to Hitler. The chief of
Main Office II was Viktor Brack, the bureaucrat who had given Hartl his
orders to feel out the Church’s position regarding euthanasia. (We will en-
counter Brack again when we turn to the U.S. “Doctors’ Trial,” for he was a
major figure not only in the Nazis’ murder of the mentally disabled, but in the
unfolding of the Holocaust in 1941 and 1942.) Within Main Office II, Office
IIb (with Dr. Hans Hefelmann as chief) was charged with solving average Ger-
mans’ problems with the state and party governmental organs, and to do so in
an informal manner. The key word here is “informal”: the very inconspicuous-
ness of the KdF in the bureaucratic wilderness of the Nazi state, along with its
intimate ties to Hitler, enabled the organization to fulfill Hitler’s wishes with-
out going through the customary bureaucratic channels. It could, in short, act
directly, discreetly, and without hindrance to accomplish the tasks given it by
the Führer. In view of its very raison d’être, we should not be surprised that
the director of Office IIb, Hans Hefelmann, was placed in charge of the
children’s euthanasia program (although Viktor Brack was Bouhler’s choice as
general head of the killing program).
Second, the chancellery’s closeness to Hitler recommended it as an execu-
tory agency of the euthanasia program. As Henry Friedlander has pointed out,
to have entrusted the program to a government office (e.g., the Reich Ministry
of the Interior) would have expanded the number of officials with knowledge
of it. The larger the circle of people aware of euthanasia killing was, the greater
the chance the public would discover what was happening. Although Hitler
had some basis for believing the German public might accept “mercy killing,”
he still feared popular opposition and unrest. Further, commissioning a state
agency with the program would have required a paper trail of official orders
signed by Hitler—orders that Hitler was loath to put into writing. Similarly,
had he given the task to a prominent Nazi Party office like the SS, the partici-
pation of conspicuous party members in the killing program might have compro-
mised its secrecy. By charging his own chancellery with implementing eutha-
nasia, on the other hand, Hitler could rest assured that a low-profile, compact,
and relatively independent organization devoted exclusively to his own person
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would carry out the killing quietly and with discretion. Thus, the KdF was a
natural vehicle for officially sanctioned but secret mass murder.21
The KdF was the leading organizer and administrator of Nazi euthanasia
(including the children’s operation), but it was not the only government office
involved in the killing process. Department IV (“Public Health Service and
Care of the Volk”) of the Reich Ministry of the Interior became the sole non-
party office to participate in the euthanasia program. Department IV oversaw
the local health administrations of the individual German states (Länder) and
supervised the state mental hospitals. From the earliest years of the Nazi re-
gime, it was no stranger to state violence against the disabled: as part of its
mandate to improve the public health, it had been an enforcer of the
government’s racial and eugenic laws. The chief of Department IV, Dr. Leonardo
Conti, was an erstwhile physician of the “martyred” Horst Wessel and founder
of the Nazi Doctor’s Association in Berlin. Conti was a true apostle of the
National Socialist world view: asked about the Nazi law published in 1938
barring Jewish doctors from treating Aryans, Conti replied, “It is only the
elimination of the Jewish element which provides for the German doctor the
living space due to him.” One level below Conti in Department IV was Dr.
Herbert Linden, who served as a section chief at the rank of ministerial coun-
cillor. As section chief, Linden superintended state hospitals, nursing homes,
and the regime’s marital and sterilization legislation. In addition, he had been
a coauthor with Arthur Gütt on a commentary on the Nuremberg and steril-
ization laws. Thus jurisdictional competence, along with the eugenic interests
of Department IV’s directors, drew the Reich Ministry of the Interior inelucta-
bly into collaboration with the euthanasia program.22
Shortly after the Knauer case had been addressed in 1938, Viktor Brack,
Hans Hefelmann, and Herbert Linden met to discuss the commission that
Hitler had given Brandt and Bouhler. They developed a plan of action, then
expanded the planning group to include pro-euthanasia doctors—Karl Brandt,
Werner Catel, Hans Heinze, Hellmuth Unger, and Ernst Wentzler. The rea-
sons for including these five men are straightforward. Brandt had been in-
volved in the Knauer case and had been given co-responsibility with Bouhler
for euthanasia; Catel had been director of the Leipzig clinic where the Knauer
baby was born. Heinze was a psychiatrist and neurologist in charge of the
Brandenburg-Görden state hospital and had been recommended by Linden
for inclusion in the planning group. Unger, an ophthalmologist, had written
a novel called Mission and Conscience that advocated euthanasia. (The novel
was later adapted as a screenplay for the propaganda film I Accuse, intended to
generate support among the German people for “mercy killing.”) Wentzler
was a Berlin pediatrician recommended by Reich Health Leader Leonardo
Conti.23
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From its earliest stages, the program was shrouded in secrecy, labeled a
“secret Reich matter.” Subsequent initiates into the program, especially at the
field level, were admonished that divulging details of the euthanasia campaign
to unauthorized persons would result in the severest punishment, possibly
even the death penalty. The most striking feature of the Nazis’ dissimulation
was the elaborate structure of camouflage organizations invented to hide the
central role of Hitler’s personal chancellery in the killing. The members of the
group planning the children’s euthanasia realized that an organization so closely
connected to Hitler should not be the direct conveyor of orders to kill handi-
capped children—at least not on the surface. Accordingly, they concocted a
sham organization with an impressively scientific name: the Reich Committee
for the Scientific Registration of Severe Hereditary Ailments. This organiza-
tion, it must be stressed, was purely fictitious; from its origins, its sole purpose
was to mask the involvement of KdF members in systematic murder. In fact,
the nominal heads of the committee were two high-ranking chancellery offi-
cials, Hans Hefelmann, chief of Office IIb of the KdF, and his deputy, Richard
von Hegener. To thicken the fog of secrecy, Hefelmann and von Hegener used
the pseudonym “Dr. Klein” in all committee correspondence relating to eutha-
nasia. This practice of using false names was common among euthanasia officials
and physicians during the war.24
The clandestine nature of the euthanasia program is one of its most arrest-
ing aspects. Why did the architects of euthanasia, from Hitler and his chan-
cellery officials to the physicians and nurses in the killing centers, insist so
strenuously on keeping the program secret? There is no unambiguous answer
to this question. The most cogent theory is that Hitler and his associates
feared public reaction were the program to be disclosed. We know that Hitler
ultimately rejected his subordinates’ pleas for a formal euthanasia law because
of the damaging uses to which it could be put in foreign propaganda. Real or
not, Hitler’s concern for enemy propaganda may reflect the actual ground for
the program’s secrecy: a genuine apprehension that the German people might
not accept the destruction of their mentally disabled relatives and country-
men. If this explanation of the program’s secrecy is true, then it helps illumi-
nate how the Führer conceived of the wrongfulness of killing disabled pa-
tients. Like his agents in the regime’s killing projects, he was aware that the
euthanasia program clashed with traditional German moral and legal culture.
The extraordinary lengths the Nazis resorted to in order to conceal the eutha-
nasia program is a significant index of their realization that the laws and mores
of German society would condemn euthanasia, no matter how much the pub-
lic was indoctrinated with the ideology of “life unworthy of life.”
In addition to creating the bogus Reich Committee for the Scientific Reg-
istration of Severe Hereditary Ailments, the euthanasia planning group faced
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a fundamental logistical problem: how would the killing experts in the KdF
know precisely who qualified for destruction and where were they to be found?
The problem was solved with the introduction of a registration system, on the
basis of which infant patients would be selected for killing. Registration forms
would be sent to mental hospitals, nursing homes, and pediatrics clinics through-
out Germany, where on-site medical staff would fill them out for each of their
patients and return them to the committee. The forms arrived at a post office
box in Berlin; from there, Hefelmann and von Hegener picked them up for
distribution to a group of experts for review.25 Sometime in summer 1939, this
planning phase came to an end. In the meantime, Mayer had delivered his
memorandum on the Church’s conjectured acquiescence to euthanasia, allay-
ing Hitler’s fears of a religious backlash. Meditating on the impending war
against Poland, Hitler may have felt it was time to initiate the killing program
he had mentioned to Gerhard Wagner in 1935. The first systematic killings of
handicapped children would occur in October 1939—scarcely one month after
the war had started.
The Reich Ministry of the Interior stiffened the enforcement arm of the
euthanasia planners on August 18, 1939, with a decree, the “Requirement to
Report Deformed etc. Newborns.” The decree, like virtually everything con-
nected with the killing program, was designated a “secret Reich matter,” a
status that explained why it did not appear in the official ministry gazette. Its
source was Department IV of the Interior Ministry. The decree enjoined all
midwives and physicians to report to the competent local health office new-
borns and children under the age of three “suspected” of suffering from the
following “congenital” illnesses:
(1) idiocy as well as mongolism (especially cases involving blindness and
deafness);
(2) microcephaly;
(3) hydrocephaly of a severe and advanced degree;
(4) deformities of every kind, especially missing limbs, severely defective
closure of the head and the vertebrae, etc.;
(5) paralysis, including Little’s Illness (i.e., spastic diplegia).26
Attached to the decree was a reporting form to be filled out by the health-care
provider. The form required, among other things, name, age, and sex of the
child, description of the illness, impact of the illness on the child’s ability to
function in the hospital, estimated life expectancy, and prognosis for improve-
ment. Once health-care providers had completed and forwarded these reports
to local health officials, the reports were sent to the committee postbox in
Berlin for review by the expert evaluators.
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The preamble to the reporting decree offered no hint of the actual reasons
behind the procedure. Instead, the language of the preamble lent a reassuring
air of scientific legitimacy to it: “In order to clarify scientific questions about
deformed newborns and mental retardation, the earliest possible registration
of appropriate cases is necessary.” Despite the uncanny secretiveness of the
procedure and the curious use of a post office box to receive the completed
forms, the reporting process was broadly accepted as an innocuous request for
governmental data.27
Once the forms arrived in Berlin, Hefelmann and von Hegener of the KdF
collected and sorted them. Although neither man had a medical background,
each selected the forms deemed appropriate for review and passed them on to
three experts in the KdF: Werner Catel, Hans Heinze, and Ernst Wentzler. We
have already encountered this trio in our discussion of the euthanasia plan-
ning group; each was a committed advocate of killing the mentally disabled.
The KdF attached its own form to every copy of the incoming reports. It bore
the letterhead of the fictitious “Reich Committee” and contained little space
for explanatory comments. A cryptic semiotic system determined the life or
death of the child: a plus sign (+) meant that the child was to be destroyed, a
minus sign (–) signified that the child’s life would be spared. Final decision
about uncertain cases was deferred with the word “observation.” In the ab-
sence of carbon copies, the same forms along with the original reports were
sent to each of the three experts for review and notation—meaning that each
expert knew how the others had voted.28
When the experts arrived at a positive finding, the committee wrote to
the local public health office with orders to prepare the selected child for
transport to one of several “children’s wards” established in state mental institu-
tions and clinics throughout Germany. The sole purpose of these children’s wards
was to kill mentally and physically disabled children. The first was erected at
Brandenburg-Görden near Berlin under the direction of the Hitler chancellery
expert Hans Heinze. Subsequently, children’s wards were erected in clinics through-
out the German Reich. There were approximately thirty such wards, staffed with
medical personnel recruited for killing by the KdF. Hefelmann and von Hegener
of the KdF, Office IIb, and Herbert Linden of Department IV of the Reich
Ministry of the Interior did the recruiting. Once a doctor agreed to participate
in the euthanasia program, he or she became an associate of the committee.29
The children’s ward at Brandenburg-Görden was the prototype for those
that followed. Hermann Wesse, indicted by German authorities in 1947 for
his involvement in child murder at the Rhineland mental hospital Waldniel,
was mentored at Brandenburg-Görden before undertaking his killing assign-
ments. Furthermore, the director of the institution, Hans Heinze, and his
students used the occasion of the children’s deaths to conduct medical re-
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search—a practice that would become characteristic of the euthanasia pro-
gram in general (as well as the Holocaust) as it spun outward to embrace men-
tally ill adults.
At Brandenburg-Görden and the other children’s wards, the KdF left it to
their hand-selected physicians to devise efficient means of killing. Their pre-
ferred method was overdoses of medication. At Steinhof in Vienna, mentally
disabled children were given excessive dosages of morphine-scopolamine; at
Eglfing-Haar in Bavaria, they received lethal cocktails of luminal and veronal.
The “medication” usually was administered in tablets or in liquid form to the
children. Occasionally, it was injected directly into them. From the stand-
point of preserving secrecy, there was much to commend these medications as
killing agents. First, they were readily available in German mental hospitals as
sedatives. Second, they were not poisons and became deadly only in overdoses.
Third, they did not immediately kill the child; rather, they typically gave rise
to complications like pneumonia, which then became the “official” cause of
death after two or three days. The physician could then soberly ascribe the
child’s death to a conventional cause, rather than to poisoning. Although the
KdF supplied the children’s wards with sufficient amounts of morphine, veronal,
and other sedatives, the chancellery’s own supplier was Office V of the Reich
Security Main Office, the Criminal Police Office (Kripo). From the time the
children’s wards were established until the end of the war, Kripo was the KdF’s
main provider of medications used to kill both mentally ill children and adults.30
Clearly, this program required that the children identified by the
chancellery’s medical experts for killing be transported to the children’s wards.
The chancellery did not itself arrange the children’s transfer; rather, this was
left to individual state health offices within local ministries of the interior.
Thus, for example, Business Section X of the Württemberg Ministry of the
Interior, which administered mental institutions in both Baden and Württem-
berg, orchestrated the transportation of ninety-three children from Württem-
berg institutions in late 1942 to the children’s ward at Eichberg, where they
were murdered. The order to put the children to death, however, always origi-
nated with the central authorities at the KdF, working through their front
organization, the Reich Committee for the Scientific Registration of Severe
Hereditary Ailments. The killing order arrived as an official document under
the letterhead of the committee, bearing the signature of a chancellery bureau-
crat.31 The language of the order was couched in euphemisms: the word “treat-
ment” (Behandlung) functioned as a code word for killing.
The incomplete historical record makes a death toll for the children’s
action impossible to ascertain with certainty. The Frankfurt prosecutor’s in-
dictment of Werner Heyde, Gerhard Bohne, and Hans Hefelmann in May
1962 estimated a figure of around 5,000.
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A canister of the sedative luminal, used in overdoses by T-4 medical personnel to cause the
deaths of handicapped children during the children’s euthanasia program. Luminal was
sometimes mixed with veronal as a lethal cocktail and administered through injections or in
tablet or liquid form. Courtesy Bayer-Archiv, Leverkusen
THE ADULT EUTHANASIA PROGRAM, PHASE ONE (1939–1941)
Children’s euthanasia was a prologue to the more ambitious and destructive
campaign to kill mentally ill adults. Sometime in July 1939, Hitler commis-
sioned Karl Brandt and Philipp Bouhler to organize adult euthanasia. In col-
laboration with Herbert Linden of the Reich Ministry of the Interior’s Depart-
ment IV, they assembled a circle of ideologically reliable doctors to assist with
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planning and executing the program. The circle included, inter alia, the chaired
professor of neurology and psychiatry, Max de Crinis; the director of the Clinic
for Psychiatry and Neurology of Heidelberg University, Carl Schneider; Pro-
fessor Berthold Kihn of Jena; and Werner Heyde, professor of psychiatry and
neurology at the University of Würzburg. In late July and August 1939, a
series of meetings occurred between these hand-selected individuals in Berlin.
Bouhler explained to the participants that euthanizing mental patients in
German asylums and nursing homes would create necessary hospital space for
the impending war and free up medical staff to care for the wounded. He
further indicated that Hitler had refrained from publishing a euthanasia law
for foreign policy reasons but reassured the attendees that they would be im-
mune from criminal prosecution for their actions in connection with the kill-
ing program. He then invited dissenters to withdraw from involvement if they
so desired. None present opted out.32
After the initial recruitment meeting with Bouhler in summer 1939, the
physicians returned to their institutions and sought out suitable personnel
there for the work of mass killing. The names of these individuals were then
relayed to the KdF in Berlin. In the meantime, having found accomplices for
their murder project, Bouhler and Brack applied their ingenuity to choosing
an appropriate means of killing. Desiring something that was quick, lethal,
and painless, they consulted three prominent pharmacologists, who recom-
mended the substance that would become the murder agent of choice in the
first phase of Nazi euthanasia: carbon monoxide gas. A chemist in the Crimi-
nal Technical Institute (KTI) within the Reich Security Main Office, Dr. Albert
Widmann, confirmed the pharmacologists’ recommendation in a meeting with
Brack. Brack commissioned Widmann and the KTI to obtain canisters of car-
bon monoxide and deliver them to the KdF. Widmann accepted this commis-
sion and thereafter received orders for the poison from the individual killing
centers, which he filled in the name of the KTI at the I. G. Farben factories in
Ludwigshafen. A chancellery official, Dr. August Becker, arranged for picking
up and transporting the carbon monoxide canisters to the killing centers. All
costs incidental to these orders were charged to the KTI.33
Concerns about the legality of the killing program nonetheless persisted.
Under German law (StGB section 211), illicitly killing a human being was a
capital offense in Germany even during the Nazi era. At a meeting convoked
by Hitler sometime in September 1939 to discuss the euthanasia program, the
chief of the Reich Chancellery and Hitler’s closest legal advisor, Hans Heinrich
Lammers, argued that the program should be established on a legal basis. If
Lammers’s testimony under U.S. Army interrogation is to be believed, Hitler
commissioned Lammers with drafting a euthanasia law. The draft was prepared
accordingly, but Hitler subsequently changed his mind on the grounds that an
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official law would “cause too great a sensation.”34 Throughout the duration of
the killing program, many of the health-care providers and public health offi-
cials involved would express their fears of criminal liability without an autho-
rizing statute. Acting on their concerns, the KdF asked Hitler for a written
authorization for euthanasia. He assented, and the chancellery prepared for
his signature an authorizing document, printed on Hitler’s own stationery. He
signed the authorization in October 1939, but backdated it to September 1, 1939,
perhaps in an attempt to convey the symbolic linkage of the war with purifying
the Volkskörper. Because so many postwar German defendants would appeal to
this document as a legal basis for their actions, it merits quotation in full:
Berlin, 1 September 1939
Reich Leader Bouhler and Dr. med. Brandt are charged with the
responsibility of enlarging the competence of certain physicians, desig-
nated by name, so that patients who, on the basis of human judgment, are
considered incurable can be granted mercy death after a critical evalua-
tion of their state of health.
(signed) A. Hitler35
The legal status of this “euthanasia authorization” was hotly debated in the
postwar euthanasia trials, when doctors implicated in the mass killing of dis-
abled patients invoked it as a legal justification for their activities. Never was
the decree accepted by a West German court as a valid law, as we will see in
subsequent chapters.
Although Bouhler was in charge of the adult euthanasia program, he rarely
participated in its daily operations. He chose, rather, to entrust the hands-on
supervision of euthanasia to his deputy, the chief of Section II of the chancel-
lery, Viktor Brack. Brack, whose educational background was not in medicine
but in agriculture (he received a diploma in agriculture from the University of
Munich in 1927), confronted the task of designing a killing program that, like
the fictive Reich Committee in the children’s euthanasia program, would con-
ceal the central role of the KdF. From the beginning, it was understood that
adult euthanasia would surpass in scope the relatively modest children’s opera-
tion. It was therefore clear to Brack and his associates that their current of-
fices on Voss Strasse in Berlin would be inadequate to accommodate the en-
larged staff needed to administer the program. Central Office II of the KdF
thus relocated to a confiscated Jewish house at number 4, Tiergartenstrasse, in
Berlin-Charlottenburg. This address was eponymous for the central killing
administration, which was thereafter referred to as “T-4”; the killing program
itself was called “Operation T-4” (Aktion T-4).36
“T-4” (i.e., the KdF, Main Office II) subsumed numerous offices within its
bureaucratic structure. These offices—particularly the T-4 Medical Office, which
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evaluated registration forms, selected patients for killing, and both appointed
and trained the medical staffs detailed to the killing centers—were the sub-
rosa puppet masters behind a series of front organizations invented by the KdF
to disguise its direction of the program. Whereas in the children’s euthanasia
a single front organization, the Reich Committee, concealed the chancellery’s
involvement, four such entities were established for the adult program: (1) the
Reich Cooperative for State Hospitals and Nursing Homes; (2) the Charitable
Foundation for Institutional Care; (3) the Central Accounting Office for State
Hospitals and Nursing Homes; and (4) the Charitable Foundation for the
Transport of Patients, Inc. The Reich Cooperative for State Hospitals and
Nursing Homes (RAG), a front for the T-4 Medical Office, conducted corre-
spondence with private and governmental parties about the process of register-
ing, evaluating, and selecting adult patients for euthanasia. The Charitable
Foundation for Institutional Care was a front for the T-4 Central Office and
dealt with all matters related to financing the program, including hiring and
compensating employees of T-4. The Central Accounting Office for State
Hospitals and Nursing Homes collected payments for patient care. Its practice
of charging per diem expenses for patients even after they had been liquidated
enabled T-4 to run consistently in the black, using the excess proceeds to
finance its operations. The Charitable Foundation for the Transport of Pa-
tients, Inc., (Gemeinnützige Kranken-Transport G.m.b.H., or Gekrat) camou-
flaged the T-4 Transport Office; it transferred patients selected for euthanasia
to the killing centers. The Reich Cooperative and Gekrat were established in
November 1939; the Charitable Foundation for Institutional Care and the
Central Accounting Office were erected in April 1940, coinciding with the
Main Office II’s move into the Tiergartenstrasse villa.37
As in the Kinderaktion, so with adult euthanasia a decree by the Reich
Ministry of the Interior facilitated the registration process. On September 21,
1939, the Reich Ministry of the Interior issued a decree to state governmental
offices called “The Registration of State Hospitals and Nursing Homes.” It
required that local authorities supply the names of all mental hospitals within
their region to the Reich Ministry by October 15, 1939, in which “mental
patients, epileptics, and the feebleminded” were institutionalized. All institu-
tions, public, private, religious, and charitable, were included, as were old-age
homes. The Ministry of the Interior informed the respondent state authorities
that the information was needed because the ministry wished to send question-
naires directly to such institutions throughout Germany; local governments
were to ensure timely completion and submission of the questionnaires. Once
the lists of institutions had been returned, the Reich Ministry sent the ques-
tionnaires to them, either directly or through the local state offices. The docu-
ments consisted of a single-page questionnaire (called the Meldebogen 2) that
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canvassed data about size, staffing, and patient population of the institution.
More ominously, it inquired about the number of patients with a criminal
background, the number of Jewish patients, and the proximity of the institu-
tion to transportation arteries. In addition to Meldebogen 2, the document
package included a set of one-page reporting forms (Meldebogen 1) to be filled
out by a doctor on individual patients. The form asked for the name, birth
date, nationality, race, period of institutionalization, the names of relatives
and frequency of their visits, the name and address of the guardian and the
payor, and whether the patient had been institutionalized for criminal insan-
ity. Finally, the doctor was invited to offer a diagnosis in a cramped section on
the form and to evaluate the patient’s ability to perform work.38
Attached to these Meldebogen forms was a one-page instruction sheet that
identified the kinds of patients to be registered. These included patients who
had been institutionalized for five years or longer; patients suffering from schizophre-
nia, epilepsy, senile illnesses, therapy-resistant paralysis and other syphilitic dis-
eases, feeblemindedness, encephalitis, Huntington’s disease and other terminal
neurological diseases—so long as these patients were incapable of any work in
the institution other than pure mechanical work (such as weeding); patients
institutionalized for criminal insanity; or patients who were neither German
citizens nor of German or related blood. For patients falling into the last
category, the instruction sheet required the reporting doctors to describe the
citizenship and race of the patient. In a footnote, the sheet provided examples:
“German, or related blood (German-blooded), Jewish, Jewish hybrid (Mischling)
of the first or second degree, Negro, Negro hybrid, Gypsy, Gypsy hybrid, etc.”39
Over the course of the euthanasia program, patients within each of the
categories specified above would be annihilated. The single most important
criterion for selection, however, was capacity for work. Already in September
1939, registration form 1 (Meldebogen 1) and the accompanying instruction
sheet stressed the importance of labor productivity beyond mere “routine” work
as a factor in identifying patients to be reported. The prewar literature on “life
unworthy of life”—especially that strain of it inspired by Binding and Hoche’s
work—had made the utilitarian argument the linchpin of the pro-euthanasia
viewpoint, referring to the mentally disabled as “ballast lives” and “useless
eaters.” In this sense, then, the Nazi assault on the mentally disabled can be
interpreted as the terminus of post–World War I attitudes about the “useless-
ness” and costliness of such patients.
As it did with the children’s program, the KdF established a system of
medical experts to review the incoming registration forms submitted from
German mental hospitals. The system of expert review in the adult example,
however, was more intricate than the children’s program. The Medical Office
of Hitler’s Chancellery, Section II, in its guise as the Reich Cooperative for
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State Hospitals and Nursing Homes (RAG), established a two-tiered structure
of expert review. The first tier consisted of medical experts to whom the regis-
tration forms were first sent for evaluation. Their assessments were then proofed
by a second tier of experts to guard against error. Extant documentation indi-
cates that approximately forty doctors, among them nine professors of medi-
cine, served at one time or another as medical experts for T-4. Of this number,
the overwhelming majority were first-tier experts. As the program unfolded,
only three doctors—Werner Heyde, Paul Nitsche (Heyde’s successor), and
Herbert Linden—would function as second-tier experts.40
When the registration forms arrived at the Reich Ministry, Herbert Lin-
den sent them to the T-4 Medical Office (the RAG), where they were collated
and catalogued. Five photocopies were made of the original forms; one copy
was sent to each of three first-tier medical experts for evaluation. After a
period of time the photocopies were returned to the Medical Office, marked
with one of three characters: a plus sign (+) in red meant that the patient was
to be killed; a minus sign (–) in blue signified that the patient should be
spared; and a question mark indicated a borderline case. A majority of the
three first-level evaluators determined whether a patient lived or died; una-
nimity was not required. Once the three photocopies with their annotations
were collected, they were sent with the original form and the other photocopy
to the second-tier experts, typically Werner Heyde and Paul Nitsche. These
men, in no way bound by the opinions of the first-tier experts, marked the
additional photocopy with either a plus sign (death) or a minus sign (life). The
second tier experts were the ultimate arbiters of life and death for the regis-
tered patients, determining literally with the stroke of a pen who would be
allowed to live and who would be destroyed. If the form bore a plus sign, the
RAG sent it to the T-4 Transport Office, which drafted lists of patients desig-
nated for killing.41
The RAG contacted the institutions that accommodated the selected pa-
tients several days prior to transport. The institutions, called by the T-4 kill-
ing specialists “surrendering institutions” and by the postwar German courts
“original institutions,” were instructed to send all medical records and person-
nel reports along with the patients, as well as all the patients’ personal posses-
sions (such as money and jewelry), which were to be logged on special forms.
Prior to pickup day, Gekrat sent a list to the surrendering institution of pa-
tients to be transported. Perhaps as a result of the doctors’ intentional practice
of underestimating their patients’ capacity for work, perhaps because of the
haste with which the forms were reviewed by the T-4 experts, Gekrat’s lists
often contained the names of patients who did productive work in the institu-
tions. In such cases, institutional directors tried to persuade the Gekrat repre-
sentatives to exempt these patients from transport. Because a sum-certain
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quota of transportees had to be filled, Gekrat typically agreed to exemptions
only if other patients could be substituted. The patients appearing on the final
Gekrat list were picked up in large gray busses. Occasionally, some patients
among those transferred sensed what was happening, and heartrending scenes
of crying, pleading, and protest broke out as they were forced into the busses.42
Once the patients had left the surrendering institution, it notified the
next of kin that the patient had been transferred to another facility on orders
of the Reich defense commissar and that this facility would eventually contact
them about their relative. Within a brief span of time, the killing center wrote
to them that the patient had arrived, but it forbade them from visiting their
relative with the assurance that they would be apprised of any change in his or
her condition. When the patient was killed, the euthanasia center authorities
informed the family of the death, ascribing it to natural causes and reporting
that the risk of epidemic disease had forced the institution to cremate the
body. An urn containing the ashes was available for shipment to them.43
It should be emphasized here that these patients were killed without their
or their families’ or guardians’ consent. And they were not transferred with
the notification and agreement of themselves, their families, or their guard-
ians. The killers did not inform local magistrates who had institutionalized
the patients; welfare and insurance organizations that financed their medical
care were likewise kept in the dark.44 The functioning of the murder apparatus
was so mysterious that even the staffs of the surrendering institutions—at
least at the beginning—often had no inkling of what lay in store for their
patients. The postwar courts would seize on the byzantine aspect of the eutha-
nasia program as evidence that the T-4 killers were fully conscious of the wrong-
fulness of their actions.
The stealth of the Nazis’ euthanasia program had an immediate—and
tragic—sequel. Doctors in local mental hospitals who completed the registra-
tion forms on their patients often did so without knowledge of the registration’s
purpose. In fact, in a rueful misapprehension of the central government’s goals,
many physicians deliberately underestimated their patients’ ability to do work,
fearing that patients capable of work would be sent away from the institution
to perform war-related labor. As a result, these patients became ensnared in
the nets of the T-4 killing program.45

The idea of establishing killing centers developed out of discussions between
representatives of KdF, the Reich Ministry of the Interior, and the chemist
Albert Widmann of the Criminal Technical Institute of the Reich Security
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Main Office (RSHA). Under interrogation by German authorities in 1960,
Widmann claimed that Leonardo Conti, the Reich Health Leader and head of
the Department of Health in the Ministry of the Interior, had rejected injec-
tions as a killing agent in favor of poisonous gas. As we have seen, in the
aftermath of these discussions, Widmann met with Viktor Brack to work out
the mechanics of how patients would be gassed. Widmann’s suggestion that
carbon monoxide gas be released through the air ducts of the patients’ hospital
rooms was dismissed on practical grounds. The notion of the killing center
emerged as a more expedient alternative.46
Brack and Karl Brandt had a short-lived difference of opinion about the
most efficacious way to kill the patients. From his discussions with Widmann,
Brack was convinced of carbon monoxide’s utility. Brandt, however, initially
opposed this idea, arguing that because the euthanasia program involved “medi-
cal measures,” a correspondingly “medical means” must be adopted; he favored
injections. (Brandt eventually overcame his scruples and agreed on carbon
monoxide.) The decision to test the effectiveness of carbon monoxide gas on
human guinea pigs grew out of this disagreement between Brack and Brandt.
The experiment took place sometime in early winter 1939–1940 at Brandenburg
an der Havel, a former jailhouse in the city of Brandenburg conveniently linked
to Berlin by rail. In this vacant prison workers from the SS Main Construc-
tion Office installed something that would become an infamous symbol of
Nazi genocide—a gas chamber disguised as a shower room. The KTI’s own Dr.
Widmann conducted the first gassing. A postwar eyewitness described the spec-
tacle that unfolded:
around 18 to 20 people were led into this “shower room” by nursing staff.
These men had to undress in the antechamber, so that they were com-
pletely naked. The doors were closed behind them. These people went
into the room quietly and with no signs of agitation. Dr. Widmann
operated the gassing equipment. Through the viewing window I could see
that after a few minutes the patients keeled over or lay down on the
benches. There weren’t any kind of scenes or tumults. After another 5
minutes the room was aired out. SS people designated for the task
removed the dead from the room on specially-constructed stretchers and
brought them to the cremation ovens. If I say specially-constructed
stretchers, I mean stretchers constructed just for this purpose. These could
be set directly in front of the cremation ovens and by means of a device
the corpses could be mechanically conveyed into the ovens without the
need for the carrier to touch the corpse. These ovens and stretchers were
built in Brack’s office.
During this same period at Brandenburg, approximately six mentally disabled
patients were given lethal injections of morphine and scopolamine by Brandt
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and Conti. The purpose of the injections was to compare their effectiveness
with that of carbon monoxide. According to Werner Heyde, our primary source
for this episode, the results cast doubt on the injection method: “The pa-
tients,” Heyde remembered, “died quite slowly, and it is possible . . . that the
injections had to be repeated.” According to August Becker, Brack was “satis-
fied” with the carbon monoxide experiment. Even Brandt was won over to
carbon monoxide. “In this way,” Becker summed up, “the beginning [of gassings]
in Brandenburg was deemed a success.”47
Brandenburg became the first of six institutions specifically designed to
kill “unworthy life” with carbon monoxide gas. Shortly after Brandenburg be-
came operative, Grafeneck in Württemberg opened its doors in January 1940.
In order to deal with the volume of victims, T-4 opened two other killing
centers at Hartheim near Linz (May 1940) and Sonnenstein in Pirna near
Dresden (June 1940). The final two euthanasia centers, Bernburg on the Saale
River and Hadamar just north of Wiesbaden in Hessen, were designed as suc-
cessor institutions to Brandenburg and Grafeneck. In each of these killing
centers, a suitable room was chosen for conversion into a gas chamber dis-
guised as a shower room. The design in all material respects followed the model
of Brandenburg. Moreover, jurisdiction over killing was divided among each of
the institutions. Brandenburg killed mental patients from Berlin; the Prussian
provinces of Brandenburg, Saxony, and Schleswig Holstein; and the states of
Brunswick, Mecklenburg, Anhalt, and Hamburg. (As Brandenburg’s succes-
sor, Bernburg would cover this region after 1941.) Grafeneck disposed of south
German patients from Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden; its own successor,
Hadamar, took over these regions plus the state of Hessen and the Prussian
province of Hanover. Hartheim killed patients from Austrian mental institu-
tions, as well as some from southern Germany and Saxony. Finally, Sonnenstein
gassed patients from Saxony, Thuringia, Silesia, and southern Germany.48
The appearance of normality surrounding the procedure lulled the pa-
tients into the mistaken belief that they were being transferred to a hospital
no different from other institutions already familiar to them. Gekrat buses
transported the patients to the killing center; in some cases, they arrived by
rail and were then picked up by “death buses” and driven to the institution.
Upon arrival, patients were met by staff members who conducted them to a
changing room, where they were instructed to remove their clothes. The tes-
timony of a Hadamar nurse from the German Hadamar trial illustrates the
procedure that usually prevailed in all the killing centers:
On the ground floor, the victims came into a reception area divided at the
time into two rooms, the first of which served as a waiting area. Here some
beds were provided for non-ambulatory patients. The second room of the
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reception area was the changing room, in which I was involved. There
first the men and then the women were disrobed. From here, the patients
were led through a hallway into the doctor’s room, where they were again
given a brief medical exam and were given a number with reference to
their medical papers. These numbers were written on their backs with a
colored marker. From the doctor’s room they came into an adjacent room,
the purpose of which I do not know. From this room they were led into a
photography room next door, in which they had to wait until all the
members of the transport had been gathered. They were then brought
together down a staircase into the gas chamber lined with glazed tiles,
which outwardly resembled a shower.49
Another eyewitness, a “stoker” who cremated the victims’ corpses at the
Sonnenstein killing center, testified before an examining judge in 1966 that
at least some of the patients he observed “still had a certain mental ability,” as
evidenced by the fact that they carried washcloths and soap with them into
the gas chamber. When the patients had all entered the gas chamber, the
gassing technicians ensured that the door and ventilation shafts were tightly
sealed. Only then did the physician open the valve of the gas tank and fill the
chamber with carbon monoxide. Within five minutes, all the patients were
unconscious; within ten, they were dead. Staff members waited a couple of
hours before airing out the chamber with fans. Once this had been done,
attending physicians pronounced the victims dead and the corpses were car-
ried out (or, in some instances, dragged out) by the stokers to a nearby room,
where the bodies were arranged in piles. The bodies were done one final indig-
nity before cremation: they were plundered by staff members. Patients with
gold teeth had been marked prior to gassing with a cross on their back or
chest. A staff member identified the corpses with gold teeth by these mark-
ings and wrenched the teeth out of their mouths with pliers. They were de-
posited with a secretary in the institution’s main office, and eventually for-
warded to the T-4 authorities in Berlin. Some corpses became the objects of
autopsies, designed both to train younger physicians (who received academic
credit from the autopsies) and to harvest brains for study in German research
institutes.50
The stokers cremated the bodies of the murdered patients in ovens, work-
ing in shifts through the night to reduce the corpses to ashes. The ashes were
literally swept into a pile and indiscriminately deposited in urns. Each urn
bore the name of a patient killed in the gas chamber, but it did not necessarily
contain that patient’s ashes. The names of the patients were then entered in
the death book maintained at every killing center. Obviously, the T-4 killers
could not report that a large number of patients (some transports contained as
many as 150) had all died simultaneously of natural causes. False causes and
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Camouflaging mass murder: the Hadamar gas chamber disguised as a shower room. The
architects of the Final Solution would imitate this practice—first introduced during the T-4
program—of deceiving murder victims by conveying to them a false appearance of normality.
Courtesy Archiv des Landeswohlfahrtsverbandes Hessen, Kassel
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dates of death had to be concocted. At the beginning of the euthanasia pro-
gram, the T-4 Medical Office disseminated lists of “causes of death” to its
participating doctors that could be cited by them in furtherance of the cha-
rade. One such list contained sixty-one different illnesses, along with brief
descriptions of the etiology, course, therapy, and complications of each dis-
ease. Stroke, pneumonia, heart attack, tuberculosis, and circulatory collapse
were among the causes of death most frequently given. The killing center
doctor recorded the fraudulent cause of death on the death certificate, certify-
ing it with a false name, and this fiction was reproduced in official correspon-
dence and in “consolation letters” sent to the patient’s family or guardian.
Because the patient had been gassed before the killing center’s notification of
his or her safe arrival had been sent to the relatives, it was likewise necessary
to falsify the date of death. The administrative offices of the killing centers
sent the letter of consolation to the family or guardian approximately ten days
after the patient’s death. The letter was boiler plate, informing the family of
the patient’s death and the “cause” and “date” of his or her demise, and offering
a reassurance that the patient had been “delivered” from suffering. It also indi-
cated that, in order to “hinder the outbreak and spread of communicable dis-
eases,” the local police authorities had required the cremation of the patient’s
body and the “disinfection” of the patient’s belongings. Urns containing the
ashes would be sent to the family if they responded within fourteen days and
presented proof that they had made arrangements for proper interment.51
From the historical record it is clear that T-4 operatives, both in the KdF
and in the killing centers, were concerned that the patients’ relatives would
discover what had really happened to their family members. This fear helps
account for the extraordinary lengths T-4 personnel resorted to in an effort to
conceal the mass murder from the victims’ families. In each killing center,
maps of Germany with colored pins demonstrated how many patients from
different geographic areas had thus far been killed. If too many pins accumu-
lated in a given region, the dates and places of death had to be changed in
order to avert the suspicion that too many patients from the same area had
died simultaneously in the same locale. A Grafeneck staff member told the
Münsingen Amtsgericht in 1947 that in spring 1940 the Berlin T-4 authorities
had ordered Brandenburg and Hartheim to exchange patient records, so that a
different place of death could be recorded for some of the patients.52
Worries about public protest nonetheless continued. Scholars of National
Socialist euthanasia have differed over whether such fears contributed to the
decision to close Brandenburg and Grafeneck in late 1940. For Henry Fried-
lander, gradually spreading knowledge among the civilian population of the
killing program was a proximate cause of Brandenburg’s and Grafeneck’s clo-
sures. Ernst Klee, on the other hand, discounts the role of public pressure,
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arguing that Brandenburg and Grafeneck were closed because they had served
their purpose of decimating “unworthy life” in their regions. Whatever the
actual reasons, the first two killing centers in the assault on the lives of men-
tally disabled patients were closed by December 1940, only to be replaced by
Bernburg and Hadamar. The killing went on without pause.53
Concern for public opinion among Nazi leaders may also account for the
creation in fall 1940 of transit centers. On an increasing basis, patients desig-
nated for killing were transferred from surrendering institutions to these tran-
sit centers, where they stayed for two to three weeks before final transfer to a
killing institution. Euthanasia defendants like Karl Brandt and Viktor Brack
devised the ruse that the transit centers had a quality control function, ensur-
ing that no mistakes had been made in the selection process. In fact, the
transit centers were designed to confound any efforts to trace a given transport
to its ultimate destination. The more labyrinthine the program, the more
difficult it was to follow T-4’s sleight of hand—or so it seemed to T-4 directors.
Nonetheless, some of the transit centers did on occasion seek to withhold
patients capable of work from transfer to the killing centers. When they did
so, they were admonished by the Berlin authorities that such exemptions were
“impeding” the “operation.” The director of the Hadamar euthanasia institu-
tion alluded to a rebuke from Berlin in reminding the director of the Wiesloch
transit center to “distance himself from every exemption.”54
By August 1941, the death toll of mentally disabled patients murdered in
T-4’s killing centers had reached 70,273. These figures are culled not from
official T-4 records, many of which were destroyed before the end of the war,
but from figures compiled by a T-4 statistician discovered at the Hartheim
institution after the war. The figures document the number of those killed at
each of the six killing centers for each calendar month beginning in January
1940 and ending in August 1941. As Henry Friedlander points out, however,
German prosecutors after the war believed these figures underestimated the
number of the dead. Based on evidence they had collected, they argued the T-
4 statistician had, among other errors, miscounted the patients euthanized at
Hartheim and Sonnenstein. They arrived at a conservative estimate of 80,000
patients killed until the official “end” of the operation in August 1941.55
The reason why Hitler ended the first phase of adult euthanasia in August
1941 is a subject of controversy among historians. For years, pressure from the
Catholic church was credited for persuading Hitler to terminate phase one of
the killing program. The bombshell was a sermon delivered on August 3, 1941,
by Count Clemens August von Galen, the bishop of Münster. Galen, who had
learned in July 1940 of the euthanasia program, went public with this informa-
tion in a sermon delivered in August 1941. In the sermon, Galen referred to
the high mortality rate among the mentally ill in German institutions that
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“did not occur randomly, but rather was intentionally produced.” Despite the
declaration of the German Bishops on July 7, 1941, condemning the killing of
an “innocent person except in wartime or in justified self-defense,” the murder
of mental patients had continued and now threatened the province of
Westphalia. Galen condemned the killings as violations of statutory law and
the Fifth Commandment, “Thou Shalt not Kill.” Galen’s sermon was read
from pulpits throughout his diocese and soon became a topic of discussion
both within and outside Germany. (British pilots dropped thousands of copies
of the sermon on German cities.) The Nazi elite was furious. Walter Tiessler, a
propaganda director, suggested to Bormann that Galen be hanged. The pro-
posal was rejected on the grounds that executing Galen would only turn him
into a martyr and stir up even more popular unrest.56
According to Ernst Klee and Henry Friedlander, the opposition of the
churches and the public protest occasioned by it induced Hitler to cancel the
official euthanasia program on August 24, 1941. The German historian of
Nazi genocide, Götz Aly, does not reject the impact of church protest and
public discontent on Hitler’s decision, but points out that other motives may
have been equally important. For Aly, the end of phase one may be the result
of the simple fact that the program had reached (and even exceeded) its ini-
tial target of killing 70,000 patients. Galen’s sermon also happened to coin-
cide with the release of a propaganda film, Ich klage an, produced by the KdF to
render the public more sympathetic to euthanasia; the stoppage in late Au-
gust may have been ordered to give the film a chance to influence public
opinion.57
Although the evidence permits more than one interpretation of the mo-
tives, it is undisputed that the killing program underwent a sea change after
August 1941. Thereafter, in terms of organization, method, and scope, the
National Socialist attack on “life unworthy of life” attained new and unprec-
edented levels of virulence. The language of resource scarcity was used to le-
gitimate killing increasingly driven by racial and political motives. As we will
see, the official “stop” of the euthanasia program did not diminish the killing
but witnessed its expansion to other “valueless” groups after August 1941—
including European Jews.
PHASE TWO OF EUTHANASIA AND THE EXPANDED KILLING
PROJECTS OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM, 1941–1945
On August 24, 1941, in the face of mounting pressure from the Church and
public unrest, Adolf Hitler ordered an official cessation to the euthanasia pro-
gram. Notwithstanding this order, however, the murder of mentally disabled
patients continued in T-4 killing centers with one critical difference: whereas
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the pre–August 1941 T-4 killings were restricted to psychiatric patients, the
radius of killing after the August stoppage was expanded to new categories of
“unworthy life,” defined less in medical than in social, racial, and political
terms. The centrifugal tendency of Nazi genocide between late 1941 and the
end of the war is the central feature of this second phase of euthanasia.
At the end of November 1941, Viktor Brack met with T-4 representatives
from all euthanasia centers. During the meeting he informed them that the
operation would continue despite its official termination. The evidence avail-
able to us indicates that only the means of killing—gas chambers—changed as
a result of the stop order. Beginning in late 1941, instead of gassing patients T-
4 doctors murdered handicapped adults with the method used to eliminate
disabled children: overdoses of medication. Others starved patients to death
by slowly depriving them of food, a program referred to as Hungerkost.58
The waning months of 1941 are a climacteric in the history of National
Socialist mass murder. During this period, a succession of events took place
that changed fundamentally the Nazi assault on “life unworthy of life.” In this
extraordinary time official euthanasia ended and a new phase of “wild” eu-
thanasia (i.e., decentralized killing loosely overseen by the Berlin authorities)
began, using not only psychiatric criteria but novel categories like “public
menace,” “criminality,” “anti-sociality,” “psychopathy,” and “racial inferiority”
to identify individuals for destruction by the T-4 physicians. Sometime in this
period Hitler issued what is generally believed to have been an oral order to
exterminate the European Jews. The death camps of the Final Solution would
not become operational until late 1941 or early 1942; yet, the fate awaiting
Europe’s Jews was already presaged in the murder of concentration camp Jews
in the T-4 killing centers—the notorious Operation 14f13. In the remainder
of this chapter I would like to discuss each of these events—“wild” euthanasia,
the application of euthanasia to other groups, and Operation 14f13—as they
relate to the original plan to eliminate mentally disabled Germans. What we
will find is that the foundational premise of Nazi euthanasia—that “useless” or
“valueless” life should be eradicated through state-organized violence—was
extended in late 1941 from the mentally ill to justify the murder of other
socially marginal groups.
“Wild” Euthanasia, September 1941–April 1945
Even after the official euthanasia “stop,” the Reich Ministry continued to
distribute questionnaires to German mental institutions biannually. In his
role as Reich Commissioner for Mental Hospitals, Herbert Linden submitted
the forms to the medical experts of the KdF for evaluation. Killing proceeded
on the basis of these expert assessments, but the gas chambers of the killing
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centers were largely dismantled; henceforth, patients selected for euthanasia
were given lethal overdoses or injections of narcotics, or simply starved to
death. Furthermore, while original killing centers like Hadamar and Bernburg
were still euthanizing patients after the stop order, the locus of killing shifted
to the transit centers—many of which were simultaneously murdering dis-
abled children in their children’s wards. Facilities such as Eichberg, Kalmenhof,
and Eglfing-Haar began to kill adult patients on-site. The Meseritz-Obrawalde
mental hospital in Pomerania and Tiegenhof in the Wartheland became major
centers for destroying the mentally handicapped. These institutions represent
only a fraction of the facilities involved in killing the disabled during the
period of wild euthanasia that ensued after August 24, 1941. A considerable
number of hospitals murdered their patients when transportation to defunct
killing centers became impossible.59
Under cross-examination at the Nuremberg Doctors’ Trial, Karl Brandt
tried to portray the T-4 euthanasia program as ending in late August 1941.
Whatever killing of mental patients occurred after this date, Brandt claimed,
had nothing to do with the “humane” program he and Bouhler had been com-
missioned to establish.60 Pace Brandt, the reality was that the T-4 offices con-
tinued to register and evaluate patients for killing even after the official stop;
it never fully relinquished control over euthanasia to local institutions. Just as
they had before August 24, the T-4 authorities in Berlin directed the transport
of patients to destinations where they were killed, provided these facilities
with narcotics to poison them, and made available its experienced personnel
to perform the killings. Nonetheless, T-4’s control of euthanasia was not as
top-down as it had been during phase one, when the T-4 Central Office had
orchestrated a program of selection, transportation, and immediate killing on
arrival at one of the six killing centers. Phase two transpired in numerous
institutions, the diversity of which posed obstacles of command and control to
the Berlin offices.61
The period of wild euthanasia also saw intense aerial bombardment of
German cities and production centers by the Allies. Beginning in February
1942, the Royal Air Force embarked on a devastating campaign to demoralize
German citizens and workers by destroying their cities. In some instances
(e.g., the attack on the German town of Lübeck in March 1942), cities that
were especially flammable were chosen for bombing. Allied sorties on Ger-
many culminated in summer 1943 in Operation Gomorrah, a joint U.S.-
British assault on Hamburg designed to reduce it to ashes. The numerous
wooden buildings in Hamburg conduced to rapid combustion, and within a
short time the city was an inferno. When Operation Gomorrah had ended,
45,000 civilians had been incinerated; 13 square miles of the city were a charred
ruin.62
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One result of Allied bombing was a grave crisis in hospital space to accom-
modate the wounded. Already in 1941, possibly in response to the demolition
of a hospital at Emden by British pilots, Hitler had charged Karl Brandt, his
escort physician, “to designate evacuation hospitals for other cities that were
in danger.” Under U.S. Army interrogation after the war, Brandt claimed that
his new duties, modest at first, were significantly enlarged in 1942 and 1943—
most likely because of damage caused by Allied bombing. On July 28, 1942,
Hitler appointed Brandt Commissioner for the Health Care System. Brandt
described his duties to his army interrogator:
The basic task of a general [Commissioner] meant the adjustment of the
needs of the civilians for materials and physicians to the Wehrmacht
sanitary needs and also space for hospital cases. This basic task could not
be carried through after 1942 because on every one of these sides there
was a greater need than materials available. This is why the adjustment
always meant taking something away from somebody who had nothing
anyway.63
Brandt’s work as Commissioner for the Health Care System (which had really
begun in late 1941) developed into an official program code-named Operation
Brandt. Under its auspices, mentally disabled patients were evacuated from
psychiatric hospitals and clinics. The reason offered for their removal was to
protect them from air raids. The chief of the T-4 Central Office, Dietrich
Allers, dispatched evacuation orders to local mental hospitals throughout the
Reich, stating that Brandt as general commissioner was ordering the transfer
of patients from psychiatric hospitals in areas “particularly endangered” by
Allied bombing.64
With Operation Brandt, National Socialist euthanasia branched outward
from allegedly incurable mental patients (the “terminal cases”) to embrace a
variety of victim groups. As the war ground on, creating new problems for the
German government within the Reich, the Nazis employed mass killing as an
instrument of population policy. In the aftermath of the Hamburg incendiary
bombings in late July 1943, for example, Hamburg women deranged by the
trauma of the firestorm were transported to Hadamar, where, it is believed,
they were all murdered. When a concerned parent sought information about
his shell-shocked daughter at the Eppendorf Hospital, he was told that she
and others had “been transferred to less dangerous areas, in order to make
room for victims of the Hamburg raids.” In addition to traumatized civilians,
members of old-age homes became ensnared in the coils of Operation Brandt
after the July bombing of Hamburg. They were transported to Neuruppin Mental
Hospital and to Meseritz-Obrawalde for killing.65
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Other Victims of Euthanasia:
The “Asocials” and Eastern European Forced Laborers
Increasingly in the Third Reich, as the euphoria of the German army’s
initial conquests evaporated amid military reversals and sustained Allied bomb-
ing of German cities, genocidal violence was employed to “solve” political,
social, and economic problems facing the Nazi government. Many of the prob-
lems were related to population policy questions, particularly the need for
army and civilian hospitals. After officials involved in Operation Brandt ex-
panded euthanasia to include not only “incurable” mental patients but shell-
shocked civilians as well, two additional groups became victims of the National
Socialist killing project: the “asocials” and sick eastern European laborers.
In 1945 the Nazi government drafted a law regarding “aliens to the com-
munity” but never enacted it. According to its terms, those prone to unruli-
ness, drunkenness, and laziness were “aliens to the community.” Beggars,
thieves, grifters, and criminals also fell into this category. On June 20, 1942,
the Information Service of the Racial Political Office of the Nazi Party issued
a call to the Gau of Vienna to suppress its asocials, because they “represent an
element of political unrest of the first order.” In the eyes of the Information
Service, a person was an asocial if he or she violated the criminal law, suffered
from unemployment although able-bodied, lived parasitically off state or pri-
vate welfare proceeds, had no settled residence, was a compulsive alcoholic, or
lived off the earnings from “immoral activities” (e.g., pimping or prostitu-
tion). The instruction sheet setting forth this capacious definition of asociality
then affirmed the biological inferiority of “those incapable of community,”
underscoring the futility of “ameliorative” measures to address this problem.
From such premises Nazi functionaries like Dr. H. W. Kranz, Gau Office Di-
rector of the Nazi Party’s Racial Office, Gau Hessen-Nassau, drew the conclu-
sion that only “special treatment”—that is, killing—could cure the problem
of asociality.66
Such attitudes permeated the upper echelons of the Nazi Party. On July 2,
1943, the Justice Ministry issued an order to send “criminally insane” patients
to the concentration camps. Section 42 of the “Law Against Dangerous Habitual
Criminals and Regulation of Security and Reform,” enacted on November 11,
1933, had supplied a basis for detaining asocials in psychiatric institutions if
they were deemed by the courts to suffer from mental illness. Invoking Section
42 of this law on August 8, 1943, Herbert Linden of the Interior Ministry
apprised directors of affected institutions that all patients institutionalized
under the Detention Law were to be surrendered to police authorities. Quite
apart from “cleansing the institutions of undesired and destabilizing elements,”
Linden wrote, the removal of the criminally insane would free up much-needed
T H E  E M P E R O R  O F  I C E - C R E A M54
beds for German citizens. Again, the ideological impulse to blot out “value-
less” life from the people’s community intersected with the population policy
need for medical resources. Once in police custody, the criminally insane were
transferred to the Mauthausen concentration camp and Auschwitz. There they
were subjected to hard labor; at Mauthausen, after the last ounce of stamina
had been wrung from them, they were sent to the Hartheim killing center and
gassed.67
Along with the criminally insane, sick eastern European workers living
in the Reich were caught up in the lethal nets of wild euthanasia. Beginning
in late 1941, as hopes for a meteoric victory over the Soviets faded and the
prospects of a long-term war of attrition took shape, the need for labor to
sustain the wartime economy became acute. In response, Hitler deployed So-
viet and Polish POWs and civilian workers throughout the Reich as forced
laborers. Harsh living conditions and maltreatment, however, gave rise to
epidemic disease among the Ostarbeiter. By 1944 substantial numbers of them
were unable to work because of tuberculosis. With the Red Army closing in
and fearing the spread of the contagion, German health authorities began
sending these unfortunate people to facilities for killing. The problem of epi-
demic disease was an issue of population policy; destruction of the disease-
bearing agents was the regime’s solution. Between July 29, 1944, and March
18, 1945, 465 Ostarbeiter were given lethal injections at Hadamar; others
were gassed at Hartheim. On September 6, 1944, the Interior Ministry gave
an official imprimatur to these killings by decreeing that all eastern laborers
incapable of work because of mental illness were to be sent to designated hos-
pitals. This decree reflected the Nazis’ tendency to blur distinctions between
separate concepts; the Ostarbeiter targeted by the Interior Ministry were not
mentally but physically ill. The regime had already equated asociality with
mental illness; now, tubercular eastern workers were also identified with the
mentally disabled. The logic of the Nazis’ hierarchy of human value was play-
ing itself out in the form of a murderous syllogism: because the mentally ill
were “unworthy of life,” they were to be killed; and because “asocials” and
tubercular eastern workers were “mentally ill,” they should be accorded the
same “treatment.”68
The September decree identified eleven state hospitals that would serve as
“collection points” for sick Ostarbeiter. They included notorious killing centers
like Tiegenhof, Kaufbeuren, Maur-Öhling, and Hadamar. The T-4 Central Of-
fice under Dietrich Allers provided the transportation and financing for this
new chapter in National Socialist euthanasia. By February 17, 1945, however,
war conditions were such that the September decree was revised: henceforth,
the patients were to be remanded to local mental hospitals responsible for
areas in which the sick Ostarbeiter were located.
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Euthanasia and the Murder of the European Jews
Respected scholars of Nazi genocide regard the T-4 euthanasia program as
a prelude to the murder of the European Jews, conceptually, organizationally,
and logistically related to that infamous event. “Euthanasia,” Raul Hilberg
writes, “was a conceptual as well as technological and administrative prefigura-
tion of the ‘Final Solution’ in the death camps.” Ernst Klee, describing the way
in which Jews, Soviet POWs, Gypsies, and others were murdered at Chelmno
(the first death camp on Polish soil), refers to the killing process there as “a
copy of the euthanasia measures.” Along the same lines, Henry Friedlander
affirms an intimate link between the T-4 killings and the Final Solution.69
Even before the beginning of the Holocaust, T-4 members were killing
Jewish concentration camp prisoners based solely on their racial background.
The murders occurred as part of an operation conceived and administered by
the SS to reduce the escalating population of Germany’s concentration camps.
As they did in their assault on the disabled, asocials, and sick eastern workers,
the Nazis solved a problem of population policy through mass murder. Aware
of T-4’s efficient work in the euthanasia program, Himmler had contacted in
early 1941 the chief of the KdF, Philipp Bouhler, about the possibility of using
T-4’s “personnel and facilities” to deal with camp populations. The issue of
their colloquy was a new killing program that began in April 1941, the
Sonderbehandlung (Special Treatment) 14f13. The term Sonderbehandlung, as we
already know, is verbal camouflage for killing, a euphemism widely used by the
SS and police forces. The label “14f13” referred to a file number employed by
the Inspectorate of the Concentration Camps, designating the annihilation
of camp prisoners in T-4 killing centers. Victims of 14f13 were prisoners in
concentration camps administered by the Inspectorate. SS camp doctors se-
lected the prospective victims based on an “official” criterion of incurable
physical illness that rendered the individual incapable of work. Unofficially,
these SS physicians received oral instructions to use racial and eugenic guide-
lines in making their selections. At Buchenwald, SS doctors were ordered to
select the disabled, Jews, and prisoners with criminal records. The major cri-
terion in every case, however, was fitness for work (although this standard,
like all criteria that supposedly governed National Socialist euthanasia, was
arbitrarily enforced).70
Once the victims had been chosen, T-4 physicians arrived in the camps to
proof the SS selections. These visits are reminiscent of similar trips made by
T-4 employees to German mental hospitals to ensure that euthanasia was properly
carried out. At least twelve T-4 doctors appeared in concentration camps as
participants in Operation 14f13. Each of these individuals had extensive expe-
rience with T-4 as euthanasia medical experts. Seated at tables, the T-4 doctors
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reviewed the prisoners selected by the SS as they were paraded before them.
The SS had previously filled out questionnaires on every selectee, containing
the prisoner’s name, birth date and place, last residence, citizenship, religion,
race, and date of arrest. As a prisoner walked past the table, the T-4 physician
decided whether to uphold the SS determination to include the selectee in the
operation. A plus sign (+) entered at the bottom of the form signified inclu-
sion in 14f13. This haphazard method of processing did not admit time for a
thorough medical exam. At Buchenwald, in fact, two T-4 doctors reviewed
873 prisoners in five days. As Friedrich Mennecke confided to his wife about
one such examination, the T-4 personnel did little more than rubber stamp
the SS’s selections. Nonetheless, they were obliged to give a “diagnosis” of the
prisoner’s condition.
No such diagnosis was required with Jewish prisoners selected for liquida-
tion in 14f13. Instead, justifications for inclusion were culled from personal
records, especially arrest records; this data was then entered on the prisoner’s
questionnaire. Mennecke, for example, recorded as “medical diagnoses” such
characterizations from Jewish prisoners’ personal records as “anti-German agi-
tator,” “lazy and indolent,” “anti-German behavior,” “vile Germanophobe,”
and “attitude hostile to the State.”71
Prisoners selected under 14f13 were subsequently transported to the eu-
thanasia centers Bernburg, Hartheim, and Sonnenstein, which were all ac-
tively involved in killing the 14f13 prisoners. Prior to the stoppage ordered by
Hitler on August 24, 1941, these institutions gassed both the mentally handi-
capped and 14f13 selectees; after August 24, the handicapped were murdered
by overdoses of medication, whereas the 14f13 selectees continued to die in
the gas chambers. Five hundred seventy-five prisoners were murdered at
Sonnenstein alone. By the time Himmler ordered the end of 14f13 in 1943
(on the grounds that too many prisoners capable of work were being liqui-
dated), the operation had claimed the lives of between 10,000 and 20,000
prisoners.72
Operation 14f13 was not the only nexus between Nazi euthanasia and the
Holocaust. In a letter regarding “the solution to the Jewish Question” from
Ernst Wetzel, an expert in the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Territories,
dated October 25, 1941, to Heinrich Lohse, the Reich Commissar for the
Ostland, Wetzel reported that “Oberdienstleiter Brack of the Führer’s Chan-
cellery has indicated his readiness to assist in producing the required accom-
modations as well as the gassing equipment.” According to Wetzel, the “equip-
ment” was not at that time available in the eastern territories and thus had to
be manufactured. Wetzel reported Brack’s apprehensions of the “many great
difficulties” that would be occasioned if the equipment was produced within
the Reich. To forestall such problems, Brack considered it “most expedient” to
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send his chemist, Dr. Helmut Kallmeyer, to Riga, “who would take care of every-
thing there.” Because the “procedure under consideration” was “not without dan-
ger,” certain “protective measures” would have to be observed. Accordingly, Wetzel
asked Lohse to have his Higher SS and Police Leader contact Brack about
sending to the east both Dr. Kallmeyer “and other auxiliary resources.”73
This document was the smoking gun at the Doctors’ Trial that implicated
Viktor Brack in the earliest planning stages of the Final Solution. In the let-
ter, Wetzel asserts that Adolf Eichmann was “in agreement with this proce-
dure”; Eichmann had informed Wetzel that “camps for Jews were to be erected
in Riga and Minsk, into which Jews from the ‘old Reich territory’ would also
eventually come.” Jews were even then being evacuated from the Reich, Wetzel
confided, and sent to the Litzmannstadt (Lodz) ghetto and “to other camps”;
later, these German Jews would be transferred to the east as slave laborers, “so
far as they were capable of work.” Concerning those Jews deemed incapable of
Left: Dr. Friedrich Mennecke, director of the Eichberg Mental Hospital and T-4 medical
expert. In the latter role, Mennecke traveled to various concentration camps to evaluate
prisoners—many of them Jewish—for inclusion in the euthanasia program. In December
1946, a German court convicted him of murder under German law and sentenced him to
death—a punishment he avoided by dying in his prison cell in January 1947. Courtesy
HHSTAW Abt. 3008, Friedrich Mennecke. Right: Friedrich Mennecke in happier times.
Courtesy HHSTAW Abt. 3008, Friedrich Mennecke
T H E  E M P E R O R  O F  I C E - C R E A M58
work, however, “there should be no second thoughts about removing them
with the Brackian devices.” The thrust of this last sentence is clear: Jewish
deportees to Riga and Minsk capable of work would be used as slaves, while
those unfit for hard labor would be gassed. Recently discovered German docu-
ments from Moscow reveal that the SS had ordered a monstrous crematorium
for Mogilev (in eastern Byelorussia, the site of carbon monoxide gassing ex-
periments) that would incinerate in excess of 2,000 corpses per day. These
documents suggest, as Götz Aly has noted,74 that the Nazis may have been
planning to erect a major extermination center for European Jews in Mogilev—
a thesis that gains in persuasive power when read together with Wetzel’s gas-
sing letter. In fact, as a result of military reversals on the eastern front and the
obvious difficulties they posed to transports, the Jewish camps envisioned in
Wetzel’s letter never materialized; instead, they were erected in former Poland.
The “Brackian devices” Wetzel referred to in his letter were gas vans. Be-
ginning in late December 1939 and January 1940, SS special units had mur-
dered the mentally disabled from Wartheland hospitals with these vans. In
September 1941, after experiments with gas vans were conducted by KTI em-
ployee Albert Widmann in Mogilev, Himmler had ordered the KTI to engi-
neer an “improved” gas van that would recycle the vehicle’s own motor ex-
haust into a sealed compartment. The new van was tested at the Sachsenhausen
concentration camp in late fall 1941; thereafter, the vans were manufactured
and sent in early 1942 to assist the Einsatzgruppen in their war on the eastern
European population. Even before their formal introduction to the USSR in
early 1942, these vans were being used to murder Jews and other groups at the
Nazis’ first death camp, Chelmno (Kulmhof in German).
Established by the SS in October and November 1941 near Chelmno, a
village in the Polish countryside, the Chelmno death camp’s purpose was to
kill and cremate human beings. By December 1941, camp personnel were us-
ing gas vans to kill Gypsies, malarial patients, Soviet POWs, the mentally
disabled, and even a group of Austrian World War I officers. By far the largest
number of victims murdered at Chelmno, however, were the Jews (particularly
Jews from the Lodz ghetto). In its technique and style of execution, the modus
operandi was almost identical to the T-4 euthanasia killings. On arrival, vic-
tims were told to remove their clothes for a shower. Supervised by SS members
wearing the white coats and stethoscopes of doctors, victims were herded down
a flight of steps and along a camouflaged ramp into a waiting gas van. When
the full complement of victims had been loaded into the van’s interior, the
doors were closed and a hose connected to the floor of the van was joined to
the exhaust pipe. In theory the victims were supposed to fall asleep painlessly
and die from asphyxiation within ten minutes, but the reality was other. Their
shrieks could be heard from the van interior as they pounded frantically on the
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locked doors and walls of the van. The death throes of the victims could last
for hours until they finally expired.
When the screams abated, the gas van departed the camp premises and
drove to a wooded area, where Jewish prisoners were forced to unload the
corpses. Victims who had miraculously survived the ordeal were shot on the
spot. Body cavities were searched for objects of value, including gold teeth,
which were torn from the corpses’ mouths with a pair of pliers. After the dead
had been looted, they were thrown unceremoniously into a mass grave. In this
manner, at least 152,000 victims were murdered at Chelmno between 1941
and 1944.75
While Chelmno was beginning the first systematic gassings of Jews and
others at a fixed location, Himmler gave the Higher SS Police Leader in Lublin,
Odilo Globocnik, an order to initiate the mass murder of the Jews of central
and southern Poland. Globocnik thereupon erected three killing centers in
the Lublin area of the General Government. The three killing centers—Belzec,
Sobibor, and Treblinka—became operational in late winter and early spring
1942: Belzec from March 1942 to December 1943, Sobibor from April 1942 to
October 1943, and Treblinka from July 1942 to autumn 1943. In contrast with
Chelmno, which murdered its victims in mobile gas vans, these extermination
centers employed a technique that had earlier proven successful in the T-4
killing centers—immobile gas chambers disguised as showers.76
In addition to these three sites, Himmler designated two others to help
expedite the new killing program. They were Auschwitz in Upper Silesia and
the POW camp at Majdanek, a Lublin suburb. The extermination arm of
Auschwitz, known as “Auschwitz II,” was at Birkenau, where more than a
million people were gassed with a pesticide used throughout the concentration
camp system as a fumigation agent, hydrogen cyanide (better known under its
trade name, Zyklon B). The first experiment with Zyklon B gassing was carried
out on September 3, 1941, at Auschwitz; by 1942, the SS had converted two
farmhouses in Birkenau into gas chambers, which were used to gas Jews and
others until four gas chambers were installed there in early 1943. The idea of
employing a stationary gas chamber was inspired by the example of the T-4
killing centers.77
Gassing unsuspecting Jews in gas chambers disguised as shower rooms was
not the only continuity with Nazi euthanasia. At least ninety-two T-4 opera-
tives were assigned to the Operation Reinhard (the extermination of Polish
Jewry) death camps. These individuals had been crematorium stokers, drivers,
transport escorts and office personnel with T-4. All wore the field gray uni-
forms of the Waffen-SS, receiving a rank no lower than Unterscharführer (a
non-commissioned officer rank within the SS); they were paid by the T-4
Accounting Office in Berlin. T-4’s managerial staff was central to the efficient
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administration of killing centers in the General Government. Christian Wirth,
an active participant in the killing of mentally ill patients at Grafeneck,
Hadamar, Hartheim, and Brandenburg, established the death camp at Chelmno;
thereafter, he was assigned to supervise with Odilo Globocnik the killing of
two million Jews at the Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka camps. Franz Stangl
was the Police Superintendent of Hartheim before taking up duties as com-
mandant of the Sobibor death camp in May 1942. During one interview in the
1960s, he commented that the Sobibor gas chamber “looked exactly like the
gas chamber at Schloss Hartheim.” His successor at Sobibor was Wirth’s re-
placement as office director at Hartheim, Franz Reichleitner. The first camp
commandant at Treblinka was Dr. Irmfried Eberl, director of the killing cen-
ters at Brandenburg and Bernburg.78
In their work within Operation Reinhard, the T-4 killers must have sur-
passed their masters’ expectations. In two years of operation (1941–1942 and
again in 1944), Chelmno murdered 152,000 people; in one year (1942), the
Belzec camp killed 600,000. The Sobibor and Treblinka camps also required a
single year (1942–1943) to murder 250,000 and 900,000 people, respectively.
By the time Operation Reinhard came to an end in November 1943, it had
taken almost 2 million lives. Of the nearly 2 million people sent to Chelmno,
Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka, only eighty-seven survived. Although Auschwitz
has become the symbol par excellence of Nazi depravity, lethality among the
four Polish death camps was actually much higher. Gerald Reitlinger has esti-
mated that approximately 700,000 of the 851,200 Jews deported to Auschwitz
were gassed at Birkenau (a mortality rate just over 82 percent); mortality rates
at the four Polish killing centers, by contrast, were almost 100 percent. For
efficiency in murder, the Nazis could not have made a better choice than the
euthanasia killers.79

After the fall of Germany in spring 1945, the forces of military occupation
confronted the prodigious destruction wrought by the Nazi government. In
the dingy confines of German mental hospitals, in the charnel houses of the
concentration and death camps, the advancing armies uncovered the corpse-
strewn highway to the Nazis’ biological utopia. The awful tale of Hitler’s as-
sault on the human race was told in the physical bodies of both the dead and
the living. It could be read from the mounds of emaciated corpses that had
once been healthy human beings, or from the gaunt, disease-wracked frames of
the survivors. Many of the men responsible, like Hitler, had already eluded
justice through suicide. Others, like Himmler, Bouhler, Leonardo Conti, and
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Dr. Irmfried Eberl, SS doctor, director of the Brandenburg and Bernburg killing centers, and
first commandant of the Treblinka death camp. Indicted for his manifold crimes after the war,
he committed suicide in his Ulm jail cell while awaiting trial in February 1948. Courtesy
Ghetto Fighters’ House, Kibbutz Lohamei Hagetaot, photographer unknown
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Herbert Linden, would take their lives in the months following the end of the
war. It fell to the Allies to decide the fates of the surviving perpetrators. As we
will see, in approaching euthanasia criminality the U.S. conception was not
driven purely by the factual record, revulsion from the grisly handiwork of
Nazi genocide, or the imperatives of international law, but was substantially
shaped by a concern for its own sovereignty. We take up the U.S. judicial
encounter with the euthanasia killers in the next chapter.
In the years prior to World War II, the United States had long
resisted international criminal tribunals as threats to its own na-
tional sovereignty. The U.S. government had opposed forming an
international tribunal after World War I to prosecute violations of
the “laws of humanity,” particularly in connection with the Turkish
government’s alleged destruction of its Armenian population. At
the time, the U.S. government supported its opposition with refer-
ence to the “vague” nature of ill-defined crimes against humanity, so
far as they involved outrages committed on civilians rather than
military members. When we examine the U.S. position in the con-
text of the subsequent rejection of U.S. participation in the League
of Nations, however, it would seem that U.S. refusal to endorse an
international tribunal had more to do with fears of diminished sov-
ereignty than with legal niceties like the prohibition of retroactive
criminal law. This notwithstanding, the United States emerged in
1945 as the most ardent champion of postwar trials to punish the crimes
of the Third Reich. The process by which this inversion came about
requires explanation. As we will see, the U.S. Army’s abrasive encoun-
ter with Nazi criminality, the extreme nature of that criminality,
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued,
the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare
that . . . the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the
protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations,
as they result from the usages established among civilized
peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of public
conscience.
—PREAMBLE TO THE 1907 HAGUE CONVENTION
(THE “MARTEN’S CLAUSE”)
CONSTRUCTING MASS MURDER
THE UNITED STATES EUTHANASIA TRIALS, 1945–1947
Chapter 2
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and the lobbying efforts of numerous central and eastern European émigrés
during the war all contributed to making the United States the foremost ad-
herent of postwar trials. In the course of our discussion, we will also see how
the early commitment of U.S. war crimes trial planners to a theory of con-
spiracy as the glue holding together its case against Nazi defendants came to
dominate the U.S. approach to the regime’s criminality in both the Interna-
tional Tribunal and the Doctors’ Trial proceedings. Ultimately, U.S. insistence
on the centrality of conspiracy to its legal interpretation of Nazi criminality is
a recrudescence of U.S. fears that its own sovereignty might be diminished.
We next explore how concerns with preserving U.S. power affected judi-
cial constructions of euthanasia criminality. In order to penetrate to this issue,
we will focus on two proceedings in U.S. courts: the Hadamar trial before a
military commission (in October 1945) and the Medical Case against doctors
and high-ranking policymakers involved in the euthanasia program, which
took place from December 1946 to August 1947. From early on, the U.S.
government viewed euthanasia as the direct result of the Nazis’ efforts to launch
aggressive wars to bring all of Europe under German hegemony. On the U.S.
theory, euthanasia was a way to free up medical resources for use by the Ger-
man army in its conquest of Europe. By connecting the destruction of “life
unworthy of life” with the conduct of a criminal war, U.S. authorities were
able to justify the prosecution and punishment of acts that the United States
feared might otherwise be considered part of the Third Reich’s domestic policy.
In short, the war connection enabled the United States to uphold the prin-
ciple of sovereignty, and to do so as it passed judgment on a euthanasia pro-
gram that, in its original design, targeted only German nationals. Linking
euthanasia with waging aggressive war is the most salient feature of the U.S.
approach to euthanasia criminality and indicates the determinative impact of
extra-legal factors—namely, U.S. leaders’ preoccupation with national power—
on the U.S. euthanasia trials.
EUTHANASIA CRIMINALITY AND THE LAW OF CONSPIRACY
Although the Geneva conventions laid the foundation for international rec-
ognition of duties and prohibitions incumbent on combatant nations, before
1945 no international accord defined “crimes against humanity” as a distinct
category of offense, the commission of which would expose an offender nation
to criminal liability. The embryo of crimes against humanity actually goes back
to a landmark fin-de-siècle document: the preamble to the First Hague Con-
vention of 1899 on the Laws and Customs of War (enlarged in the Fourth
Hague Convention of 1907) and the annexed Regulations Respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land. The preamble to the 1899 and 1907 versions
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refers explicitly to “laws of humanity” that afforded protection to “populations
and belligerents” not specifically covered by the language of the conventions.
Thus, although the Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907 dealt primarily with
“war crimes,” their jurisdiction over such acts derived from a larger, more capa-
cious source called “laws of humanity.” According to the framers of the Hague
conventions, the term “laws of humanity” would extend to “unforeseen cases”
not anticipated in its enumerated instances of wrongdoing. The vital para-
graph of the preamble, reproduced as an epigraph to this chapter, contains the
Martens clause. The thrust of the Martens clause is that “general principles”
may be used as a gap-filler to cover acts formally outside the scope of the
conventions. Article 22 of the Hague regulations presupposes these “general
principles” in its assertion that “the right of belligerents to adopt means of
injuring the enemy is not unlimited.”1
Not until the London Charter of 1945, which served as the basis for the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, were crimes against humanity
prosecuted as violations of international law. Even so, U.S. jurists, politicians,
and policymakers never entirely overcame their tendency to identify crimes
against humanity with war crimes. One of the primary arguments of this book
is that the desire to defend U.S. sovereignty from external interference, not
the abstract, undiluted pursuit of justice, conditioned U.S. interpretation of
Nazi criminality, causing U.S. policymakers and courts in the immediate post-
war years to elide the distinction between crimes against humanity and war
crimes.
The Overture to Nuremberg:
The Moscow Declaration and the Morgenthau Plan
In spring and summer 1942, the first reports of the Nazi annihilation of
European Jews began to trickle out of occupied Europe. These were not ephem-
eral rumors but soundly documented accounts from firsthand witnesses. The
Inter-Allied Conference on War Crimes, a group of fugitives from Nazi Ger-
many who lobbied for legal punishment of Nazi perpetrators, implored the
Allies to act. Moved by their plea, Winston Churchill warned in a speech
delivered in the House of Commons on September 8, 1942, that “those who
are guilty of the Nazi crimes will have to stand up before tribunals in every
land where their atrocities have been committed in order that an indelible
warning may be given to future ages.” Franklin Roosevelt echoed this
commination in his statement that the United States would ensure, once the
war ended, that war criminals were delivered up to the United Nations for
trial. At the same time, the Soviet Union declaimed against “the barbaric
violation by the German Government of the elementary rules of international
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law.” Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov spoke of a “special international tribu-
nal” that would try German leaders after the war.2
The brio of their public statements masked the Anglo-American leaders’
fears of acting hastily in the matter. Their concerns were several: assigning too
much clout to governments-in-exile; provoking reprisals on Allied POWs in
German hands; and a growing disquietude at the prospect of cooperating with
the Russians on war crimes trials. In October 1943 U.S., British, and Soviet
foreign ministers met in Moscow to formulate a concerted policy on war crimes
trials. The immediate result of this meeting was the Moscow Declaration, a
joint resolution announcing the Allies’ intention to return Nazi war criminals
to the countries where they had perpetrated their crimes for prosecution by
national tribunals. The Moscow Declaration went on to exempt “the major
war criminals whose offences have no particular geographical location” from
these national trials. Instead, the major war criminals would “be punished by a
joint decision of the Governments of the Allies.” The phrase “joint decision”
was vague; its wording left open the possibility—although the Moscow Decla-
ration made no explicit mention of it—of an international tribunal convened
to adjudicate the crimes of the major war criminals.3
From all accounts, the Allies were deeply affected by mounting evidence
of crimes without historical parallel. Shock yielded to outrage, and outrage to
a spirit of vengeance that gripped the Allied leadership on all sides. At the
Yalta Summit in April 1945, Churchill had suggested to Stalin that a list of
the “grand criminals” be compiled, and these criminals were to be arrested and
shot after establishing their identity. Churchill had grounds for thinking his
proposal would strike a responsive chord in Stalin: during their meeting at
Teheran in November 1943, Stalin had proposed that after the war the Allies
should decapitate the German army by executing 50,000 of its officers and
technicians.4 The British and Soviets were not alone in wishing to deal puni-
tively with Nazi war criminals. Roosevelt’s secretary of the treasury, Henry
Morgenthau Jr., was an assimilated Jewish American profoundly angered by
reports concerning the mass destruction of European Jews. In 1944 he urged
FDR to deindustrialize Germany after the war—a plan that would destroy
Germany’s capacity to wage war in the future. He outlined a postwar reckoning
with Nazi war criminals, striking a balance between the Moscow Declaration
and the British proposal for summary executions. Morgenthau recommended
that military commissions be established to prosecute second-tier war crimi-
nals. If the governments of countries in which criminal acts were committed
requested extradition of a defendant, these military commissions would relin-
quish jurisdiction to the requesting government. But first-tier war criminals,
dubbed by Morgenthau the “arch-criminals,” would not be given their day in
court. Because their “obvious guilt has generally been recognized by the United
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Nations,” the formalities of a trial could be dispensed with in their cases.
Morgenthau recommended that they be arrested, identified, and shot by a
U.N. firing squad.5
Morgenthau’s plan found a doughty opponent in Secretary of War Henry
Stimson. He objected that Morgenthau’s “pastoralization” of Germany would
raise the specter of starvation for millions of Germans, sowing the seeds for a
future war. Instead, Stimson proposed that major war criminals be prosecuted
before an international tribunal assembled for that purpose. It would be an
authentic trial, not a kangaroo court in which guilt was a foregone conclusion;
a war crimes defendant would enjoy U.S.-style legal rights, “namely, notifica-
tion to the accused of the charge, the right to be heard and, within reasonable
limits, to call witnesses in his defense.” According to Stimson, defendants
would be charged with violating the “laws of the Rules of War.” He pointedly
discounted the notion of prosecuting anything other than war crimes, imply-
ing by analogy that a military commission had no more jurisdiction over a
crime unconnected to the conduct of war than a foreign court would have to
prosecute defendants involved in lynchings in the American South.6 Stimson’s
argument by analogy ruled out the possibility of trying Nazi defendants for
crimes against humanity.
Members within FDR’s administration also were outspokenly opposed to
Morgenthau’s plan. FDR vacillated, affording Stimson and like-minded Penta-
gon officials the opportunity to formulate a concrete alternative to the
Morgenthau scheme. A New York lawyer, Colonel Murray C. Bernays of the
Pentagon’s Special Projects Branch, was tasked with developing this alterna-
tive plan. He prepared a six-page memorandum (“Trial of European War Crimi-
nals”) setting forth the details of a comprehensive postwar prosecution of Nazi
war criminals. Historian Bradley Smith has characterized Bernays’s memoran-
dum as “the most important single source for the ideas that shaped the subse-
quent prosecutions at Nuremberg.” Foremost among Bernays’s influential ideas
was the strategy of making the Anglo-American theory of conspiracy the cor-
nerstone of war crimes prosecution.7
The power of conspiracy as a theory of criminal liability is manifold, but
its chief attraction for Bernays was its extension of liability to all members of
the conspiracy for the crimes of any individual member, where such crimes
were the foreseeable results of the conspiracy and furthered its goal. The law of
conspiracy, Bernays realized, would solve one of the vexing problems of Nazi
war crimes prosecution that had haunted the British—that is, the logistical
difficulty involved in prosecuting the enormous number of defendants in indi-
vidual trials. He proposed trying the Nazi Party and assorted government orga-
nizations (the Gestapo, the SA, and the SS) corporately for violations of the
laws of war before an international tribunal. Although individual defendants
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would be prosecuted on the merits of their cases, each accused would represent
an organization charged with participation in the criminal conspiracy; thus,
once the accused was convicted and punished by the court, his confederates
within the organization would as co-conspirators be subject to arrest, a summary
trial, and sentencing by the Allies. In this way, the need to try unmanageable
numbers of defendants individually would be obviated. There are glaring due
process problems in this scheme, but Bernays was less concerned with giving
Nazi defendants U.S. constitutional guarantees than was Stimson. Nor were
Bernays’s superiors in the War Department disturbed by these considerations
any more than they were troubled by building a prosecution plan around the
Anglo-American doctrine of conspiracy, a charge that had never before sur-
faced in international law. For the pragmatic minds in the War Department,
Bernays’s approach served two crucial functions: it responded to public calls
for an articulate policy to deal with Nazi atrocities and challenged the
Morgenthau plan at its root.8
As it moved upward through the hierarchy of the War Department, Bernays’s
memorandum won adherents, among them Henry Stimson. In January 1945
Stimson, Edward Stettinius Jr. (the new secretary of state), and Francis Biddle
(the U.S. Attorney General and later the U.S. judge at Nuremberg) developed
a war crimes trial program along the lines suggested by Bernays. Central to the
plan was the charge of conspiracy. It also followed Bernays in recommending
that both Nazi leaders and organizations like the SA, SS, and Gestapo be
charged with war crimes and with conspiracy to carry them out. Once the
major war criminals and the organizations they represented had been tried and
convicted before an international court, it would remain to arrest and pros-
ecute smaller cogs in the Nazi criminal conspiracy. These lesser defendants
would be prosecuted in “subsequent trials,” in which “the only necessary proof
of guilt of any particular defendant would be . . . membership in one of these
organizations.”9
FDR’s successor, Harry Truman, wasted little time in adopting the Stimson
plan as official U.S. policy. In May 1945 Truman appointed Supreme Court
Justice Robert H. Jackson “chief of counsel for the prosecution of Axis crimi-
nality.” After his appointment, Jackson had effective control of war crimes
planning. His task in the ensuing months was to persuade other nations to
endorse the U.S. plan. At roughly the same time as Jackson became chief of
counsel, the United States presented a sketch of its plan to representatives
from other countries assembled in San Francisco for the United Nation’s found-
ing conference. On May 3, Stettinius and Judge Sam Rosenman, whom FDR
had appointed as his personal representative on Nazi war crimes, met with
envoys from Great Britain and the USSR. The United States dilated on its
proposed plan for trying Nazi war criminals before an international tribunal
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consisting of a representative judge from each of the four Control Council
powers (Great Britain, the United States, France, and the USSR). Each of the
four powers would also designate a representative (as Truman had already done
with Jackson) to serve on a committee to gather evidence for the trials. In
addition to the “top Nazis,” war criminals to be extradited to the countries
where they had perpetrated their crimes, and criminals “whose crimes were
not geographically located,” the United States identified a final group of de-
fendants whose prosecution would be more problematic—those involved in
crimes in which all the witnesses were dead or evidence was not extant. To
solve this problem, Rosenman proposed to “place on trial the Nazi organiza-
tions themselves rather than the individuals and . . . convict them and all
their members of engaging in a criminal conspiracy to control the world, to
persecute minorities, to break treaties, to invade other nations and to commit
crimes.” After an organization had been “convicted,” every member shown to
have joined it freely “would ipso facto be guilty of a war crime.”10
The British, Soviet, and French delegates assented to the U.S. plan. In
the wake of the San Francisco conference, legal representatives from Great
Britain, the United States, France, and the USSR met in London to prepare
an accord regarding the trials of German war criminals, containing a charter
that, in its detailed enunciation of the charges against the major offenders,
would subsequently become the governing instrument of the tribunal, as well
as the touchstone of both the prosecution and the defense. Article 6(c) of the
charter, dealing with “crimes against humanity,” would later serve as the pri-
mary charge against the euthanasia specialists in the U.S. Doctors’ Trial. The
U.S. approach to Nazi criminality in the charter stayed remarkably faithful to
Murray Bernays’s original conspiracy plan. Conspiracy, in fact, was the axle
around which the wheel of the three primary charges—crimes against peace,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity—revolved, as reflected in the charter’s
statement that “leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices participating
in the formulation or execution of a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit
any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any per-
sons in execution of such plan.” In brief, this meant that defendants would
not only be charged with the substantive charge but also with conspiracy to
commit the illegal act. Articles 9 and 10 extended the U.S. conspiracy theory
even further by authorizing the tribunal to criminalize German organizations,
thus enabling any signatory nation of the London Charter to prosecute former
members of such organizations solely on the basis of their membership. In this
manner, state authorities in subsequent national trials would need only submit
proof that the IMT had declared the organization in question criminal; once
this was done, a defendant indicted for membership in it could not challenge
the court’s findings on the issue.11
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The centrality of Bernays’s conspiracy theory to the U.S. conception of
Nazi criminality is also evident in Jackson’s Report to President Truman of
June 6, 1945. In his report, Jackson set forth with lapidary clarity the U.S.
intention to prosecute only those crimes committed in furtherance of a “mas-
ter plan” to wage aggressive war against other nations:
Our case against the major defendants is concerned with the Nazi master
plan, not with individual barbarities and perversions which occurred
independently of any central plan. The groundwork of our case must be
factually authentic and constitute a well-documented history of what we
are convinced was a grand, concerted pattern to incite and commit the
aggressions and barbarities which have shocked the world.12
This paragraph—particularly the language in the first sentence, excluding the
prosecution by the Allies of “individual barbarities and perversions which oc-
curred independently of any central plan”—makes clear the U.S. refusal to
proceed against crimes arising from motives unrelated to the larger plan to
attack Germany’s European neighbors. For Jackson and his compatriots, the
IMT would only try and punish those Nazi defendants whose crimes promoted
Hitler’s imperialistic war of domination.
Based on Jackson’s report, one would think that crimes against humanity
as a separate count would find cold comfort in the U.S. conspiracy-based ap-
proach, inasmuch as they are not technically war crimes. In fact, this was not
the case. The U.S. decision to push for including crimes against humanity in
the indictment against the major war criminals was influenced by anti-fascist
German, Austrian, and Czechoslovakian refugees (many of them Jewish) from
Nazi Germany, who, fearful that the Nazis’ brutalization and mass murder of
German nationals and stateless persons would not be redressed in a postwar
trial, implored the Allies to render justice for these outrages. The U.S. del-
egate to the U.N. War Crimes Commission in 1944, Herbert Pell, champi-
oned their cause, arguing that “crimes committed against stateless persons or
against any persons because of their race or religion” must be punished after
the war. The U.S. representatives in London carried this commitment to crimes
against humanity with them into their negotiations with the other Allies. In
their drafts of crimes potentially chargeable against the Nazis, the United
States cited “wars of aggression,” violations of the “laws and customs of war,”
and, in support of a count based on crimes against humanity, “atrocities and
persecutions,” whether or not German law at the time had recognized their
legality. These same drafts used language that would eventually filter into Ar-
ticle 6(c) of the charter, particularly the phrase “persecutions on racial or reli-
gious grounds.”13
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Crimes Against Humanity and the Ex Post Facto Question
The U.S. interests in prosecuting crimes against humanity received sym-
pathetic responses from the other Allies. Like Jackson and the U.S. team in
London, the British had been implored by Jewish groups to prosecute racially
and religiously motivated crimes perpetrated by the Nazis. The French and
Soviet representatives, whose civilian populations had experienced firsthand
the barbarism of National Socialist racial policy, readily agreed to include a
reference to such crimes in the charter. In 1943 Professor Hersh Lauterpacht,
an eminent international legal scholar, had called upon the Allies to prosecute
Nazi war criminals for their murderous treatment of European Jews that did
not formally qualify as war crimes. He used the phrase “crimes against human-
ity” to describe such crimes.14 Influenced by Lauterpacht, Robert Jackson
adopted the phrase to denote crimes of racial or religious persecution. The
term “crimes against humanity” thereafter was incorporated into a final draft
of the London Charter, which later served as the legal basis for Article 6 of the
Nuremberg charter and the Allies’ indictment. The text of Article 6 of the
IMT Charter defined “crimes against humanity” as follows:
. . . murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane
acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war,
or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or
in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,
whether or not in violation of domestic law of the country where perpe-
trated.15
There is more to the charter’s definition of crimes against humanity than
meets the eye. According to scholars like Bradley Smith, Lawrence Douglas,
and M. Cherif Bassiouni, one of the Allies’ paramount concerns at the Lon-
don Conference was to avoid the appearance that the Allies’ trials of German
war criminals were instances of ex post facto law—that is, holding a defendant
legally accountable for an action that, at the time it was performed, was not
specifically proscribed by law. Prior to the outbreak of war in 1939, there was
no statute that forbade genocide or racial persecution; hence, prosecuting Nazi
defendants for crimes against humanity as an independent theory of criminal
liability would be an application of ex post facto law. For this reason, Smith,
Douglas, and Bassiouni contend, the drafters made crimes against humanity
an “auxiliary category” of the two other charges in the charter, “crimes against
peace” and “war crimes.” The relevant inkblot in the charter’s definition of
“crimes against humanity” is the comma after the phrase “before or during the
war.” The original draft had inserted a semicolon after this phrase. The Berlin
Protocol of October 6, 1945, changed the semicolon to a comma in the final
version. This alteration effectively bound crimes against humanity to any act
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under the tribunal’s jurisdiction—that is, to war crimes and crimes against
peace. The change meant that crimes against humanity could be prosecuted
only where they were proven to further the Nazis’ conspiracy to wage aggres-
sive war on its neighbors or commit war crimes.16
Although Smith, Douglas, and Bassiouni’s argument about the Allies’ con-
cern for the principles of legality may be sound enough with respect to France
and the USSR, I believe it has less merit as applied to the United States and
Great Britain. The Anglo-Americans had more scruples about principles of
sovereignty than the principles of legality, and it was these concerns that caused
them to insist on mooring crimes against humanity to war crimes and crimes
against peace. In his address to tribunal members on this issue, the British
prosecutor, Hartley Shawcross, made clear the British concern not to infringe
purely domestic matters in Germany in prosecuting crimes against humanity:
The considerations which apply here are . . . different to those affecting
the other classes of offense, the crime against peace or the ordinary war
crime. You have to be satisfied not only that what was done was a crime
against humanity but also that it was not purely a domestic matter but that
directly or indirectly it was associated with crimes against other nations or
other nationals, in that, for instance, it was undertaken in order to
strengthen the Nazi Party in carrying out its policy of domination by
aggression, or to remove elements such as political opponents, the aged,
the Jews, the existence of which would have hindered the carrying out of
the total war policy.17
That the principles of legality, in contrast to the principle of sovereignty, were
of relatively minor importance to U.S. and British authorities is proven in
other Anglo-American primary source documents. In an article published in
German in 1947 defending the national trials of Nazi war criminals under
Control Council Law #10, English jurist and University of London professor
R. H. Graveson admitted that charging crimes against humanity under Law
#10 was an example of retroactive legislation, that is, an ex post facto law. He
pointed out, however, that retroactivity was only one interest to be protected
in criminal law, and by no means the only one. A more compelling interest
within the scope of Nazi criminal prosecution was the need to punish abhor-
rent and monstrously unjust acts. This need overrode the ban on retroactive
prosecution, as the IMT itself had recognized. For Graveson, as for the IMT,
the principles of legality were subordinate to the demands of justice.18
U.S. Chief of Counsel Robert Jackson was adamant about the overriding
imperative to sanction Nazi war criminals. In his Report to the President in
June 1945, Jackson posed the rhetorical question of how the Allies should
treat Nazi perpetrators:
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What shall we do with them? We could, of course, set them at large
without a hearing. But it has cost unmeasured thousands of American lives
to beat and bind these men. To free them without a trial would mock the
dead and make cynics of the living.
Jackson’s report foreshadows language he would use a few months later in his
opening address at Nuremberg: “The wrongs which we seek to condemn and
punish have been so calculated, so malignant, and so devastating, that civili-
zation cannot tolerate their being ignored, because it cannot tolerate their
being repeated.”19 Given the moral ardor of Jackson’s words, it is hard to imag-
ine how the formalistic principles of legality could have guided his decision to
make crimes against humanity dependent on recognized principles of interna-
tional law (war crimes and crimes against peace).
We have already observed the reticence of some U.S. policymakers to
violate the perceived sovereignty of the Nazi government. Secretary of War
Henry Stimson denied the jurisdictional authority of an international court to
try any offense unrelated to the conduct of war. In his memo to Roosevelt,
Stimson appeared to believe that wielding jurisdiction over crimes indepen-
dent of war would open the door to international violations of territorial sov-
ereignty. Nor is Stimson’s position unrepresentative of ideas about the invio-
lability of sovereignty in U.S. history—and the fear that foreign powers will
trench upon it. Much of the curious nineteenth-century bigotry in the United
States toward Catholics and Freemasons was rooted in irrational but real con-
cerns that the Papacy, or some other foreign agency, would insinuate itself into
U.S. political life and sabotage the Republic. Woodrow Wilson’s failure to gain
Congressional approval for the League of Nations after World War I was largely
because of apprehensions that an international body with superordinate juris-
diction would compromise U.S. sovereignty. Arguably, U.S. opposition to an
international war crimes tribunal after World War I was premised on the sov-
ereignty principle. When seen in historical context, the attitudes of U.S.
policymakers toward crimes against humanity as an independently actionable
species of criminality seem more intelligible. We cannot but marvel, given this
context, that the United States emerged as the primary advocate of interna-
tional trials following World War II.
Furthermore, by focusing on crimes related to the war, Jackson could bet-
ter redeem the U.S. all-encompassing theory of Nazi criminality: a conspiracy
among virtually all sectors of German society (the Nazi Party, the German
government, the military, and business) to wage aggressive war against other
countries. On the U.S. view, crimes against humanity, including the murder
of the mentally ill and European Jews, were byways along the highway of impe-
rialistic war. They were not, on this view, the animating force behind Nazi
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criminality, but incidental byproducts of the Germans’ implacable urge to wage
war to expand Germany’s borders at the cost of its European neighbors. This
conception of Nazi criminality was embodied in the London Agreement and
the IMT Charter; it dominated the U.S. approach to Nazi criminality, both
during the IMT proceedings and the U.S. Doctors’ Trial.
The hinge joining the IMT Charter and Control Council Law #10 (the
legal instrument that served as the basis for the 1947 Doctors’ Trial) was a
document issued by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “JCS 1023/10.” JCS 1023/
10 was a directive approved by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff on July 15, 1945,
setting forth what its authors hoped would be the model for war crimes policy
throughout occupied Germany. It was heavily influenced by Jackson’s Report
to the President of June 1945, reproducing almost word for word his definition
of the crimes chargeable against Nazi defendants. Like the IMT Charter, JCS
1023/10 envisioned prosecuting both principals and accessories, as well as
“members of groups or organizations connected with the commission of such
crimes.” These included Nazi Party and SS officers, members of the General
Staff, and the legal staffs of the Nazi “Peoples’ Courts,” who were to be de-
tained by theater commanders and tried if evidence warranted trial. Theater
commanders, however, were instructed to delay trial of higher-ranking officials
until it was decided whether they would be prosecuted before an international
tribunal. Jackson’s Office of the U.S. Chief of Counsel at Nuremberg was
chosen as the administrative office, charged with implementing the terms of
the directive. In late November 1945, the legal adviser to the Office of the
Military Government U.S. (OMGUS) approached Telford Taylor (at the time
involved in prosecuting members of the German General Staff before the IMT)
about heading the project.20
Crimes Against Humanity and Control Council Law #10
The Control Council, which served as the Allied occupation government
of Germany, meanwhile prepared a draft of its own law on Nazi war crimes
prosecution. Modeled on JCS 1023/10, the draft was enacted as Control Council
Law #10 on December 20, 1945. The framers of Law #10 defined its purpose as
threefold: first, to implement the terms of the Moscow Declaration (specifi-
cally, those portions of the declaration that envisioned the return of minor
war criminals to the countries where their crimes were committed and a sepa-
rate proceeding to deal with the major war criminals); second, to implement
the London Agreement and Charter; and finally, “to establish a uniform legal
basis in Germany for the prosecution of war criminals and other similar of-
fenders, other than those dealt with by the IMT.” Further, Law #10 outlined
the scope of crimes for which Nazi defendants could be held criminally liable.
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In defining such crimes, the drafters of Law #10 drew explicitly on the charges
sketched in Jackson’s Report to the President (and embodied in JCS 1023/10),
as well as those propounded in the London agreement. These included “crimes
against peace,” “war crimes,” and “crimes against humanity”—all virtually the
same as the charges in the London Charter and JCS 1023/10. Consistent with
these two antecedent documents, Law #10 also provided the charge of mem-
bership in organizations deemed criminal by the IMT.21
To assert that Law #10’s definition of crimes against humanity was sub-
stantially the same as that described in the charter and JCS 1023/10 is not to
say they were identical. In fact, the wordsmiths who fashioned Law #10’s ver-
sion of crimes against humanity introduced a crucial amendment—or, rather,
a crucial omission—in its version. Consider again the charter’s Article 6 ver-
sion defining crimes against humanity:
. . . murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane
acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or
persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or
not in violation of domestic law of the country where perpetrated.22
(emphasis added)
Law #10’s definition, on the other hand, defines crimes against humanity as
“atrocities and offences, including but not limited to murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane
acts committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on political,
racial or religious grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of
the country where perpetrated.” The critical omissions from Law #10’s version
are the two phrases in the charter’s definition above, “before or during the
war” and “in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdic-
tion of the Tribunal.” With these elisions, the drafters of Law #10 dissolved
the link between crimes against humanity and war crimes, transforming the
former into its own self-contained, independently chargeable offense.23
The odor of ex post facto law would cling to the prosecution of the major
war criminals in front of the IMT. Defenders of these trials, however, could
always rebut charges of retroactivity by pointing to specific written documents
that expressed an international condemnation of war crimes before Hitler came
to power in 1933; in some cases, as with the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928),
Germany had been among the signatories. By connecting crimes against hu-
manity to war crimes, defenders of the IMT trials could at least make a plau-
sible case that prosecuting crimes against humanity was in keeping with prior
law, and thus did not violate the principles of legality. This argument became
less convincing once the link with war crimes was annulled. The U.S. jurists
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presiding over the subsequent trials under Law #10 deflected the ex post facto
objections of defense counsel with various justifications. In the Justice Case
(Case 4), which prosecuted sixteen defendants charged with perverting the
judicial process (particularly its involvement in “racial defilement” cases), the
judges first pointed out that ex post facto law is not an absolute bar to prosecu-
tion in international law, then added that in any event the defendants must
have known their actions were wrongful. In the Einsatzgruppen and Krupp cases
(Cases 9 and 10),24 the judges defended their jurisdiction on the grounds that
international law had criminalized the defendants’ conduct well before they
had perpetrated their crimes. These justifications were often made by way of ex
cathedra statements with little analysis or sustained argumentation.
To a certain extent, we are jumping ahead of ourselves in discussing the
subsequent trials under Law #10. The first of these proceedings, the Doctors’
Trial, would bring U.S. judicial authorities face to face with the Nazis’ cam-
paign of annihilation against “life unworthy of life.” Even before the Doctors’
Trial, however, U.S. military officials presided in judgment over German medical
personnel charged with murdering hundreds of Russian and Polish workers at
the Hadamar killing center. As we will see, the U.S. Hadamar trial in fall 1945
already presages the U.S. tendency to conceive of Nazi criminality as an out-
growth of imperialistic war. This tendency was nourished and reinforced by
extra-legal concerns to protect the principle of sovereignty. U.S. policymakers,
in short, feared that allowing crimes perpetrated by governments on their own
people to be prosecuted in international criminal courts would open the door
to future trials of U.S. officials. Such a possibility represented an erosion of
sovereignty that U.S. policymakers would not tolerate.
THE U.S. HADAMAR TRIAL, OCTOBER 1945
Americans first glimpsed the Nazi euthanasia program through the fogged lens
of sensationalized accounts in hometown newspapers. The unvarnished truth
of what happened at the Hadamar euthanasia center in Hessen-Nassau, how-
ever, was more chilling than any of the embroidered newspaper stories. The
sensational features of these news accounts were unnecessary to portray Hadamar
in a notorious light; the reality was grotesque enough. Yet, the distortions in
the newspaper stories are emblematic of the fumbling early efforts by the United
States to understand the National Socialist destruction of “life unworthy of
life.” Although that understanding improved with time, it never wholly over-
came the tendency to squeeze Nazi euthanasia into misleading a priori catego-
ries and questionable interpretive frameworks. This tendency was intrinsic to
the correspondence and memoranda generated in the planning stages of the
Nuremberg International Military Tribunal. It manifested itself in an U.S.
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criminal proceeding in the case of U.S. v. Alfons Klein et al., the U.S. Hadamar
trial held October 8–15, 1945.
Hadamar was a town of 6,000 people in the German state of Hessen-
Nassau, twenty-seven miles south of the city of Wiesbaden. From 1939 until
1940, the institution at Hadamar served both as a mental hospital and a hos-
pital for German soldiers and POWs. In late 1940, it was selected as a replace-
ment killing center for the euthanasia institution at Grafeneck, which, along
with Brandenburg, was closed in December 1940. Over the next nine months,
until it temporarily closed in August 1941, the T-4 medical staff at Hadamar
gassed at least 10,000 mentally disabled German nationals. In his interroga-
tion by the U.S. Army in 1945, the director of Hadamar, Alfons Klein, claimed
that euthanasia at Hadamar ceased from August 1941 until August 1942, at
which time the killing of mental patients resumed, this time by means of
narcotics overdoses. During this second phase, children’s wards were estab-
lished at Hadamar to murder two distinct groups of children: mentally dis-
abled German youngsters and Mischlingkinder, or half-Jewish children (many of
whom were healthy before they were killed). Also during the second phase,
Hadamar personnel killed concentration camp prisoners as part of the “14f13”
The Hadamar killing center in Hessen-Nassau, the subject of the 1945 U.S. Army trial by
military commission and the 1947 trial by a German court. Courtesy Archiv des Landes-
wohlfahrtsverbandes Hessen, Kassel
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operation. It is unclear whether another group of victims, the asocials, was
murdered at Hadamar; although a witness at the German Hadamar trial in
1947 testified about plans to exterminate the inmates of workhouses there
(i.e., beggars, the homeless, and prostitutes), the evidence—much of it de-
stroyed in the waning months of the war—is not definitive on the issue. The
final victim group killed at Hadamar, hundreds of Polish and Russian forced
laborers ill with tuberculosis, was the subject of the U.S. Hadamar trial by
army personnel in October 1945.25
U.S. jurisdiction over the Hadamar defendants was premised on JCS 1023/
10, which assigned authority for war crimes trials to military theater com-
manders. Under its terms, responsibility for conducting the trials was reserved
to the Office of the Military Government for Germany (OMGUS) and the
Deputy Judge Advocate for War Crimes, European Command. On August 25,
1945, U.S. generals were authorized to indict and prosecute German defen-
dants suspected of war crimes. The trials would be conducted before one of two
bodies: either a “specially appointed” military court or a military commission
formed by the commander of an army in the field. A significant component in
the legal foundation of the military commissions was not statutory;26 rather, it
was the “common law of war,” which did not specify the kind of trial to be
given a war criminal—only that the procedure be a fair one. In trials before
military commissions, the commission itself was free to fashion rules of proce-
dure ad hoc, although, to facilitate the proceeding, the forms of General Courts-
Martial (such as the use of charge sheets) could be adopted. Significantly, the
rules of evidence observed in General Courts-martial were not binding on
military commissions. Rules of evidence were to be applied only to expedite
the trial and to prevent irrelevancies “lacking probative value.” The principle
governing admissibility was whether the proffered evidence “has probative value
to a reasonable man” as determined by the president of the commission.27
The U.S. Army’s early intramural correspondence about the Hadamar kill-
ing center set the tone for the U.S. Hadamar trial. In a memorandum from
HQ V Corps, Office of the Inspector General, dated April 6, 1945, Col. John
W. McCaslin described Hadamar as part of the “mercy killing program” estab-
lished in Germany “in accordance with the existing laws of Germany, which
permitted mercy killings and which became effective in 1939.” McCaslin was
no doubt referring to the Hitler decree of September 1, 1939 (actually signed
on October 1 and backdated to September 1), a document that empowered
Philipp Bouhler of the KdF and Karl Brandt to authorize doctors to “grant a
mercy death” to “incurable” patients. According to McCaslin, the Nazis em-
ployed Hadamar to murder political enemies and foreign laborers. He then
declares that under international law the army was “only concerned with the
murder of these foreign forced laborers, and the fact must be established that
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the forced laborers were in good health at the time of extermination, other-
wise no war atrocity has been committed under the existing laws of the Ger-
man government.”28
The claimed legality of the euthanasia program under German law appears
in other army correspondence from spring and summer 1945. In a War Crimes
Branch Summary Worksheet, an anonymous army officer portrays the killings
at Hadamar as “systematic murder in which 20,000 political prisoners, Jews,
and slave laborers are estimated to have been put to death by unidentified SS
men on orders from Berlin at a concentration camp at Hadamar, Germany
under a 1939 statute.” Revisionist historians would have a field day with the
inaccuracies in this statement: Hadamar was not a concentration camp, but a
mental institution devoted to ridding Germany of “unworthy life”; little if any
evidence exists that “political prisoners” were killed there; the killers were
not, for the most part, SS men but employees of the KdF and, later, rank-and-
file staff members of the institution; and, finally, the Hitler decree was not a
statute, but an unpublished decree—no law, as we have seen, was ever pub-
lished formally legalizing euthanasia in Germany. These mistakes recur in an
office memo to Lt. Col. Leon Jaworski (appointed decades later as the special
prosecutor in the Watergate scandal) from a Major Burton, dated May 31,
1945, who depicted the Hadamar killings as “the wholesale massacre and mur-
der of thousands of political prisoners, Jews, and slave laborers at Hadamar
concentration camp, Germany, by Gestapo and SS men.” The factual errors in
these documents suggest that U.S. military authorities regarded the euthana-
sia killings through the optic of their prior traumatic encounters with Nazi
brutality—particularly the discovery of concentration camps in Germany by the
U.S. Army and of the death camps by the Red Army in Poland, as well as the
Malmédy massacre on December 17, 1944. The inextricable association of these
events with the SS may account for the army’s predisposition to (mis)interpret
other instances of National Socialist violence in light of it.29
Most significantly for our purposes, these documents reveal the degree to
which the army had assumed a legal basis in German law for the euthanasia
program. Their presumption of legality meant that army officials would only
consider prosecuting defendants who had killed mentally healthy victims at
Hadamar. To prosecute these same defendants for killing the mentally disabled
would breach the principle of sovereignty, according to which foreign powers
are not legally permitted to intervene in the domestic affairs of another coun-
try. A July 1945 memorandum to a Lt. Col. Mize amply demonstrates the U.S.
overriding concern with state sovereignty. Affirming that the Hadamar staff
had carried out the killings pursuant to a 1939 German law, the memo’s author
denies that the army had any business prosecuting the accused for killing men-
tally ill German patients, “because there appears to be no substantial evidence
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that those Germans who were killed were not, in fact, incurably insane.” On
the other hand, the author continues, “there is an abundance of evidence that
many of the Russians and Poles were neither insane nor incurably ill from any
other disease. . . . [I]t matters little whether the law itself, which permitted
the killings under certain circumstances, would be a good defense if those
circumstances were complied with because they were not, in fact, complied
with insofar . . . as the Russians and Poles were concerned.”30
It is clear from these excerpts that U.S. Army officials were concerned
above all else with defending state power. Technically, the Americans could
have prosecuted the Hadamar defendants for killing mentally ill Russian and
Polish workers; their mental capacity had no bearing on their protection by
the Geneva and Hague conventions. In the pre-trial army correspondence,
however, the option of trying the Hadamar staff for murdering the mentally ill
of any nationality was ruled out from the beginning. As Colonel McCaslin
asserted, only if the United States could prove the murdered eastern workers
were healthy at the time of their death could they obtain a conviction under
international law. If, on the contrary, the workers were incurably insane, then
they were covered by German law—or so the United States presumed. For the
U.S. Army officials, to prosecute the defendants for performing an act legal
under German law at the time of its commission would be an impermissible
incursion into the domestic affairs of the Third Reich.
The aversion of U.S. military officials to prosecuting acts considered legal
under then existing German law structured the army JAG lawyers’ approach
to the Hadamar killings during the trial. The commitment of U.S. officials to
focus only on the murders of mentally healthy eastern workers clearly emerges
in the prosecution’s opening statement before the military commission, in
which the prosecution describes Hadamar as a mental hospital that cared for
the mentally disabled until summer 1944, when it was converted into a killing
center for Poles and Russians.31 This depiction ignores the thousands of Ger-
man adults, disabled children, and half-Jewish youngsters murdered at Hadamar
long before then. The prosecution not only neglected to mention this prior
history but strove throughout the trial to counter the defense’s attempts to
locate the murders of the eastern workers within the context of the euthanasia
program. Inasmuch as this contextualization was the defendants’ best chance
of escaping the hangman’s noose, the struggle over the degree to which it
should be foregrounded became the central theme of the trial.
From the outset, the basic theory of the defense was straightforward: the
defendants may have been involved in killing through lethal injections the
tubercular eastern workers, but they had believed at the time their actions
were sanctioned by a 1939 German law and thus were unaware their actions
were wrongful. Of course, to raise this defense required the presentation of
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evidence concerning the alleged law and the program of mass killing developed
under its aegis. Attempts by defense counsel to do just that led to the trial’s
most important legal clashes. During the presentation of its case in chief, the
prosecution called a former nurse at Hadamar, Minna Zachow, to recount how
Polish and Russian forced laborers were given lethal injections there during
summer 1944. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked the witness to
estimate how many German mental patients were killed at Hadamar between
August 8, 1942 (i.e., the date when killings resumed after the “pause”), and
March 3, 1945. This line of questioning drew an objection from the prosecu-
tor, who argued:
[T]he charge doesn’t cover any Germans at all. We could be here a month
trying that. Counsel’s clients are not on trial for any German nationals they
may have killed. This is confined entirely to the Russian and the Polish.32
Defense counsel responded that “there was no distinction made between the
Russians and Poles and . . . thousands of Germans were killed at the same
hospital by the prosecution’s witnesses and they thought it perfectly proper.”
The prosecution retorted that defense counsel’s exploration of the euthanasia
program as it affected German mentally disabled patients at Hadamar was ir-
relevant, because the defendants were not charged with murdering German
nationals. Defense counsel defended the relevance of the questioning on the
grounds that “it goes to the heart of the defense, i.e. the action against the
Poles and Russians was part of the larger program of euthanasia authorized by
the ‘law of the land.’ ” Although admitting the commission had no jurisdiction
over the murders of mentally disabled German victims, the defense insisted
that their deaths were relevant “in order that we get a complete history and
picture of this institution at Hadamar. . . . [The court] must consider the
picture as it was at Hadamar and become acquainted with the state of mind of
the accused and all other personnel at the institution.”33
Defense counsel had logic, law, and the military rules of evidence on its
side in this argument. The widely recognized defense of “mistake of law” was
relevant to the Hadamar proceedings, because it could have negated the defen-
dants’ intent to commit murder, an element necessary to finding the defen-
dants guilty of the offense.* Further, when a defendant has received incorrect
advice about a law or administrative ruling from a person charged with admin-
istering it, the defendant may raise reliance on such advice as a valid defense.34
Given the prosecution’s admission that a law on euthanasia was in existence,
according to which mentally ill Germans were put to death at Hadamar for
* A mistake of law occurs when a defendant reasonably relies on the legitimacy of a
law, judicial decision, or administrative ruling later declared to be invalid.
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years prior to the murders of the eastern European forced workers, evidence of
the degree to which defendants reasonably relied on the euthanasia “statute”
was relevant and material to the “determination of the action” under the rules
of military evidence. As we will see when we take up the German euthanasia
trials in Chapter 3, characterizing the secret Hitler order as a law is dubious;
yet, the U.S. government’s strange willingness to assume the legality of the
Hitler order certainly opened the door to examining the impact of that or-
der—and the program conceived pursuant to it—on the defendants’ state of
mind.
The military commission hearing the case sustained the prosecution’s ob-
jection on the grounds of relevance. Defense counsel did not quietly accept
the commission’s ruling but sought at several junctures in the trial to reopen
the issue of whether the defendants believed their actions were legal based on
the existence of the Hitler “statute.” Each time the defense revisited the is-
sue, the military commission rebuffed its efforts, holding this line of ques-
tioning irrelevant to the case at bar.35 Only when the defense presented its
case in chief did the commission grant some leeway to raise the issue of mis-
take of law.
In its direct examination of Alfons Klein (director of Hadamar from 1939
to 1945) and Adolf Wahlmann (assigned to Hadamar as chief doctor in Au-
gust 1942), defense counsel elicited information about the institution’s func-
tion within the T-4 euthanasia program. Replying to the question whether
Hadamar personnel were aware of the Hitler decree that “permitted the killing
of . . . incurable and mentally diseased patients,” Klein testified that they were
informed in 1940 of the euthanasia “law,” and were instructed that “the Reich
Government decided upon this law, that all incurable, mentally diseased should
die.” On redirect exam, he related that a Gauleiter Sprenger had told him the
Polish and Russian workers would fall under the same euthanasia “law”; for
this reason, he claimed, “I didn’t doubt to any extent that it was not correct.”
In a sworn statement, Adolf Wahlmann claimed that both Klein and State
Councillor Fritz Bernotat, who was in charge of all mental hospitals and nurs-
ing homes in Hessen-Naussau, had assured him the eastern workers brought to
Hadamar in summer 1944 were covered by the Hitler euthanasia order. Other
defendants charged with the murders alluded to the connection between the
“mercy deaths” of mentally ill German patients under the Hitler decree and
the killing of sick eastern workers.36
The prosecution’s discomfiture regarding this testimony is evident in the
trial transcript. On Klein’s redirect examination, his defense counsel invited
him to talk about the refusal of the German legal authorities to intervene in
the killing process at Hadamar, despite their awareness of its existence. The
prosecution balked at this line of questioning. Although the matter was rel-
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Dr. Adolf Wahlmann, chief doctor at the Hadamar mental hospital beginning in August
1942. Convicted by a U.S. military commission in 1945 for his role in the murders of sick
eastern workers, he was found guilty of murder by a German court in March 1947 for
euthanizing German patients at Hadamar. Courtesy HHStAW Abt. 3008, Adolf Wahlmann
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evant to the defendants’ perception of the illegality of their conduct, the military
commission sustained the objection. The prosecution had less success in ob-
jecting to the testimony of Dr. Hans Quanbusch, the former public prosecutor
of Wiesbaden, called as a witness for the defense. He testified that all the
prosecutors and presidents of the German appellate courts throughout the
Reich were summoned to a meeting in the Berlin state court, during which a
photostatic copy of Hitler’s 1939 euthanasia decree was shown to the partici-
pants. Quanbusch described the decree as an administrative order rather than
a law. Nonetheless, the chief prosecutors were instructed to inform their sub-
ordinates that “under no circumstances were they to do anything about charges
that were being filed.” In the event a relative of a patient killed in the eutha-
nasia operation insisted on filing criminal charges against a mental hospital,
the case was to be sent to the Ministry of Justice “as a secret state matter”
(geheime Reichssache). Quanbusch concluded that “through this [quashing of
legal action] the physicians were protected from any suing, and it was impos-
sible for the prosecutor to start any proceedings.” The prosecution moved to
have Quanbusch’s testimony excluded from consideration by the commission
in its findings of fact on the grounds of relevance, arguing that the testimony
dealt with the euthanasia of German mental patients—which was not prop-
erly before the court—and not with eastern workers. The commission over-
ruled the objection, perhaps because defense counsel claimed it was offering
Quanbusch’s testimony as evidence of the duress under which defendants had
acted.37
The government’s efforts to restrict the case to mentally healthy Polish
and Russian forced workers were consistent with the views expressed in the
pre-trial legal memoranda we have previously examined. As in the memo-
randa, so in the Hadamar trial the U.S. commitment to the principle of sov-
ereignty skewed its conception of Nazi euthanasia criminality, leading to a
number of misrepresentations. First, by excluding the mentally ill from the
picture, the prosecution entirely discounted Hadamar’s connection with the
euthanasia program directed at “unworthy life,” in the service of which Hadamar
played a pivotal role. There is little in its portrayal of Hadamar to suggest the
progression of cumulative violence as it spiraled outward from “incurable”
mental patients to include Jews, half-Jewish children, disabled children, and
eastern workers. In the illusory image of Hadamar invented by the prosecu-
tion, the institution “cared” for the mentally ill until the moment when the
tubercular eastern workers arrived in 1944.
The commission’s second misrepresentation concerned the erroneous as-
sumption that the Hitler decree of September 1939 was a valid law affording
a legal basis for the euthanasia of mentally disabled Germans. The first news-
paper accounts about Hadamar in April 1945, presumably based on informa-
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tion provided by army public relations, referred to the decree as a “German
law” or “statute.” Intramural army communiqués leading up to the trial in
October 1945 at no time questioned the legality of the Hitler order. The U.S.
prosecution team’s theory of the case during the trial demonstrated uncritical
acceptance of this belief, steering the prosecution away from any conception
of Hadamar that might involve prosecuting Germans acting under color of
German law. In this fashion, the United States virtually provided a ready-
made defense to the lawyers representing the defendants. By connecting the
killing of the eastern workers to an alleged euthanasia “law,” defense counsel
could persuasively argue that Klein and his codefendants lacked the knowledge
that what they were doing was illegal. That local law enforcement authorities
were aware of the killings but did nothing to prevent them or to hold the
perpetrators legally accountable for them only strengthened the defense counsel’s
argument.
A third misrepresentation concerned the U.S. application of the Anglo-
American doctrine of conspiracy to the Hadamar killings, a doctrine that por-
trayed euthanasia criminality as an offshoot of Nazi warmaking and the
Hadamar defendants as jointly and equally liable for the crimes. We have seen
the degree to which the law of conspiracy dominated the thinking of U.S.
policymakers within the government in the years preceding the Nuremberg
trials. On this theory, the Nazis’ plan to wage an aggressive imperialistic war
was a criminal conspiracy from which all of the regime’s criminality flowed. In
its closing argument before the military commission, the prosecution laid out
its theory of conspiracy, wherein all distinctions between principal and accom-
plice, based on their varying contributions to the criminal conspiracy, are
completely annulled:
In the cases that are carefully schemed and plotted, you will find that
there may be some 10 or 15 who participated in various stages in the
matter laying the preparations and the foundation for the . . . commission
of the act of murder itself. Every single one of those who participated in
any degree toward the accomplishment of that result is as much guilty of
murder as the man who actually pulled the trigger. That is why under our
federal law all distinctions between accessories before the fact and
accessories after the fact have been completely eliminated. Any who
participate in the commission of any crime whether formerly called as an
accessory or what are now co-principals and have been so for several
years.38
The prosecution cited U.S. Code Title 18, section 550: “Whoever directly
commits any act constituting an offense defined in any law or aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces, or procures its commission is a principal.” It
then applied this notion to the Hadamar killings:
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Now, talking about the facts of this case, why with each of them being a
principal, considered a co-principal, one is equally as guilty as the other.
. . . When you do business on a wholesale production basis that they did at
the Hadamar murder factory it means that you have several people doing
different things of that illegal operation in order to produce results and
you cannot draw a distinction between the man that may have initially
conceived the idea of killing them and those that participated in the
commission of those offenses.39
When, in the course of its closing argument, the prosecution referred to the
abolition of distinctions between principals and accomplices, it was describing
the U.S. law of conspiracy as it existed in the mid-1940s. According to con-
spiracy law, where two or more individuals conspire to commit a crime, each is
liable for offenses committed by his or her confederates in furtherance of the
conspiracy. Conspiracy essentially did away with the common law distinctions
between principals and accomplices/accessories.
The intial impetus behind the U.S. decision to apply the law of conspiracy
to the prosecution of Nazi criminality was functional in nature: by obtaining
judicial declarations that certain German organizations were criminal con-
spiracies, U.S. war crimes planners hoped to avoid the intractable problem of
trying the tens of thousands of potential defendants on the merits of each
case. There are, however, obvious drawbacks to conspiracy, chief among them
its tendency to obscure the distinctive contribution of each conspirator to the
crime. In the Hadamar trial, the prosecution successfully argued for the con-
viction and punishment of the defendants as principals—even though they
were all subsidiary actors in the Nazi scheme to destroy “life unworthy of life.”
Surveying the actual contributions of each defendant to the Hadamar
murders highlights the shortcomings in the prosecution’s understanding of
the crime. Seven defendants were indicted at the Hadamar trial: Alfons Klein,
the director; Adolf Wahlmann, the chief doctor; Heinrich Ruoff, the head
male nurse; Karl Willig, the ward male nurse; Irmgard Huber, the head female
nurse; Philip Blum, the institution’s cemetery attendant; and Adolph Merkel,
the registrar and bookkeeper. Despite the defendants’ self-exculpatory repre-
sentations during their army interrogations and at trial, the evidence pre-
sented allows us to recreate the killing of the eastern workers with a reasonable
degree of certainty. Sometime in summer 1944, Klein met with State Council-
lor Bernotat, who informed Klein he had received a letter from the Gau Em-
ployment Office concerning the large numbers of tubercular eastern workers
in Nazi labor camps. According to Klein’s testimony at trial, the letter stated
that these workers were incurably ill and inquired “whether any building or
institution could be used to shelter these sick people.” Bernotat then allegedly
asked Klein whether the sick workers could be accommodated at Hadamar. We
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have reason to doubt Klein’s innocuous portrayal of Bernotat’s request; it seems
highly unlikely that at this critical moment in the war, having already mur-
dered millions of Jews, Poles, and Russians in Eastern Europe, the Nazis would
have transferred “incurable” eastern workers to a killing center for the purpose
of sheltering them. Our skepticism is bolstered by events that ensued after this
meeting. Two weeks later, Bernotat visited Hadamar and supposedly informed
Klein there was a change of plans: the “incurable” eastern workers were now to
be killed at Hadamar. Bernotat, Klein alleged, had been told by Gauleiter
Sprenger that all the workers were incurable and thus “it wouldn’t pay to
transport them any more.” Wahlmann, on the other hand, declared that the
workers were earmarked for killing in order to free up hospital space for war-
related casualties. Klein claimed that Wahlmann was present at this meeting
with Bernotat, an assertion Wahlmann denied. Wahlmann does admit that
Klein informed him during the summer that Hadamar would receive trans-
ports of eastern workers suffering from incurable tuberculosis. These individu-
als were to be given “mercy killing,” using the same techniques refined in the
euthanasia of mentally ill Germans.40
The first transport of seventy-five sick eastern workers arrived at Hadamar
in July or August 1944. Contrary to the statements of Klein and Wahlmann,
postmortem exams of the corpses revealed that few were terminally or gravely
ill before their deaths.41 They were housed on the first floor of the institution
in two modest rooms that had been cleared of their occupants by Nurse Huber
prior to their arrival. Subsequent transports consisted of between one to ten
eastern laborers and continued from late summer 1944 until March 1945. Once
Huber had settled them in their beds, the eastern workers were attended by
Ruoff and Willig. Before the workers’ arrival both men had been briefed by
Klein and Wahlmann on the need to kill them. Wahlmann prepared the over-
doses of narcotics (chiefly veronal, trional, and chloral tablets and morphine/
scopolamine injections) and handed them to Ruoff and Willig. The two nurses
administered the “medication” to the eastern workers, who died shortly there-
after. The corpses were taken by Philip Blum (Klein’s cousin) to the Hadamar
cemetery for burial. Adolph Merkle recorded their names and phony causes of
death in the hospital patient registry, which was later conveyed to the Office
of Statistics (Standesamt) for the town of Hadamar. After the first transport,
morning conferences involving Wahlmann, Huber, and Ruoff (or sometimes
Willig) were regularly held to sign falsified death certificates and prepare lists
of patients to be killed.42
Clearly, each of the defendants in this scheme discharged a specific func-
tion: Klein relayed the order from Bernotat and Sprenger, Wahlmann orga-
nized and set in motion the means of producing death through narcotics over-
doses, Huber prepared space for and situated the victims, Ruoff and Willig
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administered the deadly cocktails, Merkle covered up the crime with false en-
tries on patient lists, and Blum disposed of the bodies. Their roles in the plan
to exterminate the ill eastern workers—reprehensible though they are—were
subordinate to the higher authorities in Wiesbaden (Bernotat and Sprenger).
Klein, Wahlmann, and the others did not contrive the plan themselves; they
loyally carried out the wishes of those who had personally designed the plan. To
treat them all as principals or co-perpetrators under a totalizing theory of
conspiracy distorts their ancillary position in a much larger, much more ne-
farious program to annihilate individuals branded by the Nazis as “surplus”
people.
The divergence between the truth of Nazi euthanasia at Hadamar and the
U.S. construction of euthanasia at trial receives further confirmation when we
examine the testimony of Wahlmann and Karl Willig. During his pre-trial
interrogation by the U.S. Army, Wahlmann made a remarkable admission:
the eastern workers were killed at Hadamar to clear hospital space for “the
wounded,” presumably German soldiers and civilians injured in air raids. “My
primary consideration was, that through this mercy killing, beds would be
made available for the wounded, friend and foe alike.” Wahlmann opined that
putting to death incurable mentally ill Germans, Russians, and Poles was jus-
tified, because “they are a handicap to us . . . when they take up room in our
institutions.”43
The case of Hadamar ward nurse Karl Willig lends credibility to Wahlmann’s
statement. From 1938 to July 1941, Willig worked at the Herborn asylum,
where in mid-1941 he assisted in evacuating Herborn’s mental patients, pre-
sumably to make possible the conversion of the facility into a hospital. After a
brief stay at Hadamar, he was assigned to the mental hospital in Lübeck; here,
in his own words, he “cleaned out the hospital of sick people,” again for the
purpose of transforming the institution into a hospital for the German army.
From Lübeck he traveled to Neustadt, “clean[ing] out hospitals all the time,”
until, at the close of 1941, he returned to Hadamar, serving first as a telephone
operator and later as a ward nurse under Heinrich Ruoff. Insofar as we know,
in these earlier clearings of patients in mental hospitals Willig did not pursue
the violent solution of killing as a way to free up hospital space. Instead, the
evacuated patients were relocated to other institutions in Germany. Not until
he reached Hadamar in late 1941 was he introduced to mass murder as a radi-
cal means to the end of creating hospital space for “valuable” Germans:
They always told me before that they put them away with gas. When I
came up there [to Hadamar] they told me that the hospital had to be
cleaned out for use for soldiers and that there was no use in those people
[the mentally ill] living. I was only a little man and had to do what people
told me to do.44
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Willig’s confession rings true to what we know of the euthanasia program in
late 1941 and early 1942. This was the period that witnessed the onset of the
Allied bombing offensive against German cities, as well as alarming reversals
on the Eastern Front. Operation Brandt, as described in Chapter 1, was devel-
oped to evacuate mental hospitals for use by bombed-out civilians and
Wehrmacht soldiers. The mentally disabled evacuees (including shell-shocked
Hamburg women in July 1943) were sent to places like Hadamar, Meseritz-
Obrawalde, and Eichberg to be starved to death or killed with overdoses of
medication. In this brutalizing atmosphere Willig cut his teeth. By the time
the tubercular eastern workers arrived in Hadamar in summer 1944, he was an
experienced and efficient killer.
The U.S. prosecutors presented a different theory of the Hadamar defen-
dants’ motives in their closing argument before the military commission: the
motive of careerism, or “personal preferment.” On this interpretation, Wahlmann,
Klein, and Huber were gamblers wagering that Germany would win the war
and that they would be rewarded for their work by a triumphant National
Socialist state: “They were seeking personal preferment, and there is no doubt
in the mind of anyone here but they would have received personal preferment
had Germany won the war.” A crass, self-regarding careerism was the force
behind their descent into mass killing, the prosecution argued. It also scoffed
at the defendants’ claims that they were unaware their actions were anything
but legal. If this had been the case, defendants would not have been at pains to
falsify the death records in an attempt to conceal the killings from the public.
Further, Huber and Wahlmann spoke openly to each other of the harsh retri-
bution they could expect if the United States won the war. The commission
hearing the case agreed with the prosecution’s version of the Hadamar killings;
on October 15, 1945, after a one-week trial, it found all the defendants guilty
of murder in violation of the Geneva conventions and the Laws of War. It
sentenced Klein, Ruoff, and Willig to death and the remaining defendants to
hard labor for terms varying from life to twenty-five years.45
What emerges from the Hadamar trial when we focus on the prosecution’s
case in chief and the verdicts of the commission is the following image of
euthanasia at Hadamar: the defendants were involved as perpetrators in a con-
spiracy to kill Polish and Russian workers suffering from tuberculosis with full
knowledge that these murders were not sanctioned by the German euthanasia
law of 1939 and for the purpose of furthering their careers in a postwar Na-
tional Socialist Germany. By disconnecting the murders from the larger con-
text of the Nazi campaign against “life unworthy of life,” including the mass
extermination of Jews, Gypsies, asocials, Soviet POWs, and the mentally dis-
abled, the U.S. prosecutors presented a historically truncated version of the
mass murder at Hadamar. U.S. concerns with protecting its own sovereignty,
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even as U.S. officials assumed a legal basis for euthanasia in German law,
predisposed their case toward error. Karl Willig, speaking in tears before the
military commission that would sentence him to death, complained: “It is a
hard fate, that we the smallest ones who never had anything to say and only
had to obey have to be here accused of such a charge.” When Willig uttered
these words in October 1945, there was certainly truth in them. The primary
designers of Nazi euthanasia had yet to be tried; many would never be held
accountable for their actions in a legal proceeding. By the time of the Medical
Case one year later, however, two of the leading figures in the program to
murder “valueless life” stood accused of crimes against humanity in the dock at
Nuremberg. The U.S. Doctors’ Trial would depart from the inadequate under-
standing of Nazi criminality that characterized the army’s prosecution at
Hadamar. At the same time, it would be encumbered with its own problematic
conceptions of National Socialist euthanasia—conceptions that, like those of
the U.S. Commission at Hadamar, were shaped by considerations of national
power.
THE U.S. DOCTORS’ TRIAL, NOVEMBER 1946–AUGUST 1947
Scarcely a month after judgment was pronounced on the Hadamar defendants,
the International Military Tribunal convened to try the “major war criminals”
under the terms of the London Charter. Consistent with the earlier recom-
mendations of Stimson and Jackson, the U.S. authorities at Nuremberg equated
Nazi criminality with a tentacular conspiracy to wage aggressive war. Their
approach was summed up by Jackson during the London conference:
[O]ur view is that this isn’t merely a case of showing that these Nazi
Hitlerite people failed to be gentlemen in war; it is a matter of their
having designed an illegal attack on the international peace . . . and the
other atrocities were all preparatory to it or done in execution of it.46
On this theory of Nazism, the Final Solution and the euthanasia program were
mere byproducts of the Nazis’ military conquests throughout Europe. Telford
Taylor perceived the danger of this reductionist understanding of Nazi crimi-
nality. In his memoirs he wrote that “the conspiracy case . . . bid fair to swal-
low the greater part of the entire case.”47 Yet, Taylor and his associates re-
mained loyal to the conspiracy theory of Nazi criminality. In his address before
the IMT, Jackson’s assistant prosecutor, Sidney Alderman, identified as the
“heart of the case” the “planning, preparation, initiation, and waging of illegal
and aggressive war.” Alderman continued:
All the dramatic story of what went on in Germany in the early phases of
the conspiracy—the ideologies used, the techniques of terror used, . . . and
C O N S T R U C T I N G  M A S S  M U R D E R 91
even the concentration camps and the Crimes against Humanity, the
persecutions, tortures, and murders committed—all these things would
have little juridical international significance except for the fact that they
were the preparation for the commission of aggressions against peaceful
neighboring peoples. Even the aspects of the case involving War Crimes . . .
are aspects which are merely the inevitable, proximate result of the wars of
aggression launched and waged by these conspirators.48
Alderman conceded that the defendants were involved in this conspiracy in
varying degrees. However, the law of conspiracy rendered them all jointly and
severally liable for the acts of each participant in the plot to wage aggressive
war: “All the parties to a Common Plan or Conspiracy are the agents of each
other and each is responsible as principal for the acts of all the others as his
agents.”49
At the London conference, the Soviets and the French had regarded the
conspiracy charge in Article 6 of the charter with consternation. The Anglo-
American theory of conspiracy was foreign to the tradition of continental law
in which France, the USSR, and Germany were steeped. Although continen-
tal jurisprudence had laws to prosecute group criminality, the charge of crimi-
nal combination was absorbed into the substantive offense at trial; there was
no separate conspiracy charge once a defendant’s guilt for a crime was estab-
lished. Interestingly, the historical adviser to the British Foreign Office, E. L.
Woodward, shared the French and Soviets’ misgivings about conspiracy, argu-
ing that no such scheme to wage aggressive war existed. Like the French and
Soviets, too, he believed the prosecution’s case—and historical truth—would
best be served by focusing on war crimes and crimes against humanity. The
prosecutors at Nuremberg dismissed these concerns, committing themselves
instead to the monolithic theory of a Nazi conspiracy to wage aggressive war,
the central hub around which the spokes of war crimes and crimes against
humanity revolved.50
Prosecuting German doctors in a separate proceeding for medical crimes
was an idea that evolved gradually as the trial of the major war criminals
unfolded. At first, the United States had no intention to prosecute Nazi doc-
tors. Control Council Law #10, enacted in December 1945, had furnished the
basis for “zonal trials” (national trials conducted by each of the four occupying
powers in its own zone, as opposed to the joint four-power prosecution of the
major war criminals at Nuremberg). Until January 1946 Telford Taylor, ap-
pointed to succeed Robert Jackson as U.S. Chief of Counsel for War Crimes,
was embroiled in the Allied prosecution of the Wehrmacht High Command
and hence could not focus on organizing the subsequent trials under Law #10.
Beginning in mid-January, he turned his attention to the successor trials, en-
visioning another international tribunal to try German industrialists and fin-
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anciers and a U.S. trial of “other major criminals” in the U.S. zone of occupa-
tion. In a memorandum to Jackson dated January 1, 1946, Taylor reported that
France, Great Britain, and the USSR also desired one more IMT to try the
industrialists and financiers. In this memo, he sketched the proposed shape of
future trials, which included, in addition to a second IMT and trials by U.S.
courts in the U.S. zone, trials of “local criminals” by military courts-martial,
trials of other “major war criminals” in the courts of “allied powers” or in
countries formerly occupied by the Nazis, and denazification proceedings to
deal with “organizational cases.” Taylor makes no mention at this stage of
plans to prosecute German doctors for medical crimes.51
Although plans to hold a second IMT went forward during the first half
of 1946, the U.S. and British authorities soon reconsidered their support of
this plan. In a memo to Taylor dated February 5, 1946, Jackson expressed his
concerns that a second IMT would lack political support in the United States.
He also presciently warned that the Russians would insist on holding a second
IMT in the Russian zone of occupation, with a Soviet judge presiding over the
trial. Taylor and his staff continued to entertain the possibility of a four-
power tribunal, especially for the purpose of trying the German chemical con-
glomerate, I. G. Farben. By summer 1946, however, they had developed their
own misgivings about a second IMT. Taylor had apprehensions about “conti-
nental and Soviet law principles unfamiliar to the American public,” as well
as the negative impact in the United States of a Soviet judge presiding over a
second IMT. In June U.S. authorities adopted a “zonal courts policy,” and by
August 1946 Taylor had informed the War Department of his plan for a U.S.
medical case based on criminal experiments performed on concentration camp
inmates.52
The stimulus to prosecute German doctors for medical crimes in a subse-
quent trial arose during IMT proceedings against Reichsmarschall Hermann
Göring, in which evidence came to light about the participation of German
Luftwaffe doctors in heinous medical experiments on concentration camp pris-
oners. The complicity of the German medical profession in Nazi criminality
was further revealed at the IMT by SS-Standartenführer Wolfram Sievers,
former General Secretary of the Ahnenerbe Society and director of its Insti-
tute for Military Scientific Research. In his army interrogation, Sievers alerted
the Allied investigators to the existence of a “Jewish skeleton collection” at
the University of Strasbourg, created from the harvested bones of Jewish con-
centration camp prisoners murdered for this purpose. As early as May 1946,
when the issue of a second IMT was still unresolved, Taylor’s office had as-
signed to an investigative group under James McHaney the task of gathering
evidence about the leaders of the SS and of the German health and medical
service. The plethora of evidence on medical crimes gathered by McHaney’s
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group and the IMT prosecution team, as well as the presence of potential
medical defendants in U.S. and British custody, influenced Taylor in August
1946 to begin the U.S. subsequent proceedings with its case against the Ger-
man doctors. In a letter to Secretary of War Howard Petersen in late Septem-
ber 1946, Taylor opined that the medical case would be “a rather easy one to
try and to decide, and therefore I think a good one to start with.”53
The U.S. Doctors’ Trial was designed primarily around the barbarous medical
experiments performed in German concentration camps during the war. Par-
ticipation in National Socialist euthanasia, charged against only four of the
twenty-three defendants as a crime against humanity in violation of Control
Council Law #10, was an incidental subplot in the trial. Taylor and his team
chose to prosecute twenty German doctors and three non-doctors involved in
medical crimes. Their criterion of choice in all twelve subsequent trials was to
find “those highly placed individuals who bore the greatest responsibility for
formulating and ordering the execution of the criminal policies which directly
led to and instigated the aggressive wars and mass atrocities . . . committed
under the authority of the Third Reich.”54 Regrettably, a considerable number
of potential defendants were unavailable for trial. Many had either been killed
or, like Dr. Ernst Robert Grawitz, the highest-ranking SS and police doctor,
had committed suicide; the whereabouts of others, such as Dr. Erich Hippke,
the chief of the combat medical system of the Luftwaffe, was unknown.
Already in July 1946, U.S. war crimes investigators were aware that the
British had assembled substantial evidence against the Hohenlychen Group,
German doctors involved in lethal and disabling human experiments at the
SS sanatorium of Hohenlychen. These included Karl Gebhardt, Fritz Fischer,
Karl Brunner, Hertha Oberheuser, Percy Treite, Rolf Rosenthal, and Karl Brandt.
Taylor’s deputy, James McHaney, initiated negotiations with the British to
have these individuals delivered to U.S. authorities with an eye toward pros-
ecuting them for criminal medical experiments on concentration camp pris-
oners. Around the same time as the U.S. investigators became aware of the
Hohenlychen Group, the U.S. neurologist Leo Alexander, tasked with re-
searching the complicity of German neuropsychiatrists in medical crimes, sub-
mitted reports on hypothermia experiments and the sterilization and killing of
the mentally disabled. The prosecution at the IMT offered these reports in
evidence against the major war criminals. Identified in Alexander’s reports as
perpetrators of crimes against humanity were fifteen of the twenty-three de-
fendants eventually prosecuted in the Medical Case. Thus, several months
before the commencement of the trial in November 1946, the issue of Nazi
medical experiments had come to dominate the thinking of the U.S. prosecu-
tion team in its approach to a future trial of German physicians once the IMT
had concluded.55
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One name that stood out conspicuously in both the Hohenlychen Group
and Alexander’s reports was the Reich Commissioner for Health and Sanita-
tion and Hitler’s personal physician, Dr. Karl Brandt. Brandt had been under
investigation by both the British and U.S. authorities since early June 1946
for his role in medical crimes at the Dachau concentration camp. The highest-
ranking defendant among those indicted at the Doctors’ Trial, Brandt was an
especially inviting target. His personal relationship with Hitler, his irrefutably
leading role with Philipp Bouhler in the euthanasia program, and his ties to
both the Hohenlychen Group and to medical atrocities performed at Dachau
rendered Brandt a veritable poster child of Nazi medical criminality. By early
September 1946, the U.S. prosecution team had added Brandt to a list that
also included other members of the Hohenlychen Group, Rudolf Brandt (the
personal administrative officer to Himmler), and the top bureaucrats in the
KdF, Viktor Brack and Philipp Bouhler. By September 9, two cuts had been
made that set the number of medical defendants at twenty-three.56 The defen-
dants were arraigned before the U.S. National Military Tribunal on November
21, 1946.
The indictment against the defendants charged them with four counts:
(1) conspiring to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity (“common
design or conspiracy”); (2) war crimes; (3) crimes against humanity; and (4)
membership in a criminal organization. The second count (war crimes) sub-
sumed criminal medical experimentation. Paragraph 9 of Count Two charged
four of the defendants—Karl Brandt, Kurt Blome, Viktor Brack, and Waldemar
Hoven—with complicity in euthanasia. The indictment describes it as a pro-
gram to murder “hundreds of thousands of human beings, including nationals
of German-occupied countries,” as well as “the aged, insane, incurably ill, . . .
deformed children, and other persons, by gas, lethal injections, and diverse
other means in nursing homes, hospitals, and asylums.” The indictment goes
on to offer a laconic theory of why these people were killed: “Such persons
were regarded as ‘useless eaters’ and a burden to the German war machine.”
The closing sentence of paragraph 9 affirms a link between National Socialist
euthanasia and the Holocaust: “German doctors involved in the ‘euthanasia’
program were also sent to Eastern occupied countries to assist in the mass
extermination of Jews.” In paragraph 8, Count Two charged Rudolf Brandt and
Kurt Blome with “the murder and mistreatment of tens of thousands of Polish
nationals” who “were alleged to be infected with incurable tuberculosis.” The
authors of the indictment briefly theorized on the reasons for the killings: “On
the ground of insuring the health and welfare of Germans in Poland, many
tubercular Poles were ruthlessly exterminated while others were isolated in
death camps with inadequate medical facilities.” To an extent, Count Three
(crimes against humanity) was redundant with Count Two. It enumerated the
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same charges of euthanasia against Karl Brandt, Blome, Hoven, and Brack and
the murder of tubercular Poles in the Warthegau against Rudolf Brandt and
Blome. (Count Three also charged Rudolf Brandt and Wolfram Sievers with
involvement in the plot to murder Jews in order to supply a skeleton collec-
tion for the University of Strasbourg.)57
In the remainder of this chapter, we will focus on the U.S. prosecution
team’s conception of euthanasia as reflected in the cases of Karl Brandt and
Viktor Brack. Blome and Hoven were relatively minor figures in Nazi eutha-
nasia and thus did not command the attention of the United States to the
extent that Brack and Brandt did. In its closing argument before the court,
the prosecution described Brandt as the “first link” in the euthanasia chain,
Philipp Bouhler as the second link, and Brack as the third. By the time of the
Doctors’ Trial, Bouhler was beyond the reach of U.S. justice, having commit-
ted suicide with his wife at Zell-am-See in May 1945. Hence, the two preemi-
nent figures in Nazi euthanasia available for trial—at least in the estimate of
the prosecutors—were Brandt and Brack.
The Questionable Humanitarian: Dr. Karl Brandt
By his own account, Karl Brandt enjoyed a peaceful and uneventful up-
bringing until the outbreak of World War I in 1914. He was born on January 8,
1904, at Mühlhausen, Alsace (at the time part of German territory). Brandt’s
father was a policeman; his mother hailed from a “medical family” (his mater-
nal grandfather and uncle were both doctors, and a second uncle was a
pharamacist). The Brandts were expelled from Alsace in 1919, sealing Karl’s
membership in a class of Germans peculiarly susceptible to the allure of Na-
zism—ethnic Germans from “lost territories” and “threatened borders.”58 A
turbulent period ensued for the Brandt family, marked by Brandt’s transfer to
different schools and his father’s detention in a French prison until 1921. In
1924 he arrived at the University of Jena to begin his medical studies.59
After completing his studies, Brandt served as a surgeon before working in
the Surgical University Clinic in Berlin in 1934, where he became chief doc-
tor in 1936. While his career burgeoned, Brandt climbed the ranks of the Nazi
Party, which he had joined in January 1932. In 1933 he became a member of
the SA. In June 1934 Brandt joined the SS, receiving a rank of Untersturm-
führer. Around the same time, he became Adolf Hitler’s “escort physician”
(Begleitarzt), a job that required him to accompany Hitler during his travels
away from Berlin. In 1938, Hitler sent Brandt to examine the Knauer child in
Leipzig. After confirming the attending physicians’ diagnosis and giving the
green light for its killing, Brandt received a commission from Hitler to dispose
of all similar cases in the future in the same manner—a commission he held
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Karl Brandt, escort physician to Adolf Hitler and from July 1942 Commissioner for the
Health Care System in the German Reich. He and Philipp Bouhler were authorized to create
the organizational framework for the children’s euthanasia program, which, under the direc-
tion of the KdF, was administered through various children’s wards installed in German
mental hospitals. Along with Bouhler, he became a leading figure in adult euthanasia,
agreeing to the use of poisonous gas as the most efficient means of causing patients’ deaths. As
Commissioner for the Health Care System, Brandt ordered the evacuation of mental patients
from psychiatric hospitals to euthanasia centers, where they were murdered. Convicted of
war crimes and crimes against humanity by the U.S. NMT, he was hanged at Landsberg
prison on June 2, 1948. Courtesy the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Collection
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jointly with the chief of the KdF, Philipp Bouhler. Bouhler authorized his
deputy, Viktor Brack (chief of Main Office II), to work with Hans Hefelmann
(director of Office IIb) and Herbert Linden (minister within Department IV
of the Interior Ministry and later the Reich Commissioner for Mental Hospi-
tals) in establishing a planning group of pro-euthanasia physicians. This group,
which included Brandt, developed the children’s euthanasia program. His early
involvement in National Socialist violence against the disabled earmarked
him as a trustworthy accomplice when Hitler extended the program to handi-
capped adults.
Brandt participated with Viktor Brack in the carbon monoxide gassing
experiments at Brandenburg in late 1939. Together they approved the carbon
monoxide method of producing death—a method that would serve as the para-
digm for the five other euthanasia centers in Germany. In late 1941 Brandt
became Commissioner for the Health Care System. As commissioner he or-
dered the evacuation of mental patients from German psychiatric hospitals,
allegedly in order to free up hospital space for wounded soldiers and civilians.
The evacuees were transferred to other sites like Meseritz-Obrawalde, Hadamar,
Eichberg, and Kaufbeuren, where they were often murdered through starva-
tion or overdoses of narcotics. Both in his interrogations by the OCCWC
(Office of the Chief of Counsel for War Crimes) and in his testimony before
the NMT, Brandt portrayed euthanasia as motivated by high-minded ideals.
He claimed his role in the killing of the mentally disabled ended with the first
phase of euthanasia; after the official stop in August 1941, Brandt averred he
had nothing further to do with it. He portrayed the first phase of euthanasia as
a benign program targeting “terminal cases” that were refractory to therapy.
Their deaths were a “deliverance” from protracted pain and suffering. Under
interrogation he related that he saw in euthanasia “the law of nature and . . .
the law of reason.” In Brandt’s eyes, this “law of nature” called into question
the Hippocratic oath. During direct examination, he emphasized that “purely
humane considerations” actuated Hitler’s decision to euthanize “incurably ill
persons.” About his own actions within the killing program, Brandt was ada-
mantly unrepentant.60
The U.S. prosecuting team’s theory of Nazi euthanasia is discernible in its
interrogations of Brandt and remained consistent throughout the trial. Not
surprisingly, the U.S. view of euthanasia clashed with Brandt’s portrayal of it
as a humanitarian measure. However, even Brandt admitted that the second
(or wild) phase of euthanasia was not primarily guided by humane consider-
ations. In his interrogations in November and December 1946, Brandt took
pains to distinguish the first “humane” phase of euthanasia from the second
“wild” phase. He cited as an example two instances of euthanasia locally initi-
ated by Gauleiter in Saxony and Pomerania that had come to his attention.
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Brandt claimed he had informed Bouhler, Martin Bormann, and Hitler about
these episodes; Hitler’s reaction was to demand immediate cessation of the
killing. Brandt believed that these examples of wild euthanasia were driven by
the need to reduce the “overpopulation” of mental patients in the two regions.
In other words, he advanced an economistic interpretation of the second phase
of killing: mental patients were put to death to conserve scarce resources. The
economistic interpretation of Nazi euthanasia has an echo in Taylor’s opening
statement before the tribunal, in which he identified as a motive for euthana-
sia the desire to rid Germany of those who had become “useless to the German
war machine.” Ultimately, the tribunal in the Medical Case would endorse the
prosecution’s economistic interpretation, identifying as one of the program’s
“prime motives” the aim “to eliminate ‘useless eaters’ from the scene, in order
to conserve food, hospital facilities, doctors and nurses for the more important
use of the German armed forces.”61
As with the military trial of the Hadamar staff, the NMT’s insistence that
euthanasia was linked to Nazi imperialism enabled the United States to con-
vict Brandt without compromising the principle of sovereignty in interna-
tional affairs. In both proceedings, euthanasia killing was portrayed as an of-
fense against international law—not as a systematic program to purify German
society of “unworthy life.” In both proceedings, too, preoccupations with re-
taining national power strictly determined the U.S. construction of Nazi eu-
thanasia. When the focus of the Doctors’ Trial shifted to Viktor Brack, the
prosecutors had an easier time connecting the destruction of the mentally ill
with Nazi war crimes, because Brack faced not only the charge of euthanasia,
but of setting in motion the most notorious international crime in history:
the destruction of the European Jews.
The Cynical Saboteur: Viktor Brack
The oldest of three children, Viktor Brack was born in 1904 in Haaren.
Before World War I, he spent some of his childhood with his mother, a Rus-
sian ethnic German, visiting her relatives in Russia. After the war, Brack
related that his family was informed by his mother’s brother, who emigrated
from Russia to Germany in 1920, that Brack’s grandmother had been murdered
by the Bolsheviks. His mother’s sister had also reportedly died there of typhus
brought on by starvation. These revelations, Brack alleged, extinguished in him
any further desire to revisit the vast, sprawling country of his mother’s family.62
After finishing his Abitur (college preparatory study) in 1923, Brack stud-
ied agriculture for a time until the loss of his parents’ property and the poor
agricultural conditions in the Rhineland Palatinate caused him to switch his
major to economics. He graduated in 1928 from a Munich technical school
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with a major in economics and thereafter worked in different roles: as an
assistant to his father farming a small plot of land the family had acquired, as
a racer with BMW in Munich, and as a chauffeur of the future head of the SS,
Heinrich Himmler, a personal friend of his father. In 1932 Brack was em-
ployed as the personal adviser to Reichsleiter Philipp Bouhler, at the time the
Economics Director of the Nazi Party. When Bouhler established the KdF in
1934 and became its chief, Brack became his staff director. In 1936, Bouhler
appointed Brack the head liaison officer with the Department of Health, de-
spite his lack of medical training. Thereafter, Brack became Bouhler’s deputy
and the chief of Section II of the KdF. It was in this office that Brack became
a major figure in organizing the euthanasia program in 1939 and the Final
Solution in late 1941.63
Unlike the army prosecutors in the Hadamar case, in the months preced-
ing the Doctors’ Trial Taylor’s prosecution team was interested in the links
between the euthanasia program and the larger Nazi assault on groups deemed
“unworthy of life.” This interest is evident in Brack’s pre-trial interrogations,
in which his interlocutors confronted Brack with their theory that the eutha-
nasia program, rather than ending, as Brack contended, in 1941, was extended
to the extermination program by the end of 1943. According to the interroga-
tors, Nazi euthanasia was little more than a “general test” (Generalprobe) for
the expanded killing program in the last four years of the war. Brack adamantly
denied a link between the two events, claiming that Hitler was not thinking of
the Final Solution when he ordered euthanasia to proceed.
The issue of the motives behind the euthanasia program became the pri-
mary ground of contestation between Brack and his interrogators. The struggle
centered on how to characterize the euthanasia program at its inception. The
interrogators began with a definition of “true” euthanasia: “Euthanasia is, ac-
cording to the jurisprudence of all states governed by the rule of law, as well as
according to German law, the act of assisting a patient transition from an
immediately occurring and extremely painful death to a less painful one. That
is, in the last stage, the administration of a dose of morphine.” Brack coun-
tered with the language of the Hitler order, which specified that only “incur-
able” cases were to be given a “mercy death.” Brack’s interrogators replied that
the actual euthanasia program launched by the Hitler order in 1939 had noth-
ing to do with real euthanasia: “If we assume the fiction that the Hitler order
gave a certain legitimacy to this killing, do you not know that the scope of the
Hitler order was grossly exceeded in the form of the execution? That not only
those people who were, according to the Hitler order, ripe for euthanasia, but
also others were killed?” The “other” victims referred to were “useless eaters,”
whose consumption of hospital beds and medical resources impeded Germany’s
conduct of aggressive war.64
C O N S T R U C T I N G  M A S S  M U R D E R100
The interrogators’ conception of euthanasia was not uniform but con-
tained at least two separate views of the Nazis’ assault on “unworthy life.” The
first was economistic/utilitarian. On this theory, the mentally ill were killed to
free up hospital space and health-care personnel for the German army as it
waged aggressive war on Germany’s neighbors. The second was the “general
test” theory, according to which euthanasia served a probative role in testing
both equipment and personnel for a future, more inclusive killing of other
groups of people. When confronted with each of these theories, Brack vehe-
mently denied them, countering that euthanasia meant solely “helping a per-
son who is suffering.” The interrogator conceded to Brack that “we could argue
about euthanasia,” but maintained that the Nazi variant was not true euthana-
sia. Rather, the interrogator told Brack he was “entirely convinced that the
actual cause was the preparation for the eastern people. Furthermore, the Jews
were not directly attacked, but [euthanasia] was only a preliminary step. The
beginning was made with the mentally ill, and that is the danger.”65
Brack’s interrogator was a proponent of the general test theory of euthana-
sia. He opined that Brack had been selected to guide the euthanasia program
because he was “a little soft,” and needed “to be toughened up.” With explicit
reference to Himmler’s Posen speech of 1943, in which Himmler commended
his SS-Gruppenführer for carrying out the “extermination of the Jewish people,”
a disagreeable but necessary task that “made us tough,” the interrogator sug-
gested to a protesting Brack that the euthanasia program was “an experiment
Viktor Brack, Bouhler’s deputy and chief
of Main Office II in the KdF. In December
1939 Brack was charged by Bouhler with
interviewing and employing personnel to
staff the killing centers of the T-4 program.
In 1941 he became involved in the “Final
Solution,” assisting in the construction of
the death camps and, most notably, the
gas chambers, as well as assigning eutha-
nasia personnel to Odilo Globocnik to aid
in the liquidation of Polish Jewry. He was
convicted of war crimes and crimes against
humanity by the U.S. NMT and executed
in Landsberg prison on June 2, 1948.
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in toughness,” designed to callous “soft” SS men like Brack for the massive
extermination of eastern European peoples.66 This general test understanding
of euthanasia presupposes ideological indoctrination of the perpetrators in or-
der to transform them into hardened killers of the Reich’s enemies. On this
account, euthanasia was less a means of transferring scarce medical resources
from the mentally ill to the German army than a longterm preparation for the
mass annihilation of Jews, Gypsies, Poles, Soviets, and other “worthless” groups,
facilitated by immersing the perpetrators in the Nazi thought world and coars-
ening their moral sensibilities through acts of programmatic violence against
the mentally ill.
The general test/ideological interpretation became a polestar of U.S. pros-
ecution of Nazi euthanasia throughout the trial. In his opening statement,
Telford Taylor previewed the prosecution’s view that Nazi euthanasia sprang
from “a perverted moral outlook in which cruelty to subjugated races and peoples
was praiseworthy,” instilled in the perpetrators in Nazi medical training cen-
ters like the Führer School of German Physicians. For the U.S. prosecution
team, the defendants were not motivated by “hot blood” or by the desire for
“personal enrichment,” but by the National Socialist hierarchy of biological
value. The United States pursued this theory of euthanasia in their cross-
examination of Brack, who took the stand to address the two most damning
charges against him: his involvement in the plot to murder European Jews and
his proposal to sterilize a remnant of the surviving Jewish population with X-
rays. By comparison with these charges, his role in the early stages of planning
the euthanasia program paled into relative insignificance.
Brack and his attorney wasted little time in addressing each of the issues
on direct examination. Their strategy could not be a policy of denying every-
thing, because the documentary evidence against Brack was overwhelmingly
incriminating. Instead, Brack and his lawyer concocted a defense that later
defendants in the German euthanasia trials would advance with far greater
success. Under German law, it is referred to as the “collision of duties” defense
(Pflichtenkollision) and consists of the argument that the defendant committed
the crime only in order to avoid greater harm. Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Heydrich’s
successor as head of the Reich Security Main Office, had raised this defense at
the IMT in Nuremberg, where he claimed he had done everything in his power
to work at cross-purposes with the Final Solution, a “system I could only seek
ways of mitigating, but whose intellectual and legal foundations I could do
nothing to change.”67 Whether Brack had Kaltenbrunner’s defense in mind as
a model is unclear. He did, however, stake his life on this “sabotage” theory of
criminal wrongdoing.
According to Brack, it had become clear to him by the end of the 1930s
that “a struggle was underway here against an entire segment of the people
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[German Jews] and I did not consider this struggle to be a good one.” Brack
claimed he had marveled at the prospect of “depriving” humanity of the works
of Jews like Mendelssohn and Heine. In view of the cultural richness of Jewish
life, Brack felt it necessary “to repudiate such a policy of hate, and that is what
happened.” When he subsequently learned of the Final Solution, he resolved
to make “the effort if possible to help,” to “do anything I could to prevent [the
destruction of the Jews].” Brack’s claim that he was forced to give the glad
hand to all around him as he secretly devised his sabotage of the Final Solu-
tion foreshadowed defenses in later euthanasia proceedings:
If I had raised the least objection to [the Final Solution] openly I would
have aroused great suspicion of myself and would have aroused an all
together [sic] and false reaction in Himmler. Therefore, I had to make the
best of a bad matter and had to pretend that I agreed with Himmler.
Therefore, I pretended to be willing to clarify the question of mass
sterilization through X-ray methods.68
The “question of mass sterilization through X-ray methods” that Brack refers
to was a matter broached in a letter from Brack to Himmler, dated June 23,
1942, regarding “using European Jews as laborers.” The text of this letter reads
in part:
Among 10 million Jews in Europe are . . . at least 2 to 3 million men and
women who are fit enough for work. Considering the extraordinary
difficulties the labor problem presents us with, I hold the view that these 2
or 3 million should be specially selected and preserved. This can be done,
if at the same time they are rendered incapable of propagating. About a
year ago I reported to you that agents of mine have completed the
experiments necessary for this purpose.69
On direct exam, Brack was faced with neutralizing the incriminating power
of this document. He tried to do so with the argument that “the real purpose
of that letter [was] . . . not to exterminate the Jews, but to preserve them.” The
letter’s reference to sterilizing the Jewish remnant was a sham calculated to
buy time for at least some of the Jews until the war ended. His “strategy” was to
induce Himmler to grant a moratorium on exterminating the Jews long enough
to conduct X-ray experiments on Jewish guinea pigs and to evaluate the re-
sults. Himmler did, in fact, accede for a brief time to Brack’s recommendation.
On Himmler’s order, Bouhler commissioned two euthanasia doctors to com-
mence sterilization experiments with X-rays, a program later abandoned as
impracticable. Brack told the U.S. court he was “convinced that by perform-
ing these experiments, hundreds of thousands . . . of Jews were saved.”70
In addition to his sterilization plan, Brack claimed he sought to derail the
Final Solution by persuading Hitler to use the Jews as a source of labor rather
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than kill them. Again, his alleged aim was to temporize until the war had
ended. Implicit in Brack’s defense is the view that the murder of the Jews was
caused by the war: remove the war, and the Jews survive. Ironically, Brack’s
assumption in this regard parallels that of U.S. prosecutors, who maintained
throughout the trial that the Nazis’ destruction of “life unworthy of life” was
the result of their waging aggressive war—a theory of Nazi criminality com-
mon to both the IMT and the U.S. NMT. Inevitably, to regard the crimes of
National Socialism as the reflexes of a nation at war reduces their abhorrent
quality by identifying them with excesses characteristic of war conditions. At the
same time, it diminishes the centrality of these crimes to the Nazi movement,
insofar as it suggests they would never have happened but for the occurrence of
the war.
Ultimately, Brack’s efforts to invoke a sabotage defense could not over-
come the mountain of documentary evidence amassed against him. That evi-
dence proved that Brack had assigned euthanasia personnel from T-4 to the
virulent anti-Semite and SS Police Leader for the Lublin district, Odilo
Globocnik, entrusted by Himmler with carrying out the liquidation of Polish
Jewry. The T-4 staff Brack assigned to Globocnik helped organize and admin-
ister the Final Solution in Poland. As if this were not sufficiently damning,
the prosecution also offered into evidence one of the most notorious docu-
ments in the history of the Final Solution, the “gassing letter” from the Reich
Ministry for the Occupied Territories to the Reich Commissar for the Ostland,
dated October 25, 1941. In the letter, Brack is mentioned as volunteering to
supply both “accommodations as well as the gassing equipment” for use in
killing Jews incapable of work. The hardier Jews would be used as slave labor;
those unable to work would be disposed of using the “Brackian devices.” These
devices, as we have seen, were gas vans, deployed since late 1939 to murder
mentally ill patients in the Wartheland. In the face of such evidence, Brack’s
portrayal of himself as a well-intentioned saboteur of the Final Solution shriv-
eled like leaves in a bonfire.
This did not, of course, deter Brack from striking the pose of a humanitar-
ian. In his discussion of the first phase of euthanasia, he rejected the
prosecution’s theory that the assault on the mentally ill was a pretext for po-
litically and racially motivated killing. “When euthanasia was introduced, we
welcomed it,” Brack testified, “because it was based on the ethical principle of
sympathy and had humane considerations in its favor, of the same sort that
the opponents of euthanasia claim for their own ideas.” He admitted “imper-
fections” in the way it was performed, but he added “that does not change the
decency of the original idea, as Bouhler and Brandt and I myself understood
it.” How, then, did euthanasia degenerate into a comprehensive program of
mass murder? Brack’s counsel blamed Himmler for perverting the program by
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“distorting” it for “reasons of hatred and bigotry, and used it for the murder of
the Jews.”71 Like Brandt, Brack resisted the prosecution’s theory that euthana-
sia at its inception was inspired by economistic, political, or racial motives.
The U.S. tribunal hearing the case was not persuaded by Brandt and Brack’s
argument. It endorsed the prosecution’s depiction of National Socialist eutha-
nasia as a program “to eliminate ‘useless eaters’ from the scene, in order to
conserve food, hospital facilities, doctors and nurses for the more important
use of the German armed forces.” At first, the court held, it was confined to
“incurable” mental patients, but gradually “the program was extended to Jews,
and then to concentration camp inmates.” The dilation of Nazi euthanasia
into wholesale mass murder transpired during the second, or wild, phase of the
program.72
On this basis, the court found Brandt, Brack, and Hoven guilty of war
crimes and crimes against humanity under Control Council Law #10. (Blome,
who raised a sabotage defense of his own for his alleged role in the murder of
tubercular Poles, was acquitted.) They were sentenced to death by hanging.
After fruitlessly pursuing their appeals, including a writ of habeas corpus filed
with the U.S. Supreme Court, the three defendants were hanged at Landsberg
prison on June 2, 1948.

The U.S. approach to the crimes of the euthanasia specialists was remarkably
consistent from the early views of Bernays, Stimson, and Jackson through the
theories and arguments of U.S. prosecutors at the Doctors’ Trial. The arma-
ture around which charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity were
molded was Nazi Germany’s launching of aggressive war. Even though the
drafters of Control Council Law #10 had abolished the link between war crimes
and crimes against humanity, U.S. prosecutors at the Doctors’ Trial continued
to assume that euthanasia-related crimes were the excrescence of Hitler’s im-
perialistic war—an assumption that punctuates their indictment, opening state-
ment, cross-examinations, and closing argument. The tribunal implicitly en-
dorsed this conception of the prosecution by amalgamating Count Two (war
crimes) and Count Three (crimes against humanity) and treating them as a
single count. Henceforth, euthanasia crimes were equated in the court’s mind
with war crimes—that is, as crimes secondary to and contingent upon the
waging of aggressive war. This tenacious commitment to viewing Nazi crimi-
nality in the funhouse mirror of German war policy is traceable to U.S. con-
cern for the principle of sovereignty in international law. Nazi euthanasia had
to be connected somehow to the war; if it were not, the Allies would be setting
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a dangerous precedent for intervening in the domestic affairs of a sovereign
nation.
The problem with this understanding is one of causality. Hitler had con-
fided to Adolf Wagner in 1935 his intention to inaugurate euthanasia if and
when war broke out. Clearly, Hitler had the scheme to annihilate “unworthy
life” in mind well before the actual start of the war in September 1939. Fur-
thermore, although we have no compelling evidence that Hitler had planned
to murder European Jewry before 1941, violent persecution of German Jews
was by no means uncommon in pre-war Germany. As Herbert Jäger insightfully
observed, Nazi genocide was not the product of the war; rather, “the war was
the instrument for implementing genocide.” What Jäger said about the de-
struction of the Jews during the war may be applied equally to other groups
targeted by the Nazis:
The life of the Jews in Germany was for a long time repressed by the
totalitarian regime and undermined through growing defamation and
degradation, before we can even speak of genocide in the verbal and
actual sense: the mass killing represented only the organization and
carrying out of that which was systematically prepared in the state system,
and was already perfected in the spirit, when the bonds of human solidar-
ity were ruptured and the illusory picture of the Jew as a parasitic
Untermensch injurious to the Volk was established. If a minority is first
equated with vermin, then the step to the intention to “eradicate” it is no
longer so great. Human dignity and life were taken from the victims long
before the gas chambers were opened to them: a process of development
over many years only needed to be pushed ahead to its final conse-
quence.73
For Jäger, identifying Nazi genocide with war crimes has the effect of misrepre-
senting genocide as something qualitatively different from—and less odious
than—ordinary criminality. It emerges as the byproduct of ordinary men in
extraordinary times, as periods of war always are. General William Tecumseh
Sherman’s famous phrase that “war is all hell” captures a common belief that
acts deemed to be atrocities during peacetime become the common coin of the
realm during times of war. Yet, the hell unleashed by war is different from the
inferno of Nazi criminality.
In the postwar era prominent German intellectuals have realized the im-
portance of distinguishing between these two orders of hell. The German ex-
istentialist philosopher Karl Jaspers emphasized the conceptual divide between
war crimes and Nazi crimes: a “completely different principle,” he argued, dis-
tinguished the two kinds of criminality. Similarly, Hannah Arendt insisted on
the singularity of crimes against humanity, warning that they should not be
conflated with war crimes.74 Combining them in a single criminological hotchpot
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can nonetheless be tempting, not least because the language of National So-
cialism (such as the rhetoric of resource scarcity marshaled in support of eu-
thanasia) seduces us into drawing questionable inferences about the motives
behind these crimes.
The Hadamar and Doctors’ Trials reveal the extent to which U.S. com-
mitment to preserve its own sovereignty from perceived encroachments by
international judicial bodies had come to dominate U.S. approaches to Nazi
criminality. On the U.S. view, euthanasia served as a means for transferring
scarce resources from “unproductive” patients to the German armed forces.
Neither the ends of justice nor the historical record compelled such an inter-
pretation; rather, U.S. distrust of foreign bodies with superordinate jurisdic-
tion predisposed U.S. authorities to connect euthanasia with the conduct of
the war. Concerns with restricting U.S. prosecution only to crimes linked
with Germany’s war of aggression determined how the Nazis’ assault on the
mentally ill would be portrayed. In the U.S. Hadamar trial, the formidable
power of this insistence inverted the customary burden of proof: in alleging
that the murders of consumptive eastern workers were undertaken for the
purpose of freeing up resources for the war effort, the U.S. military commis-
sion spurned the principle of individual responsibility. The result was to pre-
sume guilt in advance (even in defiance) of the evidentiary record—an inversion of
the traditional presumption of innocence in Anglo-American law.
U.S. reticence to open the door to foreign interference with U.S. sover-
eignty is by no means a new theme in the country’s history: the opposition of
the U.S. delegation at Versailles in 1919 to international trials for crimes
against humanity, as well as the refusal of the Senate to ratify the League of
Nations and, more recently, the 1949 U.N. Genocide Convention (finally
ratified by Congress in 1986), are all telling proofs of such reluctance. By the
mid-1940s, this long-lived concern with preserving national power received a
fresh stimulus as Europe fissioned into two armed camps. In the tension-fraught
arena of the Cold War, the United States would not brook restrictions on its
ability to project its considerable power across the globe. Simultaneously, the
West Germans were involved in a bid for national power of their own. In the
German case, however, the goal was not to sustain their sovereignty, but to
regain it after the catastrophic defeat of the war. Although the aims of the
United States and West Germany differed, each shared a common preoccupa-
tion with national power. In each case, too, considerations of sovereignty struc-
tured the judicial approach to and assessment of National Socialist crimes,
including euthanasia. In the following chapters, we will see how the quest for
power, understood as a restoration of political self-determination, led the Ger-
mans in the postwar era to exonerate the killers of the mentally ill.
The early West German euthanasia trials share with their U.S. coun-
terparts a retributive attitude toward the homicidal violence inflicted
on the mentally disabled during the war. Between 1946 and 1947,
West German courts convicted euthanasia killers of murder and
sentenced them to death. Although attitudes toward individual par-
ticipants in the euthanasia program would change after 1947, little
quarter was given to defendants prosecuted in the immediate post-
war period.
In this chapter we will examine the West German euthanasia
trials in the two-year period after World War II. We will find that
German courts punished doctors (and sometimes nurses) as perpe-
trators of murder under the German Penal Code, section 211 and
sentenced them to either death or imprisonment. The initial rigor
of these trials, however, would be short-lived. By 1948, as relations
between the East and the West spiraled into the Cold War, German
courts began to relent in their assessment of euthanasia defendants.
The trend started with characterizations of euthanasia doctors as
accomplices rather than perpetrators and reduced sentences based
on their subjective state of mind when the crimes were committed.
FIRST RECKONINGS
THE GERMAN EUTHANASIA TRIALS, 1946–1947
Chapter 3
There is a tendency of plots to move toward death.
—DON DELILLO, LIBRA
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By the late 1940s and early 1950s, this trend culminated in acquittals of proven
killers. It is the main argument of this study that the trend line from punish-
ing euthanasia killers to extenuating their crimes and, finally, acquitting them
was driven by a nationwide yearning to recoup German sovereignty after years
of military occupation—a process that uncannily resembled the interaction of
power and criminal law in the U.S. approach to Nazi criminality, yet produced
different results. In the case of the United States, concern with preserving the
inviolability of sovereignty induced U.S. officials to consider all actors within
the euthanasia program equally liable, despite the nature and degree of their
actual contributions to the crime. For the Germans, the longing for restora-
tion of national sovereignty would, over time, lead them to presume the inno-
cence of euthanasia defendants, a presumption facilitated by evolving theories
of criminal liability as applied to bureaucratic role performance within a crimi-
nal state (the Nazi government). We will explore these protean theories—and
their adoption by German courts to exonerate euthanasia killers—in subse-
quent chapters.
We begin with a discussion of two legal postulates that structured the
West German prosecution and punishment of euthanasia criminality in the
postwar era. The first, the “subjective” theory of perpetration, grew out of the
so-called Bathtub Case of 1940. The second postulate concerns the right of
German courts to exercise jurisdiction over defendants charged with acts that,
at the time of their commission, were not deemed to be criminal by the Nazi
government. For a brief time German law had recourse to natural law theory as
a means for affirming the right of German courts to punish such acts, despite
the fundamental prohibition of ex post facto laws in continental jurispru-
dence. Our conversance with these two legal postulates sheds light on how
German legal authorities conceived of Nazi criminality after the war, and how
significantly these conceptions were beginning to change by the late 1940s as
German aspirations for national sovereignty became irrepressible.
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN GERMAN
EUTHANASIA TRIALS: THE SUBJECTIVE THEORY OF
PERPETRATION AND THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW
The rigor of the first German euthanasia trials is remarkable when the context
of West German popular attitudes toward the crimes of the Third Reich is
taken into account. Although 70 percent of the population supported the
trials of the major war criminals in 1946, German attitudes toward the succes-
sor trials (of which the euthanasia prosecutions were a part) were highly criti-
cal. Trying and punishing a criminal subculture that had rained misery on
Germans and foreigners alike was acceptable to most of the population. To
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move beyond the top Nazis to indict lawyers, doctors, businessmen, industri-
alists, and military officers, however, was an entirely different matter. To pros-
ecute these representatives of the best in German society, to arraign them as
the murderers of innocent millions, was an intolerable affront to a precari-
ously maintained national pride. In 1946, 70 percent favored the trials, but an
equal number by 1950 opposed them as “victors’ justice.”
The first German courts called upon to adjudicate euthanasia-related kill-
ings did not share such sentiments. Article III of Allied Control Council Law
#4 (promulgated in October 1945) on the “Reorganization of the German
Judicial System” granted German courts jurisdiction over civil and criminal
matters except for “criminal offenses committed by Nazis or any other persons
against citizens of Allied nations and their property, as well as attempts di-
rected towards the reestablishment of the Nazi regime, and the activity of the
Nazi organizations.” In this excepted category of crimes, Allied tribunals would
enjoy exclusive jurisdiction. The terms of Law #4 were superseded in Decem-
ber 1945 by Control Council Law #10, which permitted German courts to
exercise jurisdiction over “crimes committed by persons of German citizenship
or nationality against other persons of German citizenship or nationality, or
stateless persons.” The practical import of this law was to restrict German
courts—until Law #10 was repealed in the British and French zones on August
31, 1951—to cases involving denunciations (“grudge informers”), killings re-
lated to the terminal stages of the war (“end phase crimes”), deportations of
Jews and Gypsies, concentration camp crimes on German soil, and euthanasia
cases. Law #10, in effect, excluded German courts from placing under the
judicial microscope the most notorious atrocity of the Nazi government—the
million-fold murder of Jews in the eastern territories.1
What was an impediment to prosecuting the crimes of the Final Solution
was a windfall to euthanasia trials. Because most euthanasia crimes were com-
mitted by Germans on German citizens, they fell squarely within the bounds
of jurisdiction as defined by Law #10. In prosecuting these and other Nazi
offenses, the German courts could apply either Law #10’s definitions of war
crimes and crimes against humanity or the German law of murder (section 211
of the German Penal Code). Although some latitude was given German prosecu-
tors about how they could style an indictment, it was not unusual in euthanasia-
related cases for defendants to be charged with both crimes against humanity
under Law #10 and a variant of homicide (murder, aiding and abetting murder, or
manslaughter) under the German criminal code. Where the two sources of law
were in conflict, Law #10 would be supreme—at least in theory. The provisions
of Law #10 were more favorable toward the prosecution than was the law of
homicide under the German Penal Code. Unlike the code, Law #10, grounded in
the Anglo-American law of conspiracy, did not recognize a distinction between
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perpetrators and accomplices: all participants in the crime were jointly liable
as perpetrators for any acts carried out in furtherance of it. Under the German
law of homicide, by contrast, a killer could be convicted as a murderer (i.e., a
perpetrator) only if he fulfilled all the statutory elements of the offense, con-
trolled the circumstances of its commission, or subjectively identified with the
murder while assisting the main perpetrator to commit the crime—that is, if
he embraced the murder “as his own.” Another significant difference between
Law #10 and the German law of murder was the former’s relative disregard of
subjective factors in its deliberations on a defendant’s guilt. Under Law #10,
issues that would tie German courts in knots, like a defendant’s consciousness
of wrongdoing, developmental background, or interior state of mind at the
time of the offense, were immaterial. All that mattered was that the defendant
intentionally committed or assisted in committing an act proscribed by the
terms of Law #10, namely murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation,
or political, racial, or religious persecution, all directed against “any civilian
population.” If the defendant was found to have committed any of these acts,
regardless of the degree of his participation, then he was guilty as a perpetrator
of a crime against humanity.2
German criminal law, on the other hand, was far more interested in the
subjectivity of its defendants. Much of German criminal law is a variation on
the Kantian idea that virtue (or its lack) has to do not with actions in the
world but with intentions in the mind of the actor. Influenced by the Kantian
tradition, German criminal law evinces a far greater concern for the subjectiv-
ity of the offender than does Anglo-American law. It is not that the Anglo-
Americans are disinterested in subjective factors like intent. Rather, they tend
to “read” the external act as an index of the actor’s state of mind. As one U.S.
court put it in 1918, “the law presumes that a man intends that which he does,
and it is from the statements made and the acts done that this intent is to be
determined.”3 German law, by contrast, spares no pains to excavate an actor’s
subjective intent from the facts of a criminal case. Where the Anglo-Americans
infer intent from objective acts in the world, the Germans peer into the dim
hyperspace of the human mind in search of a phantom, the actor’s will. In this
connection, a landmark decision of the German Supreme Court known as the
Bathtub Case demonstrates the primacy of subjective analysis in modern Ger-
man criminal law, especially in the postwar period.
The Bathtub Case came on appeal from the state court to the German
Supreme Court six months after the outbreak of the war and involved a woman
who had drowned her sister’s illegitimate newborn in a bathtub. Her motive
was to remove from her sister the stigma of having a bastard child. The lower
court found the woman guilty as a perpetrator of murder under section 211 of
the German Criminal Code. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed this de-
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cision on the theory that the woman, although she had killed the baby with
her own hands, had no “personal interest” in the final result of the crime. The
real perpetrator in the murder was her sister; she had incited the defendant to
the murder and had a personal interest in its occurrence. The woman was
merely a “tool” of her sister, and thus qualified as an accomplice, rather than a
direct perpetrator. The Bathtub Case was the cradle of the “subjective theory
of perpetration” in German criminal law, a theory that made a judicial finding
of murder contingent on the personal interest of the actor. In this fashion,
defendants who kill others with their own hands, like the hapless woman in
the Bathtub Case, could evade conviction as murderers if the court was satis-
fied they had acted on behalf of someone else’s interest. As Jörg Friedrich has
observed, the subjective theory was tailor-made for postwar Nazi defendants.
Although they had the blood of thousands of innocent human beings on
their hands, many argued successfully that they were mere tools of the arch-
perpetrators, Adolf Hitler and his minions.4
In the years following the Bathtub Case, German courts did not always
adopt the Supreme Court’s subjective theory of perpetration. When we turn to
euthanasia cases tried in 1946 and 1947, we notice the relatively high inci-
dence of rank-and-file defendants found guilty as perpetrators. After 1947,
however, German courts increasingly applied the subjective standard to con-
vict euthanasia personnel of complicity—even those directly involved in mass
murder—rather than perpetration. Only those defendants who killed from a
personal interest were identified as perpetrators—that is, killers in whom the
impulse to crime originated.
The second legal postulate that structured German approaches to eutha-
nasia criminality after the war was natural law theory. Revival of natural law
in the postwar euthanasia trials is intimately connected with the problem of
in personam jurisdiction, a much thornier issue than it might at first appear.
Although Hitler had vetoed enactment of a formal euthanasia law out of
regard for foreign propaganda, he had issued a secret order under his signature
authorizing Bouhler and Brandt to set the killing program into motion. Many
euthanasia personnel were aware of the order; to some, copies were exhibited.
Moreover, in an April 1941 meeting of German state prosecutors and judges
in Berlin, Viktor Brack effectively immunized euthanasia operatives from ar-
rest, indictment, or prosecution. Given the permissive atmosphere in which
Nazi euthanasia evolved, postwar defendants could plausibly argue they had
acted in conformity with the orders of the sovereign authority in Germany at
the time, and thus could not be charged with acting illegally. Further, they
could with some credibility maintain they had lacked any awareness that their
conduct was wrongful and should thus be acquitted for a mistake of law
(Verbotsirrtum).
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If, as so many euthanasia defendants argued, their actions were counte-
nanced by Hitler as the highest state authority in Germany during the war,
then their postwar indictment for participation in euthanasia would violate a
fundamental norm of German law, the ban on ex post facto (or retroactive)
prosecution. This was a cornerstone of modern German criminal law, a prin-
ciple codified in the German Penal Code of 1871, the Weimar Constitution of
1919, and the Basic Law (German Constitution) of 1949. The need to pros-
ecute Germans involved in the mass murder of hundreds of thousands of men-
tally ill patients was compelling; yet, to violate the tenets of the Rechtstaat (a
state governed by the rule of law) and criminalize actions that were not illegal
at the time of their commission risked an arbitrariness that savored of Na-
tional Socialist caprice. The Allies had encountered a similar dilemma at
Nuremberg, one solved by joining uncodified crimes against humanity to the
more securely established Laws of Armed Conflict. Where, as in the subse-
quent proceedings, the link between crimes against humanity and war crimes
was dissolved, prosecution tended to invite charges of victors’ justice from the
German public. As we have seen, however, the common law lawyers and judges
were less troubled by ex post facto considerations than were their continental
counterparts: for the pragmatic U.S. and British authorities, to allow Nazi war
criminals to escape indictment for their million-fold murders would be a far
greater injustice than to prosecute them retroactively. The International Mili-
tary Tribunal reflected the Anglo-American position in its assessment of one
defendant: “[S]o far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if
his wrongs were allowed to go unpunished.”
Because of the centrality of the “principles of legality” in continental law
(i.e., the ban on retroactive criminal laws), German judicial authorities had
more scruples about breaching the prohibition of ex post facto laws. The strat-
egy they developed to solve the problem differed in kind from the Anglo-
Americans. Rather than brush aside ex post facto objections by invoking the
overriding need to punish wanton criminality, the Germans revived a tradi-
tion of legal thought that had fallen into desuetude in German courts for 150
years—the theory of natural law. It is not an exaggeration to say that the
application of natural law theory was the most significant factor in German
jurisdiction over euthanasia-related crimes in the immediate postwar years.
With reference to it, the courts could prosecute Nazi medical crimes, and do so
consistent with the prohibition of retroactive prosecution (the principle of
nulla crimen sine lege).
If natural law theory was the most important force in legal jurisdiction
over euthanasia criminality, then the leading figure in reviving natural law was
Gustav Radbruch. For much of his distinguished legal career, Radbruch was a
steadfast positivist who urged German jurists to enforce all laws uncondition-
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ally, including unjust ones, offering them the cold comfort that they at least
were promoting legal stability (Rechtssicherheit). Radbruch’s prewar orientation
is clear in his 1932 assertion of the positivist view of law: “We condemn the
minister who delivers a sermon contrary to his conviction, but we honor the
judge who does not allow himself to be deterred from his devotion to the law
by his conflicting feeling of justice.” That the writer of so consummate a
statement of legal positivism could do a complete about-face thirteen years
afterward is astonishing. In an article appearing on September 12, 1945, in
the Rhein-Neckar newspaper, Radbruch revealed his conversion from legal
positivism:
There are basic legal principles that are stronger than every existing law. . . .
These basic principles are called the law of nature or reason. If laws
consciously violate the ends of justice . . . then these laws lack validity,
then the people owe them no obedience, then jurists must summon the
courage to deny them the character of law.
In the thirteen years between his 1932 and 1945 statements, much had tran-
spired to effect this change: the triumph by legal means of a vicious dictatorship,
the defeat of Germany in a catastrophic world war started by that dictatorship,
and the murder of millions during the war, carried out by the same dictator-
ship. The twelve-year imperium of the Third Reich was an unmitigated disas-
ter for Germany and all of Europe. Radbruch blamed German legal positivism
for helping open the door to the jackbooted vandals of the Nazi state.5
Radbruch’s message in the postwar years was all the more relevant because
it addressed the crisis into which the Nazi experience had plunged German
law—the crisis of uncertainty about the nature of what precisely bound judges
in their interpretation of laws. Radbruch’s public conversion resolved this
unsureness—at least in the minds of many German lawyers and judges—in
favor of “supralegal law.” After his first anti-positivistic salvo in September
1945, Radbruch published his well-known defense of natural law theory, “Le-
gal Illegality and Supralegal Law,” in the Süddeutsche Juristische Zeitung (SJZ) in
August 1946. Radbruch began his essay with the statement that the National
Socialists secured the obedience of the military and the judiciary to its crimi-
nal purposes with two principles: “A command is a command” and “law is law.”
The first of these tautologies, he observed, was always qualified by the Military
Code of Criminal Justice, section 47 of which forbade obedience to orders
serving a “criminal purpose.” The principle of “law is law,” by contrast, admit-
ted of no such limitations. “It was the expression of positivistic legal thinking,
which ruled German jurists for many decades almost without challenge,”
Radbruch wrote. “Legal illegality was therefore as self-contradictory as supralegal
law. Praxis was repeatedly confronted by both problems.”6
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The two “problems” Radbruch referred to were the “self-contradictory”
maxim of positivism that “law is law” (the idea that the validity of a given law
has nothing to do with substantive justice) and the natural law idea that an
unjust law forfeits its legality. Both positions were problematic; yet, judges had
to commit themselves perforce to one of the two theories. Radbruch found it
meaningful that courts had already sided with natural law in their verdicts
concerning the status of National Socialist law. One of the earliest cases was a
1946 verdict of the Wiesbaden district court in a civil matter. The case in-
volved the heirs of Jews whose property had been confiscated according to
Nazi laws during the war, before they were deported to Poland and killed there.
The defendants had purchased the confiscated property at private auction.
After the war, the heirs sued the defendants to return the property to them as
the rightful owners. The defendants raised what in Anglo-American law is
known as a “bona fide purchaser” defense, arguing they had innocently ac-
quired the property at auction and thus were the rightful owners. In its verdict
in favor of the plaintiff-heirs, the district court held that the Nazi laws declar-
ing Jewish property subject to confiscation by the state “were in violation of
the natural law, and were already null and void at the time of their decree.”7
Radbruch also described a verdict by a Russian occupation court in an
eastern German criminal case involving “denunciation” to the Nazi authori-
ties. In this “grudge informer” case, the defendant had notified the police that
his neighbor had called Hitler a “mass murderer” responsible for starting the
war. The denunciatee was subsequently arrested, convicted of “preparations for
treason,” and executed. The Schwurgericht (lay assessors) convicted the denouncer
of aiding and abetting murder despite his argument that he had acted in accor-
dance with the law at the time, which required Germans to report cases of
“high treason” to the local authorities. The court rejected this defense, evi-
dently persuaded by the prosecutor’s argument that Nazi laws targeting unjust
ends were nullified ab initio. Later in the same essay, Radbruch cited with
approval the words of the state prosecutor of Saxony, affirming that no judge
could justify his enforcement of a law that was “not only unjust, but criminal,”
inasmuch as such laws contradicted the “inescapable, authoritative law, which
denies validity to the criminal orders of an inhuman tyranny.” These and other
examples, Radbruch concluded, proved that “the struggle against positivism”
raged throughout the German court system. And the courts were well-advised
to maintain the struggle, because, in Radbruch’s oft-quoted phrase, positivism
had rendered German jurists “defenseless” against the “arbitrary and criminal
content” of Nazi laws.8
What was the content of Radbruch’s natural law, the “supralegal law” that
both measured and determined the validity of positive law? The vagueness of
his natural law invited different interpretations. According to Manfred Walther,
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Radbruch’s natural law harked back to the Vernunftsrecht (law of reason) of the
Enlightenment, rather than to Catholic (Neo-Thomistic) natural law. Walther
bases his assessment on Radbruch’s statement from 1934: “Human rights,
Rechtstaat, separation of powers, popular sovereignty, freedom and equality,
the ideas of 1789, have again emerged from the flood of skepticism, in which
they appeared to have drowned.” Walther’s identification of Radbruch’s natu-
ral law with the secular French Revolution, however, does not take account of
the impact of the war on Radbruch’s thought, nor does it reckon with some of
his postwar writings that evidence a more religiously oriented theory of natu-
ral law. In “The Renewal of Law” (1946), he referred to the “thousand year old
common wisdom of antiquity, the Christian Middle Ages, and the period of
the Enlightenment,” all of which asserted the existence of “a law of nature, a
law of God, a law of reason.” Fritz Bauer, a former student of Radbruch and the
motive force behind the postwar Remer and Auschwitz trials, traced Radbruch’s
natural law to both humanistic and religious principles of human dignity in
Western cultural history. The jurist and legal historian Eberhard Schmidt
pointed out in a 1952 lecture that Radbruch never endowed his natural law
with substantive content, nor spelled out how exactly the natural law was to
be discerned. In the wake of Radbruch’s 1947 essay, attempts were made to
flesh out the “Radbruch formula,” but even these efforts could not overcome
the conceptual fuzziness that clouds all attempts to establish a universal and
unchanging principle of right.9
However interpreted, Radbruch’s clarion call to revive natural law theory
found an audience among German jurists in the years following its publica-
tion. Prior to the Nazi era, the Reichsgericht (forerunner to the postwar Supreme
Court) subscribed to a positivistic theory of law, as typified in the famous
dictum: “The lawmaker is independent and bound to no other limitations
than those which he has himself drawn from the Constitution or other laws.”
The effects of the war and Radbruch’s highly publicized critique of positivism
wrought a thorough reorientation in the thinking of the Reichsgericht’s postwar
successor, the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Supreme Court). The Bundesgerichtshof
in fact was the first legal forum to invoke Radbruch’s formula. In a 1946 civil
case the court stated, in language taken almost verbatim from Radbruch’s “Le-
gal Illegality” article: “If the principle of equality in the promulgation of posi-
tive law is violated, the law forfeits any quality of law and is generally not law.”
Nor was such language unusual in the court’s opinions published after the war.
Appeals to a “preexisting and accepted order of values and principles of duty
governing human society,” “an inviolable and supralegal domain of human
freedom and right derived from the ‘moral autonomy’ of the person,” and “an
order of family life” that is “given by God” are scattered throughout the post-
war jurisprudence of the high court.10
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Radbruch’s influence was not confined to the highest judicial authorities
in West Germany. Anti-positivistic statements also appeared in the decisions
of district, state, and appellate courts. “The judge serves the law and has to
apply it unless its application is forbidden by the general moral law,” held the
appellate court (Obergerichtshof) of Cologne in 1949. The appellate court of
Bamberg in 1950 adjured judges to nullify “laws contrary to natural law.” In a
strange case, the district court of Wuppertal in 1946 rejected the legally mini-
mal penalty meted out to a defendant, reasoning that “the laws may no longer
be interpreted as something rigid and completely unchangeable by subordinat-
ing all feelings of justice,” because “the judge’s absolute consciousness of duty
regarding justice and morality and the citizen to be judged by him [is] higher
than the positive law.” Also in 1946, the district court of Wiesbaden held that
laws “contradicting the natural law [are] at the time of their decree null and
void.” According to the district court, such laws were those that violated prin-
ciples “so intimately connected with the nature of the human being in its
essence that their infringement would destroy the mental-moral nature of the
human being.”11
Before his death in 1949, Gustav Radbruch had occasion to comment on
the verdicts of the state and appellate courts of Frankfurt in the Eichberg case
(Mennecke, Schmidt, et al.). At trial, the defendants had defended their par-
ticipation in euthanasia with appeal to the Hitler order of September 1, 1939,
arguing that as a valid and formally binding law it had afforded a legal basis for
their actions. They further claimed that even if the order was not valid law
they had nonetheless believed at the time in its validity, and therefore were
not criminally liable because of a mistake of law. In opposition to this view,
the prosecutor had urged that the order was not a law because it lacked the
formal elements of legal validity: it had neither been published nor counter-
signed by the proper ministerial authority. The state court rejected the defen-
dants’ arguments, holding that whether the order was a law or not it was
illegal. The court in other words refused to accept the prosecutor’s view that
the Hitler order be denied legal validity on the basis of its formal inadequacies.
Instead, the court declared that the state was not the ultimate source of law; it
was bound by the “moral law.” Insofar as the Hitler order violated fundamental
norms of justice, it forfeited any claim to legal validity, even if it was consid-
ered a law at the time of its decree. The manifest immorality of the Hitler
order was so clear that it could not have been lost on the defendants. The
Frankfurt appellate court upheld the state court’s determination, noting that
the defendants must have been aware the euthanasia program violated “evi-
dent natural law principles.” In his commentary on the case, Radbruch ap-
plauded the courts’ endorsement of natural law. The verdicts demonstrated
that “even tyranny has its limits, and may not just proclaim any arbitrary act a
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law.” He concluded with the prediction that the Eichberg verdict would be of
“considerable importance for future euthanasia cases.”12
Radbruch’s words were indeed prophetic for many of the cases subsequent
to the Eichberg trial. In the trials we examine in this and subsequent chapters,
euthanasia defendants were usually charged with murder under section 211 of
the German Penal Code. The true basis for the courts’ jurisdiction, however,
was the defendants’ egregious violation of the “law of nature,” which was supe-
rior to all positive laws inconsistent with it. The verdict in the German Hadamar
trial is representative. Although acknowledging the importance of positivism
to “legal unity and security,” the state court of Frankfurt held that positivistic
interpretations were curtailed wherever individual laws clashed with the eter-
nal and unchanging law of nature. When a law violated the natural law, it lost
all of its compulsory power and ceased to be valid law. The court identified one
of the principles of natural law as the “sanctity of human life,” with which the
state could interfere only as the result of a valid legal judgment (such as a
death sentence) or in times of war. Because the Hitler order—whether or not
it was a law—vitiated this principle of natural law, it was null and void at the
moment the Führer reduced it to writing. Hence, the defendants’ actions pur-
suant to this so-called law were in reality “objectively illegal.” Furthermore,
held the court, their actions were subjectively illegal: no matter how much they
may have believed in the existence of a valid euthanasia law, “the wrongful
nature of the so-called euthanasia program was apparent even to the simplest
and most psychologically immature people”—apparent by virtue of the natural
law. The reasoning of the Frankfurt court in the Hadamar case—denying the
state ultimate authority as a source of valid law, nullifying the Hitler order for
its unjust content, and upholding the defendants’ awareness of illegality with
reference to the law of nature—is typical of many verdicts issued by German
courts between 1946 and 1948.13
Natural law gave the German judiciary a normative basis on which it
could condemn Nazi euthanasia, its top-level architects, and its field-level
implementers without violating the principles of legality (ban on retroac-
tive punishment). In trial after trial, euthanasia defendants portrayed the
killing of the disabled as a program inspired by humanitarian concerns,
with the aim of “releasing” incurably ill patients from their misery. In refut-
ing this characterization and branding Nazi euthanasia as murder, German
courts in the immediate postwar era insisted these killings were not moti-
vated by compassion but by “reprehensible” and “crassly utilitarian” ration-
ales that violated the most sacred principles of civilized peoples. By placing
their talents and energies at the disposal of this criminal project, rank-and-
file doctors and nurses had become parties to it. The unmistakable message
was that the “small wheels” in the machinery of destruction were not the
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dupes of Hitler and his minions but culpable agents responsible for what they
did.
Natural law theory also empowered postwar German courts to overcome a
potentially exculpatory defense by euthanasia personnel—namely, that the
outward trappings of legality surrounding the euthanasia program had led them
to believe in its lawfulness. Under traditional German law, this “mistake of
law,” if proven, would result in acquittal. By invoking a law of nature acces-
sible to all rational people, German judges neutralized these mistake-of-law
defenses: the unjustified killing of disabled patients was a patent violation of
the sanctity of life, a core value of the natural law, of which the defendants had
to have been aware in virtue of their very existence as rational beings.
Interpreting natural law so as to deny mistake-of-law defenses continued
until the early 1950s when the “exertion of conscience” cases phased out natu-
ral law theory. Henceforth, German courts would not assume that the law of
nature was accessible to all rational beings; instead, they would examine whether
individual defendants had “exerted” their consciences sufficiently to under-
stand the natural law. The self-evident quality of natural law was thereby de-
emphasized in favor of a subjective, case-by-case exploration of a defendant’s
capacity to comprehend the wrongfulness of euthanasia killing.14
With this context in mind, we can now turn to the German euthanasia
trials themselves, beginning with those defendants who lacked the grace or
good luck of a later trial. For in the early German trials, neither pleas of
ignorance of wrongdoing nor subjective good intentions mattered. Euthanasia
defendants stood before their accusers as perpetrators, and the flail of justice
struck swiftly and without mercy.
THE PERILS OF BEING FIRST: THE WERNICKE AND WIECZOREK CASE
Less than a year after Germany’s surrender, Dr. Hilde Wernicke and Nurse
Helene Wieczorek stood before the state court in Berlin charged with murder
in violation of section 211 of the German criminal code. They were former
members of the medical staff at the mental hospital Obrawalde near the Pome-
ranian town of Meseritz. The Berlin court’s findings of fact indicated that in
1943 Walter Grabowski, the new director of the Obrawalde mental hospital,
informed Wernicke and Wieczorek of Hitler’s order to kill all incurably ill
mental patients. He then initiated them into Obrawalde’s role in the killing
program. At first, Wernicke withheld her agreement to participate, but even-
tually she overcame her scruples with the justification that incurable patients
incapable of an adequate life should be eliminated. Wieczorek had fewer scruples,
readily agreeing to participate. Grabowski swore both of them to secrecy under
penalty of death. Thereafter, transports of patients arrived at Obrawalde along
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with lists of those designated for killing. Wernicke’s job was to examine these
lists and confirm the diagnosis of incurable mental illness. She relayed the
names of patients deemed truly incurable to nurse Amanda Ratajczak. Over
the next year, she studied on average four to six patient histories per day,
giving special attention to patients who suffered from both incurable mental
illness and physical impairment. Patients capable of work were spared. From
spring 1943 to 1944, Wernicke communicated the names of approximately
600 patients to nurses Ratajczak, E., and Wieczorek (who succeeded Ratajczak
when she became ill in summer 1944) for killing. Like her co-nurses Ratajczak
and E., Wieczorek injected lethal dosages of morphine and scopolamine into
each patient. She performed this grisly work until September 1944. On Janu-
ary 29, 1945, Obrawalde’s role in the euthanasia program came to an end when
the staff fled the institution to escape the advancing Red Army.15
The various judicial panels who heard the case within the state court of
Berlin in March 1946 found the defendants guilty of murder as perpetrators.
The German law of murder (codified in section 211 of the German Penal
Code) is complex and highly nuanced. For this reason, readers steeped in Anglo-
American legal culture may at first find German legal conceptions of murder
perplexing. Prior to 1941, murder under German law was straightforward. The
code’s definition of murder in 1912 emphasized premeditation as the essential
element of the offense: “Whoever intentionally kills a person, if he carried out
the killing with premeditation, is guilty of murder for that killing.”16 In 1941
the German Ministry of Justice overhauled section 211, redefining murder as a
killing prompted by any one of several motives:
A murderer is any one who kills another person out of joy in killing
[Mordlust], satisfaction of the sexual drive, covetousness or other base
motives, maliciously or cruelly or by means endangering the community
or for the purpose of making possible or concealing the commission of
another crime.17
Writing about this revision of section 211 in September 1941, Roland Freisler,
State Secretary in the Prussian Ministry of Justice and president of the Berlin
People’s Court, hailed it as a “renewal” that better reflected the “natural feel-
ings of the people.” For Freisler, the older version of section 211 failed ad-
equately to address the interests of “substantive justice” because its emphasis
on premeditation did not permit a “moral assessment” of the perpetrator. Freisler
quoted with approval the annotations supporting the revision:
The complete destruction of a member of the community directly affects
the community itself. Further, in morally evaluating assaults on the life of
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another, the state of mind that produces the crime is decisive. . . . Murder
is distinguished from manslaughter by a particularly base state of mind,
which has application to especially reprehensible motives or in related,
especially base means [of acting].18
Henceforth, German legal analysis to determine who was a murderer “must
regard [the defendant’s] entire personality.” Although the text of the revised
section 211 was not infused with Nazi terminology or concepts, it was justified
with resort to National Socialist principles—specifically, the will to give legal
effect to the “natural feelings of the Volk.” The new version of section 211
survived postwar efforts to denazify German law and continues unchanged
until the present day.19
At the trial of Wernicke and Wieczorek, the defendants were tried on the
basis of the new version of section 211. Dismissing Wernicke’s argument that
her actions had been inspired by the humane motive of delivering incurable
patients from their suffering, the court found that both defendants had acted
from base motives. Moreover, they had also acted “maliciously”; that is, they
had exploited the guilelessness and defenselessness of their victims after win-
ning over their trust—an act that “runs counter to every human feeling on the
grossest level.” The defendants’ subordinate status in the grand scheme of
euthanasia did not help them as it would defendants in later years. On the
issue of perpetration versus complicity, the court invoked the subjective stan-
dard of the Bathtub Case, finding that each of the defendants had identified
with the killing “as her own act.” Neither had declined or opposed Grabowski’s
offer; rather, they had inwardly assented both to the project itself and to its
reprehensible philosophy of destroying “valueless” life. The state court’s
Schwurgericht held open the door to the legal permissibility of euthanasia but
insisted that the defendants’ actions were not motivated by compassion.
Nor did the state court authorities find the defendants’ superior orders
defense persuasive. On appeal from the Schwurgericht, the appellate court de-
nied that Hitler’s 1939 order was a law, because it was never published in the
Reich Legal Journal, as was required for all newly promulgated laws. Further-
more, the appellate court held, even if the Hitler order had been a valid order,
the German Civil Servant Law obligated every official to refuse orders that
violated criminal law. The defendants not only did not refuse the order, but
“inwardly approved” of it. For this reason, they were guilty as perpetrators
under the new version of section 211.20 Because German law prior to 1949
required the death penalty in all murder cases (absent extenuating circum-
stances), Wernicke and Wieczorek were sentenced to death on March 25, 1946.
When their punishment was carried out, they became the first—and last—
euthanasia defendants tried in West German courts to suffer this fate.
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VANITY, AMBITION, AND LOVE: THE EICHBERG CASE
Nine months after the Berlin state court handed down its verdicts in the
Wernicke and Wieczorek case, the state court of Frankfurt presided over the
trial of medical personnel from the Eichberg mental hospital. In 1940 the KdF
had designated Eichberg a transit center and collection point in the government’s
campaign against the mentally disabled. In this dual role, Eichberg received
transports of mentally handicapped patients that were later dispatched to one
of the six killing centers for “treatment.” It also became a venue for murdering
both disabled adults and children.
The most notable defendant at the Eichberg trial in December 1946 was
Dr. Friedrich Mennecke, an infamous figure in the annals of Nazi euthanasia.
Mennecke’s swaggering wartime letters to his wife, interspersing banal com-
ments on his meals with casual references to the annihilation of mental pa-
tients, reveal a man deeply involved in mass atrocity without a trace of self-
accusation. In 1938 Mennecke became the director of the Eichberg mental
hospital, which he briefly left when war broke out to assume duties as an army
doctor on the Western front. In January 1940, the KdF released him from his
military duties to participate in the nascent euthanasia program. Accordingly,
he returned to Eichberg and resumed his directorship. In February 1940 he
attended a meeting of psychiatrists at the Columbus House in Berlin, where
Viktor Brack informed him and his colleagues of Hitler’s decision to set the
euthanasia program in motion. Brack reassured the attending doctors that the
program was legal, a point he drove home by circulating a copy of Hitler’s
euthanasia order. Categories of patients exempt from the program were also
discussed; these included patients injured in combat and elderly patients suf-
fering from age-related dementia. To justify the operation, Brack marshaled
the familiar economistic argument: mental patients unable to contribute to
the people’s community, but who nonetheless absorbed scarce resources, had
to be eliminated, particularly during a time of war when so many of the nation’s
most valuable citizens sacrificed their lives on behalf of the fatherland.21
Like his colleagues in attendance, Mennecke readily agreed to participate
in the program. After the February meeting with Brack, he returned to Eichberg
and completed the registration forms on his patients, occasionally ordering his
staff doctors to do the same without acquainting them with the reasons for it.
In the ensuing months, Mennecke also became an itinerant registrar for the
euthanasia program, visiting other institutions to complete forms on their
resident patients. At various satellite mental hospitals that Mennecke visited
during winter 1941, he was estimated to have filled out 200 forms; at his own
institution of Eichberg, the number reached 1,000. In addition—and more
ominously—he traveled in November and December 1941 to the concentration
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camps at Sachsenhausen, Ravensbrück, Buchenwald, Dachau, Gross-Rosen,
Auschwitz, and Flossenbürg as a participant in the Nazis’ 14f13 program. At
these camps, Mennecke was believed to have filled out forms on approximately
1,000 inmates. The state court of Frankfurt declared that “there can be no
question that some of the inmates from the camp system whom Mennecke
designated for killing were gassed in the euthanasia centers.” Among the con-
centration camp prisoners caught up in Mennecke’s registration drive were
large numbers of Jewish men and women. In making his assessment, Mennecke
had reviewed photos of the prisoners from the camp files. On the backs of the
photos he had written epithets gleaned from the records, such as “race defiler”
(Rassenschänder), “malicious agitator and German enemy” (Hetzer und Deut-
schenfeind), “rumored Communist,” “Jewish prostitute.” Although conclusive
evidence was unavailable, the state court believed that at least some of these
Jewish prisoners were later murdered in the euthanasia centers on the basis of
Mennecke’s forms.22
Mennecke’s service to Nazi euthanasia did not end with these activities.
He also served as a Gutachter (medical expert), reviewing regular shipments of
Dr. Friedrich Mennecke with his wife, Eva. The director of the Eichberg mental hospital and
a T-4 medical expert, Mennecke’s prolific correspondence with his wife became an important
source of evidence against him at his criminal trial before a Frankfurt state court in December
1946. Courtesy Bundesarchiv Koblenz
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completed forms sent to him in packets from Berlin. In the lower left corner of
each form, he wrote one of three characterizations: “Yes,” “No,” or “Question-
able.” His determinations were not based on medical exams but solely on the
forms’ contents. Wielding this divine power over the life and death of people
he had never seen, Mennecke reviewed nearly 7,000 forms as a T-4 expert. Of
this number, he designated around 2,500 for destruction. Furthermore, during
his tenure as the director of Eichberg, 2,262 patients were transferred from the
facility to the killing center at Hadamar, where almost all of them were gassed
between January and August 1941. Mennecke gave the lists of transferees to
his underlings, ordering them to prepare the affected patients for transport.
At trial, the court heard eyewitness testimony that the transferees were not all
severely ill mental patients; some were only mildly disabled patients capable of
work. Not all of them, in other words, were the “burnt out ruins” (ausgebrannte
Ruinen) that Mennecke claimed in his defense. Finally, the court was satisfied
that Mennecke had participated in the murder of adult patients at Eichberg
between summer 1941 and December 1942. His assertion that he knew noth-
ing of the killings was refuted by his detailed letters to his wife.23
Mennecke’s defense at his trial in December 1946 was that he had become
involved in euthanasia only against his will and had done everything in his
power to secure a reassignment to the front in 1942. Again, Mennecke’s letters
proved his undoing. In the eyes of the state court, they revealed his passionate
engagement with the euthanasia program, a program that gave Mennecke the
opportunity to interact with the “superstars” of mass killing. In one letter, he
boasted to his wife of the praise that Dr. Werner Heyde (an Obergutachter in
section II of the KdF and head of the T-4 Medical Department) had showered
on him for his work on behalf of the program. It gratified his ego to be associ-
ated with the “famous Berlin organization,” noting that he and his staff were
fully cooperating with it. After his transfer to the field from Eichberg, he
sought to maintain his active role as a Gutachter: in a 1944 letter to the Reich
Committee (responsible for administering the children’s euthanasia program),
he advertised his willingness to continue his lethal work, indicating that he
would accept the directorship of a children’s ward in Plagwitz (lower Silesia)
were it offered to him.24
Given this incriminating documentation, the court had no doubt that
Mennecke had contributed to the killings at Eichberg willingly and enthusias-
tically. The court noted that the children’s ward at Eichberg was established
under Mennecke’s regime as director, and that he had conducted correspon-
dence with the Reich Committee in Berlin, whose “treatment” authorizations
he forwarded to the ward’s director, Dr. Walter Schmidt. Mennecke did not
blanch at the implications of his orders: according to Schmidt’s testimony,
and as Mennecke himself confessed, he told Schmidt to proceed with “treatment”
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so long as the authorization had been given by the Reich Committee—an
order that extended equally to adult patients and to children. Applying the
subjective standard of the Bathtub Case, the court found that Mennecke had
inwardly identified with the killings, which he had “willed as his own,” and
was accordingly guilty as a “co-perpetrator” of murder—this despite the ab-
sence of proof that he had directly performed the killings himself. In its dis-
cussion of Mennecke’s motives under section 211, the court observed that he
was not an ideological killer; rather, Mennecke was driven by a “boundless
ambition” and an “illimitable need for validation.” It “flattered his vanity” to
interact as an equal with eminent professors and political figures, and he spared
no effort to ingratiate himself with them. The 200 Reichsmarks he received
every month in compensation for his work in the euthanasia program was an
added inducement. In brief Mennecke was, in the estimate of the court, willing to
sacrifice everything—“law, morals, professional ethics, honor and decency”—
to attain his goal of professional advancement. Mennecke’s unprincipled
careerism was the goad to his participation in mass killing. Such motives the
court deemed “base and reprehensible,” thus satisfying the “base motive” ele-
ment of murder under the new version of section 211.25
Because of his work as an itinerant expert, Mennecke could not assume
direction over the children’s ward installed at Eichberg in early 1941 for the
purpose of killing disabled children. Instead, he assigned the directorship to
his deputy, Dr. Walter Schmidt, who returned from the field to take up his
duties in summer 1941. For his role in the Eichberg killings, Schmidt stood
with Mennecke in the dock as a codefendant. The state court was convinced
that Mennecke had briefed Schmidt on the euthanasia program and that it
would have been impossible to conceal transfers of patients from Eichberg
without his knowledge. Schmidt assumed control of the children’s ward as the
institution’s chief doctor. He soon received a visit from Richard von Hegener,
deputy director of the Reich Committee, and Professor Paul Nitsche, one of
three chief medical experts and from December 1941 medical director of T-4.
The Berliners informed Schmidt that mentally handicapped children in his
ward were to be destroyed (the German word was behandelt, or “treated”). There
was some evidence presented at trial that Schmidt unsuccessfully tried to ex-
tricate himself from his new commission when he learned of it—a fact that
would weigh significantly in the court’s assessment of his role in the killing
program.26
From summer 1941 until the end of Eichberg as a euthanasia facility, chil-
dren afflicted with severe physical and mental handicaps were transferred to
its children’s ward. On arrival they were subjected to medical observation;
their physical and mental conditions, as well as their “educability,” were noted
on forms subsequently sent to the Reich Committee. Based on their review of
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these forms, committee employees ordered additional observation or issued an
authorization to the Eichberg authorities to have the child “treated.” In at
least thirty documented cases, Schmidt himself administered lethal dosages of
morphine and luminal to the children designated for “treatment.” In another
thirty to forty cases, he had one of his staff nurses, Heléne Schürg, dispose of
handicapped children with lethal injections (or, in a few instances, with deadly
doses of luminal tablets). It was significant to the state court that no evidence
implicated Schmidt in self-initiated killing, as the indictment against him had
alleged. All of his criminal actions, in other words, were carried out within the
scope of orders from Berlin.27
The state court did not dwell exclusively on the destructive aspects of
Schmidt’s career at Eichberg but also cited in its verdict examples of his pro-
bity as a doctor. It noted that he had sought to cure his patients with the
newest medical methods, including insulin shock therapy. Witnesses attested
to his professionalism and dedication to his patients, many of whom experi-
enced such an improvement in their condition as a result of Schmidt’s inter-
ventions that they could be released from the hospital. Anticipating later (and
more successful) defenses, Schmidt claimed these successes were his way of
opposing euthanasia: by rehabilitating patients who might otherwise have been
euthanized, he hoped to demonstrate the extreme nature of the government’s
killing program.28
For the court, Schmidt’s actions on behalf of the euthanasia program were
qualitatively different from Mennecke’s. Unlike Mennecke’s motives for par-
ticipation, Schmidt’s were not self-referential. He was not impelled by base
factors like vanity, ambition, and acquisitiveness, all of which figured promi-
nently in Mennecke’s conduct. Instead, the court pointed to the possibility
that Schmidt—perhaps because of his upbringing—suffered from a “falsely
understood subaltern loyalty to obey,” which prevented him from refusing to
collaborate with the euthanasia program. Ultimately, in the court’s estimate
he was a different moral animal from Mennecke, one to whom “a certain pro-
fessional ethos” had to be granted. The state court was clearly impressed with
the evidence presented about Schmidt’s “extraordinary efforts” to effect a cure
in his patients. For this reason, it held that Schmidt—despite his proven
involvement in the murder of his patients—had not acted from base motives
as these were defined under section 211. The court did find, however, that
Schmidt had acted “maliciously” by “secretly, treacherously, and falsely” trans-
ferring patients to killing centers like Hadamar, after forbidding their relatives
to visit them and withholding information from the families of their where-
abouts. Schmidt, in concert with his nursing staff, fostered trust in the pa-
tients and their families that they would be given medical treatment, a trust
that was soon abused by lethal injections and gas chambers. The malicious
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nature of Schmidt’s participation in the killing resulted in a finding of guilt as
a co-perpetrator of murder under section 211.29
Alongside Mennecke and Schmidt in the dock were members of the
Eichberg nursing staff. The most conspicuous among them was Eichberg’s chief
nurse, Heléne Schürg. She served as chief nurse at Eichberg from 1937 until
her dismissal by U.S. authorities in July 1945. At trial, it was proven that she
had killed between thirty and forty disabled children with lethal doses of mor-
phine and luminal, given either intravenously or in tablets. Schürg did not
dispute her role in the killings but raised a superior orders defense, arguing
that she had acted under orders from higher governmental powers. She also
argued—and I have yet to find an analogous defense in other euthanasia cases—
that her amorous infatuation with Schmidt had transformed her into an al-
most robotic tool of the chief doctor. The state court rejected the superior
orders defense, but found her lovelorn argument credible on the issue of whether
she was a perpetrator or an accomplice. The court found “she had so divested
herself of her own will that she placed all her fortitude at Schmidt’s disposal,
seeking to translate his will into reality and doing precisely that.” Such pros-
tration of her own will to act effectively nullified the “will to perpetration”
necessary to qualify as a perpetrator. She was thus guilty as an accomplice to
the murders perpetrated by Schmidt. (That is, she was guilty of aiding and
abetting murder.)30
Schürg was not the only nurse convicted of complicity in murder by the
Frankfurt court. Her colleague Andreas Senft had been a nurse at Eichberg
since 1906. As a station nurse in the men’s ward, he confessed to deliberately
killing patients with injections of morphine and luminal. His defense that his
forty years at Eichberg had conditioned him to obey doctors’ orders and to
support them in all circumstances was rejected as an exculpatory ground
by the court, which found him, like Schürg, guilty of aiding and abetting
murder.31
Until the promulgation of the German Basic Law in 1949, all defendants
convicted as perpetrators of murder in German courts were given a mandatory
death sentence, unless extraordinary factors were present to commute the sen-
tence to life imprisonment. In the Eichberg case, the court found no reason to
spare Mennecke from capital punishment. (The sentence was never carried
out; he committed suicide in his cell at the Butzbach prison near Frankfurt on
January 28, 1947.) Schmidt, however, was another story. The gap between
Schmidt’s subjective state of mind and his objective acts qualified him as an
exceptional case in the reckoning of the court, warranting life imprisonment
rather than the death penalty. A similar focus on subjectivity characterized
the court’s assessments of Schürg and Senft. Schürg’s “strong relationship of
dependence” on Schmidt was counted in her favor, as were her efforts to extri-
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cate herself from the program; she received a prison sentence of eight years. As
for Senft, the court found that his long-standing habit of deference had ren-
dered him “psychologically unprepared” to deal with his role in the euthanasia
program. He received a four-year prison term.32
The significance of the Eichberg case in the history of German euthanasia
trials can be interpreted on two levels. First, it typifies the willingness of Ger-
man courts in the immediate postwar years to convict euthanasia killers as
perpetrators under the German law of murder. In this respect, Eichberg is of a
piece with the Meseritz-Obrawalde and Hadamar trials, representing with them
a vein of cases that did not gladly suffer intentional mass killing—or the de-
fendants responsible for it. Second, the Eichberg case adumbrates some new
tendencies and directions that later courts would pursue with far more alacrity
than the Frankfurt court did. These new approaches are especially evident in
the court’s treatment of Schmidt, Schürg, and Senft. Although it finally con-
victed Schmidt of murder, the court did so only after a searching examination
of his subjective state of mind at the time he participated in the killings. Its
analysis framed Schmidt’s acts within the context of his “one-sided and false
education” about his duty to obey authority. The court did not take the next
logical step and deny Schmidt’s ability as a moral agent to withhold his con-
sent to and collaboration with an unjust exercise of the sovereign’s will, based
on his defective socialization. Yet, the raw material for such a step is implicit
in the court’s reasoning. In addition, the court’s receptiveness to Schmidt’s
argument that he only participated in euthanasia in order to curb its effects
(e.g., by curing patients through various shock therapies) is a precursor to later
“collision of duties” defenses, in which euthanasia killers would contend, with
increasing degrees of success, that they collaborated in the program only to
sabotage it from within. Although the state court of Frankfurt did not accept
this defense here as an exculpatory or justifying ground for Schmidt’s actions,
the basis for such a conclusion is discernible in the court’s rationale.
The Frankfurt court took a similar approach in its assessment of the two
nurses, Schürg and Senft. Their psychological temperament—Schürg’s love-
lorn reliance on Schmidt, Senft’s forty-year habit of automatic deference to
authority—could have, and probably would have, qualified them for acquittal
in a later era based on the theory that they lacked the necessary awareness of
illegality on which criminal liability hinges. In 1946 German courts were not
yet ready to give their defendants’ psychological makeup such exonerative ef-
fect. The memory of Nazi atrocities was still vividly etched in the minds of
most Germans. Further, the Cold War had not yet reached its full stride, as it
would in the late 1940s. The need to punish the killers of the National Social-
ist state still outweighed the need for a rehabilitated German nation as a demo-
cratic-capitalist buffer between the West and the Soviet sphere of influence in
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eastern Europe. This geopolitical situation would change between 1946 and
1948. When the worm did eventually turn and the West began to perceive the
Soviet Union as an immediate menace to international security, deserving of
higher priority than the prosecution of Nazi war criminals, the effect was to
douse the fire of German prosecution with cold water. One result would be the
wholesale acquittal or sentence mitigation of euthanasia defendants.
HUMAN WEAKNESS AND THE INERTIA OF THE WILL:
THE GERMAN HADAMAR CASE
Dr. Adolf Wahlmann, former chief doctor at the Hadamar mental hospital,
may have had a sickening feeling of deja vu as he sat in the defendants’ gallery
in March 1947. A photograph from the trial shows Wahlmann sitting rigidly,
his mouth frozen in a dispirited frown, his brows anxiously knitted, his chin
thrust forward in an attempt at tremulous self-mastery. Wahlmann had already
been convicted of war crimes at the U.S. Hadamar trial in October 1945. His
prior conviction, however, related only to Wahlmann’s role in the scheme to
murder consumptive eastern workers during the war’s waning stages. Sentenced
to life imprisonment, the seventy-two-year-old Wahlmann now stood accused
The German Hadamar Trial. Second row, left to right: chief nurse Irmgard Huber, Dr. Adolf
Wahlmann, Dr. Bodo Gorgass. Courtesy the Landeswohlfahrtsverband Hessen
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of murdering German patients at Hadamar between 1942 and 1945. A finding
of guilt could have meant the death penalty for him.
When the war broke out in September 1939, Wahlmann was living in
retirement in Heidelberg. Because of the shortage of doctors in Germany, he
was brought out of retirement and appointed chief doctor at the Weilmünster
mental hospital in June 1940. In August 1942 State Councillor Fritz Bernotat,
who presided over the system of mental institutions and nursing homes in
Hessen-Nassau, appointed him chief doctor at Hadamar. By this time, Hadamar
had long since been transformed into an extermination center for the men-
tally ill, replacing the Grafeneck institution when it was closed in December
1940. Even before Wahlmann’s arrival, at Hadamar 10,000 mentally disabled
patients had been killed through gassing as part of the first phase of the Nazis’
euthanasia program. A lull in the killing ensued from August 1941 until
Wahlmann became chief doctor in August 1942. In late August or early Sep-
tember 1942, the first transport of phase two arrived in Hadamar, consisting of
patients designated for killing from the cloister facility Hofen. Wahlmann had
been briefed in advance on the killing program and Hadamar’s role within it.
He devised a system of morning conferences with his nurses, in the course of
which they reported to him the names of patients deemed fit for euthanasia.
Wahlmann and his nurses examined the patient’s records and illness his-
tory, then discussed whether killing was indicated based on their review. The
final decision resided with Wahlmann. If he gave the green light, two nurses
wrote the name of the patient on a sheet of paper, noting the amount of
narcotics Wahlmann had specified to effect the patient’s death (e.g., the num-
ber of tablets of luminal, trional, or similar drugs). The paper was given to the
station nurses, who used it as an authorization for killing the patients so cho-
sen. During the night, these patients were given substantial overdoses, usually
in the form of narcotics tablets. If the tablets did not result in death, an
injection of morphine was administered the following morning, which invari-
ably ended the patient’s life. Afterward, Wahlmann made a brief inspection of
the corpse and fabricated false causes and times of death for the patient’s death
certificate. The Frankfurt state court estimated that at least 900 mentally ill
patients had been killed in this fashion.33
At trial, the Frankfurt court found that Wahlmann’s actions fulfilled sec-
tion 211’s definition of murder, insofar as he had acted “maliciously” by abus-
ing the trust that existed between patient and doctor. His patients and their
relatives looked to him to do everything in his power to either cure their
illness or mitigate its effect. Instead, he exploited their trust by distributing
overdoses of medication designed to cause their deaths. To this injury was
added the insult of fraudulent causes of death, aimed at deceiving the victims’
next of kin about the actual fate of the patients. Although the court found
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Wahlmann guilty of murder as a perpetrator under section 211, it denied that
he had acted from “base motives.” On the issue of what precisely motivated
Wahlmann to collaborate in the mass killings, the court cryptically attributed
his involvement to “human weaknesses and inadequacy, and a certain inertia
of the will.”34
In the black-and-white photograph of the Hadamar trial, an unassuming,
bespectacled man sits to the right of Wahlmann. He is tensely expectant,
uncannily resembling in his dark suit and tie with his recessive chin and gray-
ing temples a mild-mannered accountant. This is Dr. Hans-Bodo Gorgass,
convicted by the Frankfurt court of the murder of 2,000 patients during his
five months as a T-4 doctor at Hadamar. Like many of his T-4 colleagues,
Gorgass served on the front as a military doctor until given the “uk” (unab-
kömmlinge, or “indispensable”) designation by Hitler’s chancellery. Released
from his military duties in 1941, he was ordered to report to Berlin, where he
was received in the KdF by Viktor Brack. Brack told him that a law existed,
according to which incurable mentally ill patients were to be granted a “mercy
death” by specially appointed physicians. Although the law could not be pub-
lished because of unspecified reasons of secrecy, Brack assured Gorgass that his
work as a T-4 euthanasia doctor was perfectly legal. Brack then announced he
would receive a crash course in killing at the Hartheim mental hospital near
Linz. Without expressing concerns about the commission given him, Gorgass
immediately departed for Hartheim.35
On arrival Gorgass met with the institution’s director, Dr. Rudolf Lonauer.
Lonauer briefed Gorgass on the circle of those involved in the euthanasia
program, disclosing that the mentally handicapped were disposed of in gas
chambers located in six separate facilities within the Reich. At his trial, Gorgass
told the Frankfurt court that these revelations deeply shocked him. He claimed,
however, that Lonauer assured him only severely ill patients refractory to
therapy would be affected. This assurance, along with Lonauer’s mention of
the names of well-known physicians involved in the operation, pacified
Gorgass’s conscience. Over the next several weeks, Gorgass served an appren-
ticeship in killing at Hartheim under the tutelage of Lonauer. After his stint
at Hartheim, Gorgass graduated to the killing center of Sonnenstein near
Pirna, where he observed the asphyxiation of patients with carbon monoxide
gas. From Sonnenstein he arrived at Hadamar in mid-June 1941 to begin his
service. There he was introduced to his work by Alfons Klein’s predecessor as
director of the institution, Dr. Friedrich Berner. Gorgass claimed at trial that
Berner told him he had a copy of the euthanasia law in his possession but for
security reasons was not able to show it to Gorgass. Berner then placed Gorgass
under oath and swore him to secrecy about the euthanasia program with a
handshake.36
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The killing process at Hadamar unfolded as follows: patients arriving at
Hadamar in transports were measured, weighed, photographed, and disrobed
before being led into an “examination room,” where Gorgass inspected their
patient histories and photocopies of their registration forms, upon which the
Gutachter had inscribed his initials. The purpose of this final examination was
to ensure that the patients’ symptoms were fully noted on the photocopies and
to guarantee that no war-wounded patients or foreigners had been inadvert-
ently included. Afterward, hospital personnel brought them into the gas cham-
ber—a room thirty cubic meters in area, disguised as a shower room. Once the
entire transport (consisting of between sixty and one hundred patients) was
locked in this room, Gorgass went into a passage behind the gas chamber,
where he turned on a valve that poured carbon monoxide gas into the cham-
ber. As he did so, he observed the effect of the gas through a peephole. After
ten minutes Gorgass turned off the gas valve. Another one to two hours passed
before the chamber was ventilated and the corpses removed for cremation.
Gorgass’s role in the killing process ended at this point, only to resume with
each new transport, which arrived on average twice per week. With two excep-
tions—one involving a war veteran, the other a pregnant woman (subsequently
killed with a lethal injection by the chief nurse)—Gorgass effected the deaths
of all patients brought to him in the examination room. His role continued
from June 1941 until the end of the first phase of euthanasia in August 1941.37
Like many of his colleagues in the euthanasia program, Gorgass claimed
the patients he gassed were in advanced stages of mental illness and physical
decrepitude. The Frankfurt court found this assertion questionable, because,
in its words, “a not inconsiderable number of those killed [at Hadamar] were
neither physically nor mentally ill. There were many who were still capable of
light work, who could carry on a limited conversation, who experienced emo-
tional impressions (like joy, or emotions tied to good or ill treatment), and
who could even correspond with their relatives.” One witness, a Dr. N., testi-
fied that many of those killed could have been treated with therapeutic mea-
sures that might have improved their condition. Eyewitness testimony heard
at trial cited specific examples. Another witness, a medical doctor, described
one of the victims as a small girl “who could not work at all, but was harmless,
always happy, and greeted him every morning like a father.” His efforts to gain
her exemption from transport failed, and she was sent to Hadamar for gassing.
Another victim, a farmhand from Fulda, was not only capable of work but
cognitively aware enough to recognize a former acquaintance of his in the
Hadamar disrobing room. In its verdict the court listed several other examples,
including a Jewish assessor committed to Eichberg in accordance with section
42b for distributing communist leaflets. The man was later transferred to
Hadamar to be killed.38
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Dr. Hans-Bodo Gorgass, convicted by a German court in March 1947 for murdering 2,000
patients at Hadamar in summer 1941. Before his arrival at Hadamar, Gorgass was trained
in techniques of mass murder at the killing centers of Hartheim (Linz) and Sonnenstein
(near Pirna). Gorgass operated the valves in the Hadamar gas chamber that dispatched
German patients with carbon monoxide gas. Like Adolf Wahlmann, Gorgass was convicted
of murder under German law and sentenced to death. Both men’s death sentences were
commuted with the formal repeal of capital punishment in West Germany in 1949. Cour-
tesy HHStAW Abt. 3008, Hans-Bodo Gorgass
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In assessing the nature of Gorgass’s actions in furtherance of the euthana-
sia program, the Frankfurt state court applied the criteria of section 211, be-
ginning with “base motives.” According to the court, no such motives were
perceptible in Gorgass’s conduct. “It has not been proven,” held the court,
“that greed, the need for validation, striving after material advantage, or other
despicable motives have caused Gorgass to collaborate in the implementation
of the program.” Rather, the court believed Gorgass may have been dazzled by
the eminent figures within the KdF who had approached him, “a small doctor,”
with “a secret Reich matter.” Being awed into cooperating with a plot to com-
mit mass murder did not “bear the stamp of moral reprehensibility”; it was
instead the result of “a certain human weakness.” Despite this finding, the
court found Gorgass guilty of murder under section 211 because his actions
were “malicious”; that is, he had acted “secretly, viciously, and fraudulently.”
Like his codefendant Wahlmann, Gorgass lulled transportees into a false sense
of security by winning their trust, then coarsely abused this trust by killing
them in gas chambers camouflaged as showering facilities. Gorgass was con-
victed with Wahlmann of murder (“malicious” killing) under section 211.39
Only Gorgass and Wahlmann were convicted as perpetrators of murder in
the Hadamar case. Although neither was deemed to have acted out of base
motives, the court denied extenuating grounds in sentencing the two doctors.
Gorgass argued for mitigation under paragraph 3 of section 211, an argument
rejected by the court based on his “extremely unethical conduct during the
euthanasia operation.” According to the court, had Gorgass “carried within
himself high ethical values and a strong professional ethos,” it would have
been obvious to him that the mass killing at Hadamar was illegitimate “from a
medical as well as a human-ethical standpoint.” Presumably, only some form of
disengagement from the program would have sufficed as “ethical” conduct.
Likewise, the court based its rejection of Wahlmann’s claims of extenuation
on the “especially high measure of irresponsibility” and “strong renunciation
of the medical professional ethos” his actions displayed. Absent mitigating
factors, both men were sentenced to death.40
Besides Gorgass and Wahlmann, other members of the Hadamar adminis-
tration faced judgment at the hands of the Frankfurt court. The nursing staff
(including the luckless Irmgard Huber, convicted of war crimes in the U.S.
Hadamar Trial) and the technical and office staff were all indicted. The logic of
the Bathtub Case guided the court in categorizing the nurses as accomplices
rather than perpetrators:
They were all inwardly too dependent and possessed of a powerful inertia
of the will in order to grasp situations of such gravity in a sufficient
manner. Above all, however, they saw their medical role models, whom
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they were accustomed to respect and esteem, [acting] weakly and without
will, and found in them neither support nor a role model.41
Moreover, the Frankfurt court considered the nurses’ ability to conform their
actions to the law compromised by subjective factors, such as a “primitive
nature” and (in one case) “pregnancy” that “restricted her power to resist.” A
habit of punctilious churchgoing also weighed in their favor. On this ratio-
nale, the nurses were convicted of aiding and abetting murder and given jail
terms between three and eight years. The office staff, among them secretaries
who had logged both the arrival of patients and property (including gold teeth)
confiscated from them, were all acquitted on the ground that their criminal
intent could not be sufficiently proven.42
On appeal from the state court, the appellate court of Frankfurt criticized
the lower court’s determination that the nurses were all accomplices rather
than perpetrators. The appellate court held that the lower court had exagger-
ated the subjective theory of perpetration. This theory could only be applied
in cases where the defendants “did not themselves commit the killing, but
have collaborated in some way in the killings that were committed.” In such
cases, stated the court, “the question must be answered whether they were
perpetrators or participants, . . . i.e., [whether they] identified themselves
inwardly with [the killing] and approved of it.” Where a defendant has fulfilled
all the elements of the offense himself, however, that defendant is a perpetra-
tor. “Whoever kills another person with his own hands, whoever administers
the deadly shot, or mixes poison in another’s food, is a murderer, even if he
does it in the interests of another, i.e. ‘for’ him.” However, because the defen-
dants, and not the government, had lodged the appeal, the case could not as a
matter of law be remanded to the lower court. The latter’s characterization of
the nurses as accomplices remained unchanged.43
The Hadamar case bears comparison with the Eichberg trial: in both, T-4
doctors were convicted as perpetrators of murder under section 211’s defini-
tion of “malicious” killing; in both, nurses were characterized under the sub-
jective theory as accomplices to murder, rather than as perpetrators. Although
jurists in the two trials were willing to convict physicians of murder as perpe-
trators, we can discern in both a tendency to regard the motives of the doctor
defendants as something other than “base”: Schmidt was actuated by a “falsely
understood subaltern loyalty to obey,” Wahlmann by “human weaknesses and
inadequacy, and a certain inertia of the will,” Gorgass by “a certain human
weakness” that awed him into collaborating with mass murder. Only Mennecke,
in his overweening self-importance, was declared to have acted “basely.” Both
cases are notable, too, for their refusal to convict as perpetrators nurses who
with their own hands had murdered thousands of disabled patients. By the end
F I R S T  R E C K O N I N G S 135
of the Hadamar trial in mid-1947, we are moving steadily toward an era in the
prosecution of Nazi euthanasia in which the rationale governing the portrayal
of nursing staff as accomplices will be extended to T-4 doctors.
THE BENEFITS OF A “WEAK AND UNSTABLE PERSONALITY”:
THE KALMENHOF CASE
In the history of National Socialist euthanasia prosecution, the trial of T-4
doctors Mathilde Weber and Hermann Wesse wears a Janus face. One face
stares backward toward the earlier prosecutions of the Meseritz-Obrawalde and
Eichberg medical staffs. The other looks toward new vistas in the evolution of
German euthanasia trials. Although the first trial of the Kalmenhof doctors
would end in early 1947 with the convictions of both Weber and Wesse as
murderers, two years would pass before the Frankfurt court, on remand from
the appellate court, would change its mind and find a T-4 doctor guilty not as
a perpetrator, but as an accomplice.
The Kalmenhof mental hospital was founded in the mid-1920s as one of
several charitable public institutions, “born,” in the ironic words of the Frank-
furt state court, “in the spirit of humanity and a practicing love of one’s neigh-
bor.” The association to which Kalmenhof belonged undertook to nurture
“feebleminded” (schwachsinnig) but educable children by means of instruction
and work therapy, with the goal of making of them “useful people.” When
Hitler came to power in 1933, the Nazis wasted no time in subverting these
constructive aspirations. They replaced Kalmenhof’s director and appointed
Nazi zealot Fritz Bernotat chairman of the association. This was a dire omen
for Kalmenhof’s patients; in 1936, at a conference of directors of mental hos-
pitals in the castle of Dehrn, Bernotat was reported to have told the assembled
directors, “If I were a doctor, I would kill these patients.”44
When the killing program began, Kalmenhof was transformed into both a
transit center, to which patients from other institutions were sent en route to
Hadamar, and a miniature killing center in its own right, where individual
murders were committed through lethal doses of narcotics. At the time
Kalmenhof assumed these roles in 1940, Dr. Mathilde Weber was its managing
physician. In January 1941, the Reich Cooperative for State Hospitals and
Nursing Homes (a front organization for Hitler’s chancellery) sent to Kalmenhof
lists of patients to be prepared for transport on a predetermined day by the
busses of Gekrat. These selections had been made by T-4 experts based on
registration forms completed and returned to Berlin by the Kalmenhof staff in
1940. Of the 600 to 700 patients at Kalmenhof, 232 were transferred to
Hadamar, where they were gassed between January 17 and April 29, 1941.
Patients were also transferred to Kalmenhof from other institutions for a short
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time before transport to Hadamar. In 1942 a children’s ward for the destruc-
tion of mentally disabled children was installed in Kalmenhof. Weber served
as its managing doctor until May 10, 1944, when she was replaced by Hermann
Wesse.45
During her tenure as managing doctor of the ward, transports of children
arrived at Kalmenhof from Hamburg, Bonn, and the Ruhr. They were accom-
modated on the building’s third floor, which was reserved for the “Reich Com-
mittee children.” By this time, a portion of the hospital had been comman-
deered by the German army, causing acute shortages in hospital space. In the
children’s ward, conditions were such that several children were assigned to a
single bed. After a brief stay in Kalmenhof, nearly all of the transferee chil-
dren died. The killings were done by a floor nurse, Maria Müller, by means of
luminal tablets mixed in deadly doses in the children’s food. At trial, Weber
claimed she never personally administered lethal injections or overdoses of
medication to these children. She further argued she had no clear knowledge
that killings were taking place, because she neither lived in the hospital nor
lingered there beyond the morning hours. With respect to Müller’s actions,
Weber disclaimed knowledge of her work. When her suspicion grew that Müller
might have a hand in the patients’ deaths, she alleged that she warned the
nurse repeatedly.46
The state court did not find her defense cogent. Her assertions notwith-
standing, the court was convinced that Weber not only suspected Müller of
killing mentally disabled children in the ward, but had actual knowledge of
these killings. Further, the court believed Weber had condoned the killings
and even promoted them by listing spurious causes of death on the death
certificates. Weber herself admitted that “in the course of time” she under-
stood that the children were to be destroyed under authorization by the Reich
Committee in Berlin. With each newly arrived transport of children, Weber
received a list with the children’s names and a “treatment authorization”—a
Nazi euphemism signifying that the children were to be killed. At trial, she
testified that she had placed the list with the authorization in an open drawer
in the desk in her office but did not forward it to Müller. The court established
that hospital personnel had a passkey to Weber’s office, with which they could
have easily obtained access to it; thus, even if no direct evidence showed that
Weber had given the list to Müller, the nurse could have inspected it with
little trouble.47
Nor was the Frankfurt court impressed with Weber’s defense that she,
unlike her successor, Hermann Wesse, was not a “Reich Committee doctor.”
The court conceded this point but countered that Bernotat had instructed her
to deal with the children in the ward as follows: “You don’t have to do much,
since there isn’t any more treatment involved; it would be best if they disap-
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pear quickly.” Weber admitted she understood at the time that “disappear”
meant “be killed.” Her claims of noninvolvement were further rebutted by
mortality rates at Kalmenhof during her presence there as director of the ward.
According to records in the Idstein registry office, prior to the installation of
the children’s ward at Kalmenhof, on average one to two children died per
month; afterward, the death rate shot up to fifty-five per month. During one
six-week period, seventy children—most of them patients transported to
Kalmenhof from Hamburg on August 8, 1943—perished in the ward. On indi-
vidual days in September 1943, as many as six children died there. The court
was clearly impressed by the decline in mortality in the ward from September
26, 1943, to November 7, 1943, a period during which Weber and Müller took
leaves of absence for health reasons. Weber was temporarily replaced by Dr.
H., during whose brief tenure as director of the ward not a single child died.
When Weber and Müller resumed their work in the ward on November 7, the
mortality rate soared: from November 8 to November 11, the deaths of six
children were recorded. For the Frankfurt court, this fact proved that most of
the deaths in the ward were not due to natural causes but to poisonous doses of
medication. It further showed a dramatic linkage between the children’s deaths
and the presence of Weber and Müller.48
The data on mortality were critical in refuting Weber’s claim that the
deaths of children in the ward were attributable to natural causes. The court
rejected this defense, along with her representation that the children trans-
ported to Kalmenhof were in such a deplorable condition of health, aggravated
by the strains of transportation and inadequate nutrition, that they died shortly
after arrival. Three witnesses at trial testified to the children’s stable condi-
tion: they described many of the children as conveying “no impression of idi-
ocy” and, in some cases, playing like normal children. One witness stated that
some of the children “were all able to run,” and for this reason she had the
“impression” they were not “terminal cases.”49
Also weighing against Weber’s assertions of innocence were her documented
contacts with Professor Carl Schneider, a T-4 expert and chaired professor at
the University of Heidelberg, where he was involved in research on brains
plundered from euthanized patients. During summer 1942, Weber participated
in a four-week course with Schneider, presumably on the subject of euthanasia.
Weber portrayed the trip as purely recreational in nature—a portrayal the
court discounted. In view of the shortage of doctors in 1942, the court specu-
lated that Weber was sent to Heidelberg for initiation into the mechanics and
goals of the euthanasia program. Her link with a leading figure in Nazi eutha-
nasia, as well as her documented receipt of bonuses from the Reich Committee
in compensation for her unspecified collaboration with its “purposes,” put paid
to her defense of innocent entanglement in the program.50
F I R S T  R E C K O N I N G S138
Weber’s final line of defense foreshadowed the representations of other
euthanasia doctors prosecuted in the years after her conviction. This was the
“sabotage” argument, which she related to the court as a choice among three
alternatives:
(1) either to collaborate in the [euthanasia] project; (2) to seek a reason to
extricate myself from the institution, where I also had my illness to
consider; (3) to place myself in a position in which my life would be
secure and the greatest good of the children could be at the same time
preserved.51
Weber strove to convince the court that she had chosen the third alternative
as a means of sabotaging the euthanasia program where she could. The court
did not accept her story. Instead, it found that Weber had opted for the first
alternative of collaborating in the operation despite her revulsion against it.
The Frankfurt court agreed that she tried to disengage herself from the activi-
ties in the children’s ward; however, time and again she allowed herself to be
mollified by Bernotat’s reassurances, so that she was never able to divorce
herself from the program. The court held she could have accomplished this
separation with little prejudice or difficulty to herself. In response to Weber’s
claim that she did in fact eventually sever her connection with the children’s
ward, the court replied that she did not leave Kalmenhof for ethical or legal
reasons but, as she had written in a letter from 1944 to the authorities in
Wiesbaden, because of her failing health.52
The two primary charges against Weber related to the transfer of adult
patients from Kalmenhof to Hadamar and the destruction of disabled children
in the Kalmenhof children’s ward. The court acquitted Weber of the first charge
on the ground that no evidence existed to prove she was aware of the purpose
behind the registration forms when they were first circulated to the medical
staff at Kalmenhof in 1940. Further, when she did finally learn of their func-
tion, it was unproven that any killings were carried out on the basis of the
forms she had knowingly completed. With respect to the second charge (kill-
ings in the children’s ward), Weber fared considerably worse. Although it was
never proved Weber murdered anyone with her own hands, the court insisted
on the importance of her contribution to the murders. Without a physician to
falsify causes of death, the program could never have been kept secret. Nurse
Maria Müller, the syringe-wielding killer in the ward, relied on Weber to con-
ceal her murderous actions with misleading death certificates. Although Weber’s
contribution to the crime occurred after the killings were performed—lending
an appearance of accessory after the fact to her role in the program—the court
held that this contribution was “causal” to the occurrence of the murders.
Without it, the success of the program could not have been ensured.53
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Determining that Weber was co-responsible for the murders committed in
the children’s ward, the court had no difficulty in finding that she was a perpe-
trator, not an accomplice. In one of the last euthanasia cases to apply the
principle of the Bathtub Case to the detriment of a defendant, the court held
that Weber had embraced the killing operation as her own. In support of this
finding, it pointed to an occasion in which Weber had accused two of her
nurses of violating their oath of silence, threatening to denounce them to
higher governmental authorities. She did this gratuitously, without external
compulsion, in a manner of acting that proved “how very much she had made
the ‘operation’ her own.”54
For Mathilde Weber’s successor, Dr. Hermann Wesse, Kalmenhof was one
in a string of assignments that involved him in the mass killing projects of
the Third Reich. By the time of his arrival in Kalmenhof, Wesse was an
experienced hand in the medical destruction of human life. In 1942 he had
worked briefly in the children’s ward at Brandenburg-Görden under a leading
architect of the euthanasia program and a T-4 expert, Dr. Hans Heinze, before
reassignment to a clinic for juvenile psychiatry in Bonn. Here he was in-
structed in the techniques of euthanizing disabled children in accordance
with the standards of the KdF. In October 1942 Wesse was an assistant doc-
tor in the children’s ward at the Waldniel mental hospital until its closure
in mid-1943. From there he did a three-month stint at the children’s
clinic of the University of Leipzig under another T-4 potentate, Dr. Werner
Catel. At Leipzig, Wesse acquired his doctor’s diploma in “congenital and
acquired feeble-mindedness.” Thereafter he worked in the Uchtspringe
mental hospital’s children’s ward. His time at Uchtspringe was cut short when
in December 1943 he was drafted into the army. In April 1944, Berlin de-
clared him “indispensable” and sent him to Kalmenhof as Mathilde Weber’s
replacement.
Prior to his assignment at Kalmenhof, Wesse reported to Berlin for orien-
tation from Richard von Hegener of the KdF. Von Hegener informed him that
as director of the Kalmenhof children’s ward, he was to submit to the Reich
Committee reports about the patients containing their medical history and
“physical, neurological, psychiatric, intellectual, and characterological” assess-
ments. Three medical experts in Hitler’s chancellery would examine the re-
ports and prepare expert assessments independently of each other. If all three
agreed that the patient should be “put to sleep,” Wesse would receive a killing
order. Afterward, he was obliged to contact the Reich Committee about the
outcome. At trial, Wesse claimed von Hegener had threatened him for non-
compliance with these orders, allegedly warning him, “If you refuse, you will
face dire consequences,” then smiling and adding, “You don’t think about spend-
ing your life in a concentration camp.” After meeting with Fritz Bernotat and
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the acting director of Kalmenhof, his codefendant G., Wesse began his death-
dealing work in the children’s ward in May 1944.55
At trial, Wesse portrayed himself as a mere cog in an infernal machine. “I
was there as a simple soldier,” he told the court. “I could only say ‘yes’ and ‘yes
indeed,’ and was accustomed to obeying orders.” The evidentiary record con-
tradicted Wesse’s claim that he was just an obedient footman in the grand
scheme of mass killing. Shortly after his arrival in Kalmenhof, Wesse wrote a
letter to von Hegener, in which he virtually requested that potential euthana-
sia victims be sent to him. Wesse’s request that he be sent disabled children for
killing is enormously incriminating, inasmuch as it originated entirely from
him. No pressure was applied, no compulsion exerted, no order issued to make
such a request—it emanated solely from Wesse. His act was a gratuitous ex-
ceeding of what was required of him, much like Weber’s castigation of her staff
nurses for breaching the oath of secrecy.56
While serving as director of the Kalmenhof children’s ward, Wesse pre-
pared reports on the children based on their patient histories, medical exams,
and intelligence tests. He forwarded between 100 and 150 such reports to the
Reich Committee. When he had received a killing authorization from Berlin,
he gave it to Nurse Müller for execution, who killed the patients by mixing
luminal into their evening meals. The court found that Wesse furnished twenty-
five such authorizations to Müller, affecting a wide range of children in the
ward: “feebleminded” school-age and adolescent children, as well as “charac-
terologically deviant” children (i.e., juvenile delinquents). In two cases Wesse
himself administered lethal overdoses of morphine that caused the patients’
deaths. The patients involved, Margarete Schmidt and Ruth Pappenheimer,
were no more “hopeless” cases than some of Weber’s patients. Margarete Schmidt
was a twenty-three-year-old epileptic who worked as a servant girl in the hos-
pital. The court described her as having a “good capacity for work:” she at-
tended to much of the housework in the Kalmenhof facility, which, with some
supervision, she could accomplish without difficulty. In January 1945 Wesse,
who had earlier sent a report to Berlin on Schmidt detailing her physical and
mental condition, received a killing authorization for her. For this reason,
Wesse elected to kill Schmidt himself with an injection of luminal, a drug he
chose because as an epileptic Schmidt was accustomed to taking luminal tab-
lets. The injection did not effect her death, causing Müller to administer an
additional injection, this time of morphine, from which Schmidt expired a
short time later. The death records in the Idstein Registry Office listed her
cause of death as “epilepsy, increasing dementia, status epilepticus, brain swell-
ing.” Why Wesse and Müller murdered Schmidt was a matter for speculation
by the court. It conjectured that Schmidt’s work as a housemaid likely exposed
her to the crimes perpetrated there by Wesse and Müller. Wesse may have
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consciously slanted the report to her prejudice in an effort to authorize her
killing and thereby “dispose of a burdensome witness” (eine lastige Mitwisserin).57
If the circumstances surrounding Schmidt’s death were suspicious, those
attending Ruth Pappenheimer’s demise were sinister. Pappenheimer was an
eighteen-year-old half-Jewish girl, described by the court as “mentally normal”
but characterized by Wesse as “asocial.” She was committed to Kalmenhof in
fall 1944 after an adolescence of minor juvenile delinquency, including various
sexual peccadilloes (among them, sexual relations with a variety of soldiers)
and the theft of some bottles of wine and a wool scarf from her employer. For
reasons not clarified in the court’s opinion, State Councillor Bernotat in
Wiesbaden took an especially malefic interest in doing away with her. Accord-
ing to Wesse, Bernotat had demanded that he prepare a report about
Pappenheimer for the Berlin authorities. After the report was completed and
sent to the Reich Committee offices, Bernotat supposedly badgered Wesse
with questions about whether the killing authorization had been given, com-
plaining that Berlin worked too slowly. Eventually the authorization arrived,
and Wesse administered a lethal injection of morphine to Pappenheimer, a
mentally and physically healthy young girl. The Frankfurt court was convinced
that she was murdered only because she was Jewish.
The court’s deliberation on whether Wesse was a perpetrator or an accom-
plice was brief and succinct. In twenty-five proven cases, he had collaborated
in the murder of Kalmenhof patients; in at least two of them, he himself had
caused the patients’ deaths. Applying the standard of the Bathtub Case, the
court found that Wesse “desired the killings as his own.” For this reason, he
was a co-perpetrator in the children’s ward murders.58
What, according to the court, were Weber’s and Wesse’s motives for ac-
tion? Neither was impelled by ideology, it held. Rather, they murdered for
career-related reasons: Weber wanted to “preserve her cushy independent job,”
Wesse his “indispensability” status that exempted him from frontline military
service. The court regarded both of these motives as “base” under section 211.
As far as sentencing was concerned, the court weighed extenuating against
aggravating factors for both Wesse and Weber and found no compelling reason
to grant them a mitigated punishment. On January 30, 1947, they were sen-
tenced to death.59
This pronouncement, however, did not end Mathilde Weber’s judicial od-
yssey. Nearly fifteen months after her conviction by the Frankfurt state court,
the appellate court of Frankfurt reversed the lower court’s finding that Weber was
guilty as a perpetrator. According to the appellate court, the lower court did
not sufficiently clarify “why an action occurring after the completion of the
crime [i.e., falsifying death certificates] can be considered co-perpetration,”
instead of aiding and abetting. The appellate court did not exclude the possibility
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that Weber was indeed a perpetrator. If, for example, her “guarantee of help”
encouraged Müller’s “will to perpetration,” then such action would constitute
perpetration, even though it was done after the crime was performed. This
showing the lower court never made, according to the appellate court. For this
reason, the case was remanded for reconsideration by the Frankfurt state court.60
When the case arrived in the lower court for retrial, Weber received a
much more charitable reception than she had on her first go-around. By the
time the court delivered its new verdict in February 1949, much had changed
in the history of German euthanasia trials. Weber’s prosecutions, in fact, are
divided between two separate eras: the period of retribution (the first trial)
and the era of growing leniency toward National Socialist euthanasia opera-
tives (the case on remand). Between her first trial in early 1947 and the retrial
in February 1949, the geopolitical landscape had changed considerably in Eu-
rope. The Truman Doctrine had been announced in February 1947, declaring
U.S. intentions to “contain” Soviet communism wherever it appeared. The
Truman Doctrine made clear U.S. commitment to maintaining a strong mili-
tary presence in regions perceived to be threatened by Soviet invasion. For
West Germany, this meant unabated U.S. troop strength on German soil as a
counterweight to the Russian army. Irresistibly, as the decade of the 1940s
wound down, the realization that Germany would be divided into two separate
countries stole over the German people. The Council of Foreign Ministers,
established at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945 to develop a uniform
policy for Germany, repeatedly failed to produce a consensus on the German
question. Between April 1946 and December 1947, the council met five times
with nothing to show for its efforts except mutual denunciation and idle
speechmaking. On June 23, 1948, the futile work of the council was inter-
rupted when the Soviets instituted a blockade of West Berlin in response to
West Germany’s currency reform. The blockade isolated 2.5 million Germans
living in West Berlin from the western allies and cut off the flow of food and
electricity into the western half of the city. When the Russians lifted the
blockade after 324 days, the Council of Foreign Ministers reconvened in Paris
on May 23, 1949, the same day as the new Basic Law of the Federal Republic
went into effect. By this point, however, the prospect that German division
would become permanent had congealed into a certainty: Germany was now
split between a West and an East Germany with a partitioned Berlin situated
in the middle. The waning years of the 1940s marked the beginning of the
Cold War, the incunabula of the bipolar world that would dominate and
envenom international politics for the next half-century. The Cold War was
in full force when Mathilde Weber’s second trial began in March 1949.61
The Frankfurt court on retrial interpreted the subjective theory of perpe-
tration to Weber’s advantage. According to the court, the facts did not sup-
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port a finding of perpetration: Weber never volunteered her services to the
Reich Committee but was already involved as a doctor in Kalmenhof when the
children’s operation started; nor was she a Nazi Party member, from which the
court inferred a presumption that she did not subscribe to euthanasia for ideo-
logical reasons. The court was persuaded by her defense that “she found her
work in Kalmenhof unpleasant and quickly formed the desire to extricate her-
self from it.” Where in the first trial the court had rejected Weber’s argument
that her distaste for the killing program had led to her removal from Kalmenhof
in May 1944 (on the proven ground that she had departed for health reasons,
not out of conscientious objection), the court now accepted Weber’s claim
that her “inward rejection” of euthanasia caused her dismissal. For all of these
reasons, it found that Weber had not desired euthanasia “as her own” and was
thus guilty only of aiding and abetting murder, that is, of being an accomplice.
On the issue of punishment, the court affirmed extenuating grounds in Weber’s
case, based on her relative youth and immaturity at the time of her service at
Kalmenhof, which affected her ability “to deal with the demands made upon
her.” Moreover, her educational background had not prepared her for agoniz-
ing ethical choices. “She had only the common school and career education
behind her when she began her work in Kalmenhof in 1939,” the court held.
The court characterized her as “fundamentally a weak and unstable person,”
whose “guilt consists in the fact that she closed her eyes to what was happen-
ing around her and let the nurse subordinate to her do as she liked.” Hence
one could not lump her in with all the other euthanasia doctors; she was a
distinct “exception.” This indulgent line of reasoning led the court to sen-
tence Weber to a jail term of three-and-a-half years.62
As trifling as her sentence was in comparison with the enormity of her
crimes, Weber never served more than a month of her punishment. After her
second trial she was released from custody and her sentence suspended because
of poor health. Not until October 1954 was she deemed healthy enough to do
her time. In November 1954 she was again released, apparently for time served
prior to her second trial. By 1960 she had resumed her career as a practicing doctor.
Hermann Wesse, also indicted and tried for his role in euthanizing patients at
the Waldniel mental hospital, benefited from the abolition of the death pen-
alty in Germany in 1949. Nonetheless, he was one of the few euthanasia doc-
tors to spend considerable time in jail for his collaboration in the euthanasia
program: after twenty years, he was released from prison in September 1966 for
health reasons.
Mathilde Weber benefited from the trend toward leniency discernible in
German euthanasia trials after 1947. Had her appeal come before the Frank-
furt appellate authorities in 1946 or 1947, we might question whether she
would have enjoyed such a favorable outcome. One historical factor that may
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account for this seachange in judicial attitudes was the growing antagonism
between eastern and western Europe. The tension between the United States
and the Soviet Union in the late 1940s was a godsend for Weber in her second
trial. A politically and morally rehabilitated Germany was needed to anchor
the Western alliance against the Soviet bloc. The imperatives of international
politics intersected with a West German society eager to lay its scandalous past
to rest and avid to recoup its sovereignty after a brief period of eclipse. Within
this society, the West German judiciary—itself tainted by its prior contacts
with Nazism—became an auxiliary to the nation’s willed amnesia. The tools of
German criminal law like the distinction between perpetration and complicity
and the statutory definition of murder were used to further this act of collec-
tive forgetting. Although the most visible symbol of the yearning to forget
appeared in late 1949 with the Bundestag’s amnesty of certain types of Nazi
crimes, trials like Weber’s had already proclaimed West Germany’s determina-
tion to close the book on National Socialist criminality.
In the early phase of the German trials, however, the courts convicted
defendants as perpetrators of murder under German law. The wrongdoers’
motives, in the estimate of the courts, were various: they included ideological
affinity with Nazi doctrine (Wernicke, Wieczorek), vanity and self-seeking
ambition (Mennecke), a distorted sense of obedience (Schmidt), human weak-
ness and an “inertia” of the will (Wahlmann and Gorgass), careerism (Wesse),
and a weak, unstable personality (Weber). Among these euthanasia killers,
only Wieczorek, Wernicke, Mennecke, Weber, and Wesse were deemed to have
acted with “base motives” (i.e., in a morally reprehensible manner). Only
Wernicke and Wieczorek paid for their participation in Nazi euthanasia with
their lives. With the exception of Wieczorek, all nurses were convicted as
accomplices to murder, based on motives ranging from love (Schürg) to thought-
lessness (Senft). These determinations were predicated on a subjective analy-
sis of each defendant’s moral and intellectual capacity to comprehend the wrongful
nature of the killing operation. Of these early trials, only in the Kalmenhof
case did a West German court categorize a T-4 doctor as an accomplice rather
than a perpetrator. As we will see in Chapters 4 and 5, reducing euthanasia
doctors’ roles in the Nazi killing program from perpetration to complicity—
and, in several cases, even acquitting them for “proven innocence”—would
become inflationary in West German courts after 1947.
In 1948 Brigadier General Telford Taylor, the U.S. Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes, noticed a change in the climate of opinion regard-
ing the prosecution of Nazi crimes. It was already perceptible in
U.S. successor trials under Control Council Law #10, of which the
Medical Case was a part. “It was apparent to anyone connected with
the entire series of trials under Law #10 that the sentences became
progressively lighter as time went on,” Taylor wrote. “Defendants
such as Darré, Dietrich, und Stuckart in the ‘Ministries case’ (Case
#11), who, although convicted under two or more counts of the
indictment of serious crimes, received very light sentences in April
1949, would surely have been much more severely punished in 1946
or 1947.” Taylor attributed this trend toward greater leniency to “wan-
ing interest on the part of the general public” in war crimes trials
and heightened focus on “international events,” by which he clearly
meant the Cold War.1
The impact of Cold War politics on the trials of Nazi war crimi-
nals cannot be overstated. With increasing stridency in the immediate
postwar era, West German politicians and policymakers connected
the liquidation of war crimes trials with the restoration of national
In the end, the destroyer triumphs—Lucifer upon the ruins
of the world.
—NORBERT ELIAS, ON HITLER’S DESTRUCTION
OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC
LUCIFER ON THE RUINS OF THE WORLD
THE GERMAN EUTHANASIA TRIALS, 1948–1950
Chapter 4
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power. To a great extent, continued prosecution of Nazi criminals was framed
by the larger issue of German rearmament, particularly after the outbreak of
the Korean War in June 1950. Interpreted in the West as a gambit to export
communism by force of arms, North Korea’s invasion of South Korea drama-
tized the need to incorporate the Federal Republic into a western defense sys-
tem in central Europe. In the ensuing year after the invasion, the West Ger-
mans prepared the draft of a security treaty with the allies, clearly intended to
recover some measure of national power for West Germany. Discussions be-
tween representatives of the West German government and the Allied High
Commission, held in the spring and summer of 1951, had raised the issue of
overhauling the current system of pardoning as an element of a general secu-
rity treaty. Monitoring the progress of the negotiations, the members of the
Heidelberg Circle demanded a radical change to the pardon system: the right
to pardon and to carry out sentences in the cases of convicted war criminals
imprisoned in Germany should be transferred from the Allies to the German
government. Adenauer’s justice minister, Thomas Dehler, shared the aspira-
tions of the Heidelberg Circle as they pertained to solving the war criminal
problem. He signed a fifteen-point catalog prepared by the central bureau in
fall 1951, setting forth demands that no death penalties be meted out in war
crimes cases, sentences less than twenty years be commuted, new investiga-
tions be discontinued, and ongoing trials be terminated if the prosecution did
not expect a sentence greater than twenty years.2
The extreme nature of such demands was in part fueled by the public’s
tendency to conflate atrocities unrelated to the war with “war crimes.” Al-
though many Nazi defendants were charged with murder and crimes against
humanity rather than war crimes (only 88 of the 603 prisoners held by the
Allies in spring 1952 were German soldiers), energetic campaigns to amnesty
Germans in Allied custody leveled the distinction between war crimes (re-
sented as victor’s justice) and the racially inspired mass murder of the Nazi
government. Even Konrad Adenauer was not immune to this fallacy. Reject-
ing calls for a general amnesty, Adenauer pointed out that a more limited
amnesty was appropriate, because “among the convicted there was a certain
percentage to whom the word ‘war criminal’ perfectly applies, and whose pun-
ishment must be maintained.” For Adenauer, the “real” criminals—the lower-
class sadists within the concentration and death camp system—should be pros-
ecuted, and the rest left in peace.3
The pressures exerted by the West Germans to end the era of war crimes
trials achieved two notable successes. First, they induced the Allies to release
nearly 75 percent of their German war criminals between 1950 and 1952. No
amnesty would be necessary: most of the remaining prisoners were released in
the years after 1952. The British and French closed their prisons for war crimi-
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nals in 1957, and the United States released the last of the “Landsbergers” in
1958. Second, pressures to liquidate continued trials of Nazi defendants found
their mark in West German court rooms, where convictions of war crimes
suspects plummeted by 68 percent between 1950 and 1951, and by 98 percent
between 1950 and 1955. The euthanasia trials of the late 1940s and early
1950s, steeped in this spirit of leniency for Nazi killers, reflect in miniature
this historic moment.
A series of cases beginning in 1948 inaugurated the new Cold War era of
leniency in euthanasia-related prosecutions. A distinguishing feature of these
cases was the legal doctrine of “collision of duties,” by means of which eutha-
nasia doctors not only evaded the charge of murder, but left German court-
rooms as moral heroes dedicated to undermining euthanasia by participating
in it. In this chapter, we explore how this transformation of medical killers
into heroes served the purposes of German yearnings for rejuvenated national
power—a power believed to be inconsistent with an ongoing judicial confron-
tation with the Nazi past.
DESTROYING LIVES IN ORDER TO SAVE LIVES:
THE COLLISION OF DUTIES CASES
That an act of homicide may be justified or excused on a theory of necessity
(Notstand) was an idea that arrived late in the history of German criminal law.
The German Criminal Code of 1871 contained no mention of it as a justifying
or exculpatory ground, nor did case law acknowledge it. Up until the third
decade of the twentieth century, therefore, German law did not recognize as
legal an action committed in violation of the law for the purpose of avoiding a
greater harm—including a physician’s efforts to save the life of a mother by
aborting her fetus. Under German law prior to 1927, such a physician could
face homicide charges. In 1927, however, the German Supreme Court made
law by endorsing a new theory of justification in a criminal abortion case. The
defendant, a German physician, had ordered an abortion for a woman believed
to be a suicide risk if forced to carry her illegitimate child to term. His actions
were objectively illegal; the law forbade the killing of a fetus unconditionally,
admitting of no special circumstances (like the health of the mother) that
might justify or excuse the killing. The German Supreme Court, however,
expounded a new theory of “extra-statutory necessity” (Übergesetzlicher Notstand),
holding that a doctor who commits an abortion is not guilty of criminal homi-
cide if the doctor acted only after carefully weighing the legal interests
(Rechtsgüter, literally “legal goods”) involved and deciding that the mother’s
interest outweighed that of her fetus. In short, the court held that acting to
prevent a greater harm or to preserve a higher legal interest did not make the
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actor criminally liable, even if the conduct fulfilled all the elements of the
statutory offense.4
A variant of the extra-statutory necessity doctrine was the “collision of
duties” defense. According to this form of the defense, an actor is to be acquit-
ted of a crime if he was forced to commit it in order to avert a “greater injustice.”
The collision of duties would emerge in the late 1940s as the first successful
defense in German courts against charges of murder for euthanasia crimes,
beginning with the case of Drs. Karl Todt and Adolf Thiel of the Scheuern
mental institution.
The “Merciless Quandary” and the Limits of the Law: The Scheuern Case
The mental hospital Scheuern in the province of Hessen-Nassau was, like
the Kalmenhof institution, established on the lofty principle of Christian charity
toward the mentally handicapped. Also like Kalmenhof, Scheuern was drawn
into the euthanasia program early in the war. The institution had cared for
epileptic and “feebleminded” patients since its creation by the Inner Mission
of the German Evangelical Church in 1850. It remained true to its mission
until 1937, when the provincial authorities replaced Scheuern’s executive board
with Nazified members of the local government. The president of the new
board was State Councillor Fritz Bernotat, a ubiquitous presence in the ambi-
tious killing project launched in Hessen-Nassau. His accession to president of
Scheuern’s executive board was an unmitigated disaster for its patients. Bernotat
pressured the director of Scheuern, Dr. Karl Todt (a doctor of pedagogy, not
medicine), into joining the Nazi Party, despite his tepid attitude toward Nazi
ideology.5
Todt’s medical assistant, Dr. Adolf Thiel, took up his duties at Scheuern
in 1938. Although he had joined the Nazi Party well before 1933, the state
court of Koblenz characterized him as a lukewarm supporter of Nazism. In
summer 1940, both Todt and Thiel were at Scheuern; the two men had been
exempted from military service, Todt because of his age, Thiel because of his
medical unfitness. That summer, Todt received from Berlin the first batch of
registration forms to be completed on his patients. Innocent of their purpose,
Todt completed the forms on 500 to 600 patients and returned them to the
Berlin authorities. In March 1941 the first transports of patients identified for
killing were sent from Scheuern to unknown destinations. In the aftermath of
these transports, Todt and Thiel received notices announcing the deaths of
the transferred patients. At this point they realized their patients had been
killed pursuant to the Nazis’ euthanasia program.
March 1941 was also the month when provincial authorities decided to
convert Scheuern into a transit center (Zwischenanstalt) at the service of T-4.
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Scheuern henceforth received shipments of patients from other institutions
designated for ultimate transfer to Hadamar. The purpose of the transit cen-
ters was twofold: to create an additional screen to obscure the fates of trans-
ferred patients by sending them to intermediate stations before final trans-
port to a killing institution; and to afford more opportunity for exempting
patients who did not meet the guidelines for killing, for example, war veter-
ans, cases of age-related senility, or patients capable of work. Transit centers
were established throughout Germany, but the province of Hessen-Nassau
had a disproportionately high share. In addition to Scheuern, the provincial
transit centers included Weilmünster, Herborn, Kalmenhof, and Eichberg—
all favorably close to the killing center of Hadamar, which they supplied with
victims.6
Between March 1941 and September 1944, Scheuern served as a transit
center for approximately 1,640 patients. At trial the state court of Koblenz
had no difficulty finding both Todt and Thiel guilty of complicity in the mur-
ders of around 1,000 of them. By aiding the transport of patients from Scheuern
to Hadamar and continuing to fill out the KdF’s registration forms after dis-
covering their purpose, the pair had fulfilled the elements of the offense of
aiding and abetting murder. Further, their actions were “objectively” illegal in
the sense that no traditional justifying grounds like self-defense or emergency
existed to legitimate their conduct. The novelty of the Scheuern case, how-
ever, occurred when the court refused to find the defendants personally cul-
pable for their involvement in euthanasia killings. The court premised its
acquittal of the accused on a defense that had been unsuccessfully raised by
other defendants in earlier cases: the “collision of duties” defense.
According to the Koblenz court, Todt and Thiel were ensnared in a “mer-
ciless quandary” not of their own making: either to abstain from illegality by
resigning their posts, as a result of which their patients would be abandoned
to ideological zealots from Berlin who would ensure their complete destruc-
tion; or to collaborate in the euthanasia program, assisting with the destruc-
tion of patients already doomed to die in order to save whoever they could.7
The court accepted Todt and Thiel’s claim that they had chosen the second
course of action—remaining at their posts in the Scheuern facility, at great
risk to themselves, for the purpose of sabotaging the euthanasia program. The
sabotage consisted of discharging patients who might otherwise have been
transported, exaggerating patients’ capacity for work and its importance to
the institution, and concealing severely ill patients from the roving T-4 com-
mission that occasionally visited Scheuern. In this manner, the court deter-
mined, the defendants saved 250 patients from transport at the cost of col-
laborating in the transfer of 1,000 patients, all of whom were subsequently
murdered. A 20 percent rate of success was a significant accomplishment, the
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court held, given the “horribly constraining circumstances” the defendants
faced. Moreover, if the defendants had resigned in protest, they would have
been replaced by “some sort of SS man, an obedient minion, or one of the
young doctors reared in the Hitler youth, who would have proceeded with the
necessary ruthlessness.” As a result, the court believed, more patients would
have died.8
Remaining at one’s post to save as many lives as one could, even at the
price of assisting in the destruction of those whose fates were already sealed,
did not justify the defendants’ actions, the court held. Rather, the patent
conflict of duties they faced excused their actions. In other words, their col-
laboration in euthanasia was objectively illegal, but they bore no criminal guilt
for it. For this reason the defendants had to be acquitted. In arriving at this
determination, the Koblenz court exhibited a degree of hesitancy and circum-
spection—we might even say humility—lacking in verdicts that were soon to
follow. We see this attitude in the court’s quotation of the German criminal
law jurist von Weber on the subject of the collision of duties: “The solution of
such a conflict can only be found in an absolute sense in the conscience; the
individual must negotiate his conscience with his God. The legal order offers
no standard for its solution.” Von Weber concluded that he who has grappled
with such a conflict “after earnest examination of his conscience” should not
be held criminally liable for his actions. Von Weber’s theological discourse,
recalling Martin Luther’s idea of the individual alone before God, must have
struck a chord in the state court, which adopted von Weber’s view of the
matter in acquitting the defendants. Although they were excused from crimi-
nal wrongdoing, the court refused to speculate on the quality of their inward
conscience: “Whether the defendants are able inwardly to feel themselves free
of any guilt is a matter for their personal conscience.”9
The argument that one has participated in criminal behavior in order to
curb its worst excesses did not surface for the first time in the Scheuern case.
Ernst Kaltenbrunner had raised a similar defense at the IMT in Nuremberg, as
had Viktor Brack during his testimony at the U.S. Doctors’ Trial. Neither had
met with success. The Scheuern case was the first acquittal of euthanasia de-
fendants on the basis of a “conflict of duties.” Other courts would accept this
defense in the aftermath of Todt’s and Thiel’s acquittals, albeit with more
cocksureness than the Koblenz court had evinced. The latter had recognized
that the Scheuern trial was, in the vernacular of U.S. law, a “case of first
impression” (i.e., a case without precedents to guide its resolution). This may
help explain the tentative quality of the opinion. The court’s verdict in
Scheuern was a bellwether of a new age in euthanasia prosecution, perfectly
suited to a newly reconstituted West Germany seeking to cast off even the
minimal reservations the Koblenz court had entertained.
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The Rhine Province Case
The Scheuern case, as we have seen, was the first West German trial to
acquit euthanasia defendants. Not until the Rhine province trial, however,
would a German court characterize the actions of its defendants as not only
legally justified, but as morally praiseworthy. The leading defendants in the
trial were all charged with murder under section 211 of the German Penal
Code and crimes against humanity under Control Council Law #10 for their
roles in the Nazis’ euthanasia program. They included Dr. Walter Creutz, the
former state councillor and department chief for the Rhine province’s system
of mental institutions headquartered in Düsseldorf; Drs. We. and R., former
departmental doctors in the mental hospital of Galkhausen; Drs. Kurt Pohlisch
and Friedrich Panse, professors of psychiatry and neurology at the University
of Bonn; and Dr. Hermann Wesse, former assistant doctor in the children’s
ward at the Waldniel mental hospital from October 1942 until July 1943.
They had reason to be encouraged by the outcome of the Scheuern trial: its
rationale would be applied to acquit all of these doctors (except Hermann
Wesse), thus perpetuating the trend toward acquittals of euthanasia defen-
dants.
When the war started in 1939, Dr. Walter Creutz was serving as a medical
officer in the German army until given indispensability status and reassigned
as departmental chief in the Rhine provincial administration. On his return
to the Rhineland, he discovered that the rumors he had heard of measures
against the mentally ill ordered by the highest levels of the Nazi government
were true. The court found that Creutz consulted with friends of his within
both the Protestant and Catholic institutional systems, particularly the direc-
tor of the Inner Mission, Pastor O., and the Prelate Schulte-Pelkum. Pastor
O. informed him that the institutions of the Inner Mission had declined fill-
ing out the questionnaires distributed to all public and private mental hospi-
tals by the Reich Ministry of the Interior. Regrettably, other public and private
institutions in Württemberg in 1940 had not followed the Inner Mission’s
example but, believing the forms were part of a statistical survey to determine
the labor capability of their patients, had filled them out, taking special care to
underestimate their patients’ ability to work so as to avoid their conscription
into the German war economy. In this manner, they unwittingly wrote the
death warrants for the patients reported in the forms.10
The Düsseldorf state court was persuaded that Creutz was stung by these
revelations and thereafter sought to organize a plan of resistance to the eutha-
nasia program among the mental hospitals and nursing homes of the Rhineland.
Toward the end of 1940 or beginning of 1941, he composed a memorandum to
convince the governor, Heinrich Haake, to oppose implementation of the
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killing program in the Rhineland. The memo was allegedly tuned to the pro-
Nazi biases of Haake and hence emphasized the unrest among the population
and the erosion of public trust in health-care institutions that such a program
would invariably cause. Creutz’s ruse was for a time successful; impressed with
the logic of the memo, Haake declared his intention to reject implementing
euthanasia in the Rhineland. Haake even stiffened his resolve when Berlin
announced that a “commission” would be sent to Haake’s offices in February
1941 to “discuss this question.” Haake invited Creutz to present his dissenting
view to the commission. When the delegation from the KdF arrived on Febru-
ary 12, it was composed of some of the euthanasia program’s leading figures. To
this august group of killers Creutz made his pitch. When he had finished,
Werner Heyde, a member of the delegation, responded with a single gesture:
he removed a copy of Hitler’s euthanasia order of September 1, 1939, and
presented it to Haake.11
The Hitler decree had the desired effect. Haake immediately backpedaled,
exclaiming that, in view of the expressed will of the Führer, he withdrew all
his objections to adopting the euthanasia program in the Rhineland. The Ber-
lin Commission then demanded that transit centers be erected in the Galk-
hausen and Andernach facilities. These two institutions were chosen because
patients could be readily transported from them to Hadamar by the busses of
Gekrat. Haake later called the directors of Galkhausen and Andernach and
instructed them on the commission’s decision to transform their institutions
into transit centers. Creutz in the meantime found himself in a dilemma:
whether to resign his position in protest, or to remain at his post to minimize
the damage to Rhineland mental patients. He opted for the second of the two
alternatives. Creutz’s decision, the court held, was actuated by a sense of duty
to his profession and to the patients entrusted to him. Reprising the findings
of the Koblenz court in the Scheuern trial, the Düsseldorf court believed that
Creutz’s resignation would have sounded the death knell for numerous
Rhineland patients, because a zealous advocate of euthanasia no doubt would
have succeeded him. Intent on curbing the effects of the euthanasia planned
for the Rhine province, Creutz attended a meeting sponsored by the KdF in
Berlin, where, in the presence of 50 to 60 health-care professionals, Viktor
Brack discussed Hitler’s order to set euthanasia in motion, alluding to the
secret draft of a law that would one day place the program on firm legal stand-
ing. At this meeting, Werner Heyde outlined the categories of patients ex-
empt from the program. These categories included patients capable of work,
patients whose mental illness was war- or age-related, foreigners, and patients
incapable of transportation.12
After this meeting in Berlin, according to the court’s findings of fact,
Creutz organized his own conference of directors from public mental hospitals
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and nursing homes within his administrative district of Düsseldorf-Grafenberg,
scheduled for March 29, 1941. At this conference, he tried to marshal resis-
tance to the euthanasia program. Acknowledging that open rebellion against
the measures would be futile, he urged his audience to remain at their posts
and save as many patients from transport that they could. This could be ac-
complished by broadly interpreting the criteria for exemption as outlined by
the Berlin authorities, particularly in the home institutions of the patients
and in the transit centers. Creutz recounted the categories of patients exempt
from transport, then added that the range of those exempted could be enlarged
by identifying patients injured in accidents as suffering from war-related dis-
abilities. Furthermore, Creutz suggested that diagnoses of schizophrenia among
elderly patients be changed to age-related pathology. The participants in this
conference agreed with Creutz that it was more advisable to remain at their
posts and save whoever they could than to resign and leave their patients
vulnerable to a potentially less sympathetic replacement.13
On the same day that this conference of directors convened in Düsseldorf,
a commission from Berlin consisting of five doctors under the leadership of
Professor Paul Nitsche appeared at the Andernach mental hospital. Nitsche,
like Heyde, was a T-4 chief medical expert and (beginning in December 1941)
the head of T-4’s Medical Office; later on, he would develop the scheme to kill
mentally handicapped patients surreptitiously with overdoses of luminal. Af-
ter examining some of the Andernach patients, Nitsche and his colleagues
prepared a list of patients selected for liquidation to be given to Andernach’s
director upon his return from the Düsseldorf meeting. The patients on this list
numbered 225 men and 245 women. They would not be transported from
Andernach to Hadamar until June 7, 1941, but when the operation was set in
motion, it unfolded with lethal thoroughness: with only a handful of excep-
tions, all transferred patients were gassed after arrival at Hadamar. A similar
procedure took shape at the new transit center Galkhausen, where three of the
five doctors from the Nitsche commission prepared lists of patients (255 men
and 154 women) for transportation. A number of these selectees were later
withheld, so that a total of 232 men and 141 women were transferred from
Galkhausen in late May 1941 to Hadamar for killing.14
Typically, Creutz received the transport lists from Berlin, and he forwarded
them to the home institutions along with an order to have the patients noted
on the lists prepared for transfer to the transit centers of Andernach or
Galkhausen. After the patients were transported, the home institution re-
turned the lists to Düsseldorf, indicating in the “Remarks” column the names
of patients exempted from transport. From Düsseldorf the lists were re-routed
to Berlin. The transferred patients were received in special subdepartments
within the transit centers; at Galkhausen, the men were accommodated in a
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subdepartment headed by a Dr. We., the women in one headed by a Dr. R.
Creutz had assigned Dr. We. to the post of departmental doctor in Galkhausen
in March 1941 from the Grafenberg institution. The director of Grafenberg, a
Dr. Sioli, informed him prior to his departure of the euthanasia program now
underway in the Rhineland. Sioli also told him he had been assigned to
Galkhausen “as an especially reliable doctor” who could be entrusted with the
order to sabotage the operation to the best of his abilities. Shortly after he
assumed his duties, Creutz briefed him on the tasks and goals that lay ahead of
him as part of the plan to work at cross-purposes with the Berlin authorities.
Dr. R., on the other hand, was at Galkhausen at the time it was transformed
into a transit center, serving there as head doctor in the women’s department
since 1938. Beyond rumors, Dr. R. knew little about the euthanasia program
until relatives of patients killed at Hadamar contacted him with news of their
deaths. His suspicions then grew that the patients had been the victims of foul
play. Later, the director of Galkhausen, Dr. Winkel, apprised him of the pro-
gram, emphasizing the broad latitude he and other doctors could exercise in
withholding patients from transportation.15
The Düsseldorf court found that both We. and R. did everything in their
power to undermine the government’s campaign against the disabled. They
embellished their assessments of their patients’ capacity for work even in espe-
cially severe cases, sometimes discharging their patients from the hospital in
order to remove them from transport. The court was satisfied that We. had
practiced this deception in thirty-four cases and R. in forty cases. Both had
regularly approached the relatives of patients to submit requests for release,
coaching them on the proper method for submitting such petitions. In one
case cited by the court, R. was involved in an abortive attempt to “abduct” a
patient vulnerable to transport. After this abduction was foiled by a staff nurse,
R. demonstrated his willingness to give it a second try, in the event the danger
of transportation was imminent.
We. and R.’s efforts received the unwavering support of Creutz back in
Düsseldorf. Creutz approved all petitions for release submitted to him from
Galkhausen. Their collective efforts to subvert the operation provoked nu-
merous warnings from the T-4 offices in Berlin, which admonished Creutz
over the phone to implement the measures more rapidly and with greater
efficiency. In March 1941, Gekrat proposed to Governor Haake the immedi-
ate removal of patients from four Nassau institutions as a way to erase the
backlog caused by the retarded pace of transfer from the Rhineland institu-
tions. Catching wind of this communiqué, Creutz persuaded Haake to reject
Gekrat’s proposal. At a directors’ conference in Düsseldorf in July 1941, Creutz
again underscored the importance of restricting the operation as much as
possible. Two months later, in September 1941, he was notified in a letter
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signed by Werner Heyde that the euthanasia program had been terminated
“for technical reasons.”16
The court had little documentary evidence on which to make a finding
about the success of Creutz and his fellow conspirators in their attempts to
oppose the program. Instead, it was largely confined to witness testimony (in-
cluding that of Creutz, We., and R., all witnesses with a motive to lie). The
best it could determine was that, of the 5,046 patients identified for transport
by the Berlin authorities, approximately 946 were ultimately transferred to
Hadamar for liquidation.
Several months before the official stop of the program, Creutz received a
visit from Hans Hefelmann and Richard von Hegener of Berlin’s Reich Com-
mittee. They confided in Creutz that the committee had launched a new pro-
gram to euthanize mentally ill children in specially created “children’s wards.”
Rhineland facilities were to play a part in this expansion of the killing project.
Creutz was ordered to establish in Galkhausen and in another institution yet
to be determined two such wards. He expressed his misgivings about this op-
eration, but the committee representatives were unmoved. Thereafter, Creutz
remonstrated with the Berlin offices until in July 1941 he received a letter
from Viktor Brack accusing him of intentionally obstructing installation of
the wards in the Rhineland. Brack warned Creutz that if he did not change his
view on the matter, he would face dismissal from his job as well as a complete
overhaul of the Rhineland’s institutional system. Creutz gave Brack’s letter to
Haake, who resented the charges of misfeasance against one of his officials.
Haake contacted Reichsleiter Philipp Bouhler about the dispute. Haake and
Bouhler arrived at an agreement that a children’s ward would be established at
the Waldniel mental hospital. Haake overcame Creutz’s hesitancy about par-
ticipating in the operation of the ward by assuring him it would be wholly
subordinate to the Reich Committee and that he would need only to worry
about installing and assigning a nursing staff to it.17
As with the adult operation, Creutz resolved to cooperate with the children’s
program only to the degree necessary, all the while pursuing a plan of subver-
sion and sabotage. Choosing a house in Waldniel as the site for the proposed
children’s ward, Creutz temporized by having it thoroughly renovated, a project
that lasted several months, and by insisting on outfitting it with a hard-to-
obtain X-ray machine (although no such equipment was needed in the ward).
Not until October 1941 was the ward ready to receive its new director. Creutz’s
report to the Berlin Reich Committee that he was unable to find anyone
willing to serve as the ward’s director became the occasion for Berlin to ap-
point its own man, a doctor from Saxony named Georg Renno.
Renno was no stranger to killing mental patients: he had served for a time
as a gassing technician at the Hartheim killing center before taking up duties
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as director of the Waldniel children’s ward in October 1941. Before Renno
could begin his work at Waldniel, he suffered a hemorrhage that rendered him
unable to fulfill his responsibilities. Renno proposed Dr. Hermann Wesse as
his replacement. During Wesse’s prior visits to see his wife, who was a staff
doctor in Waldniel’s adult section, Wesse had declared his support for eutha-
nasia to Dr. Renno. These declarations no doubt commended him to Renno as
his possible successor. The Reich Committee’s Hefelmann and von Hegener
vetted him at a meeting in the waiting room of the Düsseldorf train station.
Afterward, they adjourned to the offices of the provincial government, where
they informed Creutz that Wesse would succeed Renno in the Waldniel
children’s clinic. Creutz invited Wesse to wait outside, then complained to
Hefelmann and von Hegener that Wesse was not properly trained to under-
take the work. Surprisingly, Hefelmann and von Hegener did not override his
criticism but suggested that Wesse be sent to the children’s ward in Görden for
advanced training with Dr. Hans Heinze, the director of the ward and a T-4
expert.
Wesse remained at Görden until February 1942, at which time, primarily
at the instance of Creutz, he was sent for further psychiatric training at the
Rhine State Clinic for Juvenile Psychiatry in Bonn, where he lingered another
seven months. In the meantime, Creutz contacted the Waldniel hospital and
demanded that its chief medical advisor, a Dr. Sc., be assigned to monitor
Wesse’s activities in the children’s ward. Creutz personally instructed Dr. Sc.
to stop any excessive or careless action by Wesse. With this spy in place,
Creutz ordered Wesse’s transfer to Waldniel on September 26, 1942. By Octo-
ber, Wesse was active as the director of Waldniel’s children’s ward, filling out
reports on the patients that noted the severity of mental disability (e.g., “idiocy,”
“feeble-mindedness,” “mild, medium, or severe degree”) and his evaluation of
the child’s educational capability. These reports were forwarded to the Reich
Committee in Berlin. Weeks later he received a decision from the committee:
educable children were to be discharged and children considered incapable of
education were to be “put to sleep.” The authorization was also euphemisti-
cally worded: “The child X is to be brought to therapy.” After a final exam,
Wesse had two of his nurses, W. and M., administer between three and five
tablets of luminal to the child in the evening. Afterward the victim typically
fell into a deep sleep before dying one or two days later. Wesse himself in-
formed the relatives that their child had died of an “acute illness.” He then
falsified the cause of death in the victim’s death certificate. In this way, Wesse
and his accomplices caused the deaths of “at least” thirty children with lethal
overdoses of luminal.18
In addition to his involvement in the transports of Rhineland patients
during phase one of the euthanasia program and in Wesse’s infanticide at the
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Waldniel children’s ward, Creutz was charged with complicity in the transfers
of patients to the Hadamar killing center from 1942 to 1945. The immediate
cause of this second wave of transports was the increasingly urgent demand for
hospital space because of Allied bombing of German cities. The Rhineland
was particularly afflicted with a shortage of available beds. To cure the prob-
lem, the Reich Ministry of the Interior suggested that 370 patients be trans-
ferred from the monastery of Hoven (which was to be used as a hospital for the
bombed-out residents of an old age home in Cologne) to Hadamar. Creutz
objected to the suggestion, but his fears were allayed with reassurances that
Hadamar would resume its functioning as a normal mental hospital. Nonethe-
less, Creutz continued to be apprehensive that something would go wrong at
this notorious killing center. Wishing to consult directly with the medical
staff at Hadamar, he traveled to the institution to inspect it for himself. While
there, he encountered former patients from the Rhineland who had been trans-
ferred to Hadamar now working on the institution’s grounds. He saw no evi-
dence that patients were being put to death within Hadamar’s walls. Encour-
aged by his visit, Creutz returned to Düsseldorf with the belief that transports
to Hadamar could move forward without danger to the patients. This trust
seemed to have been abused when death notices about the Hoven patients
transported to Hadamar poured into Creutz’s office. Creutz asked Haake to
inquire about the reasons for the deaths. The latter’s inquiry disclosed that
predominately infirm patients had been transported and that the high inci-
dence of such patients accounted for the mortality rate.
The transportation of patients from Rhineland facilities accelerated from
1943 until the end of the war. With the proliferation of death notices it be-
came clear to Creutz that transferred patients were being killed in the collec-
tion centers. In April 1943 Creutz submitted a petition to Josef Goebbels,
State Secretary Stuckart of the Reich Interior Ministry, and Karl Brandt, re-
questing an investigation of why so many patients were dying after transfer.
His concerns were dismissed with the reply that the high mortality rates re-
sulted from food rationing required by the war emergency and from transport-
ing severely ill patients. In the meantime, Creutz continued to send patients
within the Rhine province to mental hospitals throughout Germany, includ-
ing the killing centers at the Pomeranian mental hospital, Meseritz-Obrawalde,
and Gross-Schweidnitz in Saxony. Some were dispatched to the General Gov-
ernment in Poland (that part of occupied Poland not formally annexed to the
German Reich). Interested in establishing his own collection center for men-
tally disabled transferees from the Rhineland staffed with Rhineland medical
personnel, Creutz sent one of his physicians to the General Government to
investigate the feasibility of such a plan. His representative negotiated with
local authorities to make the institution of Kulparkow near Lemberg available
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for this purpose. Between August 1943 and May 1944, Dr. R. and several
nurses from the Rhineland were transferred to the Kulparkow institution.19
This period of deportations between 1942 and the end of the war coin-
cided with the wild euthanasia characteristic of phase two of the killing pro-
gram. For the Rhineland as for much of the German Reich, the selection of
patients in this phase was made not on the basis of forms but by the home
institutions themselves. Although the Berlin authorities stood behind the
program from beginning to end, their presence was now less conspicuous, their
role restricted to identifying hospital space made available by the transports
and to providing transportation.
The Düsseldorf state court found that Creutz fulfilled all of the elements
of aiding and abetting murder as well as crimes against humanity under Law
#10. Creutz was not, however, a perpetrator but an accomplice, because he “by
no means desired the result as his own.” The court next turned to consider
whether Creutz’s acts were objectively illegal. We will recall that the court in
the Scheuern case deemed Todt’s and Thiel’s actions illegal but acquitted them
based on a “collision of duties” (that is, the duty to remain aloof from criminal
wrongdoing and the medical duty to save as many patients as they could). In
the Rhineland case, by contrast, the court held that the doctrine of “extra-
statutory necessity” (Übergesetzlicher Notstand) justified Creutz’s involvement
in the transportation of patients to their deaths. The lay assessors on the court
found that Creutz was an unswerving opponent of the operation, sparing no
pains to restrict the numbers of patients removed for killing. In order to sub-
vert the aims of the program, Creutz had to project an image to his superiors
in Berlin of cooperation with their designs. Wherever he could, Creutz worked
at cross-purposes with Berlin: his orchestration of a program of sabotage, his
consistent resistance to a children’s ward at Waldniel, his opposition to eutha-
nasia enthusiast Dr. Renno, and his planting of Dr. Sc. in the ward to oversee
and restrain the actions of Dr. Wesse all attested to Creutz’s commitment to
impede euthanasia in the Rhineland. The state court was further impressed
with the numbers of patients Creutz’s sabotage plan had saved: of the 5,000
patients Berlin had earmarked for destruction, only 946 were finally dispatched
to the killing centers. Individual cases supported these figures. For example,
the court cited the transport lists of September 4 and 13, 1941, which had
sent ninety-seven patients to the transit centers of Galkhausen and Andernach
for ultimate transfer to Hadamar for killing. Of these patients, sixty-seven
were withheld or discharged—a significant accomplishment ascribed to Creutz’s
rescue plan.20
None of these achievements would have been possible without Creutz’s
limited participation in the killing program, the court stated. Invoking an
argument familiar from the Scheuern case, the Düsseldorf court pointed out
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that resigning from his post would have opened a vacuum quickly filled by
Berlin with a zealous euthanasia proponent. In this regard, the court found
meaningful the example of the mental health system in Vienna during the war.
Informed by Brack of the planned euthanasia program in early 1940, the advi-
sor (Referent) for Vienna’s health-care system, a Prof. Dr. Gu., resigned his
position in protest. The result was that Berlin appointed an ideological Nazi
to the post, who implemented euthanasia killing in Vienna’s mental hospitals
remorselessly and in full compliance with Berlin’s wishes. Consequently, 50
percent of Vienna’s mental patients were destroyed—a figure that dwarfed the
mortality rate of 7.5 percent in the Rhine province. Had Creutz followed Gu.’s
example and resigned his post, the Rhineland likely would have experienced a
death rate similar to Vienna’s.21
Creutz’s difficult but conscientious choice to remain in his job inevitably
ensnared him in criminality. His situation, the court analogized, was like that
of a man who encounters three mountain climbers hanging from a rope over a
sheer precipice. The only means of saving any of the climbers is to cut the rope
they are clinging to, with the aim of at least saving one of them; a failure to act
would consign all of them to certain death. By cutting the rope and rescuing
one of the climbers, the man’s action was justified by the extraordinary cir-
cumstances of the predicament in which he found himself. The court consid-
ered the metaphor of the three mountain climbers applicable to the Rhine
province case. In each case, the actor must decide either to renounce any
involvement, thereby ensuring destruction of the patients, or to participate in
a criminal enterprise in order to save as many as possible. Creutz, a confirmed
enemy of euthanasia, elected to rescue patients in the only manner available
to him and did a creditable job of it. His actions relating to the 946 adult
patients transported to their deaths in 1941 and the 30 children killed in the
Waldniel children’s ward from 1942 to 1943 were justified under the legal
doctrine of extrastatutory necessity. Thus, he was acquitted of both aiding and
abetting murder and crimes against humanity in these two instances of mass
killing.22
Regarding the transportations of patients between 1942 and 1945 for the
purpose of freeing up hospital space, the court likewise found Creutz innocent
of wrongdoing. Although some patients were murdered in facilities like Meseritz-
Obrawalde, there was no evidence that Creutz was aware they were being trans-
ported to their deaths. With this final acquittal, Walter Creutz walked out of
the Düsseldorf courtroom on November 24, 1948, a free man.23
The Galkhausen staff physicians, Drs. We. and R., raised the same
extrastatutory necessity argument to defend their participation in the eutha-
nasia program. Although they, like Creutz, fulfilled the objective elements of
the offense of aiding and abetting murder, they too were acquitted as saboteurs
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of euthanasia. Dr. We. exploited every opportunity to foreground his patients’
status as war heroes or foreign nationals to secure their exemption; in other
cases, he exaggerated a patient’s fitness for work or deliberately misrepresented
a patient’s psychopathy as being war-related. Several witnesses vouched for Dr.
R.’s vocal opposition to the euthanasia program. One witness, a Protestant
minister, related that R. had confided in him that he had remained at his post
only to save patients. Other witnesses described how R. had subverted the
program by exempting certain patients from deportation to Hadamar. The two
doctors, like Creutz, faced a dire “conflict of duties” that forced them to choose
between abandoning their patients to almost certain doom or collaborating
minimally in the euthanasia program so as to rescue whoever they could. The
court held that this “collision of duties” operated as a “justifying ground” to
acquit both We. and R. of all charges.24
The last group of defendants in the Rhine province case to be acquitted on
the basis of a collision of duties was two University of Bonn professors, Kurt
Pohlisch and Friedrich Panse. Pohlisch enjoyed a triple appointment as a pro-
fessor of psychiatry and neurology at the University of Bonn, head doctor of
the university’s mental clinic, and director of Bonn’s provincial mental hospi-
tal. Panse, who had befriended Pohlisch during their studies together at the
University of Berlin, used his connections with Pohlisch in 1936 to obtain an
appointment as chief doctor at the Provincial Institute for Psychiatric and
Neurological Genetic Research in Bonn. In 1937 Panse became a lecturer at
the University of Bonn, where he taught courses on racial hygiene. Both men
joined the National Socialist party that same year.
Although witnesses at the trials of Pohlisch and Panse lionized them for
their commitment to pure science, the professors’ research on eugenics during
the 1930s suggests anything but disinterested science. Under the auspices of
the Central Office for the Hereditary Biological Inventory, they worked on
developing a national genetic data bank to record the racial-hygienic back-
ground of the German population. Pohlisch and Panse’s contribution was a
prodigious archive containing eugenic information on 300,000 residents in
the Rhine province. Their work on this project brought them into contact with
a rogues’ gallery of future euthanasia killers, including Herbert Linden, future
T-4 chief medical expert and Reich Commissioner for Mental Hospitals.25
In April 1940, Pohlisch and Panse attended a recruitment meeting of
mental health professionals in Berlin presided over by Viktor Brack. During
this meeting, it was generally agreed that all schizophrenics hospitalized with-
out improvement in their condition for a period of five years, as well as all
“feeble-minded” patients not regarded as essential workers, were to be killed
after inspection of their registration forms by government experts. In the af-
termath of the meeting, both men served for a time as T-4 medical experts
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reviewing these registration forms until summer 1940. The court determined
that in 10 of the 300 to 400 cases Pohlisch examined, he had affirmed a basis
for proceeding with euthanasia; the figure for Panse was 15 of 600 cases. These
actions, the court found, furthered the goals of the Berlin authorities to anni-
hilate disabled patients deemed “unworthy of life,” thus fulfilling the elements
of the offense of aiding and abetting murder and crimes against humanity.
(The professors were accomplices rather than perpetrators because they did
not embrace the killings “as their own,” but participated in euthanasia solely
on behalf of the T-4 leadership.)
Pohlisch and Panse claimed that their engagements with the T-4 program
were all actuated by a desire to subvert it from within. One witness at trial
testified that the two professors had objected to the killing program at the
April meeting. They had characterized the meeting as a success in terms of
restricting the categories of patients subject to euthanasia. The Düsseldorf
court found evidence to support this testimony, such as proof that the two
men had proposed revising the registration forms to include additional cat-
egories of exemption from transport. Panse had persuaded the Berlin authori-
ties to exempt some patients from transfer in order to use them as specimens
in high school instruction; Pohlisch convinced them that a determination
could not be made based only on the registration forms but also required a
personal examination. Furthermore, the court found that the agreement to
exempt patients capable of work from transport was the result of the pro-
fessors’ lobbying efforts. Summing up their role at the April conference,
the court concluded: “It must be said that in the conference considerable
restrictions were achieved and both defendants contributed to it through their
suggestions.”26
With respect to their roles in completing the registration forms, the court
accepted Pohlisch and Panse’s assertion that they so rarely identified a patient
for transport that Berlin eventually cancelled shipment of the forms to them.
The court was also receptive to their argument that they selected for transport
only patients whom they believed were terminal cases likely to die before re-
moval could occur, or who were so ill that they would be exempted under
Berlin’s guidelines on patients incapable of transport. Not one of the patients
they had selected, the professors declared, were killed as a result of their selec-
tion. The court tended to agree with them, noting that the mortality rates in
the Andernach and Galkhausen facilities (serviced by the Bonn professors)
were lower than other institutions in the Rhine province from May to July
1941. Based on this evidence, the state court held that it was “not only pos-
sible, but highly probable” that the defendants’ arguments were correct and
that their work on the registration forms never resulted in the deaths of any
patients.27
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The Düsseldorf court had no difficulty in justifying the Bonn profes-
sors’ actions on the ground of a “collision of duties.” On the basis of “proven
innocence,” Pohlisch and Panse were, like Walter Creutz, acquitted of all
charges.
The court’s tribute to the Bonn professors is oddly discordant with what
we know of their research in racial-hygiene during the 1930s. To suggest that
such research, conducted under the aegis of the Nazi state, was not overtly
political disregards the historical record. Further, in his 1961 judicial testi-
mony before his death by suicide, T-4 Obergutachter Werner Heyde dismissed
Pohlisch’s self-exculpatory portrayal of himself as a saboteur of euthanasia,
countering that Pohlisch was “uninterruptedly active as an expert” for Berlin,
and that at the April 1941 conference he enthusiastically supported the eu-
thanasia plans outlined by Viktor Brack. These facts, coupled with Pohlisch’s
energetic exertions to prepare a draft of a euthanasia law (later vetoed by Hitler
out of fear of foreign propaganda), cast the defendants’ moral “dilemma” in a
different and unflattering light.
In the court’s defense, much of this information was unknown to it in
1948 when it proclaimed that the defendants had “pursue[d] the higher duty to
save at least a part of the patients who would otherwise be lost.” Both men
resumed their psychiatric careers after their acquittal. In this way, the three
defendants acquitted in the Rhine province case were beneficiaries of West
Germany’s peculiar “policy toward the past” that emerged in the later years of
the 1940s—a policy that included the reintegration into professional life of
former Nazi officials. Before Creutz, Pohlisch, and Panse could move on with
their lives, however, they faced yet another round of judicial proceedings.
In German criminal law, by contrast with its Anglo-American counter-
part, both the defendant and the government are entitled to appeal a decision
that either believes is legally deficient. (In U.S. and English law, the principle
of double jeopardy interposes an absolute barrier to any such appeal by the
government of an acquittal.) In the Rhine province case, the state prosecutor
appealed the Düsseldorf state court’s decision directly to the Supreme Court
for the British Zone, arguing on appeal that the court had misapplied the
doctrine of “extrastatutory necessity.” The Supreme Court agreed and reversed
the lower court’s verdict regarding Creutz, Pohlisch, and Panse because it was
based on a misinterpretation of extrastatutory necessity. According to the higher
court, this doctrine was inapplicable in cases where two groups of people were
involved—that is, one group to be saved and another to be sacrificed. Only
when two legal duties were in conflict and the actor performed the higher of
the two duties at the expense of the lower could the defense be successfully
invoked to justify violating the law. Clearly, the Supreme Court for the British
Zone felt that the Düsseldorf court had endorsed the defendants’ sacrifice of
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“hopeless” patients in the interests of saving other patients.* This was a grave
legal error, the Supreme Court held, because you could not compare the two
groups and proclaim one worthier of being saved than the other. Implicit in
the Supreme Court’s opinion is a subtle rebuke directed at the lower court for
assigning the lives of “incurable” patients to a less valuable class of “legal goods”
than the lives of healthier patients.28
In January 1950 the case was retried in the Düsseldorf state court on re-
mand from the Supreme Court for the British Zone. The authors of the sec-
ond opinion were unfazed by the higher court’s criticism. They continued to
laud Creutz for hazarding his own life and career on behalf of his patients,
describing him as a man who had pushed himself “to the very brink of the
concentration camp” in his efforts to save lives. In minimal deference to the
Supreme Court’s ruling, the state court declined applying extrastatutory ne-
cessity a second time; instead, it found that Creutz was “exempt from punish-
ment” because he had acted blamelessly. For the Düsseldorf court, even this
lenient outcome insufficiently recognized Creutz’s valor. By the time of Creutz’s
second acquittal, the Supreme Court for the British Zone was no longer avail-
able to chasten the state court: in 1950 it had been replaced by West Germany’s
Federal Supreme Court, which exhibited a less critical attitude toward the
findings of the lower courts in these cases.29
The Rhine province was not the first case to acquit euthanasia accom-
plices of criminal wrongdoing; that distinction belongs to the Scheuern trial.
The cases of Creutz, Pohlisch, and Panse, however, were the first euthanasia
trials to portray these accomplices as moral superheroes, dedicated to saving
human lives on peril of being thrown into a concentration camp. By the time
of Creutz’s retrial in October 1950, the reservations expressed by the Koblenz
court in the Scheuern trial (“whether the defendants are able inwardly to feel
themselves free of any guilt is a matter for their personal conscience”) had
dissipated. Increasingly, courts were using triumphalist moral language to de-
scribe the participation of euthanasia defendants in the mass destruction of
the mentally disabled. For German critic of postwar German justice Jörg
Friedrich the Rhine province case was a judicial and moral outrage. “Only this
judiciary, itself well-schooled in murder, could extol to his patients a nine-
* The Supreme Court for the British Zone (OGHBZ) was frequently at odds with
regional courts in West Germany in the postwar years. The antagonism may have
resulted from the OGHBZ’s role in ensuring that Allied Control Council Law #10
was properly observed in trials conducted by regional courts. As Dick De Mildt has
observed, the perception by some German jurists that Law #10 violated the ban on
ex post facto laws within German jurisprudence may have sparked their resentment
of it. See De Mildt, In the Name of the People, 358n39.
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hundred-fold murder accomplice as an idol of morality,” Friedrich corrosively
remarked.30 The Düsseldorf court’s example did not fall on flinty soil. It flour-
ished in the verdicts of subsequent courts, transforming men into virtuous
paragons who, in a different era, would have earned the label of murderers.
The Württemberg Case
One of the more bizarre of the “collision of duties” euthanasia cases in-
volved four doctors in the Württemberg mental health administration. Their
twelve-day trial is remarkable for the range of verdicts it issued for these eu-
thanasia killers: two acquittals on a theory of collision of duties, one acquittal
for lack of evidence, and a conviction of the primary defendant, albeit with a
mitigated sentence that reflected the court’s unwillingness to condemn his
murderous complicity on moral grounds.
The leading defendant in this case, Dr. Otto Mauthe, was the former chief
medical officer for the mental health system in Württemberg’s Ministry of the
Interior. Mauthe was commissioned to implement the euthanasia program in
the state of Württemberg. Acting on this commission, he ensured that regis-
tration forms were distributed and properly completed in the forty-eight insti-
tutions within his jurisdiction. In late November 1939, he informed these
mental institutions via a decree from the state Ministry of the Interior that
war conditions required that certain patients be transferred, as ordered by the
Reich Defense Ministry. The institutions receiving transports were to provide
notice to the patients’ relatives. After this decree was disseminated, lists with
names of patients to be transported were sent to the home institutions, which
were expected to ready the patients for transfer. These patients were later
transported to the killing center of Grafeneck (and, after its closure, to
Hadamar), where with few exceptions they were murdered. In order to prevent
discharge of patients before they could be transported to their deaths, the
Ministry of the Interior issued a decree in September 1940 prohibiting dis-
charges without the ministry’s approval.
The killing center Grafeneck came into existence in October 1939 when,
on orders from Berlin, a former castle belonging to the Samaritan Foundation
Association was converted into a euthanasia center for mentally handicapped
patients. The rooms within the Grafeneck facility were used as office space for
the T-4 staff. The actual extermination room was located in a shack formerly
used for farming. This inauspicious structure was converted into a gas cham-
ber. Adjacent to it, three crematoria were installed to dispose of the murdered
patients’ bodies. A large wooden barracks and doctor’s office stood nearby.
When the mentally disabled arrived at Grafeneck, usually in busloads of ap-
proximately seventy-five people, they were brought into the receiving bar-
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racks, disrobed by nursing personnel, and led to the examining doctor. A
minute-long physical exam ensued. Occasionally, the exams resulted in an
exemption of the patient from killing. The vast majority, however, were con-
ducted into the gas chamber, which, in an eerie prefiguration of the gas cham-
bers at Auschwitz, was disguised to resemble a shower room, complete with
mock water faucets. Once all patients were in the chamber, the door was shut
and locked, and the chamber filled with carbon monoxide gas. Within min-
utes the patients were dead. Their bodies were removed and immediately cre-
mated. The presiding doctor recorded false causes, dates, and places of death
on the victims’ death certificates. The Registry Office of Grafeneck officially
registered them as suffering death from “natural causes.” In an effort to ob-
struct public knowledge of the killings, the Grafeneck staff monitored the
hometowns of the victims with colored pins stuck into a map of Germany. In
this way, they could ensure that suspicion would not be aroused by issuing too
many death notices for patients from any one location.
The Grafeneck killing center took a frightful toll of lives during its short-
lived existence from October 1939 until mid-December 1940. Some 10,654
disabled patients were killed there during this fourteen-month period. After
its doors were closed in December 1940, the Hadamar institution took up
where Grafeneck had left off. Evidence admitted at Mauthe’s trial indicated
that 267 patients from Württemberg institutions were killed at Hadamar. In
addition to these killings, at least 93 children were transported to children’s
wards outside Württemberg, chiefly Eichberg, where they were murdered.
Otto Mauthe typified a new species of criminal that appears for the first
time in history during the era of Nazi genocide, the “desk murderer” (Schreib-
tischtäter). Although never harming anyone directly, he consigned thousands
of patients to their deaths with the stroke of his pen. Based on the evidence
before it, the state court of Tübingen was convinced that Mauthe played a
central role in the administrative measures essential to the successful imple-
mentation of the killing program—primarily in the form of preparing and
sometimes personally signing decrees issued by the Württemberg Ministry of
the Interior. The court enumerated a list of incriminating decrees authored by
Mauthe, each of which promoted euthanasia in some material respect. The
decree of June 10, 1940, for example, required mental health officials in Stuttgart
to prepare lists of patients for transport to Grafeneck. Another one (August 9,
1940) prohibited the Liebenau institution from informing relatives of
transportees of their removal. He issued the decree of June 5, 1941, to the
Weinsberg mental hospital, ordering the transport of patients to the Hadamar
killing center. It was further proven that Mauthe himself had visited institu-
tions in Württemberg in order to complete registration forms that had been
improperly filled out. Patients identified by Mauthe on these forms were later
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transported and allegedly killed. The record teemed with other evidence ad-
verse to Mauthe, including situations in which he overruled exemptions made
by other doctors and ordered their transport to Grafeneck. It was also shown
that he had pacified the victims’ families with false assurances about their
fates.
In its deliberations about Mauthe and his codefendants, the state court of
Tübingen departed from the custom established in earlier euthanasia trials and
elected to apply Control Council Law #10’s crimes against humanity (Article
II, 1c) rather than German law to the defendants’ crimes. German law, the
court held, was ill-suited to deal with the “mass criminality” perpetrated by the
Nazi state. For the court, the German Penal Code did not anticipate participa-
tion in mass murder, “but rather a multiple participation in a single murder”;
and because the code had no category for mass murder, mass killings under the
code that numbered in the hundreds and thousands were “impossible.” Ger-
man law, in the presence of Nazi genocide, curled back upon itself. Therefore,
Law #10’s crimes against humanity was the appropriate theory of criminal li-
ability to be applied in this case.31
Mauthe (or his attorney) must have taken note of the Scheuern and Rhine
province cases, for he raised the collision of duties as a defense at trial, arguing
that he had participated in the euthanasia program only to hamstring its aims
from the inside. The Tübingen court acknowledged the legal validity of
extrastatutory necessity and collision of duties, but insisted that they could be
applied only when “strict requirements” were met in a given case. Turning to
Mauthe, the court had little problem concluding that he did not satisfy these
requirements. Mauthe, it held, did not collaborate in euthanasia in order to
save lives, but out of fear for personal disadvantages he might otherwise face,
especially to his professional advancement. Further, he did not exploit all op-
portunities for saving patients, using his freedom of discretion; rather, he ex-
pressly avoided saving patients because of his “exaggerated anxiety and bureau-
cratic indifference.” (In one example, he refused to support an exemption lest
the SS investigate or his superior should disapprove.) The court described ten
separate instances in which Mauthe failed to authorize discharge for a patient
when there was abundant opportunity to do so. These examples belied his
claim that he sought every opportunity to rescue patients from transportation
to the killing centers.32
Similarly, Mauthe neglected opportunities to extricate children from trans-
port to the children’s ward at Eichberg, despite his awareness that patients
were being killed there. These examples decisively proved that Mauthe, even if
he inwardly disapproved of euthanasia, nonetheless colluded in it—not out of
a desire to save his patients, but out of fear for his position. For this reason,
the court rejected his collision of duties defense.
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In sentencing Mauthe, the Tübingen court counted as factors in mitiga-
tion his “weakness,” which rendered him vulnerable to “general political pres-
sure and the much stronger personality of his superior, Dr. Stähle.” The court
even conceded that Mauthe may have been inwardly willing to save patients,
but his “anxiety and bureaucratic inhibition” paralyzed his ability to act. For
his role in facilitating the killings of 4,000 people, he was given a five-year jail
term. Mauthe did not even serve this mild punishment; not long after the
trial, his sentence was suspended and Mauthe was released from prison.33
A second physician convicted by the Tübingen court was the acting direc-
tor of the Zwiefalten mental institution, Dr. Alfons Stegmann, charged with
delivering his patients for transportation and killing. Stegmann claimed he
had known nothing about the purpose of the transports until after the trans-
ports’ departure—an assertion refuted by witness testimony that Dr. Stähle
had enlightened him on the reason for the transports in February 1940. More-
over, his behavior during the period of his directorship at Zwiefalten contra-
dicted his “sabotage” argument. He not only maintained regular contact with
euthanasia specialist Dr. Ernst Baumhardt, but made regular voluntary visits
to the killing center at Grafeneck. On one occasion, he caught a lift in a
Gekrat bus to go cherry picking in Winnenden. At one point on this outing,
a cigarette pasted to his lip, he commented to a bystander as a mentally ill
woman was loaded onto the bus: “There goes my bride!” The court described
such detachment from the plight of these doomed human beings as “cool” and
“cynical,” belying his claim that he had always resisted the T-4 killing program.
Nor did Stegmann’s documented exemptions of patients capable of work weigh
in his favor, because they were fully within the scope of permissible action as
defined by the Berlin authorities. Far more damning was his gratuitous act of
selecting 75 patients for transport from 120 photocopies given him by Dr.
Baumhardt. This act, in concert with others, sufficiently proved he was more
inclined to promote than to resist the killing program.
Despite his clear support of Nazi euthanasia and his proven contribution
to the deaths of hundreds of patients, Stegmann received a trifling jail term of
two years. The court considered several factors in mitigation of his punish-
ment: his collaboration was “relatively small”; he did not himself design the
killing program; and he was a young doctor at the time, installed during the
war as director of a large mental hospital, and thus merely responded to deci-
sions made by his superiors. These considerations, as we have seen in other
cases (such as the trial of Mathilde Weber), were typical of sentencing under
German criminal law: real responsibility for institutional criminality was se-
curely lodged at the top of a bureaucratic hierarchy. The farther down the
hierarchy a defendant was, the greater the probability the defendant would
qualify for extenuated punishment.34
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The third and final physician convicted by the court, Stegmann’s succes-
sor as director of the Zwiefalten institution, a Dr. F., also enjoyed a significant
reduction of her sentence. She was charged with committing a crime against
humanity for her role in preparing transports of patients from Zwiefalten based
on the transport list. The Tübingen court acquitted her in nearly every case,
finding no evidence to contradict her claim that she had exempted patients
from transfer on her own initiative. In the cases of three specific patients,
however, the court declined an outright acquittal. These cases involved pa-
tients killed with lethal injections of scopolamine and trional ordered by Dr. F.
At trial, she tried to portray the injections as designed to alleviate the suffer-
ing of terminally ill patients, not to induce their deaths. Her self-exculpatory
declaration, however, was inconsistent with an earlier confession she had made
during an interrogation in Freiburg, in which she had admitted to injecting
the moribund patients with lethal overdoses in order to abbreviate their lives.
Because she had not caused their deaths “cruelly,” “maliciously,” or out of “base
motives” but “solely out of pity,” and because these three killings were unre-
lated to the Nazis’ brutal campaign to destroy “life unworthy of life,” they were
neither a crime against humanity nor murder under German law. Instead, her
acts constituted manslaughter under section 212 of the German Penal Code.35
Clearly sympathetic to Dr. F., the court sentenced her to a prison term of one-
and-a-half years (the minimal legal punishment for each case of manslaughter,
or six months per death).
Although the collision of duties defense found no application in the con-
victions of Mauthe, a Dr. S., and Dr. F., one defendant in the Württemberg
trial did successfully invoke it to secure his acquittal. This defendant was a
medical specialist in psychiatry, a Dr. E., indicted for accompanying Mauthe
on his trips to various mental institutions in Württemberg for the purpose of
completing registration forms on their patients. Dr. E. argued at trial that he
and Mauthe made these trips only to strike from the transport lists the names
of patients capable of work, and thus, far from promoting euthanasia, they had
actually restricted it. Finding Dr. E.’s defense unrefuted by the evidentiary
record, the Tübingen court acquitted him on the basis of a collision of duties.36
The Württemberg trial in 1949 encapsulates in miniature the tolerant
spirit of the post-1947 euthanasia trials. When it did not acquit a euthanasia
doctor outright, as it did Dr. E., the Tübingen court meted out comparatively
trivial sentences for egregious violations of the law of nations. A mathemati-
cal computation, for example, throws into disturbing bas-relief the court’s le-
nient attitude toward Mauthe: if we divide the total number of hours in a five-
year prison sentence such as Mauthe received (and ultimately did not serve) by
the total number of his victims (4,000), we arrive at a figure of approximately
ten hours of jail time per killing. Willfully or not, such a sentence conveys a
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message to the rest of society that this type of killing is of a different order of
wrongdoing than conventional homicide—an order of wrongdoing that soci-
ety may condone, because it lacks the reprehensibility of conventional murder.
In the 1960s, polls of West German citizens indicated that many wished
for the prosecution of National Socialist crimes to come to an end, in part
because many Germans regarded the crimes committed during the era of Na-
tional Socialism as something other than true criminality. A German expert
on the prosecution of Nazi crimes, Herbert Jäger, once commented that the
“good citizen” did not object to state-sponsored mass murder, but to “non-
conformist” murder outside the boundaries of the well-ordered state. Nor was
this prejudice restricted to German laypeople. In the twenty years after the
war, German courts typically reserved their harshest punishment for the Exzess-
täter (excess perpetrators), those killers who committed crimes of violence
beyond the scope of what was ordered (auf eigene Faust tut, literally “acting on
one’s own fist”). The psychopathic killer received the scorching reprobation of
the German courts, while the “small wheels” within the machinery of destruc-
tion often escaped condign punishment. For Jäger, one of the foremost goals of
prosecuting Nazi crimes was to cultivate an awareness in the German popula-
tion that violence performed on the orders of the highest state leadership is
criminal. Under this standard, the trial of the Württemberg doctors can only
be regarded as a spectacular failure.37
The Baden Case
As we saw in the Württemberg trial, the T-4 functionaries in Berlin some-
times worked through local state authorities to accomplish their aims of imple-
menting euthanasia. In other cases, they worked directly with mental institutions
themselves. For this reason, officials in the provincial government sector—espe-
cially the health departments within local ministries of the interior—could be-
come essential partners in the destruction of “unworthy” life. The example of
State Councillor Fritz Bernotat of Hessen-Nassau comes readily to mind; with-
out his sedulous efforts on behalf of euthanasia, the killing program in Hessen-
Nassau would never have functioned with the same harrowing efficiency that
it achieved under his guidance. The work of local officials like Bernotat was
fraught with potential for appalling destruction. Otto Mauthe’s hands were
dripping with the blood of 4,000 disabled patients; Bernotat’s victims can be
numbered in the tens of thousands.
On May 1, 1950, the state court of Freiburg im Breisgau convened to re-
try Otto Mauthe’s counterpart in the Baden Interior Ministry, Dr. Ludwig
Sprauer, and the former director of the Illenau and Wiesloch psychiatric hos-
pitals, Dr. Josef Artur Schreck. Accused of involvement in the euthanasia
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program, both defendants had been convicted in an earlier proceeding in No-
vember 1948 of crimes against humanity and aiding and abetting murder; both
were given lifelong prison terms. Their conviction was duly appealed and the
verdict partially reversed by the Freiburg Court of Appeals on technical legal
grounds. The case thereafter was remanded to the lower court for retrial in
May 1950.
Dr. Ludwig Sprauer was the director of the Health Department (Depart-
ment IIIb) of the Baden Interior Ministry. As director he controlled twelve
mental hospitals in Baden, including state, district, and religiously affiliated
institutions. In October 1939 Sprauer was summoned to the Reich Ministry of
the Interior in Berlin, where Herbert Linden informed him that war condi-
tions required reserve hospitals. Linden then swore Sprauer to secrecy and
told him about plans to euthanize incurable mental patients “in the sense of
the Binding-Hoche proposals.” By “granting” these patients a “mercy death,”
the necessary beds would be made available for use as reserve hospitals. Linden
assured Sprauer that a “legal foundation” for the killing program existed, but
that a euthanasia law had not yet been enacted. Until its formal legalization,
the program was backed by a September 1939 authorization by Hitler. Sprauer’s
role was to facilitate registration and transportation of incurable patients in
Baden institutions.38
Despite Sprauer’s willingness to collaborate in the killing program, medi-
cal personnel throughout Baden resisted its implementation. The court was
aware of only two directors of Baden mental hospitals who failed to oppose the
operation: Sprauer’s codefendant Josef Artur Schreck and a Dr. Gercke. The
rest engaged in a relatively successful plan of sabotage. On one occasion, in
early December 1940, a Gekrat transport leader left the institution of Jestetten
with an empty bus because the staff doctor and chief nurse had refused to
surrender their patients to him. The director of the Fussbach institution went
so far as to don his SS uniform when the Gekrat busses arrived and launch
into a heated argument with the transport leader, the result of which was that
only thirty of the ninety patients designated were finally transported. These
and other incidents of resistance, however, did not spur Sprauer into opposing
the euthanasia program; on the contrary, he scotched resistance wherever it
appeared. His tactics of quashing opposition ran the gamut from threats of
imprisonment to “collegial” invitations to take extended vacations. On an-
other occasion, he transferred a Dr. L., a staff physician at the Illenau institu-
tion who had protested the killing program, to the health office in Karlsruhe.
As in the Rhine province, a sabotage “conspiracy” embracing all of Baden’s
directors except Schreck and Gercke developed. These doctor-saboteurs re-
solved to subvert the killing program by discharging patients, transferring them
to work positions, or removing them to private institutions where they would
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be out of harm’s way. They also exempted patients from transport by characteriz-
ing them as capable of work. Opportunities arose during this sabotage initiative
for Sprauer to cooperate with it. The director of the Emmendingen facility, a
Dr. Ma., asked Sprauer to authorize exemption of twelve children who were
capable of working independently of supervision. Sprauer refused, and the chil-
dren were transported from Emmendingen to Grafeneck. Sprauer’s obduracy
persuaded Dr. Ma. to withhold patients without first obtaining his permission.
When Sprauer learned of this, he reprimanded Ma. for his act of sabotage, and
warned him that if he continued he would face dismissal, or possibly even his
own personal transport to Grafeneck.
The court accepted Sprauer’s representation that the euthanasia program
profoundly disturbed him. “A false bureaucratic ambition and submissiveness
to authority,” however, impelled his collaboration with the program. Fears
that a critical attitude toward it would prejudice his career haunted him, caus-
ing an almost knee-jerk submission to orders issued “from above.” (In the
words of one witness, “what came from Berlin was Gospel for [Sprauer].”) “He
did not want to lose his job in the ministry,” the court held, “where after a few
years he hoped to rise to the position of a ministerial councillor.” The court
had no doubt that Sprauer perceived the wrongfulness of the program, and
that he even suffered grievous mental stress over it; but his “loyalty to duty”
overrode his moral compunction. Periodically, in response to the pleadings of
institutional directors, Sprauer reluctantly approved exemptions; but in these
cases he usually required that other patients incapable of work be substituted.
The court attributed his submissive attitude toward authority to a “character
weakness.” Notwithstanding this infirmity in his personality, he was always
conscious that the killing program and his actions in connection with it were
wrongful.39
In its assessment of Sprauer’s conduct, the Freiburg court adopted the by
now familiar taxonomy of perpetrators of and accomplices to National Social-
ist euthanasia. The perpetrators were “Hitler and his henchmen”—Himmler,
Bouhler, Brandt, Linden, and Brack. These were the men at the top of the
Nazi power structure who “initiated” and “guided” the euthanasia program from
its inception—men who acted out of “base motives” and “maliciously” to de-
stroy patients they considered “superfluous eaters.” Sprauer’s work as the direc-
tor of the Baden Interior Ministry’s health department, on the other hand,
classified him as a “typical accomplice” to the mass murders committed by the
Nazi leadership corps. By consigning patients to transports that he knew would
result in their deaths, Sprauer fulfilled the objective elements of the offense
(both a crime against humanity and aiding and abetting murder). His argu-
ment that his actions were justified by an extrastatutory necessity, inasmuch
as any refusal to collaborate would have meant dismissal from his job and
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certain “professional disadvantages” harmful to both himself and his family,
was dismissed by the court. According to the court, prejudice to one’s career
was not a compelling legal interest under the doctrine of extrastatutory neces-
sity—certainly not one that would justify sacrificing the lives of patients.40
Any duress Sprauer experienced was legally negligible; under German law, only
an “immediate threat to life and limb” rose to a level sufficient to justify or
excuse a criminal act. He had no reason to fear for his personal safety, or for
the safety of his family, in the event of a refusal to cooperate with the euthana-
sia program. On May 2, 1950, after a two-day trial, the Freiburg court found
him guilty of aiding and abetting numerous murders and of crimes against
humanity.
Because the death penalty had been abolished in Germany in 1949, the
court meted out to Sprauer an eleven-year jail term. Within months after he
was sentenced for his role in helping to murder 3,000 persons, the Freiburg
prosecutor’s office suspended Sprauer’s punishment and released him from
prison. Simultaneously, the government of Baden-Württemberg awarded him
a pension of DM 450 per month. The effort beginning in 1945 to purge the
German civil service of former officials of the Nazi government was unraveling
as the decade wound down; of the party members dismissed from their jobs in
1945, increasing numbers of them were reintegrated into the German civil
service by the early 1950s. Sprauer was one, but by no means the only, example
of this trend.
One of the decisive proofs against Sprauer’s argument that he had always
sought to undermine the euthanasia program was his nomination of Dr. Josef
Artur Schreck to serve as a medical expert for the operation. Sprauer must
have known of Schreck’s supportive attitude toward euthanasia; his work on
behalf of T-4 would not disappoint Sprauer’s trust in him. Schreck had not
always been an adherent of destroying “life unworthy of life.” Not until the
work of Binding and Hoche was published in 1920 did he embrace euthanasia
as a “humane” method for ending the lives of severely mentally handicapped
patients. He believed euthanasia should be restricted to two groups of pa-
tients: “full idiots” and those who had become feebleminded as a result of
accident or illness. Administering a “mercy death” to the latter group, he felt,
was particularly humane, because it would spare them the indignities of an
institutionalized existence—a deliverance he himself would desire if he were
in such a condition. The court noted that Schreck continued to adhere to
these ideas until the day of his trial.
Schreck’s contributions to the killing program occurred in two official
capacities: as an institutional director and as a T-4 expert. He served at various
times as director of three Baden mental hospitals, as well as the temporary
director of the children’s ward in another institution. As director at the Rastatt
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hospital, he received registration forms for 580 of his patients in late 1939.
Although he, like his colleagues at other Baden institutions, had not been
informed of their purpose, he nevertheless intuited what was afoot, suspecting
that a “program along the lines of Binding/Hoche might be involved.” Evi-
dence indicated that between 15 and 20 percent of his patients were capable of
work and enjoyed a cognitive life in which they were responsive to their envi-
ronment. This notwithstanding, when Rastatt was dissolved in June 1940 a
contingent of registered patients was brought in seven transports to Grafeneck
and gassed. Schreck, who had meanwhile been informed of the purposes of the
transport, did nothing to impede it. He tried to console a distraught nurse by
referring to the exigencies of the war, assuring her that it was a “completely
humane” proceeding.41
At one of the Baden institutions under his direction, moreover, Schreck
proved himself a devoted adherent of the killing program. In one case cited by
the court, Schreck provided a diagnosis of a patient on the registration form
that almost guaranteed his transportation, describing him as a schizophrenic
“with considerable disintegration of the psychological personality.” A physi-
cian familiar with the patient challenged Schreck’s assessment at trial, calling
the patient a “mild case with no disintegration of the personality.” Schreck’s
summary of the patient’s length of time in the institution was likewise inaccu-
rate: in contrast with Schreck’s assertion that he had been institutionalized
“with brief interruptions” since June 1917, the court found that from 1917 to
1940 the patient had spent as many as eighteen years outside hospitals—hardly
the continuous institutionalization punctuated by “brief interruptions” alleged
by Schreck. Miraculously, this patient survived the killing program and was at
the time of the trial alive and doing productive work.
Schreck’s brief stint as director of the children’s ward at the Wiesloch
institution also incriminated him in the killing program. At the suggestion of
Sprauer, Herbert Linden appointed Schreck to this directorship, communicat-
ing to him that the children in the ward were to be euthanized. Until its
dissolution in June 1941, twelve children were killed there, the last one in
May. They ranged in ages from three to five and were characterized as “full
idiots” beyond treatment. The children were killed with two or three injec-
tions of luminal, which induced terminal pneumonia in the victims. The first
three killings were performed by Schreck himself, as were the autopsies on
their corpses. Defending his actions, Schreck claimed they were motivated by
purely humanitarian concerns, because it was “inhumane” to prolong the life
of a child who lacked a complete brain or suffered hydrocephaly.
The gravamen of the charges against Schreck, however, was his work as a
T-4 expert. After Sprauer had recommended Schreck as ideologically reliable,
he was ordered to report to Herbert Linden in Berlin in February 1940. In
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Berlin he and fifteen other doctors attended a meeting chaired by Viktor Brack,
who related that because of unspecified “war conditions” the “ancient problem
of euthanasia had again become acute.” Brack told his audience that the Reich
Chancellery had already prepared a law on the subject, but it could not be
published during the war, and thus had to be treated as a “secret Reich matter.”
The victims were to include all patients under institutional care for longer
than five years, excepting war veterans, foreigners, and patients capable of
useful work. Photocopies of the registration forms were then exhibited to the
participants, along with an explanation of how the medical experts were to
evaluate them. At the end, all participants were asked if they were willing to
work as medical experts for the euthanasia program. Schreck told the court he
had freely accepted the offer, because the program coincided with his own
philosophy on euthanasia. He added, however, that he fully believed in the
legality of the program when he agreed to collaborate with it.42
From March until December 1940, Schreck assessed some 15,000 registra-
tion forms sent him by the T-4 front office, the Reich Cooperative for State
Hospitals and Nursing Homes. The first shipment contained 350 to 400 forms
from three Baden institutions, among them forms on patients he knew per-
sonally. Thereafter he requested that he be sent forms only from non-Baden
institutions, in order to ensure his ability to judge them objectively. Notwith-
standing his claims that he evaluated each form assiduously, the court rejected
any suggestion that an accurate portrait of a patient could be gleaned from the
modest information contained on the registration forms—least of all an ad-
equate basis for determining whether a patient was incurable. The court con-
sidered Schreck intelligent enough to understand this inadequacy and thus
accountable for making life-and-death decisions based on them.
The Freiburg state court’s legal analysis of Schreck’s crimes closely paral-
leled its assessment of Sprauer. Schreck, like Sprauer, was deemed an accom-
plice to murders committed by the real perpetrators, the “Berlin planning and
leadership circle.” Although the court refused to treat him as a perpetrator, it
did consider Schreck’s contributions to the murder of mental patients sub-
stantial. These contributions, moreover, were neither justified by Schreck’s
alleged belief in a wartime emergency that excused his actions, nor his claim
that he had assumed Nazi euthanasia was a rational and humane extension of
the Binding/Hoche thesis regarding “life not worth living.” Declining to pass
on the legality of a program faithfully modeled on the Binding/Hoche guide-
lines, the court stated that the government’s war on the disabled had nothing
in common with the arguments of Binding/Hoche—a patent discontinuity of
which Schreck must have been aware. Because Schreck must have seen the
startling lack of congruence between the two, it followed that he may have
been a true believer in the “crass utilitarian consideration” that underpinned
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the whole operation, “namely, the exclusion of superfluous eaters in the inter-
est of securing nourishment and the need for hospital space.” And yet, despite
his willingness to participate in the destruction of “superfluous eaters,” the
court did not find that he was fully aware of the illegality of his actions. Rather,
he suffered from “legal blindness,” a failure to grasp the criminality of his role
in the program that did not rise to the level of an exculpatory “lack of aware-
ness of illegality” (which would have acquitted Schreck on the basis of a mis-
take of law), but was less morally reprehensible than a conscious flouting of
the law.
The court’s reasoning here becomes murky. It seems to be saying that
Schreck did not fully appreciate the illegality of his actions, but this lack of
awareness did not rise to the level of a mistake of law sufficient to acquit him
of the charges. The court compared the motivational complexes of both Sprauer
and Schreck:
While in Sprauer’s case an exaggerated need for authority led to his legal
blindness, Schreck succumbed to an inward development, at the begin-
ning of which—and this makes the participation of highly esteemed men
and psychiatrists in the operation especially tragic—stood an actual pity
for the sickest of the patients. . . . The same man reputed to have a
paternal and benevolent attitude toward his patients clearly expressed the
view, when filling out forms on his Illenau patients . . . , that valuing a
human life was no longer for him a precise procedure. These failures
cannot be regarded as accidental, but are the symptoms for the destruction
of the professional ethic, which every doctor had to suffer who involved
himself in the extermination program.43
In this way, the court blurred the contours of Schreck’s personal responsibility
for his actions, locating their origins in the depraving influences exerted by
the killing program and its economistic philosophy on all its accomplices.
The court convicted Schreck, as it had Sprauer, of aiding and abetting
murder under German law and crimes against humanity under Law #10 on
May 2, 1950. These convictions related to his work as an expert evaluator and
to his actions as director of the three Baden hospitals under his direction. He
was acquitted of the homicide charge for his personal involvement in killing
the three children in the Wiesloch children’s ward, because he was motivated
in these three cases by the desire “to deliver them from their incurability and
incapacity.” Unlike the Berlin authorities, who routinely lied to the victims’
families, Schreck had informed the children’s families that euthanasia was the
best means of ending their child’s suffering; thus, his conduct could not be
regarded as deceptive. Because these killings were not prompted by any of the
motives required by the German law of murder, they were instances of man-
slaughter under section 212. For the same reason, the children’s deaths were
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not crimes against humanity, insofar as Schreck did not commit them with a
sense of “damaging human dignity through the cruelty and pitilessness of his
actions.” The court sentenced him to a jail term of eleven years. Like Sprauer,
he was soon released from jail, serving only a year of his sentence.
The Baden case represents both a deviation from and a continuance of the
post-1947 trend toward leniency in German euthanasia trials. On the one
hand, the Freiburg court refused to accept the defendants’ claim of extrastatutory
necessity; on the other, it treated both defendants as accomplices rather than
perpetrators, ascribing their motives to an obsequious careerism (Sprauer) and
the “tragic” perversion of a once high-minded concern for human life (Schreck).
In Schreck’s case the court’s dismissal of the charges for murder and crimes
against humanity as applied to the deaths of the three Wiesloch children even
implied that he had acted compassionately to end human suffering.
The trials of euthanasia defendants in the aftermath of the Baden case are
notable for their renewed willingness to acquit on the basis of extrastatutory
emergency. Beginning in the early 1950s, moreover, a novel theory won accep-
tance in West German courts as a defense to the charge of euthanasia-related
homicide. That theory—the “exertion of conscience” defense—and its en-
dorsement by West German jurists reveals the extent to which the yearning
for an end to the prosecution of Nazi-era crimes had infiltrated the judiciary’s
attitudes about euthanasia criminality. To a significant degree, this yearning
was impelled by a desire for restored national power after the catastrophe of
Germany’s defeat in 1945. We turn to this new series of verdicts and the
rationale invoked to support them in the next chapter.
THE RENEWAL OF THE COLLISION OF DUTIES DEFENSE
The West German euthanasia trials between 1948 and the mid-1950s
occurred during a tumultuous era in German and international his-
tory. The U.S. goal of integrating into the Western alliance a demo-
cratic and pro-U.S. Germany became a pillar of European foreign
policy in both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. As early
as 1949, the Pentagon and State Department realized the military
inadequacy of NATO troop strength as compared with the Soviets:
its undersupplied twelve divisions were dwarfed by the USSR’s twenty-
seven. A solution to this mismatch, in the minds of Secretary of
State Dean Acheson and Pentagon policymakers, was to rearm West
Germany and shore up NATO’s ground forces with German soldiers.
Opinion about German rearmament was divided within the State
Department; some officials feared French and Soviet responses to
any plan to revive the German military. The reservations of these
critics, however, were dealt a severe blow with the outbreak of the
Korean War. Acheson saw Soviet fingerprints all over the North
Korean invasion and inferred that the USSR might also be willing
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Chapter 5
Political language . . . is designed to make lies sound truthful
and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity
to pure wind.
—GEORGE ORWELL, “POLITICS AND THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE” (1950)
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to launch a surprise invasion in Europe. In September 1950 Acheson proposed
at a meeting of French and British foreign ministers the establishment of a
transnational European army that would include German troops. Although
the U.S. plan for a European Defense Community would ultimately founder in
1954 when the French rejected it, the aim of German rearmament was achieved
with the incorporation of a new West German military into NATO in May
1955.1
The idea that West Germany must have sound democratic credentials if it
were to enjoy the most visible badge of sovereignty, rearmament, influenced
the German state’s policy on war crimes trials. Obviously, contemporary Ger-
mans burdened with allegations of committing Nazi war crimes could not shore
up the Free World’s bulwark against Soviet Communism. As scholars of post-
war Germany have demonstrated, the Federal Republic of Germany employed
various strategies to advertise its reinvention as a democracy protective of
human rights and freedoms. Philosemitism was one such strategy: through
public avowals of exaggeratedly positive attitudes toward Jews, the Germans
served notice on the world community of their readiness to regain the status of
a sovereign country. Another bona fide display of Germany’s rebirth as a demo-
cratic state was anti-Communism. Given the penchant after the war to clas-
sify both National Socialism and Communism under a common “totalitarian-
ism,” the Cold War rhetoric and policies of the fledgling state were outward
symbols of West Germany’s transformation from authoritarianism to a mili-
tant democracy—broadminded, tolerant of diversity, yet prepared to defend
the West from a Communist despotism likened in postwar years to Nazi tyranny.
As a whole, philosemitism and anti-Communism confirmed West German
claims to moral, political, and social legitimacy, and buttressed German asser-
tions of national power at a time when the Federal Republic was in its infancy.2
The prosecution of Nazi criminals was enmeshed in this complex skein of
geopolitics and the quest for revived national power. Like philosemitism and
anti-Communism, the abolition of trials of Nazi-era perpetrators became part
of a strategy to regain German sovereignty. One gambit in this strategy was the
Bundestag’s Christmas Amnesty of 1949, which freed Nazi defendants sen-
tenced to jail terms of six months or less—a decree that affected nearly 700,000
West Germans. On January 1, 1951, it was the Americans’ turn: the U.S.
occupation authorities amnestied Nazi defendants convicted at Nuremberg
with sentences of less than fifteen years. This decree released convicted indus-
trialists like Alfried Krupp and Fritz ter Meer, co-founder of the I. G. Farben
slave labor concern at Auschwitz. By February 1951 every industrialist war
criminal had been released.
In that same year, the Bundestag promulgated the “131 Law,” deriving its
name from Article 131 of the 1949 German Constitution. Article 131 had
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assumed responsibility for regulating the “legal condition” of former Nazi bu-
reaucrats, many of whom had fled eastern Germany with the collapse of the
Third Reich and were now unemployed in the western part. Others had been
expelled from the civil service by denazification procedures for their proven
Nazi past; at least one-third (100,000) of the bureaucrats covered by Article
131 had been classified as “compromised” by denazification courts. The 1951
law based on Article 131 was a coup for this group of erstwhile Nazi function-
aries. It required federal, state, and local governments to allocate at least 20
percent of revenue paid for salaries to employ the 131 beneficiaries. Although
the law excluded former officials classified as “major offenders,” in reality few
of the “131’ers” (only 1,227) were affected by the restriction. In this fashion,
former Gauleiters and Security Service commanders who had successfully con-
cealed their past and received mild classifications were able to reenter the
West German civil service.3
These developments in the early 1950s were both symptoms and causes of
a nationwide amnesia that crept over West Germany about its recent geno-
cidal past. In the years that followed, ex-Nazi officials were reabsorbed into
German society, many of them into state and local government. At the same
time, in those trials of Nazi criminals that did take place, German courts
acquitted euthanasia defendants with reference to extrastatutory necessity and
a new theory to justify acquittal: the defendant’s inability to “exert his con-
science” sufficiently to recognize the illegality of his actions. This new defense
became another implement in the West German judiciary’s toolbox to exoner-
ate euthanasia killers and liquidate the era of Nazi war crimes trials.
Theologians for Acquittal: The Hannover Province Case
The doctrine of extrastatutory necessity, used as a means of acquitting
euthanasia doctors, was in temporary eclipse in the Württemberg and Baden
cases. In July 1950 the eclipse came to a dramatic end in a series of cases that
acquitted entire slates of defendants, many of them deeply involved in murder-
ing disabled patients during the war. In retrospect, it is clear that these trials
signify the high-water mark in the history of euthanasia acquittals by German
courts.
The verdict in the first of these trials was published in late July 1950 by
the state court of Hannover. The defendants were three officials in the provin-
cial government of Hannover: Dr. Ludwig Gessner, former governor of the
Hannover province, and two of his departmental chiefs within the public health
department, Dr. Georg Andreae and Dr. F. This trio distributed decrees of the
Reich government for the province of Hannover, by means of which patients
were transported to transit centers before being transferred to killing institutions.
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For their roles in this apparatus of destruction, the defendants were charged
with aiding and abetting murder and crimes against humanity.
Euthanasia came somewhat late to the former Hannover province. When
the Berlin authorities decided during summer 1940 to include the province in
the killing program, it had already been implemented for some time in
Pomerania, Vienna, Freiburg, Tübingen, Württemberg, Hessen, Saxony, and
the Rhine province. Responsibility for inaugurating the program that summer
in the Hannover province fell to the three defendants. At the time the pro-
vincial government administered the mental institutions at Göttingen (700
patients), Lüneburg (1,100 patients), Osnabrück (700 patients), Wunstorf (500
patients), and Hildesheim (1,200 patients). In addition to these public hospi-
tals, the Hannover province contained religiously affiliated institutions, in-
cluding one on whose board of directors Dr. Andreae served. In some of these
hospitals the provincial government accommodated disabled patients from the
Hannover province. Hannover patients were also to be found in institutions
outside the borders of the province: forty patients were lodged in the Witte-
kindshof institution near Oeynhausen, seventy at Tillbeck, fifty at Dorsten,
and a handful at Sandhorst near Aurich. The grand total of patients entrusted
to the provincial government for care amounted to 7,000; of this number,
approximately 4,000 were within the province’s own institutions, while 3,000
were housed in contracted institutions. All of these hospitals, provincial, reli-
gious, and contracted, would be swept up in the T-4 euthanasia plan.4
In July 1940 the first registration forms poured into the Hannover prov-
ince from Berlin. An accompanying instruction sheet ordered the provincial
administrators to have the forms completed and returned to Berlin by August
1, 1940. In February 1941 the first transport lists arrived for the institutions of
Göttingen, Lüneburg, and Hildesheim, containing the names of 200 patients.
Each of the three institutions had to select 120 patients from the lists of 200
and prepare them for transfer. Transports based upon these lists occurred on
March 7 (Lüneburg and Hildesheim) and March 11 (Göttingen). The first
transports of 121 patients from Göttingen on March 11, 1941, went to the
killing centers of Sonnenstein and Hadamar. The patients dispatched to Son-
nenstein were gassed in April 1941, those to Hadamar in June 1941. Other
institutions were obliged to transport their hand-chosen patients on April 22
and 24 (Osnabrück) and April 23 and 24 (Wunstorf). A third wave began in
July and August 1941. By the end of the first phase in the euthanasia program,
1,669 patients had been transported from provincial and contracted institu-
tions within the Hannover province from a total patient population of 7,000.
All transports were conducted, at least in part, by T-4’s Gekrat. Even after
Hitler had officially ended euthanasia in August 1941, more than twelve trans-
ports from Hannover province institutions occurred. As late as February 16,
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1943, twenty-five patients were transported from Osnabrück to the Pomera-
nian institution of Meseritz-Obrawalde. Although the defendants were origi-
nally charged with these later transports, as well as a transfer on September
21, 1940, of 185 mentally ill Jews from the Wunstorf institution to an “un-
known destination” in Poland, the court refused to consider them in its assess-
ment, thus restricting their liability to the transports between March 1941
and August 1941.5
The governor of the Hannover province, defendant Ludwig Gessner, first
learned about the euthanasia planned for the region in early summer 1940,
shortly before Berlin sent registration forms to the province’s mental hospi-
tals. Even prior to this time, he had heard rumors that patients were being
destroyed in other parts of the German Reich. In response to his inquiries to
Berlin, he received a visit in June 1940 from two members of the Reich Chan-
cellery. These men informed Gessner of plans to implement “humane” eutha-
nasia in the Hannover province. When Gessner inquired about the legal basis
for such a measure, he also was told a law had not yet been decreed because
Hitler feared its impact on foreign propaganda. Nevertheless, Hitler’s full au-
thority stood behind the program. At this point, according to the Hannover
state court, Gessner resolved to do everything in his power to thwart the
extension of euthanasia to his own province. He contacted his subordinate
within the provincial administration for mental hospitals, Dr. Georg Andreae,
about compiling a list of reasons describing why euthanasia was impracticable
in the Hannover province. Gessner then sent a memorandum to the Reich
Minister of the Interior, Dr. Wilhelm Frick, setting forth his objections to the
program. In the memo—drafts of which were unavailable to the court, as they
were allegedly destroyed in a fire that gutted the state office buildings in 1943*—
Gessner expounded six reasons for his principled opposition to the killing
program:
1. Killing mental patients did not promote the philosophy of the Nazi
Party. This occurred much more through hindering the congenitally
ill from reproducing by sterilization.
2. The financial burden of caring for the mentally disabled in the
Hannover province was bearable, in part because of subsidies from
private payors. Thus, the euthanasia measures were not needed from
an economic standpoint.
3. Neither diagnoses nor prognoses with respect to mental illness were
certain enough to justify the extreme measure of killing patients.
* Several witnesses at trial vouched for the existence of the memorandum, including
Dr. Walter Creutz, already acquitted because of an analogous sabotage plan in the
Rhine province.
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4. The euthanasia measures could produce internal political problems,
especially because the Church and a significant percentage of the
population clearly condemned euthanasia.
5. It is unclear how these ideas, once set in motion, might ramify further,
and to which group of patients the exterminatory philosophy of
euthanasia might next be applied.
6. The euthanasia program would bring large numbers of health-care
professionals into a crisis of conscience.
Conspicuously absent from the memo, as the court noted, were ethical and
religious reasons for staying the hand of euthanasia. At trial, Gessner ex-
plained this absence with reference to the ideological disposition of his audi-
ence: only practical considerations would have had any chance of swaying the
true believers within the Berlin government.
Quite apart from the ethical issues involved, Gessner’s six objections were
eminently sensible, but they did not influence the decisions of the Berlin
authorities. Although Frick was sympathetic to Gessner’s argument, Hitler,
who had apparently been informed of the memo’s contents, dismissed Gessner’s
misgivings and insisted on proceeding with euthanasia. Gessner contacted the
president of the Hannover province, a man who had boasted he had the ear of
Hitler, about persuading the Führer to reconsider the killing program for the
province. Neither he nor his successor agreed to approach Hitler about the
subject. Gessner’s remonstrance with Linden was likewise unsuccessful. In
December 1940 and January 1941, the head of the Rhine province system for
mental hospitals, Walter Creutz, visited Gessner and Andreae in Hannover.
The purpose of the visit was to discuss common strategies they could pursue to
minimize the destructive effects of euthanasia. They came to the conclusion
that the three governors of the provinces of Hannover, the Rhineland, and
Westphalia had to be persuaded to oppose the killing program. This proved to
be a pipedream, as we saw, when the governor of the Rhine province, Haake,
declined to support the resistance after learning that the Führer backed the
operation.6
The court accepted the defendants’ representations that their efforts to
curb the euthanasia program were thwarted at every turn. Departmental chiefs
within the Reich Ministry of the Interior reacted with horror when Gessner
discussed with them the possibility of sabotage. Gessner sent Andreae to Ber-
lin to inquire further about the legal basis for the operation, where he met
with Werner Heyde. Andreae communicated to Heyde his and Gessner’s qualms
about euthanasia, to which Heyde replied that the system of transit centers
would reduce the risk of error. As for the legality of the program, Heyde showed
Andreae Hitler’s euthanasia decree of September 1, 1939, but reminded him of
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the confidentiality of the matter. Andreae later relayed these details of his
interview with Heyde to Gessner. Together, they agreed there was nothing
further they could do to deter the implementation of the program in the
Hannover province, because it had the unqualified support of Hitler.
When the first transport lists arrived in Gessner’s office in February 1941,
Gessner ordered Andreae to summon the directors of the three affected insti-
tutions (Göttingen, Lüneburg, and Hildesheim) to Hannover to discuss the
situation. Andreae was to impress upon the directors Gessner’s oppositional
attitude toward the euthanasia plan. At trial, the directors in attendance at
this meeting testified that Andreae made such a “depressed impression” on
them that they immediately discerned his opposition to the killing program.
From the beginning of their discussion, Andreae made clear to them Gessner’s
critical attitude. One of the directors, a Dr. Gr., expressed his belief that “such
a thing could not be desired by the Führer.” Andreae thereupon revealed to
him the existence of the Hitler decree that Heyde had shown him. He then
gave each director a list with the names of 200 patients, from which they were
to select 120 for transfer.7
In the months after this February 1941 colloquy, Andreae consulted with
Dr. Heyde to obtain exemptions from transport for certain patients. He then
reduced to writing the categories of patients to be exempted and attached
them to a decree signed by Gessner, which was forwarded to Hannover mental
institutions along with the second series of transport lists on March 25, 1941.
The patients to be exempted were those suffering from war-related injuries,
age-related senility, dementia, or infectious illness; patients incapable of train
transportation; and, finally, workers essential to the operation of the institu-
tion. According to the court, Andreae strove to expand the range of exemp-
tions from transport. In an April 1941 letter to the directors of the province’s
mental hospitals, he related that not only patients suffering war injuries were
to be withheld, but also all army veterans whose frontline military service
could be verified (e.g., through possession of the Front Warrior’s Cross or
evidence of war wounds). When the Berlin authorities caught wind of this
new exemption, the T-4 transport office objected, claiming that in the trans-
port lists for the Göttingen institution three patients were deemed front vet-
erans and withheld from transport. The same occurred with other transport
lists in the province. In a May 1941 letter to the provincial government,
Gekrat asserted that exemptions could not be conducted solely because a pa-
tient served at the front; exemption extended only to patients whose mental
illness was caused by injuries suffered in the war. The state court of Hannover
cited Gekrat’s letter as evidence of the thoroughness with which the Berlin
offices scrutinized the province’s exemptions—proof of the considerable limi-
tations on the defendants’ freedom of action.8
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In response to Gekrat’s criticism, Andreae negotiated with Dr. Heyde a
new set of criteria for exemption that would be acceptable to Berlin. Andreae
set forth the new standards in a letter to the directors of Hannover’s mental
hospitals:
The following may be withheld from transport:
1. War-injured. Under this category fall not only pensioners, but also
those who can be proven to suffer from a [war-related] wound. . . .
2. Participants in the war who have received war decorations, e.g., the
Iron Cross 2nd Class, Decoration of the Wounded. This does not
include the War-service Cross or the Front Warrior Decoration.
Participants in the war who have acquired special decorations or
recognition in the field, without being in possession of decorations.
The decision I retain personally for myself [Andreae]. . . .
9. Patients with a sound capacity for work.
10. Other patients who enjoy special grounds, like capacity for imminent
discharge, significant retention of personality, a heartfelt relationship
with their relatives or an exceptional hardship for them. I will make
the decision about these groups.9
By the end of the euthanasia program in the Hannover province in August
1941, the court found that only 231 deaths attributable to euthanasia killing
could be proven “with certainty” (3.3 percent of all institutionalized patients
in the province). The court, however, believed the actual number of victims
was much higher. Its opinion was based on statements made by the Hadamar
T-4 doctor, Hans-Bodo Gorgass, who testified that approximately 90 percent
of the 1,669 patients transported to killing centers during the first phase were
destroyed. If Gorgass’s estimate was accurate—and the court believed it was—
then the figure had to be adjusted to 1,500 victims, or 21 percent of the
province’s institutionalized population.10
The indictment charged Gessner with crimes relating to his role in sign-
ing the order that implemented the killing program in Hannover province
(decree of March 25, 1941) and otherwise promoting the transport of patients
to their deaths. Similarly, Andreae was charged with relaying the transport
order to the directors of the Göttingen, Lüneburg, and Hildesheim institu-
tions and distributing transport lists. He was also accused of issuing a series of
orders, which he either drafted or signed himself, that promoted the imple-
mentation of transports in the province. (The prosecutor withdrew additional
charges for Andreae’s participation in the transport of Jewish patients in Sep-
tember 1941 and twenty-five patients from Osnabrück to Meseritz-Obrawalde.)
A Dr. F., the medical departmental chief in the provincial government, was
charged with overriding the reluctance of one institutional director at the
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directors’ meeting in February 1941, admonishing him that he had no choice
but to transport his patients. He was also charged with promoting the killing
program by signing transport orders and refusing to agree to exemptions pro-
posed by some of the Hannover institutions.
In its deliberations on the evidence, the state court of Hannover was
visibly sympathetic to the defendants. Although it conceded the defendants’
role “as intermediate authorities” in transmitting the Berlin decrees to the
provincial hospitals, the court insisted the defendants acted independently
“only in the cases of exemptions, which, far from advancing the killing pro-
gram, actually constricted it.” The defendants’ guiding principle throughout
was “to defend the most vulnerable of the patients from transfer to the killing
centers.” In this respect, the court held, “they succeeded to a large degree.”
The court sketched the familiar dilemma facing the defendants in 1941: they
could either resign their posts and thereby abandon their patients to certain
disaster, or they could remain at their posts and rescue as many as possible.
Through no fault of their own, the defendants were caught in a “tragic situa-
tion,” in which either alternative they chose would result in the “severest
consequences.” In a remarkable passage, the court confessed to the inability of
the law to deal adequately with this “conflict of conscience.” Nothing in the
German Penal Code afforded a solution to this dilemma.* The excuse of neces-
sity was inapplicable, because the defendants feared no danger to themselves
in the event of their resignation. Berlin would not only have accepted Gessner’s
withdrawal, but would have encouraged it, because it would have vacated his
position for a more ideologically suitable replacement.
Finding the German Penal Code unhelpful on the issue, the court turned
to the literature of German jurists like Eberhard Schmidt and Helmut von
Weber, who believed an “extrastatutory justificatory ground” existed in such
cases. The court quoted Schmidt’s statement in a 1949 article: “The state may
not charge the commission of an illegal act against a person in a situation of
moral distress, who without moral fault is forced to commit an illegal act, the
noncommission of which would burden his moral conscience.”11 The opinion
notes that the Schwurgericht adopted Schmidt’s position. Complementary with
Schmidt’s statement, the court invoked the mystical language of Helmut von
Weber, cited two years previously by the state court of Koblenz in the Scheuern
case:
The solution of such conflicts can be found only in the conscience; the
individual must come to terms with his God about it. The legal order
* The doctrine of extrastatutory necessity was not codified in the German Penal Code
until 1975.
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provides no standard for its solution. On account of this deficit in
competence, however, the decision made by someone after earnest
examination of his conscience should not be criminalized.
The Hannover court expressed its agreement with this mystagogic interpreta-
tion, holding that “whoever therefore decides in such a conflict to remain at
his post, at the price of participating in a criminal operation in order to rescue
whoever can be rescued, should be excused from criminal wrongdoing.”12
The prominence of theology in the court’s verdict was accentuated by the
testimony of Protestant ministers during the trial. Asked about the church’s
view of the defendants’ actions, a Pastor D. of the Inner Mission replied, “[I]t
was solely a matter for the individual person . . . to make a decision that he
would be able to defend before his conscience and before his God.” Pastor D.
related the example of the Württemberg monks who, refusing to be a party to
euthanasia, quit their posts in protest. The price, however, was a higher mor-
tality rate among the patients of their hospital. In his view, the higher duty
was to remain with one’s patients and to do everything possible to shield them
from harm—a view that Pastor D. claimed the deceased Pastor von Bodel-
schwingh of the Bethel institution had shared. Such testimony further con-
vinced the Schwurgericht “that the actions of the defendants are morally justified.”
The defendants were therefore acquitted by reason of an “extrastatutory colli-
sion of duties that excludes fault.”
Much of the court’s rationale in the Hannover province case derived from
the alleged moral probity of the defendants and the (relatively) low mortality
rate among provincial hospitals, for which the defendants were given partial
credit. As Dick de Mildt rightly observes, because the documentary record was
largely destroyed during the war, much of the evidence favorable to the defen-
dants was obtained from the defendants themselves or from their medical col-
leagues, some of whom (like Creutz) had faced similar indictments for their
participation in the killing program. Each of the defendants had longstanding
affiliations with the Nazi Party, to which he owed his professional advance-
ment in the provincial ministry. All three of them were members of the bas-
tion of ideological Nazism, the SS. Despite these allegiances, the court ac-
cepted witness accolades about the defendants’ decency and professionalism
on their face. In de Mildt’s words, “such an approach made the exoneration of
the former ‘euthanasia’ accomplices an almost foregone conclusion.”13
Quite apart from its questionable assessment of the defendants’ profes-
sional record, the court’s treatment of the “collision of duties” defense is con-
ceptually fuzzy. Typically, a collision of duties involves a situation in which an
actor confronts two mutually irreconcilable legal duties; by performing one,
the actor necessarily violates the other. In its verdict the court does not specify
the conflicting duties. The defendants assuredly had a legal duty not to collude
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in the destruction of their patients; but in what sense did they have a legal
duty to rescue as many patients as possible? The example of the Württemberg
religious order cited by Pastor D. is illustrative here: the monks refused to
collaborate in the killing, but their “distancing” of themselves from the crime
violated no law. Although Pastor D. opined that the brothers were derelict in
satisfying the demands of the moral law—an opinion the court apparently
shared—they cannot be accused of violating a legal duty, which is precisely
what the collision of duties requires. This conceptual obscurity in the court’s
position may have propelled it into the arms of theology for a solution: where
the law afforded no relief, God would.
Expendible Life Revisited: The Andernach Case
The spectacle of euthanasia accomplices leaving German courtrooms as
free and morally rehabilitated men reached its peak in the July 1950 retrial of
the director and staff doctor of the Andernach mental hospital. The director
was Dr. Recktenwald, who had occupied that position at Andernach in the
Rhine province since 1934; his subordinate, Dr. Kreitsch, had worked as chief
doctor of the Andernach men’s ward since 1932. In July 1948, they were both
charged and prosecuted for aiding and abetting murder and crimes against
humanity for their contributions to Nazi euthanasia. Both were convicted. A
year later their appeal finally made it to the appellate court of Koblenz, which
reversed their conviction and remanded the case to the state court of Koblenz
for retrial. Their acquittal in the second state court proceeding firmly cemented
the case within the strain of euthanasia verdicts that not only exonerated
their defendants, but transformed them into champions of higher virtue. Fur-
ther, the case is without peer for its keen interest in the defendants’ state of
mind during their participation in the Nazi euthanasia program.
Rhineland mental hospitals received their first registration forms from
the Reich Ministry of the Interior in June 1940. The secrecy draped over the
killing program concealed its true purpose from the institutional directors. As
previously noted, many of them assumed the forms were being compiled for
statistical reasons; others believed they were designed to register workers for
the armaments industry. Recktenwald thought the forms were part of a planned
division of mental institutions into nursing homes for more advanced cases
and mental hospitals for less severe patients. Kreitsch assumed the forms re-
lated to a Reich card index maintained on mental patients. Guided by these
erroneous assumptions, doctors throughout the Rhine province, including the
defendants, filled out the forms and returned them to Berlin. When the pro-
vincial ministry discovered the actual reason for the forms, Walter Creutz
took affirmative steps to hinder the extension of euthanasia to the Rhineland.
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His efforts, however, miscarried when state governor Haake refused to oppose
a measure supported by Hitler. The Berlin authorities demanded that the
Andernach and Galkhausen institutions be converted into transit centers for
assembling the patients designated for euthanasia. The two facilities were cho-
sen because of their proximity to arteries of transportation: with ready access
to the autobahn and the German rail system, T-4 could more easily transfer
the doomed patients from the transit centers to the killing institutions. Only
the directors of Galkhausen and Andernach were to be initiated into the kill-
ing program; all other staff members were to be kept in the dark.14
When Creutz informed Recktenwald of the operation, Recktenwald alleg-
edly threatened to quit. Creutz pleaded with him to remain in his job and save
as many patients as he could. He then told Recktenwald about Werner Heyde’s
promise that a subsequent exam could be performed in the transit centers, on
the basis of which patients might be exempted from transport. Such exams
would afford an opportunity to save patients who would otherwise be killed.
Creutz’s suasion was effective, in part because he told Recktenwald that Dr.
Kreitsch and another doctor had been designated to perform the subsequent
exams at Andernach. According to the court, after his conversation with Creutz,
Recktenwald spoke with other physicians about his “crisis of conscience.” All
told him he ought to remain in his job and collaborate with Creutz’s sabotage
plan. An attorney friend from Wuppertal explained to him that mere partici-
pation in the operation to oppose it from within did not fulfill the elements of
homicide. These inputs apparently tipped the scales even further in favor of
his participation. He agreed to remain director of Andernach in order to work
at cross-purposes with the euthanasia program.
On March 29, 1941, Recktenwald attended a meeting of the directors of
Rhineland mental hospitals in Grafenberg held by Walter Creutz. At this
meeting Creutz unveiled his plan to mount a concerted sabotage of the eutha-
nasia program. After securing the assent of all the participants to his plan,
Creutz described how they could minimize the number of transportees by con-
sciously bringing as many patients as possible within the exemptions Berlin
had allowed. This could best be accomplished by exploiting the vagueness of
Berlin’s directives in subsequent examinations conducted in both the home
institutions and the transit centers. Creutz urged his listeners to practice chi-
canery as needed in order to save patients’ lives: thus, where appropriate, they
were to characterize the condition of patients injured in accidents as being
combat-related. Throughout his presentation Creutz emphasized the need for
caution, because the Berlin authorities, he warned, would analyze their ex-
emptions and might require Creutz personally to justify them. In the sabotage
plan Creutz outlined, Recktenwald and Kreitsch confronted the most “thank-
less task”: they were to devise some way of exempting patients transferred to
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the Andernach transit center who had been deemed “hopeless” by their home
institutions.15
For intensity of interest in a defendant’s psychological makeup, none of
the postwar trials of euthanasia defendants matched the Koblenz court in the
Recktenwald case. The court was impressed with Recktenwald’s “humanistic
education,” which supposedly inoculated him against the “realistic utilitarian
thinking” of Nazi euthanasia. The court also stressed Recktenwald’s pioneer-
ing work in modern psychiatric therapy. He was the first director of an institu-
tion in the Rhine province to apply “the most modern methods of healing to
‘hopeless’ cases,” including work, insulin, and shock therapy. “It would have
been foreign to his life’s work,” the court maintained, “if he who had dedicated
his life to the mentally ill and observed a strict professional ethos, should now
violate all his sacred principles and his life’s work by killing the very patients
so dear to him.” Recktenwald had never flinched from expressing his critical
attitude toward the euthanasia program, an attitude he shared not only with
his friends and most intimate colleagues, but with T-4 potentates like
Hefelmann, von Hegener, Heyde, and Paul Nitsche. These Nazi worthies were
aware of Recktenwald’s position and complained about it. Heyde and some of
his colleagues met in Düsseldorf to reexamine some of the patients Recktenwald
had exempted from transport.
As for Dr. Kreitsch, the court described him as enjoying the “complete
faith” of Recktenwald. Creutz regarded him as a staunch opponent of euthana-
sia, and for this reason appointed him to conduct the subsequent examina-
tions of patients at Andernach. Based on his known antipathy for the killing
program, Kreitsch was inserted as a monkey wrench to disrupt the smooth
functioning of the operation. His task was to examine the patients earmarked
for killing by the Berlin expert evaluators and to propose to Dr. Recktenwald
possibilities for their exemption. One witness testified that Kreitsch had con-
fided in him his uncompromising rejection of euthanasia, referring to it as a
“disgrace.”16
In the eyes of the court, the heart of the prosecution’s case against
Recktenwald and Kreitsch was their collaboration with the transport of pa-
tients from Andernach to Hadamar in 1941. Between May 9 and July 11,
1941, some 517 patients were sent from their home institutions in the Rhine
province to the transit center at Andernach. After July 11 until the cessation
of euthanasia in August 1941, another 352 transportees arrived there from the
same home institutions. Upon arrival at Andernach, Recktenwald examined
each patient as well as the accompanying medical records. Although he had
been sent the “worst material,” he and Kreitsch subjected the patients to work
therapy treatment, managing in some cases to enable the patient to perform
“productive work,” which Recktenwald then used as a ground for exemption.
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“This intensive treatment of the transferred patients,” the court remarked,
“already violated Berlin’s orders, because Berlin had permitted only a subse-
quent exam in the transit center, not treatment of the patients removed there.”
Of the 517 patients transferred to Andernach before July 11, Recktenwald and
Kreitsch exempted 42 of them from transport to Hadamar. The court was
convinced that several of these exemptions were patent acts of sabotage. It
reconstructed the final lists of the numbers of the disabled later transferred to
Hadamar, arriving at a figure of 447 patients ultimately killed in Hadamar after
transport from Andernach. Because of Hitler’s order in late August 1941 to
stop the killing program, the additional 352 patients transferred to Andernach
after July 11 were spared killing at Hadamar. The court added this figure to the
42 patients exempted by the defendants (including 26 who had died in the
meantime of natural causes) to reach a grand total of 420 patients rescued by
them from the euthanasia program, or 50 percent of the patients originally
earmarked for killing.17
We may question the court’s fuzzy math in arriving at this percentage, but
there is no disputing the court’s admiration for the defendants’ achievement—
especially as compared with other provincial German health systems during
the war. As the Düsseldorf court had done in the Creutz trial, the Koblenz
court cited the example of Professor Gu., the head of the Vienna health sys-
tem, who had refused in 1940 to collaborate in the killing program and was
replaced with a more pliable representative. The result was the extermination
of one-half of Vienna’s disabled patients. One witness, the chief doctor at the
Bethel institution, testified that the staffs of two institutions, Stettin and
Zwiefalten, had refused to complete the T-4 registration forms. Consequently,
teams of SS doctors arrived at the hospitals to perform their own examinations
on the patients, resulting in their near total destruction. Comparison with the
other Rhine province transit center, Galkhausen, also accrued to Recktenwald’s
credit. Of the 542 patients transported to Galkhausen, the medical staff ex-
empted 24 and discharged 2—figures that fall short of Andernach, which had
exempted 37 of the 517 patients and discharged 5. At trial, witnesses—all of
them doctors—declared that to abandon the patients and miss the opportu-
nity to save at least some of them would have been an act of desertion.
In assessing the defendants’ culpability in furthering the criminal aims of
T-4, the court found no evidence that the defendants promoted the killing
program through their actions. They did not select patients for transport to
Andernach; this had been done chiefly by the Berlin commission under Pro-
fessor Paul Nitsche. The subsequent examinations undertaken by the defen-
dants did not facilitate the program, but rather stymied it by exempting some
patients who would have been transported to their deaths but for the exams.
The critical issue, however, was the defendants’ role in transporting patients
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not considered suitable for exemption. These non-exemptions, the court held,
did not promote the euthanasia program, because they involved the most “hope-
less” cases; their exemption would have aroused the suspicion of the Berlin
authorities, who would surely have sent their own commission to Andernach
to examine and transfer the patients to Hadamar. Had Recktenwald exempted
all the patients transported to Andernach, regardless of their condition, he
would have endangered Creutz’s sabotage plan and Berlin would have recog-
nized immediately what Creutz and his fellow saboteurs were doing. Far from
promoting Berlin’s design, Recktenwald made extraordinary contributions to
foil it, especially by applying his modern therapeutic measures to improve the
conditions of some severely ill patients to the point where he could justify
their exemption. This was an important point for the court: Recktenwald
managed to rescue patients whom his co-conspirators in the sabotage plan
“had not dared to retain.” For this reason, Recktenwald and Kreitsch’s role in
the province-wide sabotage plan was “essential” and “decisive.”18
Recktenwald and Kreitsch were finally acquitted on the basis of a collision
of duties. On the one hand, they had the legal duty “to use their medical arts
for the healing of their patients to the best of their ability”; this duty could be
satisfied only “if they participated in the operation and accepted the necessity
of surrendering the unsavable.” On the other hand, they had a legal duty to
abstain from participation in the killing of patients. This second duty, in the
view of the court’s Schwurgericht, was subordinate to the overriding duty to
save patients. To hold the defendants criminally liable for aiding and abetting
murder under these circumstances would violate the “natural sense of justice”
(natürliches Rechtsempfinden). Insofar as the court restricted its rationale for
acquittal to the collision of duties, its decision was defensible. In a strange
obiter dictum, however, the court also justified its acquittal of the defendants
with reference to preserving the “higher legal good”—that is, the lives of the
healthier patients—by sacrificing the lesser good—that is, the lives of the
“hopeless” cases. Such a sacrifice, the court stated, “is not illegal”; it is compa-
rable to the case of a doctor aborting the life of a fetus (the lesser legal good) to
save the life of the mother (the higher good). By injecting this reflection into
its verdict, the court suggested that the value of human lives could be mea-
sured against each other, and one group legally proclaimed superior to the
other. Such a style of thought, as noted in connection with the Creutz trial, is
redolent of the Nazis’ own hierarchy of valuable and less valuable groups of
human life. It suggests that, however subtle or unconscious, the judges shared
an affinity with the Nazi thought world that affected their deliberations on
the defendants’ complicity in murder.
The diametrical interpretations of the factual record in the Andernach
case underscores the power of nonlegal factors to shape and even determine
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the outcomes of trials. Recktenwald and Kreitsch emerged from the Koblenz
courtroom not only assoiled of all wrongdoing, but as moral heroes. That this
interpretation was not the only one deducible from the evidence is demon-
strated by the defendants’ conviction in the first trial. With reference to the
same factual record, the Koblenz court in the first proceeding arrived at a
dramatically different conclusion:
[The defendants] consciously let themselves become engaged in the
murderous undertaking of the euthanasia program. They willingly, if
reluctantly, accepted the role designed for them . . . and by and large
performed it as expected of them. By doing so they made an essential
contribution to the euthanasia program and were links in the chain which
runs from the “Führer Chancellery” and the Reich Ministry of the Interior
down to the gas chamber and the crematorium in Hadamar.19
In the theoretical discourse of Critical Legal Studies, such a dissonance among
interpretations of the same evidentiary record is called “flipability.” The term
is a playful but incisive critique of the indeterminacy of legal “facts” and doc-
trines—an idea that challenges at its root the very idea of value-free adjudica-
tion.20 The “flipability” of legal decisions points to the role of non-formalistic
factors in legal reasoning, such as social, economic, or political considerations
that often function as the de facto motors driving judicial process. The force of
these extra-juridical factors may operate consciously or unconsciously within
the minds of judges, and in different degrees of intensity at various times.
Again, it cannot be stressed enough that the German judges in these cases
were steeped in a cultural milieu thirsting for a break with the recent National
Socialist past, and yearning for a fresh start at a renewed German nationhood.
Leniency and the True Believer: The Eglfing-Haar Case
In the 1947 U.S. Doctors’ Trial, a schoolteacher named Ludwig Lehner
testified about his visit to the Eglfing-Haar mental hospital during the war. In
the course of his visit, the institution’s director, Dr. Hermann Pfannmüller,
escorted him to the children’s ward. Along the way, Pfannmüller’s language
was peppered with references to “life unworthy of life.” Arriving in the ward,
he pulled a child out of his bed and showed him to the onlookers. “While he
exhibited the child like a dead rabbit,” Lehner testified, “he stated with the air
of an expert and a cynical grin: ‘With this one it will only be two or three more
days.’ The image of the fat grinning man, in his pudgy hand the whimpering
skeleton, surrounded by the other starving children, I can never forget.”21
In March 1951 it was Pfannmüller’s turn to stand before the bar of justice,
charged with murder for his role in transporting patients to killing centers and
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for the deaths of children in the Eglfing-Haar children’s ward. At the time of
his trial, Pfannmüller was in his mid-sixties, and thus belonged to the cohort
of Nazi doctors subjected to the traumas and privations of World War I. Un-
like most of the doctors we have considered, who typically joined the Nazi
Party after 1933 for career-related reasons, he was an “old fighter” (alter Kämpfer)
who had joined the party in the early 1920s. His reputation as a devoted Nazi
and medical expert earned him appointment to the Office for Technology, in
which he was tasked with medically examining the “talented” children of sol-
diers killed in action in order to determine whether they were genetically
“worthy” of preferential investment by the office. The Nazi Party recognized
his skills by using him as an expert lecturer in public meetings. The aim of his
lectures was to “instruct” the German population on the contents of the re-
cently promulgated Hereditary Health Law from the perspective of “racial-
political” and “hereditary-medical” concerns.22
At trial Pfannmüller told the court he had become involved in the eutha-
nasia question after the death of his father. The elder Pfannmüller suffered
from a chronic kidney disorder that caused him terrible pain until he received
a lethal injection from his attending physician. This experience was seared
into the junior Pfannmüller’s mind, as were his experiences during the Great
War as a doctor in the psychiatric hospital in Homburg, where he witnessed
the deaths of patients “like flies” from malnutrition “under the most horrify-
ing conditions.” According to Pfannmüller, the highest mortality rate affected
the “working patients,” while the incurable non-working patients, the “hu-
man corpses,” survived. After the war, still affected by his experiences, he
delved into the literature on euthanasia, especially the work of Alfred Hoche
and Karl Binding. This work left a lasting impression on Pfannmüller’s thought.
He even had occasion to meet Hoche during a congress in Freiburg in 1922.
In this fashion, as related in his own words, he became a firm adherent of
euthanasia.
The Bavarian government appointed Pfannmüller director of the mental
institution of Eglfing-Haar in 1938, a position he held until the end of the
war. In November 1939 he submitted a report to the public insurance examin-
ing board regarding the maintenance of “life unworthy of life” in state hospi-
tals. He voiced his opinion on the need to “eradicate” such patients with
lapidary clarity:
As a confessionally unattached and fervent National Socialist director of
a mental hospital, I feel myself obligated to demonstrate an actual
conservation measure that is suitable to influence favorably the economic
standing of the institutions. In this position, I believe it appropriate to
refer clearly to the need for us doctors to grasp the importance of eradicat-
ing life unworthy of life. Those unfortunate patients who live only a
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shadow life of a normal human being, who have become perfectly useless
for social membership in the human community by virtue of their illness,
whose existence is to themselves, their relatives, and their surroundings a
torment and a burden, must be subjected to rigorous eradication.
Pfannmüller continued:
Precisely these days, in which the heaviest sacrifice of blood and life is
demanded of our most valuable men, teach us emphatically that it should
not be possible on economic grounds to fill institutions with living
corpses for the sake of a high principle of medical care that is no longer
relevant. For me it is unimaginable that the best, blooming youth die at
the front while incorrigible asocials and irresponsible antisocials have a
secure existence in our institutions.
The “high principle of medical care” Pfannmüller referred to is the physician’s
devotion to the well-being of the patient, as enjoined by the Hippocratic oath.
Sometime in summer 1940 he attended a meeting in Berlin to discuss the
overcrowding in German mental institutions and ways to provide health care
to patients amenable to treatment. In attendance were Philipp Bouhler, Reich
Health Leader Leonardo Conti, Viktor Brack, Karl Brandt, and Herbert Lin-
den. At this meeting, according to Pfannmüller, Bouhler revealed that all
institutionalized patients were to be medically evaluated in order to separate
the incurable patients from those responsive to treatment. The incurables
would ultimately be accommodated in facilities specially equipped for their
care. For this purpose, registration forms would be distributed to all institu-
tions, which were to be filled out and returned to the Reich Cooperative for
State Hospitals and Nursing Homes in Berlin. Here, expert commissions would
review the forms to determine whether the patient should be transported to
the special facility.
At Eglfing-Haar, Pfannmüller distributed the forms to his staff doctors
and explained to them the guidelines for filling them out. He also swore them
to the strictest secrecy. After his doctors had completed the forms and re-
turned them to Pfannmüller, he examined the patients himself to guarantee
the accuracy of the report. He then sent the forms with his signature to Ber-
lin. In September 1940 Berlin notified him that a certain number of incurable
patients were to be transported on orders of the Reich Defense Commissar. He
was to prepare the patients whose names appeared on the transport list for a
trip lasting several hours. Gekrat in Berlin would contact him with dates for
picking up these patients. The court could not determine whether Pfannmüller
knew of the true purpose behind the first transport, the patients of which were
murdered almost without exception. It was proven, however, that after the
first transport had left, Bouhler visited him at Eglfing-Haar and showed him
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Hitler’s decree of September 1, 1939, explaining that the selected patients
were to receive a “mercy death.” Despite Bouhler’s disclosure, Pfannmüller
continued to prepare his patients for transfer to the killing centers at Grafeneck
and Hartheim. Nearly all were killed. The last transport before the cessation
of the official killing program in August left Eglfing-Haar in June 1941.23
According to the court, Pfannmüller was aware that at least 918 of the
patients who left Eglfing-Haar were being transported to their deaths. Exact
figures regarding how many of these transportees were actually killed were
unavailable, because Pfannmüller incinerated the institution’s records before
the arrival of U.S. troops.
In addition to his complicity in sending patients to the killing centers,
Pfannmüller was charged with collaborating in the destruction of handicapped
children. In October 1941 he installed a children’s ward at Eglfing-Haar to
receive the Reich Committee children, that is, children designated for killing
by T-4’s Reich Committee for the Scientific Registration of Severe Hereditary
Ailments. The determination was made by three T-4 evaluators, who con-
veyed their assessment to the child’s home institution. The designated chil-
dren were either killed on the spot or transferred to a children’s ward designed,
like Pfannmüller’s, for the express purpose of killing them. The ward at Eglfing-
Haar accommodated on average between fifty and sixty children. When the
“treatment authorization” arrived from Berlin, Pfannmüller examined the af-
fected children; if he was satisfied that the child was incurable, and thus a
specimen of “life unworthy of life,” he authorized his staff doctor to euthanize
the child. From October 1941 until late April 1945 at least 120 children,
ranging in ages from a few months to sixteen years, were killed with overdoses
of luminal (usually sprinkled in their food) or with injections of morphine and
scopolamine. Death typically occurred within three days, although some pa-
tients suffered longer death throes, dying of acute pneumonia after three weeks.
The advantage of these forms of killing, by Pfannmüller’s own admission, re-
sided in their close resemblance to natural causes of death—a charade impor-
tant to the success of the operation, because it hoodwinked parents who vis-
ited their children on a regular basis.
Around the time that the “special treatment” was administered, the par-
ents or relatives were notified that their child was incurably ill. A short time
later, a letter arrived informing them their child had died and the burial al-
ready concluded. In no cases were bodies returned to the next of kin. The
letters often cited pneumonia or tuberculosis as causes of death. On Pfannmüller’s
orders the corpses of the dead children were dissected and their brains sent to
a research center in Berlin, where they were processed into cross sections. In
at least two cases involving severely deformed children, Pfannmüller himself
gave the lethal injections.
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Pfannmüller’s defense insisted that euthanasia was justifiable on ethical
and moral grounds. Euthanasia might be debated and discussed, as it had been
for centuries, but attaching criminal liability to its practitioners was inadmis-
sible. As he had at the U.S. Doctors’ Trial, he struck the pose of a humanitar-
ian committed to the welfare of his patients. Although the Munich state court
refused to accept these arguments as a basis for acquittal, it treated Pfannmüller
with kid gloves he hardly deserved. First, in the face of evidence that showed
Pfannmüller’s calloused attitude toward the mentally disabled, the court char-
acterized him as an accomplice, not a perpetrator, because he “by no means
had the animus auctoris [intent to act for one’s own purposes],” and “stood
outside the actual circle of those who drove forward these mass killings of
mental patients.”* Second, Pfannmüller could be convicted only of aiding and
abetting manslaughter, not murder, because he was unaware “of those circum-
stances of the crime which made the killing of the transported patients either
malicious or cruel” as required by the German law of murder. Acknowledging
that the overarching euthanasia program was a “malicious and cruel proce-
dure,” the court refused to characterize Pfannmüller’s role in it with the same
language. The court conceded that he had been aware the patients and their
relatives were being deceived about the goals of the transports, but held it was
unproven that he had been personally aware of “the methods of selection, the
fundamentals according to which the selections were made, and the entire
tactics of deception outside his own institution.” Apparently, in the eyes of
this court, such knowledge was essential to finding him guilty of aiding and
abetting murder for organizing transports of his own patients to their deaths.
All that could be proven was that he aided and abetted a form of killing that
fell short of legal murder—namely, manslaughter (Totschlag). Third, the court
inexplicably denied that the destruction of disabled children in the Eglfing-
Haar ward amounted to murder, because none of the conditions for murder
specified by section 211 were present: the killings were not base, malicious, or
cruel. In fact, the court accepted Pfannmüller’s self-portrayal as an advocate of
euthanasia for “humane” motives.24
Finally, the Munich state court paid Pfannmüller the courtesy of denying
any wrongdoing for his role in starving patients to death through a premedi-
tated system of reduced food rations. Because of dislocations caused by the war,
the Bavarian Interior Ministry published an order on November 30, 1942,
instructing the directors of Bavarian mental hospitals to provide a “special
* The court’s view of Pfannmüller stands in stark contrast with Viktor Brack’s testi-
mony at the Doctors’ Trial, where Brack identified Pfannmüller as an important cog
in the euthanasia machine.
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ration” (Sonderkost) for their non-working patients. This special ration was to
be stripped of fat and meat, and consisted of little more than boiled vegetables
and water. The court timidly referred to the special ration as a means of trans-
ferring essential nutriment from non-working to working patients. In fact, at
the conference of directors that preceded publication of the November decree,
Dr. Valentin Faltlhauser, director of the Kaufbeuren mental hospital, declared
that after cancellation of the formal euthanasia program in August 1941, elimi-
nating patients could now be done by gradually starving them to death. The
Sonderkost was Faltlhauser’s brainchild, and he left no question that it was
intended to cause the patient’s death within three months.25 Not surprisingly,
Pfannmüller offered a more benign interpretation of the special ration: it was
designed only to guarantee the working patients an extra portion to compen-
sate for their higher expenditure of calories, not to cause the deaths of non-
working patients through starvation. He claimed that he had personally instructed
his chief cook to supplement the Sonderkost with meat and fat, and that he had
even sampled it on several occasions. The court accepted Pfannmüller’s ac-
count without demur, calling the Sonderkost “meager fare,” but denying that it
caused malnourishment, because the addition of fat in the preparation fur-
nished the necessary amount of protein. Because Pfannmüller’s aim with the
Sonderkost was not to starve bedridden patients, the court acquitted him of all
deaths associated with it.
Notwithstanding his documented collaboration in the murders of patients,
the Munich court convicted Pfannmüller of aiding and abetting manslaughter.
In considering his punishment, the court reprised Pfannmüller’s self-portrait
as a humanitarian—and did so in the cadences of social Darwinism: “On the
basis of his experiences within his own family and during his time as a doctor
in mental hospitals in the First World War, he became convinced that the
killing of incurable patients was a deliverance for them. It was a measure tanta-
mount to a natural selection process” (emphasis added). Moreover, the court con-
sidered it a factor in mitigation that Pfannmüller, like all Germans under
Nazism, was no doubt influenced through war propaganda to assign a reduced
moral value to human life, thus transmuting the act of killing into something
trivial. In view of these mitigating factors, as well as his grave illness and
advanced age, he was sentenced to a five-year prison term. This sentence was
further whittled down to two years after crediting him with time already served.
The Pfannmüller case, although not acquitting its defendant outright, was
nonetheless a travesty of justice in the postwar era. The case indicated the
German judiciary’s willingness not only to treat egregious offenders as accom-
plices (a trend emerging already in the late 1940s), but to deny altogether that
their actions were murder under German criminal law. The novelty of the
Pfannmüller case, as German expert on Nazi criminality Willi Dressen has
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asserted, is its denial of the element of “malice” (Heimtücke)* in its assessment
of euthanasia killing. As we have seen in our analysis of the German cases,
courts rarely found that defendants acted out of “base motives.” In most of the
trials we have examined, however, German courts upheld the existence of
malice in order to find defendants guilty of aiding and abetting murder. The
Pfannmüller case changed the complexion of this assessment. In the ensuing
years covered by our study, no euthanasia doctors would be convicted by West
German courts of murder. Pfannmüller’s trial was a decisive step down this
path toward leniency and acquittal.
THE TURN OF THE SCREW: THE “EXERTION OF CONSCIENCE” CASES
On March 18, 1952, the West German Supreme Court issued a verdict des-
tined to have a profound impact on the adjudication of euthanasia trials there-
after. The High Court held that a defendant could be punished for a criminal
act only if he or she was capable of conforming to the law’s requirements.
When perpetrators, after maximum exertions of their understanding, could
not reconcile the demands of the law with their own conscience, no criminal
liability attached if they chose to follow their conscience in violation of the
law—so long as they acted “conscientiously.”26
The Supreme Court’s holding would offer regional courts fresh opportuni-
ties to acquit euthanasia defendants in the years after 1952. A trio of cases de-
cided in December 1953 premised their acquittals on this “exertion of conscience”
doctrine. An analysis of the opinions reveals that, as in the extrastatutory
necessity/collision of duties cases, the outcomes of these trials were condi-
tioned less by the neutral application of legal theory to the facts than by the
court’s preexisting will to acquit.
The Conscientious Childkiller: The Sachsenberg Case
Among the first cases to acquit a euthanasia defendant on the basis of an
“exertion of conscience” defense was that of Dr. Alfred Leu, a physician at the
Sachsenberg psychiatric hospital near Schwerin (in the province of Mecklen-
burg) where he had worked from 1929 until April 1945. In his first trial in
October 1951, Leu was charged with complicity in the murders of adults and
* Malice under German law means that a defendant has killed or collaborated in
killing in a manner that exploits the vulnerability of the victim. Secretly lacing a
victim’s food with poison, for example, qualified as a “malicious” killing in the
earlier cases.
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children at the Sachsenberg institution. His defense was the classic sabotage
argument: he collaborated in the killings only in order to minimize the dam-
age and save as many people as possible. Had he resigned his post, a more
zealous doctor would have replaced him, resulting in the deaths of still more
patients. The state court of Cologne accepted this argument, holding that it
would be a miscarriage of justice to convict a defendant ensnared like Leu in a
“tragic predicament.” Leu was acquitted and his case appealed to the German
Supreme Court, which reversed and remanded it for retrial.
In its findings of fact on retrial, the Cologne state court found that Leu
filled out the first shipments of registration forms without knowledge of their
purpose. Not until late 1940 or early 1941 did he learn of the euthanasia
program. With the discovery, he realized that open refusal to complete the
forms would invite a visit from a commission of SS doctors whose ideological
zeal would ensure that two-thirds or more of his patients would be registered
for the killing program. He resolved to continue filling out the forms in order
to accentuate, where possible, his patients’ capacity for work. In this way, he
could bend and distort his reports to save patients who otherwise would fall
prey to the assessments of an SS physician. He felt obligated by his “medical
conscience” to contribute to the destruction of hopeless terminal cases so as to
save patients still amenable to therapy. This was the strategy Leu followed
henceforth, the court found. On one occasion in early 1941, Leu added the
names of three newly arrived patients to a transport list. They, along with a
collection of patients from Leu’s nursing station, were taken to the killing
center at Bernburg and gassed.27
In summer 1941 the military confiscated the Lewenberg mental institu-
tion for use as a military reserve hospital. Lewenberg was the site of a children’s
ward designed to euthanize handicapped youngsters. With the conversion of
Lewenberg into a military hospital, the 280 patients of its children’s ward were
sent to Sachsenberg, where they were accommodated in Leu’s empty nursing
station. (His station had been depopulated by the transports to Bernburg.)
Sachsenberg’s director, Dr. Fischer, appointed Leu head of the new children’s
ward and reported the appointment to the Reich Ministry of the Interior. In
September 1941 the Reich Chancellery summoned Leu to a meeting in Berlin
with the directors of the Reich Committee, Drs. Hefelmann and von Hegener.
During this meeting the committee’s directors told Leu that the new ward in
Sachsenberg under his supervision would undertake the destruction of dis-
abled children. Leu claimed at trial that he declined his participation in the
planned measures, a refusal that Hefelmann and von Hegener accepted. This
notwithstanding, a few weeks later “treatment authorizations” arrived at
Sachsenberg from the Reich Committee, identifying 180 patients in Leu’s
children’s ward for euthanasia. The Reich Committee’s chief medical experts
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had chosen these patients based on forms submitted to them by the former
head of the ward at Lewenberg.
In a subsequent meeting with Hefelmann and von Hegener, Leu was told
he could exempt 5 percent of the children from transport without any further
justification. They also permitted him to withhold other children from trans-
fer, so long as he could support the exemption in writing to the Reich Com-
mittee in accordance with the applicable guidelines (i.e., the educability of the
exempted child). Returning to Schwerin, Leu decided to assume responsibility
for the killing program in the ward. Leu claimed he knew the killing program
was wrong, even if it was sanctioned by a valid law; on the other hand, coop-
erating with it was the only way to rescue some of the children from death.
The court sketched Leu’s dilemma as a prototypical collision of duties: “The
defendant stood before a choice: either to distance himself from the killing
and refuse the order given by Berlin, thereby abandoning two-thirds of his
department to destruction; or to carry out the extermination orders, thereby
participating in the deaths of some children in order to rescue a considerable
number of other patients who would otherwise be killed.” Leu felt compelled
by his conscience to “sabotage the goals of the Reich Committee and the
euthanasia program it sponsored.” He thus believed it was his duty to collude
in the destruction of a “limited” number of patients to save others.28
Having made his decision, Leu spoke with the Sachsenberg director, Dr.
Fischer, about detailing experienced nurses to the operation. Leu chose the
four nurses himself, whom he initiated into the plan to kill “incurable” chil-
dren on orders from Berlin. The children would be dispatched with excessive
dosages of veronal and luminal. Afterward, he swore each of the nurses to
silence about the program. When the first lists of patients arrived from Berlin,
they contained the names of 180 children. The court found that Leu exceeded
the Reich Committee’s guidelines in exempting 110 children from euthanasia.
The remaining 70, described by one witness as being in a “horrible” physical
state, were killed in the ward.
In the striking incongruity between the adverse evidence of criminal wrong-
doing and the final verdict of acquittal, the Leu case may be unique among
German euthanasia trials. Statements by Leu in support of the euthanasia
program were abundantly documented. Several witnesses testified that Leu
had professed to them his unwavering commitment to euthanasia. Other wit-
nesses stepped forward to incriminate Leu, claiming that they personally wit-
nessed unaccountable deaths in the departments under his supervision. These
witnesses attested to their beliefs at the time that Leu had caused the patients’
deaths through overdoses of narcotics. Their belief rested on the observed fact
that patients who seemed perfectly healthy were dead only days later. A staff
doctor at Sachsenberg, a Dr. Br., described events in Leu’s stations that con-
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vinced him the defendant was murdering his patients with overdoses. Dr. Br.
had been so upset by these occurrences that he spoke of the Sachsenberg facil-
ity as a “murder institution.” He believed Leu continued to kill adult patients
after the children’s operation had been set in motion. Another witness claimed
Leu had killed between 200 and 300 adults at Sachsenberg with overdoses of
veronal—a charge the witness had leveled against Leu sometime in 1941. Leu
had denied the charge at the time but characterized euthanasia of incurable
patients as a “welcome measure.” During their meeting with the Berlin au-
thorities, Leu denounced this witness and Dr. Br. to the Reich Committee.
Hefelmann and von Hegener responded by praising Leu as a “great guy” who
“acted entirely in accordance with the wishes of the Reich Committee.”
Leu’s defense against these allegations during his trial was predictable: he
had projected the appearance of being an adherent of euthanasia in order to
avoid suspicion. Had he gone public with his inward opposition to it, his
reports to the Reich Committee would have been analyzed with a fine-tooth
comb, thus jeopardizing his sabotage scheme. To the charges that adult pa-
tients were killed with overdoses of narcotics, Leu countered that the wit-
nesses had misinterpreted their brief glimpse of patients in a drug-induced
deep sleep, mistaking them for patients on the verge of death. Leu denied
authorizing the killing of adults with excessive dosages of veronal or luminal.
The narcotics he administered were all in the medically prescribed doses to
alleviate chronic motor restlessness. Finding the witness testimony credible,
the lay assessors nonetheless refused to accept it. According to the assessors,
the witnesses were not in a position to observe and report accurately on occur-
rences in Leu’s station. They knew nothing about the patients’ medical histo-
ries or the narcotics prescribed for them; they made no inquiries of the nursing
staff nor ascertained the actual cause of death through autopsy. Fatal to the
acceptance of their testimony was the witnesses’ inability to cite a single veri-
fiable case in which drug overdoses caused by Leu resulted in a patient’s death.
To the witnesses’ adamant claim that healthy patients who entered Leu’s sta-
tion were seen shortly thereafter in a coma-like state followed by reports of
their deaths, the court replied that they may not have seen what they thought
they saw. The patients’ conditions might have been caused by liberal doses of
narcotics given to suppress their violently restless motor activity, as Leu had
claimed. Their subsequent deaths may have ensued as a result of prolonged
sleep that weakened the patients through inactivity and malnutrition, making
them more susceptible to illness. The court accepted this improbable scenario
as “unrefuted” against Leu.29
Acquitting Leu of the charge of killing adults at Sachsenberg, the court
next turned to the children’s ward killings. Here, the court appeared to accept
Leu’s representation of sabotage in toto. Leu, the court held, had participated
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in euthanasia only to save as many patients as possible. He could not, how-
ever, have carried off the deception unless he conveyed the impression of be-
ing an ardent supporter of euthanasia. This could be accomplished only by
characterizing some of the children in the forms as incurable and incapable of
work. Although this effectively sealed the fates of these children, any other
characterization would have excited Berlin’s attention, and his sabotage plan
would have been betrayed. He would then have been dismissed from his posi-
tion and a more ideologically committed doctor appointed to succeed him. He
sacrificed children “who were, from a psychological standpoint, completely
below the zero line” in order to rescue other patients. Despite numerous wit-
nesses who testified that Leu was a true believer in loyal service to the killing
program, the court accepted Leu’s claim that he had to transmit this impres-
sion to everyone around him lest his opposition plan be foiled. A lack of
collegial solidarity in Sachsenberg, moreover, may have deterred Leu from sharing
his mind with his colleagues. In sum, the court endorsed Leu’s defense that his
“actual inner attitude” toward euthanasia was critical and oppositional, not
supportive.
With respect to the undisputed killings in the children’s ward, the court
refused to consider them base or malicious. Respected scholars like Binding and
Hoche had debated for decades the permissibility of “delivering from their vegeta-
tive existence” severely ill patients. Leu was aware of this debate, and his ideas
about euthanasia reflected the academically serious—and non-reprehensible—
thoughts of sober men. He was also familiar with the results of the Melzer
survey conducted in the early 1920s, indicating that many parents advocated
the “mercy killing” of their severely handicapped children on humanitarian
grounds. Leu’s attitude toward the deaths of these incurable patients was thus
not “base” as defined under the German law of murder. Neither was it mali-
cious, because Leu did not exploit the victims’ vulnerability in a reprehensible
manner. Because Leu’s involvement in the killings did not constitute murder,
the only charge he faced was the lesser included offense of manslaughter.30
At this point in its verdict, the court could have simply acquitted Leu on
the basis of a collision of duties. It had already set forth, albeit implausibly, a
fact pattern that led to such an interpretation. Instead, the court introduced a
new exculpatory rationale into euthanasia adjudication—the “exertion of con-
science” defense. The court began by citing the “landmark” decision of the
German Supreme Court from March 1952, in which the High Court held a
criminal action punishable only if the defendant was able to conform to the
demands of the law. At the same time, the defendant had the duty to “exert
his conscience” in a degree commensurate with his life experience and profes-
sional training in determining whether a contemplated action was legal. Con-
versely, if an actor faced with a conflict between the demands of the law and
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the demands of his conscience chose to follow his conscience, then he could
not be held criminally liable. His immunity to criminal guilt, however, as-
sumed that “he has exerted the intellectual and moral powers of his conscience
in order to recognize what is right or wrong, and acts in accordance with this
insight.” This exertion of conscience defense became the crux of Leu’s acquit-
tal. The law required Leu to refrain from killing; yet, his conscience com-
manded him to participate outwardly in it for the purpose of rescuing patients.
Leu had “exerted his conscience” to its utmost extent and felt that he had to
follow its insistent voice. On this ground, Leu was exonerated of all criminal
charges related to the deaths of children in the Sachsenberg ward.31
From both a legal and a moral perspective, the Leu verdict may be the
most extraordinary of the postwar euthanasia trials. In contrast with some of
the other defendants acquitted after 1947 (such as Creutz and Recktenwald),
Leu had not only transferred patients to their deaths in the killing centers but
had organized and administered euthanasia with his own hands. Yet, the Leu
decision provided West German courts with yet another rationale for acquit-
ting medical killers.
Doing Away With the Monsters: The Uchtspringe Case
At roughly the same time as the Cologne court freed Alfred Leu, the state
court of Göttingen applied a similar rationale to the cases of two doctors im-
plicated in euthanasia killings, Gerhard Wenzel and Hildegard Wesse. Wenzel
was accused of either personally administering or authorizing nursing staff to
poison 130 children during his tenure from June 1941 to August 1943 as direc-
tor of the children’s ward at the Uchtspringe mental hospital (near Magdeburg).
His codefendant was his successor in the directorship of the children’s ward,
Dr. Hildegard Wesse (wife of the ill-starred T-4 doctor Hermann Wesse), charged
like Wenzel with killing approximately sixty disabled children with overdoses
of morphine, but also with giving lethal injections to thirty female patients.
In May 1941, Wenzel was serving as head doctor on a Luftwaffe field air
base in France, when he was summoned to the KdF in Berlin. On arrival he
was received by Hefelmann, von Hegener, and the director of the Uchtspringe
mental hospital, a Dr. B. During their discussion, Wenzel was asked about his
attitude toward the euthanasia of “fully idiotic children.” He replied that these
“life forms” were an “onerous psychological burden” for their doctors, nursing
personnel, and their families. As a doctor at Uchtspringe, Wenzel was often
approached by parents requesting that he “deliver” their children from suffer-
ing. Based on these experiences, he considered euthanasia an ethically defensible
solution to incurable suffering, provided that it was regulated by a legal proce-
dure. Hefelmann replied that a legal basis for euthanasia had been established,
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at which point he read the Hitler order and the draft of a euthanasia law to
Wenzel. For “war-related reasons” the law was unpublished, although, Hefelmann
assured him, it was known within the state service. Hefelmann outlined the
work of the Reich Committee, then informed Wenzel he was being declared
“indispensable” and reassigned to the children’s ward in Uchtspringe. As the
ward’s director, he would receive transports of mentally handicapped children
whom he was to observe and later report on to the Reich Committee. The
report would summarize the patient’s condition with special attention to their
responsiveness to treatment. The incurable children were to be killed, and
doubtful cases would be reserved for further observation or discharged. Wenzel
accepted the job offered him and returned to his unit in France.32
A few weeks later, he reported to Uchtspringe’s children’s ward, which
housed between 350 and 400 children in four separate buildings. He remained
there (with one interruption in his service) until August 1943, when he ten-
dered his resignation. During his time as director of the ward, the court esti-
mated he had prepared 1,000 to 2,000 reports, characterizing eighty children
as incurable. The euphemistically worded “authorizations for treatment” ar-
rived from Berlin for these children. Wenzel understood the word “treatment”
in the Berlin authorizations to mean “killing.” He passed on the authorization
to the station nurse, who gave the children overdoses of luminal in their soup
or milk in accordance with Wenzel’s instructions. These overdoses caused the
patients’ death within a few hours. Sometimes Wenzel ordered the ward nurse
to inject the children with morphine; on occasion he injected them himself.
He concocted false causes of death in the notices sent to the children’s par-
ents, partly because euthanasia was top-secret, partly to spare their feelings.
Wenzel’s defense at trial was that he had believed at the time in the ethi-
cal permissibility of euthanasia. Eminent cognoscenti had discussed it for de-
cades, and it had won not a few respected proponents. He had accepted the
expertise of the Reich Committee, the leaders of which were represented to
him as the leading experts in the field. Procedurally, every safeguard against
abuse had been observed. His involvement in killing was purely scientific and
humane. For these reasons, he argued, he should be acquitted on the basis of a
mistake of law (Verbotsirrtum).
Previous euthanasia defendants had, of course, raised similar arguments.
Typically, however, West German courts until the Uchtspringe trial had re-
jected this defense, claiming that no matter how much support for euthanasia
was marshaled by the Nazi authorities, a reasonable person could plainly see
that the mass murder of defenseless patients violated the “natural moral law,”
which was superior to the positive law of the Third Reich. Because natural law
was accessible to all rational beings, all were bound by its prescriptions and
prohibitions, no matter what the law of a particular government commanded.
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The Göttingen state court did not deny the existence or obligatory quality of
the natural law; instead, it adopted a highly subjective analysis of the actor’s
ability to discern whether his conduct violated the law or not. An actor’s duty
to “exert his conscience” hinged on “the circumstances of the case and the life
and professional background of the individual.” This meant that the actor had
to “mobilize all his intellectual powers of recognition and all his conceptions
of value . . . to develop a judgment about the legality or illegality of a certain
action. If, notwithstanding [such exertion], he is unable to perceive the ille-
gality of his action, his error is unavoidable, and he cannot be held criminally
liable for it.”33
The court found that Wenzel fell into this category of actors whose exer-
tions of conscience were incapable of grasping the wrongfulness of their ac-
tions. During his meeting in Berlin with Hefelmann and von Hegener, it was
explained to him that a euthanasia law existed and was known throughout the
civil service, although it remained unpublished. The court accepted his claim
that he had trusted in the representations by the leading men of the KdF.
These considerations were the prelude to an extraordinary disquisition by the
court on “life unworthy of life,” the destruction of which, the court noted,
could not be regarded “a priori” as “immoral.” In the pre-Christian era, au-
thorities as various as Plato and Seneca had expressed support for destroying
“monsters” (Monstra). Under the influence of the Catholic Church, which
branded euthanasia a hubristic intervention in affairs better left to God, the
destruction of unworthy life entered a period of eclipse. Nevertheless, there
was evidence of its resurgence in the late medieval era in Thomas More’s Uto-
pia (1516), which “discusses the putting to sleep of incurable patients . . . in a
way that reveals the social thought [of the time].” In his Table Talks, Martin
Luther had advocated drowning a twelve-year-old child believed to be a change-
ling, because it was legal to kill a mere “piece of flesh” that had “no inner soul.”
The court admitted that German law in the modern period had criminalized
such killing, but added that “permitting [it] is not entirely strange to [German
law].” The court cited nineteenth-century authorities like the Pandects and
the Prussian General State Law, which had given special dispensation for “do-
ing away with the monsters.” Even the Braunschweig Penal Code of 1840 had
punished a mother convicted of killing her baby “lacking human form” with
only a minor fine and a jail term of six weeks.
The court cited Binding and Hoche to show how earnestly the subject had
been taken up in the interwar years. It quoted from The Permission to Destroy
Life Unworthy of Life that “it can be forbidden from neither a legal, social,
ethical, nor a religious viewpoint to destroy these individuals, who form the
horrid counterpicture of authentic humanity, and who in almost every case
arouse the horror of those they meet.” On the contrary, “it strains the concept
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of humanity to want to preserve life unworthy of life unconditionally.” Ac-
cording to the court, these ideas were endorsed by many other authorities,
including German, Swiss, and Danish politicians during the 1920s, as well as
theologians like Dr. Thrändorf, who chided a culture that would “let capable
people go to rack and ruin in favor of incapable members of the society, for
whom new palaces were built and who lived a carefree life at the expense of the
healthy taxpayer.” The opinions of learned jurists, doctors, politicians, and
theologians confirmed the intuitive feelings of the German people. The
Göttingen court referred to the high percentage (73 percent) of parental sup-
port for covert euthanasia expressed in the 1920 Melzer survey. One father
quoted by the court wrote: “Certainly there are many who deplore the barbar-
ity and heartlessness [of euthanasia], but that is of course the outpouring of a
false humanity; the outsider cannot in such cases pass judgment.” For the
court, the overwhelming support for euthanasia “cannot simply be shrugged off.”
These ruminations led the court to conclude that euthanasia “cannot be
called . . . a measure that contradicts the general moral law, or the fundamen-
tal ideas of justice and humanity.” Wenzel was aware that “leading minds” had
approved the “release” of “life unworthy of life.” In view of this broad, centu-
ries-old support for the idea among distinguished thinkers and the public at
large, how could Wenzel be charged with knowingly violating the natural law
when he put these ideas into practice? Nor could Wenzel have “exerted his
conscience” sufficiently to grasp the illegality of the Reich Committee’s pro-
gram: it had all the outward indicia of “orderliness,” including panels of expert
evaluators who enjoyed reputations for working “carefully and conscientiously.”
Although the procedures may not have conformed perfectly to those prescribed
by Binding and Hoche, Wenzel could not be charged with knowledge of these
minor deviations. Insofar as Wenzel’s experience with the bureaucratic guide-
lines that structured euthanasia was concerned, “the procedure offered . . .
security against abuses and gross errors.” Because Wenzel “could not have ar-
rived at a different result by a more conscientious examination [of the mat-
ter],” he had to be acquitted of the killings in the Uchtspringe children’s ward.34
Wenzel’s replacement as director of the children’s ward, Dr. Hildegard Wesse,
came to Uchtspringe from the University Clinic for Children in Leipzig. Prior
to this appointment, she had been the director of the men’s department in the
Waldniel institution. In August 1943 she arrived at Uchtspringe as Wenzel’s
successor. She did not immediately assume the directorship of the children’s
ward, however; this position was held by her husband, Hermann Wesse, until
he was inducted into the German army in December 1943. At this time, and
with alleged reluctance, she became director of the children’s ward, a position
she held until July 1945. She had first become aware of the euthanasia pro-
gram during her work at the Waldniel institution, when her husband became
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director of the Waldniel children’s ward in October 1942. Around this same
time, on orders from the Reich Committee, he had introduced the euthanasia
of “fully idiotic” children into the ward. At trial she claimed her husband only
acquainted her with his work in broad strokes, because he wanted to spare her,
as a woman, so grave a “psychological burden.” A lesser gentleman, Dr. Werner
Catel (a member of the planning committee for the children’s euthanasia and
one of its three expert evaluators), provided her with more detailed informa-
tion during her stint at the Leipzig Clinic. He told her that three experts had
been charged with overseeing the program. He reassured her that only “full
idiots” were being targeted, and that killing could go forward only when all
three experts had agreed the case was hopeless.
When she was appointed to replace her husband in the children’s ward,
Hildegard Wesse claimed she had misgivings—not because she disapproved of
euthanasia, which she affirmed in theory, but because she did not know if she
was equal to the task of carrying it out herself. She eventually accepted the
appointment, however, and thereafter carried out the same type of killing that
Wenzel had done before her. From January 1944 to January 1945 she prepared
400 to 500 reports on the ward’s children for review by the Reich Committee.
Like Wenzel, she offered her prognosis on the children, characterizing them
either as incurable or as capable of improvement. Because the Berlin authori-
ties generally followed her recommendations, she assumed the committee’s
experts were carefully examining each case she submitted. When Berlin sent
“treatment authorizations” to her for sixty children, she instructed the floor
nurse to give the children doses of luminal or trional tablets in their food. The
children lost consciousness and died after a couple of days. For hardier chil-
dren she ordered morphine injections, which were administered by the nurse
or Wesse herself. After their deaths, Wesse sent notices to the children’s fami-
lies listing fabricated causes of death. She had no compunction about this
deception, because she felt it was “right” to spare their feelings.35
Wesse, like her predecessor Wenzel, was acquitted of wrongdoing in con-
nection with the killings in the Uchtspringe children’s ward. The rationale for
acquittal of the charge was the same in both cases: like Wenzel, Wesse could
not have exerted her conscience any further to understand the wrongfulness of
her actions. She reasonably assumed the procedure was “well-organized and
reliable from an ethical-medical standpoint.” The cautious attitudes exhibited
by the experts in the Reich Committee reassured her that the program was
being administered conscientiously and with scientific precision. She had, in
short, no good reason to doubt the ethical or legal timbre of the killing proce-
dure. According to the court’s interpretation, it was ethically and legally defen-
sible for a lower-level functionary to accept a “conscientious” and “scientifically
precise” procedure ordered by the top of the institutional chain.
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If Wesse’s activities had been restricted to the children’s ward, she would
have walked out of the Göttingen courtroom a free woman. Her murderous
work at Waldniel, however, also involved thirty disabled women, and for these
killings the court refused to accept a mistake of law. At the end of 1944, Wesse
was informed of Berlin’s decision to order the killing of mentally ill adults in
the Waldniel men’s and women’s departments. By contrast with the procedure
in the children’s ward, no prior observation and expert review would be ob-
served with these killings, because this would unduly delay the process. Wesse
was assigned responsibility for euthanizing incurable patients in the women’s
department. She accepted the assignment, reasoning to herself that the pres-
sures of the war had forced Berlin to deviate from the cautious procedures
that governed euthanasia in the children’s ward. Another doctor segregated
the severest cases among the female patients and removed them to Wesse’s
children’s ward. She reviewed the patient records of these handicapped women
and decided to “put to sleep” thirty of them. Wesse carried out the killings of
these women herself with morphine injections. At her trial, she raised the
defense that she was motivated by pity to destroy these patients, and that she
never doubted their killing was in harmony with the wishes of the Berlin
authorities.
Apparently, the Göttingen court’s magnanimity toward the killers of dis-
abled patients was not unlimited, because it rejected Wesse’s argument and
held her criminally liable for the deaths of the thirty women. The critical
factor in distinguishing these killings from the euthanasia of the children was
their unregulated character. The killings were done on a summary basis, with-
out procedural safeguards in place to convey the appearance of ethical and
legal legitimacy. Had Wesse roused her conscience sufficiently—as was her
legal duty—she would have recognized the glaring illegality of these makeshift
orders. “If she had [exerted her conscience],” the court held, “then, with her
exceptional intelligence, she would have seen that something was not in or-
der—that entrusting a young assistant doctor [like herself] with deciding alone
about the euthanasia of mental patients is simply indefensible.” In other words,
she would have understood that any “law” that permitted such a haphazard
procedure “must have exceeded the limits of what is legally permissible.” Wesse
could have acted differently than she did; she could have expressed to the
Reich Committee, with whom she was on good terms, her refusal to partici-
pate in the anarchic destruction of patients. Because she failed to “exert her
conscience according to the measure of her intellectual powers to recognize
what is right and wrong,” she was criminally liable for these deaths.36
Despite this finding, the court refused to characterize her killings of these
women as murder under German law, inasmuch as the killings lacked the char-
acteristics of reprehensibility (base motives, maliciousness, and so forth). For
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this reason, she was convicted of manslaughter. In the sentencing phase of the
trial, the court considered mitigation appropriate because Wesse had been
medically trained in an era when “utilitarian considerations” undermined the
doctor-patient relationship. She was given a remarkably lenient jail term of six
months per patient killed, a sentence the court deemed “appropriate and suffi-
cient.” But even this disproportionate punishment was never carried out, be-
cause on December 27, 1954, the Göttingen court decreed the sentence null
and void.*
The Uchtspringe case represents with the verdict in Leu the floodtide in
the coddling of euthanasia defendants by West German courts. Leu, Wenzel,
and Wesse had all killed scores of patients, often with their own hands. If, as
Ulrich Herbert argues,37 the Christmas Amnesty of 1949 had sent a message to
the German population that the era of punishing Nazi crimes had ended, then
the wave of acquittals in the early 1950s culminating in the exoneration of the
child-murderers Leu, Wenzel, and Wesse must have been seen for what it
was—a sign of the refusal of West German courts to convict the murderers in
their midst.
The Cruel Month: The Warstein Case
T. S. Eliot may have thought April was the “cruelest month,” but from the
perspective of postwar justice that title better describes the month of Decem-
ber 1953, when three separate courts in three trials acquitted euthanasia de-
fendants. We have already discussed two of these cases. The third and final
case involved two doctors, a Dr. P. and a Dr. S., employed during the war in
the largest of the Westphalian mental hospitals, Warstein. Dr. P. became di-
rector of Warstein in July 1934; Dr. S. served as assistant doctor there begin-
ning in January 1931, rising to chief doctor in March of that year. In 1937, S.
also assumed the directorship of a ward created at Warstein by P. to accommo-
date mentally ill patients with tuberculosis. During the war, both men split
their professional lives between military service and work at Warstein.
Warstein was swept up into the killing operation in summer 1941, along
with the other Westphalian mental hospitals. From June 1941 to August 1941,
some 2,720 patients from these institutions were transferred to transit centers
in Hesse. Of this number, the Dortmund state court found that 1,227 patients
* Nullification of the sentence was carried out pursuant to the “Law for Exemption
from Punishment” (Straffreiheitsgesetz) of 1954, which exempted from punishment
cases of manslaughter punishable with a prison term of three years or less. The law
covered crimes committed between October 1, 1944, and July 31, 1945. See de
Mildt, In the Name of the People, 354n151.
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were subsequently sent to killing centers and gassed. Only 125 of the 2,720
transferees survived the transfer. The fate of the remaining 1,368 patients,
however, was unknown. Ten transports with 902 patients were transferred from
Warstein to the transit centers. It was proven that, from 1941 to 1944, 401 of
these patients died and 36 survived. What became of the other 465 could not
be ascertained at the time of the trial.
The transports from Warstein followed the same pattern that prevailed in
other home institutions throughout Germany. Registration forms were sent to
Dr. P. for distribution to his staff doctors, who filled them out on their pa-
tients and returned them to Berlin. Months later, transport lists from Berlin
arrived in P.’s office. The court was satisfied that both defendants were aware
of the purpose of the transports when they assembled their patients for trans-
fer. The indictment charged them with aiding and abetting murder and crimes
against humanity for their knowing participation in furthering these trans-
ports of patients designated for killing.38
The defendants’ odyssey through the German judicial system was one of
the most sinuous among the euthanasia cases. The trial in December 1953 was
the end of a long, snaking road of indictment, acquittal, appeal, and retrial,
involving not fewer than three separate trials (the first in October 1948) and
two appellate reviews and reversals. The number of conflicting verdicts and
counter-verdicts offers a poignant example of the “flipability” in post-1947
euthanasia judgments. The will to exonerate the defendants was present al-
ready in the 1948 trial, when the Schwurgericht of Münster acquitted P. and S.
on the ground of an extrastatutory necessity. By December 1953, thanks to the
German Supreme Court’s verdict of March 18, 1952,39 a new rationale had
emerged to support the defendants’ acquittal: the exertion of conscience doc-
trine. Although the Dortmund state court found that both men had know-
ingly promoted the crime of murder, it also found that neither was aware that
his actions were illegal. The court’s holding was grounded in an acceptance of
the defendants’ argument that they had participated in euthanasia only to save
as many of their patients as possible. By remaining in their posts and sabotag-
ing the program where they could, the defendants had rescued as many as 30
percent of their patients by striking their names from the transport lists, dis-
charging them from the hospital, or arranging their transfer to Catholic hos-
pitals not yet imperiled by the killing operation. Both defendants moreover
were devout Catholics without ideological ties to the Nazi Party. Clearly, they
had fully “exerted” their consciences and decided to “remotely collaborate”
with the euthanasia program in order to undermine it. Despite their conscien-
tious reflection, they had no awareness that their minimal promotion of the
killing program was illegal—quite to the contrary, they believed that outward
compliance with the program in order to save patients was legally required.
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The Dortmund court, unlike the earlier state courts that had acquitted P.
and S., did not hold that it was legal to sacrifice some patients in order to save
others. Rather, it held that the defendants were justified in believing their
contributions to the sacrifice of some patients were legally permitted. This was
because of the “moral turbulence” of German society under the Third Reich, a
time “when normal values had been overturned.” Legal authorities had dis-
agreed on the wrongfulness of sacrificing some in order to save others; thus, a
defendant could not be held accountable for conscientiously “arriving at an
erroneous decision,” about which even distinguished jurists could not agree.
This applied a fortiori to P. and S., who were “insufficiently prepared and
armed for the decision of such an extraordinarily difficult question of law and
conscience.” The court went on:
The measure of the required exertion of conscience depends on . . . the
life and professional background of the individual. The entire educa-
tional and professional training of the defendants—in their specializations
one-sidedly medical—were not oriented to communicate to a young
person sufficiently clear and unambiguous. . . . The defendants were
therefore, through no fault of their own, intellectually and spiritually
unequipped for an extraordinarily complicated situation. They lacked the
casuistic, ethical, and legal education for the correct solution. Insofar they
cannot be held criminally responsible for their erroneous decision.40
P. and S., in brief, had “exerted their conscience” to the maximum degree.
Nothing further could have been required of them.
The Sachsenberg, Uchtspringe, and Warstein cases—all decided in De-
cember 1953—inaugurated a subtle shift in the acquittal of euthanasia doc-
tors. The prior tendency to acquit them with recourse to a collision of duties
or extrastatutory necessity gave way by 1953 to acquittals based on “exertion of
conscience” (a form of mistake of law). The new emphasis on a defendant’s
capacity for moral reflection held sway in West German courts for the next
two decades.
Flipability and the Case of Dr. Sch.
One defendant who did not appear in the Warstein case of December 1953
was a doctor of law and Westphalian civil servant, Dr. Sch. He had been
indicted along with P. and S. in 1948 for aiding and abetting murder and
crimes against humanity, based on his participation with them in organizing
the Nazis’ euthanasia program in Westphalia. At the first trial in October
1948, he claimed he had no knowledge of the killing ordered by the authorities
and had therefore only unwittingly promoted the euthanasia program by for-
warding Berlin’s registration forms and transport lists to Westphalian mental
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institutions. The Schwurgericht in Münster agreed that no evidence existed to
prove his knowledge of the goals of the transports. At this same trial, Sch.’s
codefendants P. and S. had admitted to knowing of the lethal purpose behind
the transports but argued they had collaborated only to avoid greater harm to
their patients. Both were acquitted on the basis of an extrastatutory necessity.
In March 1949, the Supreme Court for the British Zone reversed the verdict
of the Münster Schwurgericht and remanded the case for retrial, noting the
contradictions in the findings of fact regarding Dr. Sch. On remand, in Au-
gust 1949 the Münster court convicted Dr. Sch. of aiding and abetting murder.
The German Supreme Court rejected his appeal of this verdict in November
1952. He thereafter filed a petition for amnesty, which effectively stayed ex-
ecution of the sentence against him.
In November 1954 he applied for a new trial, now arguing that, contrary
to his claims in earlier trials, he really had known all along about the euthana-
sia program but decided quietly to join the sabotage operation of other provin-
cial doctors. No doubt emboldened by the exertion of conscience cases, he
added that he had searched his conscience at the time and decided it was not
wrongful to sacrifice some patients in order to save others. His applications
were rejected in May 1955. He appealed this determination to the appellate
court in Hamm, which overturned the lower court’s rejection in May 1956,
thereby permitting a new trial. The case went forward on January 28, 1959.41
Ample evidence was available to rebut Dr. Sch.’s defense that he had acted
only in the best of faith to minimize the damage of the killing program. Unlike
his earlier codefendants, Dr. Sch. had failed to raise this defense until six years
after his first trial in 1948. Second, his political affiliations suggested that
Nazi functionaries had considered him a reliable party member to whom sen-
sitive party offices could be entrusted. Two witnesses testified during his trial
that he had always impressed them as a devout National Socialist. Despite the
shadow this evidence cast on Sch.’s defense, the Münster state court acquitted
him of aiding and abetting murder. (Crimes against humanity under Control
Council Law #10 ceased to be chargeable against defendants tried in West
German courts for Nazi crimes after August 31, 1951.) The court clearly felt
that he had “exerted his conscience” to the best of his ability, qualifying his
actions as the product of a mistake of law. Complicating Sch.’s ability to dis-
cern the wrongfulness of his conduct was the novelty of the situation he found
himself in—a situation for which his legal studies could not have prepared
him. “The situation here was completely new,” the court held. “Never before
in history had a state ordered the mass killings of innocent patients. . . .
Accordingly, the defendant could find no solution to the problem in his stud-
ies of legal literature.” The court found it meaningful in this context that Sch.
was “only of mediocre talent as a jurist.”42
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With his acquittal in 1959, Dr. Sch. could join the ranks of other Nazi
defendants scrubbed clean of moral and legal blemish for their willing partici-
pation in the Third Reich’s assault on humanity.
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PROSECUTION OF
NAZI EUTHANASIA POST-1953
German physicians and civil servants were not the only beneficiaries of the
judiciary’s lenient attitude toward euthanasia crimes. Since the late 1940s,
German courts had declared nursing staff involved in killing patients inno-
cent of criminal wrongdoing. Even before the “exertion of conscience” cases,
German courts had acquitted nurses with reference to the mistake of law doc-
trine, on the grounds that their lack of education rendered them incapable of
recognizing the illegality of their actions, or that the Führer order backing it
up had no legal effect.43 The same rationale was employed to acquit the nursing
staff of the Meseritz-Obrawalde institution, prosecuted in the Munich state
court in 1965. The court iterated the familiar language about the defendants’
intellectual and moral incapacity to understand that killing patients was ille-
gal. By virtue of this defect, they could not “exert their conscience” suffi-
ciently to adjudge the euthanasia program wrongful, especially because their
supervisor-doctors ordered it, a law was alleged to support it, and neither the
police nor the local prosecutors had intervened to stop it. The “fog of doubt”
enveloping their actions prevented any morally autonomous action.44
The trend toward acquitting euthanasia defendants based on an exertion
of conscience/mistake of law rationale would continue after 1965. In 1967, T-4
gassing technicians Heinrich Bunke, Aquilin Ulrich, and Klaus Endruweit
were acquitted because an “unavoidable mistake of law” clouded their “aware-
ness of the illegality of their actions.” Although the German Supreme Court
reversed their acquittal in 1970, the case on remand eventuated in yet another
miscarriage of justice: Bunke, Ulrich, and Endruweit were declared “unfit for
trial” on medical grounds, and a fourth T-4 doctor prosecuted with them, Kurt
Borm, was acquitted in 1972 by the Munich state court on a mistake of law
theory—a verdict upheld by the Supreme Court on appeal in 1974. As Willi
Dressen has observed, the decision in the Borm case contradicted the holdings
of earlier courts that no defendant could invoke his or her reliance on a law
repugnant to the “natural law.”45 Dressen’s statement is partially correct: the
Munich court’s verdict did clash with the holdings of earlier courts. That turn,
however, had occurred much earlier than 1972, as the exertion of conscience
cases of the early 1950s prove.
The German euthanasia trials demonstrate that the law can be a fragile
refuge for justice. A defining feature of criminal law is its role in reducing
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interpersonal violence between members of a social order. Rather than entrust
justice to private individuals and personal blood feuds, society vests the deter-
mination of guilt or innocence in a court system charged with applying the law
with fairness and impartiality. Legal “science,” not extrajuridical forces, is sup-
posed to govern a court’s deliberations. During the Third Reich, the homicide
laws had failed to arrest Germany’s descent into genocide and mass murder. In
the postwar era, law revealed itself again to be at the mercy of geopolitical,
ideological, and psychological forces. Whether using the language of extra-
statutory necessity, collision of duties, or exertion of conscience, West German
courtrooms after 1947 became a force field in which these vectors were given
free play. The upshot, as we have seen, was the acquittal or lenient treatment
of hundred- and thousandfold murderers.
Even the U.S. euthanasia trials were not immune to such forces. From the
beginning of their plans to try Nazi war criminals, the United States had
committed itself to the position that the crimes of euthanasia doctors (like
those of Nazi perpetrators generally) were bound up with the Nazis’ plot to
wage aggressive war. By killing patients, resources could be freed up to supply
the army in its campaign to Germanize the European continent. The United
States hewed to this interpretation for political reasons: if the euthanasia pro-
gram was disconnected from Nazi military aggression, a precedent would be set
for intervening in the domestic affairs of sovereign nations. The principle of
sovereignty was at the center of U.S. concern. Commitment to a war-centered
theory of genocide led the United States to construe Nazi euthanasia as an
outgrowth of Hitler’s boundless imperialism—a conception that relegated the
ideology of destroying “life unworthy of life” to a secondary role. By the late
1940s, as the horizon of the Cold War lowered over Europe, acquittals in both
U.S. and West German courts became more common. Although the law de-
manded the prosecution and punishment of war criminals, the will to acquit
won out. Once more, as it had during the war, the law had proven to be
deficient as a firewall against criminality and injustice.
Examination of the U.S. and West German euthanasia trials opens a win-
dow on the role of extralegal factors in criminal adjudication. The trials show
us how easily the law becomes the servant of power, and that power, rather
than exerting its influence from a position external to legal process, is in
reality deeply interfused with it. What legal positivists have for decades ascribed
to a realm extrinsic to law is, on the contrary, intrinsic to it. In the U.S. and
West German euthanasia cases, the ability of power to affect legal adjudication
was so pronounced that it inverted burdens of proof. For the United States,
the principle of assuming innocence until guilt is proven was overturned dur-
ing the Hadamar and medical trials. For U.S. officials, to sever the euthanasia
program from the conduct of the war had portentous longterm implications
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for U.S. sovereignty. Concerns with preserving national power induced U.S.
jurists to assume the guilt of euthanasia defendants as co-perpetrators with
Hitler of the crime of waging aggressive war. For the Germans, their presump-
tion of guilt with formal indictment was similarly inverted: they tended to
assume the innocence of euthanasia defendants (especially after 1947) and
sought ways to vindicate this presumption. With respect to the West Germans,
too, power considerations played a central role in this transposition. Seeking to
recoup a national sovereignty that had seemed irrecoverable in May 1945, by
the late 1940s West German authorities felt the need to close the book on
their criminal past. Psychological, political, and geopolitical needs made such
closure possible. Democratic, philosemitic, capitalist, and anti-Communist,
the new Federal Republic turned a fresh, unblemished countenance to the
Western allies, prepared to defend the West against the Soviet menace. Be-
hind that carefully rouged face lay the rot of a past that would prove in coming
years—and in defiance of all efforts to deal with it—to be unmasterable.

In November 1954 Dietrich Allers, a German jurist who had served
as the manager of T-4’s Central Office, sent a letter to his former
colleague and fellow jurist Reinhold Vorberg, the one-time director
of Office IIc of the KdF. Sanguine about the changed fortunes of T-4
perpetrators in the years since the end of the war, Allers wrote:
Take a look around and think back to the time around 1947.
At that time, all of us envisioned a miserable personal future
for ourselves. Today most of us have again become something,
and it is my opinion that we should not demand too much.
Certainly quite a few people who held totally different
positions [before] have landed well on their feet.1
Allers may have spoken too soon: in December 1968 he and Vorberg
were convicted of complicity in the deaths of 70,273 mentally ill
patients during the war. Vorberg was sentenced to a ten-year jail
term, Allers to eight years. (They were credited with time already
served during preventive detention and freed without spending a
day in jail.) Their subsequent conviction notwithstanding, Allers’s
rosy assessment of the improved situation of euthanasia killers after
CONCLUSION
In the end it is the mystery that lasts and not the explanation.
—SACHEVERELL SITWELL, “FOR WANT OF THE GOLDEN CITY”
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1947 was an accurate one. Our study of the verdicts from the U.S. and West
German euthanasia trials confirms his perspective on postwar justice in the
Federal Republic. It suggests the following periodization: a brief two-year in-
terval between 1945 and 1947 characterized by convictions of euthanasia de-
fendants as perpetrators of murder or crimes against humanity, and an extended
period after 1947 characterized by the lenient treatment of these defendants,
including mild sentences, acquittals, and, in the event of conviction, their
portrayal as accomplices rather than perpetrators.
In the German trials, the precedent of the Bathtub Case was applied with
greater frequency after 1947 to reduce the defendants’ wrongdoing from perpe-
tration to complicity. Relatively new defenses, such as extrastatutory necessity
and collision of duties, were adopted to acquit participants in the euthanasia
program. By the early 1950s, in the wake of a German Supreme Court decision
on the mistake of law doctrine, German courts employed a different theory to
exculpate euthanasia defendants—the exertion of conscience defense. None
of the facts in the cases we examined compelled West German courts to accept
any these defenses. Just as easily, the courts could have rejected the proffered
defenses as insufficient to justify participation in a program to kill the men-
tally disabled. Not value-free legal science but political, social, and cultural
forces were at work in these trials, shaping, forming, and often distorting the
courts’ verdicts.
The adjudication of euthanasia criminality in the postwar years was a sub-
set of a larger confrontation with the manifold crimes of National Socialism.
Like Nazi criminal trials generally, the euthanasia cases were instrumentalized
after 1947 to enable the West German state to achieve full sovereignty. In
short, they became an important fourth pillar of what Norbert Frei has termed
West Germany’s “policy toward the past,” which Frei described as consisting of
(1) amnestying Nazi perpetrators, (2) integrating them into the new Federal Re-
public, and (3) “normatively demarcating” West Germany from anti-democratic
movements on the right and the left. To this trinity of factors can be added
judicial lenience toward German professionals like the doctors, nurses, and
bureaucrats examined in this study. Many of the individuals we have discussed
returned after their trials to a medical practice or the civil service where they
became unobjectionable professionals of the Federal Republic. Whether through
liquidating trials, acquitting the defendants, or mitigating their punishment,
the West German judiciary contributed to the Federal Republic’s quest for
national power by facilitating the reintegration of compromised elites into
postwar German society.
The Cold War was a boon to this quest for German sovereignty. The
defense of Western Europe required a democratic West Germany securely
moored to the United States as a counterweight to the Soviet bloc. With the
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proclamation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, the United States made clear
its intention to oppose with “counterforce” the USSR throughout the world—
an intention that signified U.S. commitment to establishing West Germany
as a member in good standing of the Atlantic alliance. By 1950 the United
States was seeking support in Europe for a European Defense Community, to
which a rearmed West Germany would contribute troops. The West Germans
were in a position to bargain, and they did not hesitate to use it to their
advantage. As we have seen, the nascent Cold War created the opportunity for
the Federal Republic’s leaders to offer the West a quid pro quo: recovery of
sovereignty, which included quashing legal proceedings against Nazi war crimi-
nals, in exchange for West Germany’s participation in the anti-Soviet alli-
ance. In the Bundestag debates about German rearmament preceding the Gen-
eral Treaty of May 1952, the sentiments of a majority of the delegates were
forcefully expressed in a resolution, setting forth demands “that those Ger-
mans charged with war crimes and either already convicted by Allied courts or
still held without a verdict be released, so long as what is at issue is not a crime
as the word is ordinarily understood, that is, for which a single individual is
responsible. An objective examination of the individual cases must follow
without delay.”2 Such demands were in keeping with the German chancellor’s
view that only the “real criminals” of the Nazi regime should be punished,
while soldiers and others who merely discharged their duty—those who did
not commit “a crime as the word is ordinarily understood,” to quote the
Bundestag resolution—would suffer no legal prejudice. In this manner, the geo-
political realities of the Cold War became the occasion for an internal repres-
sion of Germany’s recent past, an act of forgetting driven by the desire to
rekindle national power.
The quest for renewed sovereignty, anchored in a policy of amnesty, inte-
gration, normative demarcation, and liquidation of continued trials of Nazi
perpetrators, serviced profound psychological needs in the immediate postwar
era. It both palliated the sting of a calamitous military defeat and nurtured a
tottering sense of hope for Germany’s survival as a sovereign country. Perhaps
for this reason, the course charted by the Federal Republic received broad
support within the German population, from lawyers like the Heidelberg Circle,
journalists, church leaders, fugitives from the East, and small parties in the
Bundestag (e.g., the Free Democratic Party [FDP] and the German Party) to
representatives of major political parties like the CDU and Social Democrats,
who felt growing popular pressure to bring to an end the era of Nazi war crimes
trials. Such an end would not only certify the Federal Republic of Germany to
the world as a nation ready to assume its role in the coalition against “totali-
tarianism”; it would also deflect the gaze of social control from the crimes of
German elites in a society still characterized by the paradigm of a shame culture.3
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National self-esteem was at stake should the trials continue and German elites
be punished. The euthanasia trials were deeply entangled in this political,
geopolitical, and psychological maelstrom.
If power lay at the root of West Germany’s suppression of further trials,
considerations of national sovereignty also affected the prosecution of Nazi
euthanasia defendants in U.S. military courts. Even before the end of the war,
the United States discussed the possibility of making conspiracy the center-
piece of postwar trials of Nazi war criminals. Faithful to the originators of the
conspiracy theory, the U.S. drafters of the London Charter regarded all crimes
leveled against the major war criminals—crimes against peace, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity—as outgrowths of the Nazis’ conspiracy to wage ag-
gressive war against the countries of Europe. On this theory, Nazi criminality
was a byproduct of the plan to bring Europe under the heel of German domin-
ion. Euthanasia emerged as a scheme to transfer resources from “useless eaters”
to German soldiers in order to fortify them in their conquests. The theory of
conspiracy enabled U.S. prosecutors to charge their defendants as perpetrators
rather than as accomplices. By contrast, West German courts did not regard
euthanasia as driven by the engine of a conspiracy to wage aggressive war.
Instead, particularly from 1945 until 1947, they focused on their defendants’
actual contributions to the euthanasia program, guided by the principle of
individual culpability. At no time did German triers of fact impute criminal
liability vicariously to an accused. This was a considerable advantage for the
defendants, one that, when reinforced by the society-wide aspiration to free
Germany from the incubus of its Nazi past, tended toward mild punishments
and acquittals.
Differences in approach to euthanasia criminality—the United States guided
by conspiracy, the Germans by individual culpability—did not stop here. The
U.S. view of its jurisdictional rights over Nazi defendants also differed from
the German conception. For the United States, the Third Reich’s violation of
the traditional Laws of War created the jurisdictional basis for both the IMT
and the U.S. NMT. I have repeatedly emphasized that the Anglo-American
jurists were not particularly concerned with the ex post facto question. In
response to objections about the retroactive effect of prosecuting Nazi war
criminals, the Anglo-Americans replied either that no ex post facto problem
existed, because the defendants were charged with violating internationally
recognized principles of law; or, in the alternative, that the need to punish
these terrible crimes outweighed the principles of legality (e.g., the ban on
retroactive punishment). By contrast, German courts were more sensitive to
the principles of legality, chiefly because they formed the backbone of the
continental tradition of law. From the end of the war until the early 1950s,
German courts neutralized the ex post facto problem by insisting on their
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defendants’ ability to grasp the wrongfulness of Nazi euthanasia based on an
intuitive perception of natural law. The principle of abstaining from the mur-
der of innocents might have been suspended by the criminal orders of the Nazi
state, but it was still codified in the universal law of nature, to which all
rational beings had access. By 1953, this revival of natural law was tacitly
overruled as West German courts began to express doubts about the ability of
euthanasia defendants to comprehend the wrongfulness of their actions. Hence-
forth, all that would matter was whether defendants had in good faith roused
their consciences in an effort to understand the moral quality of their contem-
plated acts.
The changes in the administration of justice described above were far from
a mechanical application of neutral legal principles. Rather, they were to a
significant degree the products of extralegal factors, chief among them the
craving for restored sovereignty. The potency of extra-juridical forces was such
that it inverted burden of proof standards in both sets of national trials. The
geopolitical need to link euthanasia with the plan to wage aggressive war led
the United States to presume the euthanasia defendants guilty; the West Ger-
mans’ need to recover their sovereignty and forget their traumatic past led
them to presume their defendants innocent.
The conclusions yielded in this study contradict Robert Jackson’s opti-
mistic assertion at Nuremberg that the IMT would be “an independent agency
responsible only to the law.” Jackson’s hopeful statement sums up the aspira-
tional core of Anglo-American principles of due process and the rule of law.
In reality, the law in the trials we have examined was captive to the political
needs (real or perceived) of the United States and West Germany in the
postwar era. We should hardly be shocked by the degree to which power poli-
tics affected Nazi trials beginning in 1945. The United States has long been
allergic to international organizations that might, however remotely, erode its
sovereignty: subversion of Turkish war crimes trial proposals after World War
I, the refusal of the U.S. Senate to join the League of Nations in 1919, refusal
to ratify the 1948 U.N. Convention on Genocide until 1986, and recent
opposition to the International Criminal Court are all examples of U.S. his-
torical distrust of international bodies. In view of this history, we should not
puzzle over U.S. insistence on knitting together all aspects of Nazi criminal-
ity (especially euthanasia) under a grand theory of conspiracy to wage aggres-
sive war—even if such a theory obscured the actual misdeeds of Nazi doctors
or distorted history on behalf of realpolitik. As for West Germany’s judicial
confrontation with its criminal past, it is hardly surprising that a nation ac-
cused of participating in the murder of millions would flinch when examining
its recent forays into genocide with the probing eye of the criminal law—
particularly when the recollection of these events was still painfully fresh. To
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expect a disinterested pursuit of justice in such circumstances may be to expect
too much.
It is of course tempting to blame the West Germans for failing to impose
punishment on the likes of Leu, Recktenwald, and Wenzel commensurate with
their abhorrent crimes. In any moral analysis, however, condemnation is jus-
tified only if the actor could have acted differently but consciously chose an
unethical path. Norbert Frei makes a powerful case that a more searching
confrontation with perpetrators of Nazi crimes after the war might have jeop-
ardized West Germany’s reinvention as a democratic, pro-Western state. Con-
tinued engagement with war crimes investigations was unpopular among the
German populace. Facing popular pressure, and harried by far-right extremists
who waved the bloody shirt of war crimes trials in a bid to win votes, the
CDU-CSU and SPD had little room for maneuver. The Federal Republic’s
“policy toward the past” was an expedient strategy to placate the West German
people, secure votes for the mainstream parties, and fend off the threat posed
by extremists within the FDP and the German Party. Any other approach may
have driven the German electorate to turn to authoritarian “alternatives.”4
In a review of Frei’s book, Jeffrey Herf takes issue with his defense of West
Germany’s policy toward the past. For Herf, Frei’s evidence does not support
the claim “that democratization had to arrive in precisely this way.” Rather,
a more intensive judicial investigation of the crimes of National Socialism
may have not only strengthened democracy within the Federal Republic,
but would have tapped the vibrant memories of eyewitnesses to ensure maxi-
mum prosecution and punishment of Nazi offenders. In the end, Herf con-
cludes, “a different path to democracy . . . was conceivable”—a path that, far
from skirting war crimes trials, would have plunged the Germans into their
very heart.5 Herf’s critique proceeds from the aspirational core of war crimes
trial theory, the notion articulated by Robert Jackson that the pure pursuit of
justice should guide society’s treatment of heinous criminality. Given the ac-
tual constraints facing political leaders like Konrad Adenauer in postwar West
Germany, however, the liquidation of war crimes trials may have seemed the
only tenable solution at the time to stabilize German democracy, particularly
with radicals in the wings poised to exploit the war criminal issue for their
electoral advantage.
The behavior of other actors in Germany’s war crimes drama, on the other
hand, is more culpable. Members of the amnesty lobby—churchmen, lawyers
within the Heidelberg Circle, ex-soldiers, journalists, and many others—were
less concerned with placing the new German democracy on secure footing
than in avoiding the evocation of a painful and incriminating national dis-
grace. Yet, even with respect to these groups, our moral condemnation should
be tempered by the awareness that resistance to publicizing atrocities commit-
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ted in the name of the nation-state is not a peculiarly German phenomenon.
The “imagined communities” conjured by the nationalist imagination breed
an imaginary self-esteem that rises or falls with the fortunes of the state. The
glorious deeds of the nation infuse the citizens with pride; the infamous crimes
of the nation diminish that self-esteem, provoking demoralization or denial of
terrible truths. When the most visible source of national pride, full sover-
eignty, is involved, and when recovery of sovereign power intersects with the
yearning of millions to repress the memory of past crimes in which many had
participated, an honest confrontation with the nation’s history is, at best,
unlikely. This is true for any country, be it capitalist or communist, a dictator-
ship or democracy.
“That four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury, stay
the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the
judgment of the law is one of the most significant tributes that Power has ever
paid to Reason,” Robert Jackson famously averred in his opening statement
before the Nuremberg IMT. To a degree, Jackson was assuredly correct. Con-
trary to Soviet (and even British) proposals to shoot Nazi war criminals in a
massive auto-da-fé after the war, the Big Four subjected the major war crimi-
nals to a legitimate, litigated trial, complete with defense counsel and the
opportunity to call and cross-examine witnesses. What Jackson did not see
when he uttered these words was that Power would have its revenge on Reason
in the years between 1945 and 1953. Ultimately, our expectations that pros-
ecution of human rights offenders can be, in Jackson’s words, “responsible only
to the law” may be excessive, as the history recounted in this study shows.

A considerable amount of history has been covered in these pages. We have
traced the rise of negative eugenics in Germany during the scarifying years of
the Weimar Republic, culminating in the rise to power of a political party that
located negative eugenics at the center of its ideology. We have seen how
negative eugenics led to the Nazi euthanasia program in 1939, and we have
witnessed the process whereby euthanasia became both precedent and training
ground for the extermination of entire ethnic groups, particularly the Euro-
pean Jews. We have studied U.S. and West German judicial responses to eu-
thanasia criminality—responses that were conditioned by both the need to
punish appalling forms of criminality and to preserve (United States) or re-
cover (West Germany) national sovereignty.
In closing, I would like to consider briefly some additional conclusions
that might be gleaned from the trial records we have considered. Because of
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the traumatic character of Nazi genocide and the complexity of judicial en-
counters with it, the crime and its punishment naturally invite a broad sum-
ming up—an effort to find some nugget of wisdom in an event so terrible
and a suffering so vast. What remains of this woeful history for us today?
How might we appropriate the significance of Nazi crimes and their pun-
ishment in our contemporary world? I would like to ponder two important
lessons suggested by the trial materials: the first related to the nature of
prosecuting state-sponsored crimes, the second to the nature of the crimes
themselves.
First, in examining the historical prologue to the IMT and U.S. NMT, we
saw that legal niceties like the ban on ex post facto prosecutions evaporated in
the face of Nazi crimes. Questions of jurisdiction and retroactivity were subor-
dinated to the need to punish these enormities. Although the Martens Clause
had opened the door to criminalizing acts not specifically condemned by the
1907 Hague convention (“until a more complete code . . . has been issued, . . .
belligerents remain under the . . . law of nations”), no international instru-
ment had proscribed crimes against humanity until the London Charter in
1945. In the years since the Nuremberg trials, international law has condemned
with exquisite particularity the kinds of excesses perpetrated by the Nazis: the
U.N. Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide (1948), the four Geneva conventions for the Protection of War Victims
(1949), the Helsinki Accords (1975), and the Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (1977) all seek to criminalize Nazi-style assaults on civilian
populations. Enhanced linguistic specificity, however, does not mean that cur-
rent international statutes will cover all future acts of global violence, given
the human imagination’s endless fecundity in devising new methods of torture
and mass death. If we someday face a situation similar to that confronting the
Allies in 1945, the will to punish can be expected to outweigh formalistic
concerns about retroactivity and due process.
Second, a crucial factor in a criminal regime’s ability to transvalue the
morality of a civil population is time laden with intense experience. Most of
the perpetrators in this study retained their awareness that killing innocent
people was wrongful at some level, be it legal or moral. In some cases (regret-
tably few in number), doctors approached about collaborating in the euthana-
sia program refused to participate. When Ludwig Sprauer informed the direc-
tor of the Illenau institution, a Dr. R., about the program in December 1939,
R. flatly rejected Sprauer’s invitation to collaborate with it. Thereafter, Dr. R.
vainly tried to organize a resistance among other Baden directors against Sprauer
before taking a three-month “vacation.” On his return, he continued to joust
with Sprauer over exempting Illenau from the euthanasia program. Sprauer
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not only refused to grant this exemption, but demanded that R. prepare a list
of sixty patients for transport to the transit center of Reichenau. His efforts to
oppose the program thwarted, R. retired a few months later.6 Other directors
of Baden institutions opposed attempts to transport patients from their facili-
ties to the killing center at Grafeneck. The examples of Dr. R. and the Baden
directors prove that not all German physicians had abandoned devotion to
the welfare of their patients.
Why was this so? The Nazi Party was only in power twelve years—long
enough to affect the moral landscape in Germany, but not long enough to
effect a complete “transvaluation” of German mores. Yet, the Nazis were re-
markably efficient in investing this brief window of opportunity for indoctri-
nation with maximum propaganda effect. The time available to them, in other
words, was laden with the experience of the National Socialist thought world.
Despite the brevity of the regime’s existence, evidence of an incipient trans-
valuation does exist, particularly within the indoctrinated party cells of the
SS, Gestapo, and Security Services. Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, during the war a
Wehrmacht officer serving in eastern Europe, had occasion to observe the com-
bat units of the SS. He was struck by the fact that these SS soldiers neglected
the recovery and care of their wounded comrades, an attitude that contra-
dicted the duty to care for the war-wounded within the German army. The
stormtroopers had internalized the Nazi Party’s ethic of the total expendibility
of the individual—a transvaluation of values the Nazis had effected in less
than a decade. In the field of Nazi medicine, German bioethicist Eckhard
Herych relates the story of his now deceased godmother, who was educated at
the chief medical training center for SS doctors, the Würzburg College of
Medicine. Throughout most of her postwar career, she was able to dissemble
her attitudes toward the mentally disabled. At the end of her life, however,
the onset of senile dementia made it increasingly difficult to hide her feelings.
On one occasion, as she was walking with Herych through the crowded streets
of a German city, she encountered a handicapped person in a wheelchair, about
whom she quipped: “We would know what to do with him back then.”7 The
menace in this remark is unmistakable: she was clearly referring to the Nazi
euthanasia program. If the Nazis could transform the moral consciousness of
the party’s ideological vanguards within twelve years, what might they have
achieved with more time?
The baneful genius of National Socialism was to mobilize tens of thou-
sands of ordinary citizens to engage in acts of almost inconceivable violence.
Its success was partly the result of the insinuation of National Socialist values
into the moral resources of common people. By exploiting negative attitudes
toward minority groups like the mentally disabled, Jews, and others, the Nazis
“miked” the internal auditoria of their accomplices, making them receptive to
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the criminal messages of party ideology. The voices of conventional morality,
however, were never entirely silenced; many of the perpetrators retained a
clear understanding that Nazi violence was both illegal and immoral.
These aspects of Nazi criminality—the mundaneness of the killers and
their unremarkable vulnerability to the commands and enticements of a geno-
cidal system of authority—suggest that the evil done by the National Social-
ists was not interred with their bones. The words of the late Fritz Bauer, a
judicial activist in the prosecution of Nazi criminals in West Germany until
his death in 1969, reach us over the ruin of decades with a disturbing hint of
prophecy: “It appears certain to me that nothing belongs to the past, every-
thing is still present and can become future.”
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